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ABSTRACT 
 
The changed legislative landscape of the 2008 Companies Act required a 
rebalancing of the agency relationship between the board of directors and 
shareholders given the more onerous statutory oversight and accountability 
requirements. This study investigates the relationship between the board and firm 
value of 84 companies on the SRI index between 2012 and 2014, separating the 
governance role of the board into their corporate control and managerial labour 
roles using uniquely constructed indexes. Fixed effects with generalised least 
squares estimations were used to assess the relationship between the corporate 
control and managerial labour of the board and various proxies for firm value. As 
board level controls need time to filter through to firm value the study also 
considered a negatively lagged relationship to firm value. The study expands on the 
practice of constructing indexes in governance studies by constructing two control 
indexes to measure quality assurance and company control indicators as well as the 
control index (CI) representing the corporate control role of the board and the 
managerial labour index (MLI) representing the managerial labour role of the 
board. The results show that both the CI and MLI indexes are positively associated 
to return on assets a performance measure controlled by the board but negatively 
related to next year’s return on assets, suggesting a short-term focus of the board’s 
governance role of a time-horizon problem. However, the CI and MLI indexes are 
positively associated to enterprise value and next year’s enterprise value indicating 
that the more dispersed shareholders in the market value the governance role the 
board as an alternative to shareholder monitoring. The association between MLI 
and Tobin’s Q and next year’s Tobin’s Q is small but negative. The latter can be 
attributed to the increased statutory responsibility of shareholders regarding board 
remuneration, and an upward pressure on director’s remuneration to compensate 
board members for their increased liability risk. A more in-depth study on the root 
cause of the changed association between return on assets and next year’s return on 
assets is an area of future research. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The curator’s report on African Bank Limited found, among other things, that the business of the 
bank was not conducted with the intent to defraud but negligently, and that board members 
“allowed themselves to be dominated” by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). 
(Myburgh Report, 2016:476). 
 
1.1 Introduction to the study 
 
The above quotation from the Myburg report highlights the importance of the 
board of directors (board) as board-level control failure can threaten the existence 
of a company. The purpose of this study is to address the knowledge gap with 
respect to the relationship between the board as a governance mechanism and firm 
value, that has arisen due to the introduction of the 2008 Companies Act (with its 
more stringent regulatory environment), from an agency theory perspective. The 
changed legislative environment would require a repositioning of the agency 
relationship between the board and the shareholders as the legislative changes 
placed more approval decisions in the hands of shareholders while increasing the 
bonding of the board. The board is an internal governance mechanism, as it is the 
expert board that acts as the ultimate controller and direction-giver in a company 
(Fama, 1980:294). This statement of Fama highlights the controlling and directional 
role of the board. Thus, the board is the ultimate level of control in a company, 
where control is seen not merely as the oversight of activities to prevent abuses but 
also the oversight and direction of the activities and labour of the board towards 
improved firm value.  
 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge on board-level controls by 
positioning the controlling role of the board in the corporate control construct with 
directional control in the managerial labour construct. Bathala and Rao (1995:95) 
support the importance of board-level controls by noting that the board is “the most 
important of the organizational controls”. The focus on the board as a governance 
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mechanism is a control-orientated focus that centres on the controlling “tone at the 
top”1. A control focus is important as the board is seen as an alternative monitoring 
mechanism to shareholders (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010:943). Using a control 
focus positions this study in the assurance realm as governance controls are 
important for both internal2 and external auditors. The assessment of the overall 
control environment (Gray & Manson, 2005:232-233) that stem from the ‘tone at 
the top’ influences the nature and extent of assurance services. Assurance services 
are influenced by the control environment as controls influences control risks, a 
component of assurance risk. 
 
The main research objective (RO) of this study is to assess the relationship 
between the board as a governance mechanism (using corporate control and 
managerial labour) and firm value. This assessment is done within the context of 
the 2008 Companies Act’s legislative environment, using an agency theory 
perspective or lens. Section 30(2A) exempts companies where the shareholders are 
also the directors (with no separation between ownership by the shareholders and 
control by the board) from the requirement of an annual external audit (RSA, 
2008a)3. The Companies Act also legislates a statutory audit and social and ethics 
committee for larger companies and public companies. Together the legislative 
requirements emphasise the need for additional oversight in situations where there 
is a division of duties between the shareholders and the board.  
 
Two sub-objectives flow from the RO. Sub-objective 1 (SO 1) is to develop 
an index of control indicators (CI) to measure the level of corporate control of the 
board. Sub-objective 2 (SO 2) is to develop an index of managerial labour 
indicators (MLI) to measure the level of managerial labour of the board. Together 
the level of corporate control and managerial labour controls measured allow the 
study to assess the relationship between the board as a governance mechanism (CI 
and MLI) and firm value. It is important to highlight that studying the board as a 
                                                 
1 Tone at the top refers to the board’s responsibility to lead by example by establishing the right tone 
at the top to highlight the importance of the overall internal control environment. 
2 The focus for internal auditors is on the evaluation of the organisation’s operational, risk 
management, internal control and governance processes (IIASA, [S.a.]). 
3 RSA refers to the Republic of South Africa. 
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governance mechanism is a small sub-section (Gill, Vijay & Jha, 2009:7; Yarram, 
2015:163) within the umbrella of the broader corporate governance field and should 
not be interpreted as being synonymous with corporate governance.4 This study 
uses descriptive research presented by means of a narrative argument to motivate 
the measures used to assess the relationship between the board as a governance 
mechanism (CI and MLI) and firm value (Dudovskiy, 2013:36). It is not a causal 
study. 
 
The study focuses on the boards of South African companies on the Socially 
Responsible Investment (SRI) index as a population5. The SRI index companies are 
large companies that use transparent disclosure practices to retain their position on 
the index. This study argues that shareholders are the primary group holding the 
board responsible and accountable resulting in an agency relationship between the 
board and the shareholders. Given the large size of the SRI companies, separation 
between the shareholders and board is more likely, enabling an agency theory lens. 
The study is based on a near population size sample6 of 84 boards of companies on 
the SRI index over a three-year period, resulting in 252 firm-year observations. The 
use of both cross-sectional and time series data enables this study to use balanced 
panel data7 to assess the relationship between the board as a governance mechanism 
(CI and MLI) and firm value. Details on the research methodology used are 
described in chapter 6. 
 
                                                 
4 Corporate governance has emerged as a discipline associated with various subject areas from 
management, ethics to accountancy, with no accepted definition (Ntim, 2009:30). This study focuses 
on the board as a governance mechanism using corporate control and managerial labour to control 
and direct the activities and labour of the board in relation to firm value. The control focus of the 
study is aligned with the use of controls in the broader field of assurance or auditing. The broader 
field of auditing commonly uses narrative descriptions, as is evidenced by the audit report, whereas 
the accounting finance disciplines tend to prefer using numbers, as is evidenced by quantitative focus 
in annual financial statements. 
5 The market capitalisation of the companies on the SRI index was 82% of the JSE All Share index 
in 2012. 
6 The sample is discussed in detail in section 6.6 and the list of SRI companies is summarised in 
Appendix 2 for ease of reference. 
7 Panel data can be assessed using advance econometric methods that consider the cross-sectional 
and time series nature of the data and require a balanced panel that includes data from the same 
boards of companies for all the time periods. 
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The timing of the study coincides with a more stringent regulatory 
environment applicable to South African companies and boards at the beginning of 
the second decade of the 21st century, specifically in the years 2012 to 2014. The 
stricter requirements of the “new” Companies Act, No. 71 of 2008 limit the control 
options of the board due to increased bonding (RSA, 2008a). Bonding is the term 
used when mechanisms such as legislation or contracts are used to limit the actions 
of a person. The 2008 Companies Act includes sections aimed at improving 
transparency, accountability and the integrity of companies (sections 23-34 and 
Chapter 3), and sections on the governance of companies that include the 
responsibilities of directors (sections 57-78) (RSA, 2008a). The Act therefore bonds 
the options of the board and specifies directors’ liability (RSA, 2008a: section 77).8 
Some sections place greater approval responsibilities on shareholders for example, 
the approval of directors’ remuneration as directors and the appointment of an audit 
committee (RSA, 2008a: sections 66, 68 & 94).  
 
Prior studies highlighted the value of the board as a governance mechanism 
by describing it as a primary governance mechanism (Wijethilake, Ekanayake & 
Perera, 2015:250-251). Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010:58) explain that the 
complexity of the composition combined with the difficulty of observing the actions 
of boards are interlinked, which complicates a study of boards. The latter explain 
why, despite the extant literature on CEOs or corporate governance, there are few 
in-depth studies on the board, especially in South Africa.9 Prior South African 
research on corporate governance is summarised in Appendix 10 as studies related 
to corporate governance can include subsections on board-related controls. 
 
This thesis proposes that the more regulated environment in which the board 
as a governance mechanism controls the activities of a company results in increased 
monitoring and bonding to reduce goal divergence and maximise firm value. Board-
                                                 
8 It is not the goal of this study to assess the effectiveness of the new Companies Act even though 
econometric methods are often used to assess the impact of policies over time. The focus of this 
study is on the relationship between the board as a governance mechanism and firm value, given the 
more regulated environment of the 2008 Companies Act. The period of the study is discussed in 
more detail in section 6.6.1. 
9 More information on prior board-related South African studies is summarised in chapter 2. 
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level controls are used to align the interests of the board with those of the 
shareholders to whom the board reports annually via the annual integrated report 
and at the annual general meeting (AGM). The use of controls for goal alignment 
is in line with the internal control mechanisms described by Walsh and Seward 
(1990:423). Board-level controls include separation of duties, monitoring or 
oversight and alignment of their remuneration with their board roles. The board as 
specialist managers can be broken down into two broad specialisations, namely 
expert monitoring (Wang, Xie & Zhu, 2015:930) by non-executive directors, 
including independent directors, and specialist management by executive directors 
(Steyn & Stainbank, 2013:319). The two levels of specialisation create separation 
of duties with monitoring or oversight which is in line with the division of labour 
described by Fama (1980:289-292). The levels of specialisation are specifically 
considered in the development of the CI and MLI indexes. 
 
To recap, the main research objective or RO of this study is: 
RO - to assess the relationship between the board as a governance 
mechanism (CI and MLI) and firm value.  
The objectives of the study are assessed within the context of the legislative 
environment of the 2008 Companies Act, using an agency theory lens. The main 
RO led to the following two sub-objectives: 
SO 1 – to develop a CI index to measure the level of corporate 
control of the board. 
 
SO 2 – to develop a MLI index to measure the level of managerial 
labour of the board. 
 
To achieve SO 1 the study aims to develop a CI index to measure the level of 
the board’s corporate control (in line with the seminal work on index building by 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001)). To achieve SO 2 the study aims to develop a 
MLI index to measure the level of managerial labour of the board (also in line with 
Gompers et al. (2001)). In turn, the sub-objectives suggested two sub-hypotheses 
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(SH) that would support the main hypothesis in achieving the study’s main 
objective and purpose.  
SH 1 – There is a positive relationship between the CI index that 
measures the level of the board’s corporate control and firm value.  
 
SH 2 – There is a positive relationship between the MLI index that 
measures the level of the board’s managerial labour and firm 
value. 
 
As the board as a governance mechanism is represented by corporate control 
and managerial labour controls, the sub-hypotheses lead to the main objective, 
namely to assess the relationship between the board as a governance mechanism 
(CI and MLI) and firm value. The main objective can be expressed as a hypothesis: 
 
H 1 – There is a positive relationship between the board as a 
governance mechanism (CI and MLI) and firm value.  
 
Prior South African corporate governance studies have shown a positive link 
between corporate governance mechanisms and firm value (Abdo & Fisher, 2007; 
Ntim, 2009; Kolobe, 2010). However, some studies produced mixed results, 
depending on the proxy used for firm value (Mans-Kemp, 2014; Ashwin, 2015; 
Tshipa, 2017). Because the board as a governance mechanism is merely a 
subsection of the broader corporate governance field, the board was mostly treated 
as a subsection in the above studies. Tshipa (2017:205) is the exception as his 
corporate governance study used board size, independence, committees, diversity, 
activity and CEO duality as the six independent variables. Given the mixed prior 
South African findings on corporate governance coupled with the stricter legislative 
environment, a more in-depth study on the board’s relationship with firm value is 
warranted. The literature on in-depth South African studies on boards as a 
governance mechanism is sparse; board focused studies generally use limited 
board-related variables (refer to the summary in section 2.3.2.3 on prior South 
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African board-related research), which supports the need for more in-depth 
research, especially given the changed legislative environment.  
 
Through the enhanced governance requirements that ensue from King III 
(IoDSA, 2009a; IoDSA, 2009b) and the 2008 Companies Act (RSA, 2008a), the 
regulatory environment as an external governance mechanism influences the 
control options of the board as an internal governance mechanism. The legislative 
and regulatory changes have resulted in a knowledge gap regarding the relationship 
between the control mechanisms used by the board and firm value. This relationship 
has not been evaluated in the context of the more stringent regulatory 
developmental environment while taking the corporate control and managerial 
labour constructs into account. Thus, the research problem can be worded as the 
following question: 
 
What is the relation between the controlling (CI) and directing 
(MLI) role of the board as a governance mechanism and firm value 
in a more regulated developmental environment? 
 
The motivation for this study, including the knowledge gap, is discussed in 
more detail in section 1.3, while the expected contribution is discussed in more 
detail in section 1.4. The next section briefly describes the background to the 
research. 
 
1.2 Background to the research 
 
In the early 1990s, political reform freed the South African economy from 
isolation and ushered in an era of rapid change, with trade liberalisation and 
international investors opening up opportunities and challenges (Malherbe & Segal, 
2001:3). In this environment of rapid political reform coupled with a newly opened 
competitive global market, the need to establish more formal corporate governance 
practices in South Africa was identified as a means of enhancing competitiveness. 
Afshan, Chhetri and Pradhan (2011:82) note that although access to a global market 
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increases access to resources, it also increases competition as multinationals enter 
the local market. To regulate competitiveness, South Africa has been developing 
corporate governance guidelines since 1992. These guidelines were initially aimed 
at the private sector and highlighted the “importance of a properly functioning 
board as a key ingredient” (Armstrong, Segal & Davis, 2005:9).  
 
It is possible that companies with unmanaged agency problems can benefit 
from following good governance guidance as it can help to reduce slacking and 
wasteful behaviour. However, as the agency problem is addressed over time the 
initial benefits could decrease as goal alignment is achieved. In the latter case 
additional regulatory controls could be costly. Zhang (2007:110) found statistically 
significant negative abnormal returns linked to Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) events. 
Thus, increased legislative bonding could be costly in situations where goal 
alignment has already been established. 
 
Improved governance is a valid strategy as new governance practices can be 
used to help companies improve their control to make them more competitive in a 
global environment (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004:417). The rapidly changing 
environment of the 1990s resulted in a number of improved governance practices 
that were mainly supported by governance guidelines and improved legislation (a 
more detailed discussion is included in chapter 2). Malherbe and Segal (2001:4) 
identify the market through international institutional investors and the practice of 
using share-based remuneration for executives in South Africa as the most 
important forces behind the initial push towards improved governance practices. 
The governance guidelines included specific guidelines affecting boards, which are 
the focus of this study. 
 
As the directors are the agents of the shareholders who need to approve their 
appointment and directors’ remuneration (as per sections 66 and 68 of the 2008 
Companies Act (RSA, 2008a)), this study uses an agency theory perspective to 
assess the relationship between the board as a governance mechanism, and firm 
value. The agency problem centres on how the board of a company can minimise 
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the risk that stems from goal divergence (Dalton, Hitt, Certo & Dalton, 2007:2). 
Goal divergence could, for example, include instances where executive directors, 
as specialist managers, use their position for personal advantage and not to 
maximise firm value. The maximisation of self-interest is not unusual as the 
consideration of basic utility maximisation economic tools remains commonplace 
(Wooldridge, 2014:3). In line with the utility principle accounting systems 
including control systems consider the cost versus benefit balance of the system to 
ensure the value of the information derived from the system exceed the cost. 
However, legislation bond firms to comply to the legislative requirements 
irrespective of the cost benefit balance. 
 
In the opening quotation to this chapter from the Myburgh Report, inaction 
by board members was highlighted as negligent. The inaction or slacking of the 
board may be linked to moral hazards that are hidden through the use of information 
asymmetry, both goal divergence or agency problems.10 The Myburgh Report 
(2016:105) identified an additional claim of R2,465 billion against the reported 
profits in the periods 2008 to 2012, highlighting the extent of prior skewed 
disclosure (information asymmetry). The moral hazard and information asymmetry 
problems in African Bank are typical causes of goal divergence that are associated 
with agency theory problems11 (McColgan, 2001:11). Dowd (2009:142) notes, in a 
study on moral hazard and the global financial crisis, that moral hazard is a 
pervasive feature that influences the development of the types of contracts and the 
organisation of the markets used to manage moral hazard or agency problems. 
Bolton (2013:i77) explains the continued challenge in achieving goal alignment is 
that the agency theory does not result in simple quantitative methodological 
applications that practitioners can use for goal alignment. This challenge is 
compounded by the problems involved in using contracts to manage or control 
board activity and labour that are difficult to observe (Adams et al., 2010:58) with 
the object of reducing moral hazard. 
 
                                                 
10 Section 3.3.4 discusses goal divergence problems in more detail. 
11 The goal divergence problems support the use of agency theory in this study. 
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Using governance mechanisms to manage the agency problem is considered 
to be an important survival factor for companies (Fama & Jensen, 1983a:327). 
Afshan et al. (2011:82) explain that good governance is a factor in business survival 
that can result in improved competitiveness, which in turn increases access to 
funding. However, the extensive literature on the influence of governance and 
control mechanisms on firm value has yielded mixed findings globally as well as 
locally (Ma, 2009:2031; Pugliese, Bezemer, Zattoni, Huse, Van den Bosch & 
Volberda, 2009:292; Ashwin, 2015; Muchemwa, Padia & Callaghan, 2016). Some 
prior studies have found positive relationships (Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid & 
Zimmermann, 2006; Brown & Caylor, 2006; De Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Ntim, 
2009; Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2010; Ntim, Opong & Danbolt, 2012; Meyer & 
De Wet, 2013; Van Essen, Engelen & Carney, 2013), some negative relationships 
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; Kim & Yoon, 2007; Yammeesri & 
Herath, 2010). However, some studies found no relationships between various 
board-related governance and control mechanisms and firm value (Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998; Dalton et al., 2007; Brick & Chidambaran, 2010; 
Wintoki, Linck & Netter, 2012).  
 
The South African context of this study considers the contrast between the 
First World elements in the economy with its robust state-of-the-art legal system 
(Matola, 2014), and sophisticated market (in the JSE) (Malherbe & Segal, 2001:25; 
Armstrong et al., 2005:10), and the Third World challenges such as the need to 
uplift disadvantaged communities and transform. South Africa is grappling with 
inequality, with child-headed households (Nkomo, 2008), with basic needs like 
food security (Altman, Hart & Jacobs, 2009), and a consistent and alarming 
corruption index score of between 42 and 4412 for the 2012 to 2014 period 
(Transparency International, [S.a.]). Labour issues are also a challenge with 
unemployment at around a quarter of the population (Statistics South Africa, 
2016a:iv). South Africa can be viewed as a “developmental state grappling with 
profound economic, political and social transitions rooted in sociohistorical factors” 
                                                 
12 A corruption score of 43 indicates perceived endemic corruption in a country’s public sector 
(Transparency International, [S.a.]). 
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(Nkomo, 2015:253). However, the profit motive driving companies is still critical, 
especially as companies are seen as a main economic driver (Mongalo, 2003), 
guided by the strong First World legal system and market to help fund the 
development of the Third World elements.  
 
This study argues that the enhanced requirements of the 2008 Companies Act 
influence the rigour with which the board approach their duties, especially since the 
shareholders appoint the board members individually and approve their 
remuneration as directors (RSA, 2008a: sections 66 & 68). The rigour used by the 
board is important as the Horwath 2002 corporate governance report13 highlights 
the risk that directors could pay more attention to personal gain than to their 
fiduciary duty, given the spectrum of “maximum possible” versus “minimum 
excusable governance practices” (Psaros & Seamer, 2002:5). To encourage rigour 
the 2008 Companies Act (RSA, 2008a) is more prescriptive regarding directors’ 
conduct (section 76) and directors liability (section 77), thereby increasing the risk 
of legal action against board members. Carciumaru (2010:251) “found that director 
liability has in fact increased [in South Africa] because of the courts and society 
being more willing to hold directors accountable for their actions or inactions”. The 
new legislation limits some of the board options on control mechanisms, for 
example, by requiring shareholders to specifically appoint directors who comply 
with specific independence requirements to the audit committee and changing the 
audit committee to a statutory committee to oversee assurance (RSA, 2008a: section 
94).  
 
Although the corporate governance body of knowledge suggests that good 
governance by the board should be positively related to firm value, the changed 
legislative and regulatory environment means that the new reality needs to be 
evaluated as the past cannot always be used to predict the future. Ntim, Opong and 
Danbolt (2015:195) note that the role of the board in South Africa may differ 
                                                 
13 Associate Professor Jim Psaros and Michael Seamer from the University of Newcastle Business 
School developed a corporate governance star rating for the top 250 Australian listed companies and 
compiled the results in the Horwath 2002 corporate governance report, in acknowledgement of 
their sponsors. 
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because of the different legal and governance structures. This is one of the factors 
that gave rise to this study.  
 
1.3 Motivation for this study and the knowledge gap 
 
The main motivation for the study is to address the knowledge gap that stems 
from the changed legislative environment. Assessing the relationship between the 
board as a governance mechanism and firm value extends the body of knowledge 
on board-level controls by using the corporate control and managerial labour 
construct within the context of a smaller, more regulated developing economy. The 
contribution is discussed in more detail in section 1.4 while the motivation is 
discussed below. 
 
Firstly, assessing the board’s controls from an agency theory perspective 
could improve insight into the relationship between the board’s control and 
direction of the activities and labour of the board and firm value. Prior studies on 
the relationship between the board and firm value resulted in mixed findings, which 
indicates that there is still a need for a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between the board as a governance mechanism and firm value, given the different 
proxies for firm value (Udayasankar & Das, 2007:262; Gill et al., 2009:8; Tshipa, 
2017:198). The need for additional research is further supported by a South African 
study by Meyer and De Wet (2013), who reported mixed findings for three board 
variables and three proxies for firm value in the period 2010 to 2012. In a more 
recent local study, Muchemwa et al. (2016:509) recommended further research on 
specific board-related mechanisms such as board structure, director remuneration, 
directorships held, age and gender diversity. A unique characteristic of South 
African corporate governance is its pre-emptive nature in pursuit of enhanced 
competitiveness. The changed, more stringent regulatory environment which 
followed the introduction of the 2008 Companies Act, and the governance 
guidelines in King III, increased the bonding of the board as a governance 
mechanism. Increased bonding results in a knowledge gap regarding the 
relationship between the board as a governance mechanism and firm value in a more 
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regulated environment as the response of boards to the increased bonding has not 
been researched nor is there clarity on the relationship between the board as a 
governance mechanism and firm value given the mixed prior findings.  
 
Secondly, the need for more extensive governance research, which includes 
research on the board, in developing countries, including African countries, is 
supported by other authors (Jackling & Johl, 2009:492; Ntim, 2009:376; Afshan et 
al., 2011:89; Kumar & Singh, 2013:96). More in-depth research has also been 
recommended by recent South African studies on board characteristics (Muniandy 
& Hillier, 2015; Muchemwa et al., 2016). Although the study of Tshipa (2017:1 
and 205) was more extensive with 1170 firm year observations (90 companies 
between 2002 and 2014), it only assessed the relationship of six board-related 
variables to firm value over the period. A more in-depth assessment could 
contribute to the broader body of knowledge on the use of board-level controls.  
 
Thirdly, prior studies over multiple periods show an increased tendency 
towards improved adaptation to best practices over time (Ackers, 2009:14; Ntim, 
2009:343). However, no local studies have considered what happens when best 
practices become commonplace. A practice of moving towards what are regarded 
as best practices can result in nearly all companies using the same control 
mechanisms to address goal divergence. As soon as a control practice becomes 
commonplace it becomes a constant factor and this changes the cost/benefit balance 
of the control. Governance and control mechanisms that were found to be positively 
related to firm value in the past might no longer have a positive relationship once 
the practice becomes commonplace and the effect evens out. Following a line 
similar to the shape of a logarithmic growth line that plateau at the end. In addition, 
the need to consider within-firm differences over time, using panel data and panel 
analysis methods, has been highlighted by Adams et al. (2010:67). 
 
Lastly, the continuously evolving nature of business and corporate 
governance guidelines requires ongoing research. In South Africa, there is an 
increased focus on the accountability and responsibility of the board, which is 
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encapsulated in the enhanced accountability requirements included in Chapter 314 
of the 2008 Companies Act (RSA, 2008a) and the more stringent governance 
recommendations in the King III governance code and report (IoDSA, 2009a; 
IoDSA, 2009b). The continual changes in governance regulation led to the issue of 
King IV in November 2016 (IoDSA, 2016). Continual changes in legislative and 
governance requirements have a direct impact on the board as the board is the 
responsible and accountable body in a company who need to ensure compliance 
with the legislative and regulatory environment. 
 
The next section highlights the contribution of this study to the body of 
knowledge on boards as a governance mechanism and the control mechanism used 
in the corporate control and managerial labour constructs in a more regulated 
developmental context. 
 
1.4 Contribution of this study 
 
This study contributes to the body of literature on the board as a governance 
mechanism in the following ways. Firstly, given the complex role of the board, this 
study contributes to the body of knowledge by building indexes to assess the 
board’s use of controls in the corporate control and managerial labour constructs. 
Together the MLI and CI (defined in chapters 4 and 5) indexes represent a set of 
comprehensive board-level indicators that differentiate this study from prior studies 
which focused on limited board-level variables (Meyer & De Wet, 2013; 
Muchemwa et al., 2016; Tshipa, 2017). The CI and MLI indexes measure board-
level control in the corporate control and managerial labour constructs to enable an 
assessment of the relationship between the board as a governance mechanism and 
firm value. The only more comprehensive study that includes board-related 
variables is the corporate governance study by Tshipa (2017), who performed an 
extensive study based on 90 companies between 2002 and 2014 using six board-
related indicators as variables. This study used narrower indicator definitions to 
                                                 
14 “Chapter 3” refers to Chapter 3 of the Companies Act.  
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develop indexes that represent the in-depth use of board-level controls as boards 
are a difficult phenomenon to study. The indexes comprehensively represent the 
controlling and directional role of the board by consolidating 25 indicators in the 
CI index and 23 in the MLI index to make it possible to study board-level controls 
in greater depth. 
 
Secondly this study contributes to the body of knowledge by applying a 
control focus that uses the two constructs to differentiate between the controlling 
and directional role of the board as a governance mechanism. The focus on control 
in this study differs from normal operational internal controls as the control 
mechanisms available to the board focus on directing and controlling the activities 
and labour of the board on a more strategic level. In contrast to normal internal 
controls, which generally need to operate in an effective and efficient manner, the 
board-level controls can be slow to respond and filter through to firm value. Given 
that the board only meets a few times a year, inefficiencies in board-level controls 
are not unexpected. A delayed response of up to two years was linked to the removal 
of a CEO after significant reported losses, which demonstrates that high-level 
controls seldom respond in the absence of a crisis (Jensen, 1994a:17), highlighting 
the inefficiencies. The same principle seems to apply to South Africa as African 
Bank’s board only pressured its CEO to resign after suffering significant losses for 
the second year in a row (Ziady, 2015). This study specifically considers the 
inefficient nature of board-level control by assessing the relationship between the 
board as a governance mechanism to a negatively lagged firm value. 
 
Thirdly, South African governance follows the African world view of 
ubuntu15 (Ifejika, 2006), which emphasises ethical leadership. This study extends 
the existing literature by including an indicator to incorporate ethical leadership into 
the MLI index. To measure ethical leadership a qualitative content analysis was 
performed on the integrated reports of the relevant companies with the aid of 
Leximancer.16 This enabled the study to incorporate ethical leadership into the MLI 
                                                 
15 Ubuntu comes from a Zulu phrase, "Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu", which means “a person is a 
person through other people” (Ifejika, 2006). 
16 Leximancer is an automated content analysis tool. 
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index to acknowledge the hybrid governance model used in South Africa. The value 
of ethical leadership and improved disclosure was highlighted by Cho, Lee and 
Pfeiffer (2013:82) who found that disclosing negative information on corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) reduces the bid-ask price spread of shares more than 
positive disclosure. The importance of ethical leadership is supported by the 
Companies Act that requires the board to appoint a Social and Ethics (S&E) 
statutory board committee to help govern ethics, transformation and social 
responsibility in the company. This study includes indicators linked to the S&E 
committee in the CI and MLI indexes.  
 
In the fourth place, this study extends the index building methods used to 
consolidate independent variables to control variables. The first consolidated 
control variables are the quality audit score (QAS). The QAS consolidates the 
bonding impact of the requirements of the Companies Act relating to external audit 
and the audit committee into a single score. The development of a QAS 
differentiates this study as it consolidates the complex relationship linked to 
assurance into an index and positions the audit or assurance relationship outside of 
the control of the board. The second consolidated control variable focuses on 
company-level controls or company control indicators (CCI). The CCI considers 
the risk, growth, prior performance, company size, board size and board 
independence when constructing the index. This study differentiates itself by 
positioning board size and independence outside the direct control of the board as 
part of the CCI index. Board size and independence are dependent on the 
shareholders who appoint the board. The development of the CCI differentiates this 
study as it consolidates the complexity of past control or direction decisions 
(relating to risk and growth, for example) that bond the current options of the board 
with the board size and composition into an index that falls outside the direct control 
of the board in the current year. 
 
In the fifth place, this study is based on the boards of companies on the SRI 
index and applies an agency theory perspective on SRI companies, where the focus 
is on social responsibility coupled with transparent reporting. An agency theory 
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perspective in a study on the SRI index has received relatively little attention in 
South Africa as prior studies using the SRI index focused on social or sustainable 
objectives (Sonnenberg & Hamann, 2006; Herringer, Firer & Viviers, 2009; 
Maubane, Prinsloo & Van Rooyen, 2014). Although the selection of companies in 
prior corporate governance studies that used samples of 90 or more companies 
(Ntim, 2009; Mans-Kemp, 2014; Tshipa, 2017) would have overlapped with 
companies on the SRI index, these studies did not control for the SRI index in the 
analysis or discussion of their findings.  
 
In the sixth place, the period of this study focuses on the business environment 
after the enactment of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (RSA, 2008a). The period of 
the study started in 2012 and ended in 2014 as the composition of the SRI index 
changed in 2015. Although a number of recent South African studies deal with the 
link between the broader field of corporate governance and firm value (Ntim, 2009; 
Opperman, 2009; Semosa, 2012; Mans-Kemp, 2014; Ashwin, 2015), or follow a 
more focused approach by considering board characteristics and firm performance 
(Muniandy & Hillier, 2015; Muchemwa et al., 2016), these studies do not consider 
the impact of the 2008 Companies Act on the control options of the board as a 
governance mechanism. The stronger legal requirements could encourage board 
members to limit their potential liability by using controls where the costs exceed 
the benefits or result in upwards pressure on directors’ remuneration. Thus, this 
study contributes to the body of knowledge by addressing the knowledge gap on 
the relationship between the board, as a governance mechanism, and firm value, in 
a more regulated environment and a developing economy. 
 
In the seventh place, the focus of this study on the SRI index included 
companies from all industries in contrast to recent corporate governance studies that 
focused on specific industries (Ntim, 2009; Mans-Kemp, 2014; Tshipa, 2017). This 
study used a unique industry classification based broadly on the spectrum of 
customers to identify two industry groupings. The first group is the basic or primary 
sector with a limited number of customers and the second group is the consumer-
centred sector with a wide spectrum of customers. 
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Given the contribution made by this study in the above areas, coupled with 
the mixed prior research findings highlighted above, there is a need for further 
research on the board as a governance mechanism, especially in a more regulated 
business environment in South Africa, a developing country. The next section 
briefly describes the background to governance in South Africa. 
 
1.5 Background to governance in South Africa 
 
The call for enhanced governance and control mechanisms in the early 1990s 
was not only a localised requirement; international investors who were considering 
investing in the new South African democracy were demanding good corporate 
governance practices (Malherbe & Segal, 2001:4; Kakabadse & Korac-Kakabadse, 
2002:306). These international investors were sufficiently powerful to influence the 
markets, causing share prices in companies with corporate governance practices 
that did not follow international norms to fall sharply (Malherbe & Segal, 2001:6).  
 
Companies are important as they are the predominant structure in which the 
productive assets of a country, and in this study South Africa, are deployed. The 
extent of their importance is highlighted by Armstrong et al. (2005:10), who found 
that “over three-quarters of South Africa’s productive capacity rests in the hands of 
private business”. As governance practices influence how efficiently and 
effectively the companies’ assets are used, guidance on good governance practices 
has become critical for South Africa. Governance guidance has focused on helping 
the country’s businesses adapt to a demanding, competitive business environment 
after the country emerged from a period of isolation (Malherbe & Segal, 2001:10). 
Improved governance practices are important in establishing competitiveness and 
growing companies; Vaughn and Ryan (2006:504) explain that the practice of using 
corporate governance in attracting foreign investment by developing countries is an 
essential component in helping to establish economic stability and growth. The 
“taken-for-granted” governance expectations of foreign investors delivered 
external forces that furthered the establishment of good corporate governance 
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practices in South Africa (Malherbe & Segal, 2001:4). In addition, the South 
African view that corporate governance can help to establish improved governance 
practices (Godfrey, 2002:25 & 27), led by internal forces (including share-based 
remuneration), has helped to push for the establishment of good corporate 
governance practices. 
 
Corporate governance guidelines became more formalised with the first King 
report, the King Report on Corporate Governance17 (King I). King I was issued by 
the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA) in 1994 to address the need 
for improved guidance on corporate governance while moving towards a more 
competitive global economic environment (IoDSA, 1994). Corporate governance 
guidelines can be useful in establishing a basic level of governance. This is 
supported by Haspeslagh (2010:376) who considers corporate codes a suitable 
method of helping to guide “unsophisticated companies or countries to the basic 
level of governance”. The use of governance guidelines to establish a “new basic 
level” can mean that the positive impact of improved governance measures can be 
short-lived and will stop once the new base-line or plateau is reached, requiring 
continuous improvement in governance practices to obtain further benefits. In 
addition, the new “basic level” can be used as a control barrier to maintain 
governance control at the new expected level to minimise goal divergence caused 
by moral hazard. Control options highlight the choices of boards regarding a 
company’s direction and control, which undoubtedly help to attract or repel 
investors.  
 
In 2002 the McKinsey Global Investor Opinion Survey found that 
institutional investors view corporate governance indicators as being on a par with 
financial indicators and are prepared to pay a premium for companies with high 
governance standards (McKinsey & Company, 2002). The McKinsey study 
contributed significantly towards encouraging the adoption of best governance 
                                                 
17 The titles of reports are highlighted in italics in the text to distinguish the titles from the rest of the 
text, King I is the commonly used short reference to the King Report on Corporate Governance, 
issued in 1994 by IoDSA. 
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practices in South Africa as evidenced by the detailed references to it in King II18 
(IoDSA, 2002:13). The initial implementation of governance guidelines in South 
Africa occurred in a flourishing economic environment as South Africa experienced 
an annualised growth rate of 3.28% in real gross domestic product (GDP) between 
1994 and 2012, with the years 2005-7 showing the highest growth rates, exceeding 
an annualised real GDP of 5%19 (Bhorat, Hirsch, Kanbus & Ncube, 2013a:3). 
Statistics South Africa (2016b) notes that “the global economic crisis of 2008” 
resulted in a “a negative growth rate -1,5%” in 2009, followed by “positive growth 
rates during 2010–2015”. However, the growth rates “were still well below the 
achievements of 2005–2007” (Statistics South Africa, 2016b). 
 
It is possible that poor governance and control practices can have a negative 
impact as they can result in the inefficient use or wasting of resources. Poor 
governance in the public sector, as evidenced by the findings of the Auditor-General 
of South Africa (AGSA) for the 2013/2014 period, indicate that only 51% of 
national and provincial departments received unqualified audit opinions, 72% 
showed non-compliance with key legislation, there was R2.6 billion in unauthorised 
expenditure, R62.7 billion in irregular expenditure, and fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure of just over R1,1 billion (AGSA, 2013/2014). To help encourage 
further improved governance practices, King IV20 used industry-specific guidelines 
to assist different industries like the public sector to better apply governance 
guidelines (IoDSA, 2016:74). The impact of King IV’s guidelines falls outside the 
scope of this study as the guidelines came into effect after the timeline applicable 
to the study. King IV is nevertheless discussed in chapter 2 as part of the South 
African governance environment. 
 
In 1994 the guidance provided by King I was opportune as it helped to guide 
South African companies to evolve from operating in an isolated market to 
                                                 
18 King II is the King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa, issued in 2002 by IoDSA 
to stay abreast with global practices. 
19 No study could be found on whether there was any real relationship between the implementation 
of improved governance practices and economic growth, making this an area for future research.  
20 King IV is the Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2016 issued 1 November 2016 
by the IoDSA. 
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competing in the global marketplace. In South Africa, the guidance of King I was 
updated by King II in 2002, King III in 200921 and King IV in 2016 to ensure that 
the country stayed abreast of global best practices in corporate governance (IoDSA, 
1994; IoDSA, 2002; IoDSA, 2009a; IoDSA, 2009b; IoDSA, 2016). The foundation 
of all the King reports is built on ethical and effective leadership, with King IV 
consolidating the 75 principles in King III into 17 and changing from “apply or 
explain” to “apply and explain” (IoDSA, 2016:6-7).  
 
As the guidance of the various King reports was context-specific it helped to 
develop an African model of corporate governance that is based on stakeholder-
centric African values (also referred to as ubuntu), within a strong legal 
environment (Andreasson, 2011b:647). Adding an ethical focus to governance is 
not unusual as Arjoon (2006:68) notes that effective governance needs to “adhere 
to ethical principles, not merely comply with rules”. The evolution of governance 
guidelines to stay abreast of global best practices in governance was critical, as 
improved control and governance mechanisms were and still are available to aid in 
encouraging continuous economic reform (Chakrabarti, Megginson & Yadav, 
2008:63).  
 
In addition to the guidance provided on corporate governance, various 
legislative changes were enacted to encourage good governance principles. Laws 
that focused on the public sector include the Public Finance Management Act 
(PFMA) (RSA, 1999) and the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) (RSA, 
2003). These laws helped to regulate effective and efficient management in the 
public sector in line with the constitution (RSA, 1996). Legislation that encourages 
transparent and competitive behaviour in the private sector includes the 
Competition Act (RSA, 1998a), the Employment Equity Act (RSA, 1998b), the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act (RSA, 2000), the Security Services Act 
prohibiting insider trading (RSA, 2004), the Auditing Profession Act (RSA, 2005a), 
the Corporate Laws Amendment Act (RSA, 2006), the Companies Act (RSA, 
                                                 
21 King III consists of two publications, the King Code of Governance for South Africa 2009, and 
the King Report on Governance for South Africa issued in 2009 by IoDSA. 
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2008a) and the Consumer Protection Act (RSA, 2008b). The legislative change 
important for this study is the 2008 Companies Act as it introduced stricter 
requirements that bond the board directly as well as via their fiduciary duties to the 
company. This stricter legal environment is likely to influence the selection of 
controls used by the board in the control and direction of the activities and labour 
of the board. The increased liability risk of the board could lead to the adoption of 
more conservative practices to reduce their increased liability risk in a manner that 
could constrain future growth. Alternatively, it could lead to upward pressure on 
board remuneration to compensate the board members for the increased personal 
risk they are exposed to.  
 
Although the controls used by the board as a governance mechanism are a 
small subsection of the broader corporate governance field, considering what 
corporate governance is helps to establish the context. Godfrey (2002:26) describes 
corporate governance as ensuring the “efficient, responsible, transparent and honest 
governance of economic entities”. This highlights the ethical nature of corporate 
governance. King I used a more basic definition and described corporate 
governance as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled” in line 
with the Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance (Cadbury report) (Cadbury, 1992:13; IoDSA, 1994:1). Such direction 
and control use various control mechanisms including other governance 
mechanisms such as institutional shareholders. The direction and control principles 
referred to in this study are a narrower application of the broader corporate 
governance direction and control as defined in King I and Cadbury as this study 
only focus on board-level controls. The definition of corporate governance in King 
IV highlights ethical leadership, performance and control for legitimacy and sees 
corporate governance as “the exercise of ethical and effective leadership by the 
governing body towards the achievement of the following governance outcomes: 
 Ethical culture 
 Good performance 
 Effective control 
 Legitimacy” (IoDSA, 2016:20) 
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1.6 Governance mechanisms 
 
There are two main groups of governance mechanisms: external and internal. 
External mechanisms focus on the market and legislation, while internal 
mechanisms focus on the board of directors and blockholders or institutional 
shareholders (Walsh & Seward, 1990:423 & 434; Cremers & Nair, 2005:2859). In 
South Africa, the external environment includes protective legislation, for example 
encouragement of competition (RSA, 1998a), employment equity (RSA, 1998b), 
access to information (RSA, 2000), legislation for companies (RSA, 2008a), and 
consumer protection (RSA, 2008b), with the JSE as the market for listed companies 
(JSE, 2010a).  
 
The changes in the 2008 Companies Act have significantly enhanced the 
legislative bonding of the board of public companies as shareholders have to 
appoint directors individually, approve their remuneration, approve the issuing of 
shares and loans to directors, and appoint independent directors to a statutory audit 
committee (RSA, 2008a: sections 41, 45, 66, 68 & 94). The Act contains enhanced 
requirements regarding a director’s conduct and liability as well a requirement for 
public companies to establish a statutory social and ethics (S&E) board committee 
(RSA, 2008a: sections 72, 73, 76 and 77).  
 
A more detailed discussion on the internal governance mechanisms is 
included in chapters 3, 4 and 5. Fama and Jensen (1983b:303) explain that the 
external and internal governance mechanisms are used to control agency problems 
caused by the “separation of decision and risk-bearing functions”. The separation 
of duties between “decision management (initiation and implementation of 
decisions) and decision control (ratification and monitoring of decisions)” also 
applies to South Africa, as noted by Cohen and Uliana (1990:8-9). This links 
external and internal governance mechanisms to agency theory and the use of 
control mechanisms to reduce agency problems. More information on the control 
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mechanisms in corporate control and managerial labour is included in the following 
sections.  
 
1.6.1 Control mechanisms 
To evaluate control mechanism used by the board, this study considers board-
level controls in the corporate control and managerial labour construct as well as 
controls outside the direct control of the board, referred to as control variables. 
Control variables are control mechanisms outside the immediate influence of the 
board that can influence firm value. Control variables stem from the broader 
corporate governance environment, including the divergence of shareholders, 
institutional shareholders including blockholders, industry, firm size, board size, 
and external assurance. The control variables used by this study are summarised in 
Appendix 4 and are defined and discussed in more detail in chapter 4.  
 
Anderson, Melanson and Maly (2007:780) note that the ongoing debate on 
governance efficacy follows two streams related to the board, one focusing on 
improving incentive schemes to direct labour, and the other on improving the 
board’s monitoring ability (control) through increased independence. These two 
streams are similar to the corporate control and managerial labour constructs used 
in this study.  
 
1.6.1.1 Corporate control construct 
Corporate control focuses on the structure and composition of the board and 
its committees as a control. One of the current key focus areas for boards is 
separation of duties and oversight, taking into account the separation of the role 
between the chairperson of the board (chairperson) and the chief executive officer 
(CEO), the separation between the role of the CEO and CFO and the use of non-
executive directors, including independent directors, to oversee and monitor 
activities of the board as well as of the different board committees (IoDSA, 2009a: 
principles 2.16 & 12.18). With the continuing focus on oversight, the board remains 
an important internal control mechanism (Markarian, Parbonetti & Previts, 
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2007:299). To develop the CI index to assess the level of corporate controls used 
by the board, this study examines the oversight and monitoring activities of the 
board and its committees. The 25 indicators used to construct the CI index are 
summarised in Appendix 5 and discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
 
1.6.1.2 Managerial labour construct 
Managerial labour deals with the control and direction of the board’s labour, 
focusing on directing and evaluating board performance in a manner that aligns the 
interests of the board and the shareholders. Performance-linked incentives and 
performance evaluations may be used, for example. To develop the MLI index to 
assess the level of managerial labour control applied by the board, this study 
considers the tenure, the age of the directors, the evaluation of directors’ 
performance, the frequency of meeting attendance, the structure of directors’ 
remuneration and the value and timing of directors’ remuneration. The 23 indicators 
used to construct the MLI index are summarised in Appendix 6 and discussed in 
detail in chapter 5. 
 
The relationship between the CI and MLI indexes and firm value is assessed 
using an agency theory lens to consider the goal alignment impact of board-level 
controls. Together the CI and MLI indexes are the independent variables used in 
this study as they encapsulate board-level control as applied by the board as a 
governance mechanism. The next section briefly introduces agency theory. More 
details on the historical development and current relevance of agency theory are 
included in chapter 3. 
 
1.7 Introduction to agency theory 
 
Agency theory focuses on managing the challenges caused by the separation 
of the board whose decisions control the company (the agents) and the shareholders 
or owners (the principals), who are the ultimate risk-bearers of the company. The 
separation of duties alludes to possible goal divergence and exploitation of the 
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parties. The challenges of goal divergence and exploitation attract more attention 
after corporate disasters and there is an increased movement towards holding board 
members personally accountable (Adams et al., 2010:58). Controlling for goal 
alignment with the shareholders is in line with the “logic of shareholder value 
maximization” (Lok, 2010:1306; Joseph, Ocasio & McDonnell, 2014:1935). 
Controlling for the possible exploitation of the owners as residual claimants22 by 
the opportunistic decisions of managers or agents (the agency problem) is central 
to the management of the agency relationship (Fama & Jensen, 1983b:312). The 
need for controls to counter the possible exploitation of shareholders emphasises 
the control aspect of governance. Yammeesri and Herath (2010:279) note that 
control mechanisms are necessary to ensure that management act in the best 
interests of shareholders. However, adding controls for protection against a possible 
“downside” can be costly. When the costs of controls exceed the benefits derived 
from improved efficiencies the control can be viewed as costly. 
 
In South Africa, the current validity of the importance of the separation of 
ownership from control is encapsulated in sections 30(2A) and 66(9) of the 
Companies Act (RSA, 2008a). Section 30(2A) waives the audit requirement of 
private companies in situations where all the shareholders or security holders are 
also directors as there is no agency relationship that could lead to goal divergence 
or information asymmetry problems, two main agency problems (Rispel, De Jager 
& Fonn, 2015:3). Section 66(8) and (9) require directors’ remuneration “for 
services as a director” to be pre-approved by shareholders via a special resolution, 
thereby reducing the risk of excessive directors’ remuneration (RSA, 2008a). Thus, 
the 2008 Companies Act indirectly controls for an agency relationship. 
 
The continued use of agency theory in some recent studies (Engelen, 
2015:928; Muniandy & Hillier, 2015:111; Pepper & Gore, 2015; Rashid, 2015; 
Rispel et al., 2015) shows its continued relevance as a theory. The agency theory is 
a useful theory to describe the complex interaction between shareholders and the 
board given the variety of available measures that can be used to address goal 
                                                 
22 Shareholders are residual claimants in the case of a liquidation. 
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divergence. Although the contribution of prior studies based on alternative theories 
is considered, this study follows an agency theory perspective and a different 
theoretical view falls outside the scope of this study. Thus, considering a different 
theoretical view of the board like institutional theory (Wu, Patel & Perera, 2015) is 
an area for future study. 
 
An agency relationship is defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976:308) as “a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some services on their behalf which involve delegating some 
decision making authority to the agent”. The separation of ownership and control 
creates a demand for governance mechanisms, like the board or institutional 
shareholders, to help control goal divergence in an agency relationship (Afshan et 
al., 2011:82). Agency relationships can lead to conflict or goal divergence, as the 
directors or managers (called agents) are responsible for the achievement of the 
company’s business objectives and goals, while the shareholders or principals 
merely receive the benefit of the managers’ efforts through increased share prices 
and profits that can be distributed to the shareholders as dividends. As it is assumed 
that individuals act with self-interest to maximise their utility, agency theory 
assumes that directors, as the managers of the company’s assets, will act in their 
own best interests using excessive perks or perquisites (rent-seeking) and shirking, 
which conflicts with the best interests of the shareholders, who are the residual risk-
takers. The maximisation of self-interest through rent-seeking has negatively 
influenced most of the economies in Africa and is unfortunately also prevalent in 
South Africa (Gumede, 2015). The conflict generated by the divergence of interests 
between shareholders as principals and directors as agents is referred to as agency 
conflict or the agency problem and is not a new phenomenon. It was famously 
described by Adam Smith as follows: 
 
“The directors of such joint-stock companies, however, being the 
managers rather of other people’s money than their own, it cannot well 
be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which partners in a private copartnery frequently watch 
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over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider 
attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very 
easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and 
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the 
management of the affairs of such a company.” (Smith, 1776/2003:941). 
 
The impact of self-interest is not new: warnings in “early accounting 
textbooks” state that “managers would use accounting to serve their own interests 
at the expense of shareholders” (Watts & Zimmerman, 1979:279). The 
maximisation of self-interest remains a challenge that needs to be managed to 
ensure that individual goal maximisation does not detract from the common goal 
maximisation (Liu, Gao, Cheah & Luo, 2016). The self-interested and divergent 
goals of the directors as agents and shareholders as principals have led to the 
development of agency theory (Berle & Means, 1933; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983b). The seminal works relating to 
the development of agency theory are discussed in more detail in chapter 3. 
 
In accounting, agency theory plays a prominent role, as “[a]ccounting 
procedures are devised in order to reduce agency costs of contracts”, thereby 
helping to enhance company performance (Watts & Zimmerman, 1979:278). To 
further the use of accounting to reduce information asymmetry, section 29(1)(a) 
(RSA, 2008a) of the Companies Act requires the financial statements of companies 
to comply with the requirements of the financial reporting standards, thereby 
helping to set a common standard for financial reporting. Together with the external 
audit requirement, this results in the availability of useful and reliable financial 
information on public companies. The 2008 Companies Act sets clear requirements 
on the rights and obligations applicable to boards and companies. The Act regulates 
financial reporting (sections 26-28) and monitoring using external audits and 
independent directors (sections 90 & 94), thereby enabling the capital market to 
serve as an external governance mechanism through its enforcement of its listing 
requirements. The above are in line with the elements considered to be important 
for national governance systems as identified by Yoshikawa and Resheed 
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(2009:254). Strong financial reporting and auditing are already some of South 
Africa’s strengths as the country was ranked first according to the World Economic 
Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), for the 2012-2013 and 2016-
2017 periods, based on the strength of the local application of auditing and reporting 
standards (WEF, 2012-2013:324-325; WEF, 2016-2017:324-325). 
 
Despite its governance guidelines, South Africa has not been immune to 
corporate failures, which have been partly attributable to governance and ethical 
failures. Examples “include Macmed, a healthcare company which collapsed in 
1999” at a cost of R986 million, where the company secretary was an 
unrehabilitated insolvent, Leisurenet, with its collapse blamed on fraud at the 
highest level costing R1.2 billion and Fidentia, which acted like a Ponzi scheme 
and spent more than a billion of ‘widows’ and ‘orphans’ money (Armstrong et al., 
2005:26; Cobbett, 2013). South Africa views insolvency in a serious light as being 
an “unrehabilitated insolvent” is grounds for disqualification of a person from being 
a “director or prescribed officer” under the Companies Act (RSA, 2008a: section 
69). Corporate failures can, however, render valuable information on the 
effectiveness and efficiency with which the different mechanisms and controls have 
been operating to reduce goal divergence.  
 
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, research has been published dissecting 
the causes and offering governance solutions (Allen & Carletti, 2010), as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not prevent the financial crisis. The 2008 global financial 
crisis “is commonly believed to have begun in July 2007 with the credit crunch, 
when a loss of confidence by US investors in the value of sub-prime mortgages 
caused a liquidity crisis” (Davies, 2014). One of the causes of the crisis was 
attributed to executive remuneration practices that focused on short-term gain 
(OECD, 2009:10) and enhanced goal divergence. “The role that incentive 
remuneration played in causing the financial crisis is evident in the significant 
corporate governance and regulatory changes that have occurred since the 
economic recession of 2008” (Bussin, 2015:232). Care should, however, be taken 
not to see improved governance recommendations or regulations as the magic 
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solution to prevent future financial crises or corporate disasters. No amount of 
controls can prevent abuse or solve systemic problems, as is evidenced by the 2008 
financial crisis. Haspeslagh (2010:375) remarks that failed corporate governance 
was one of many contributing factors to the 2008 financial crisis, with greed, 
wishful thinking and linear extrapolation as some of the other factors, while Volcker 
(cited in Malherbe and Segal (2001:82)) notes that “as long as greed and fear remain 
part of human genetic make-up financial crises will happen”. Thus, the challenges 
caused by greed or the extreme maximisation of self-interest are part of human 
nature and result in moral hazard which, in turn, causes information asymmetry, 
both of which are goal divergence problems.  
 
The prevalent maximisation of self-interest observed in the South African 
political and economic environment is an indication that the maximisation of self-
interest exists in South African society (Nicolaides & Grootes, 2016), and that goal 
divergence problems remain challenges that should be addressed. Moral hazard and 
information asymmetry form an integral part of goal divergence problems in the 
agency theory and are discussed in more detail in section 3.3.4.  
 
Within the broader economic environment, the board as a governance 
mechanism can still be used to reduce the likelihood of corporate scandals through 
the application of controls that focus on addressing goal divergence problems. 
Murphy and McIntyre (2007:209) acknowledge the important role that boards play 
in the management of the agency problem caused by the divergence of interests. 
The importance of the contribution of boards was also highlighted in the Cadbury 
report which made the statement that: 
 
“[T]he effectiveness with which their boards discharge their 
responsibilities determines Britain’s competitive position. They must be 
free to drive their companies forward but exercise that freedom within 
a framework of effective accountability. This is the essence of any 
system of good corporate governance.” (Cadbury, 1992:11). 
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Despite the differences in origin, the statement regarding the important role 
of boards of directing their companies within an accountability framework is 
equally applicable to companies in South Africa, with the legislation and 
governance regulations providing the overall governance framework. Carver 
(2007:1034) explains that as shareholders delegate their authority “to the board, not 
to individual directors and not to the CEO”, the board is accountable to the 
shareholders, establishing an agency relationship. The overwhelming continued use 
of agency theory in corporate governance studies, (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 
2003:371; Anderson et al., 2007:780; Dalton et al., 2007:2; Ntim, 2009; Mans-
Kemp, Erasmus & Viviers, 2016), has helped to retain the theory’s position as a 
dominant theory in the broader corporate governance field.  
 
The theoretical perspective of the agency theory, as applied in this study, is 
used to explain the predictive nature of the theory, based on the argument that 
shareholders are the primary focus of the board as they are the people who appoint 
the board and approve its remuneration. Focusing first on shareholders is also called 
the “enlightened shareholder value logic”, which considers “the interests of 
employees, suppliers, customers, the environment, and corporate reputation while 
still giving primacy to shareholder value creation” (Lok, 2010:1309).  
 
This study therefore argues that the board will firstly consider shareholders 
(as the primary stakeholder group that can hold them responsible and accountable), 
resulting in an agency relationship, by placing shareholders in the position of a 
preferential stakeholder. As this study is based on an agency theory perspective, the 
stakeholder versus shareholder primacy debate falls outside the scope of this study. 
The shareholder/stakeholder debate mostly centres on answering the question “for 
whose benefit” should a company be managed, a question that falls outside the 
scope of this study as the focus is on the relationship between the board as a 
governance mechanism and firm value. This study’s focus on the relationship 
between the board and firm value is consistent with the fiduciary duty of the board 
required by the Companies Act section 76(3), to act in the “best interest of the 
company” (RSA, 2008a). Acting in the best interest of the company leads to goal 
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alignment as a company that is profitable over the long-term can maximise the 
utility of both the board and the shareholders. In section 2.3.2, which deals with the 
uniqueness of South African corporate governance, this study expands on the 
tension between a shareholder and stakeholder view for an improved perspective 
on the South African context. 
 
The use of agency theory as the main theory in this study is supported by the 
continued prominence of the theory in research, as it navigates the relationship 
between the shareholders who appoint the board, and the board. In addition, the use 
of an agency theory perspective in the assessment of the board as a governance 
mechanism and the controls used by the board helps to guide the focus of the study 
as theories help a study to “look at complicated problems” by “focusing … on 
different aspects of the data and providing a framework within which to conduct 
[the] analysis” (Reeves, Albert, Kuper & Hodges, 2008:631). The research 
methodology used to achieve the purpose and objectives of this study is discussed 
in the following section. 
 
1.8 Research methodology  
 
The research methodology encapsulates the research approach, world view, 
design and methods used to test the hypotheses, to achieve the research objectives 
and the purpose of the study. Chapter 6 discusses the selection of a suitable research 
approach, world view, research design and research methods in detail.  
 
This study follows a quantitative research approach with a post-positivist 
world view and a non-experimental design to enable the study to collect 
observational data to assess the relationship between the board as a governance 
mechanism and firm value. A qualitative approach requires the quantification of 
board-level controls and a non-experimental design requires the collection of data 
linked to uncontrolled variables or indicators. Quantifying board-level control 
observations enables the study to build the CI and MLI indexes and to measure the 
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level of controls used by the board as a governance mechanism as a step towards 
achieving the study’s purpose. 
 
1.8.1 Research purpose, objectives and hypotheses  
The purpose of this study is to address the knowledge gap with respect to the 
relationship between the board as a governance mechanism and firm value, that has 
arisen due to the introduction of the 2008 Companies Act (with its more stringent 
regulatory environment), from an agency theory perspective. The main research 
objective or RO of this study flows from the purpose and focusses on the assessment 
of the relationship between the board as a governance mechanism (CI and MLI) 
and firm value. Two sub-objectives with their accompanying sub-hypotheses have 
been developed from the RO. 
 
SO 1 – to develop a CI index to measure the level of corporate 
control of the board 
 
SH 1 – There is a positive relationship between the CI index that 
measures the level of the board’s corporate control and firm value.  
 
SO 2 – to develop a MLI index to measure the level of managerial 
labour of the board 
 
SH 2 – There is a positive relationship between the MLI index that 
measures the level of the board’s managerial labour and firm 
value. 
 
To achieve the sub-objectives to enable the study to test the sub-hypotheses 
the study developed the CI and MLI indexes to measure the level of the board’s 
corporate control and managerial labour. The index construction was based on the 
index building principles used in the seminal work by Gompers et al. (2001). As 
the board as a governance mechanism is represented by corporate control and 
managerial labour the sub-hypotheses lead to the main hypothesis: 
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H 1 – There is a positive relationship between the board as a 
governance mechanism (CI and MLI) and firm value.  
 
The CI and MLI are complementary and together encapsulate the board as a 
governance mechanism, enabling the study to use multiple regression methods to 
assess this relationship for all the hypotheses in one test. In addition, the use of the 
same boards over the same period results in a balanced panel that can be assessed 
using panel analysis methods (econometric methods) that take both the cross-
sectional and the time series nature of the data into account. Assessing the 
relationship between the board as a governance mechanism and firm value requires 
actual quantifiable data linked to firm value. Firm value is the dependent variable 
used in this study and the board as a governance mechanism measured using the CI 
and MLI indexes are the independent variables. Relationships can be assessed using 
statistical methods such as correlation and regression analysis (Howell, 1999).  
 
1.8.2 Research method  
To achieve the research objectives and answer the research questions, data for 
each director for each of the identified indicators or variables were extracted using 
mainly the integrated annual reports and websites between 2012 and 2014 of the 
sample of companies on the SRI index. The extracted data have been summarised 
to consolidate the data of individual directors to represent the board for each 
company, and each year. Where necessary, this information has been supplemented 
by financial and other company information extracted from the McGregor’s BFA, 
INET BFA or IRESS23 database as well as from the Who owns Whom database.  
 
The extracted and summarised information was used to build the CI and MLI 
indexes that further consolidated the board-level indicators in the corporate control 
and managerial labour constructs to enable further statistical analysis. The final 
                                                 
23 The name of the commercial database changed from McGregor’s BFA to INET BFA to IRESS 
during the period of the study. 
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assessment against firm value to test the hypotheses used panel data that assessed 
the influence of the CI and MLI indexes to test the relationship between the board 
and firm value, using Fixed and Random Effect estimation methods. The 
assessment also considered the results of the Breusch-Pagan variation of the 
Lagrange Multiplier test and the Hausman test. Panel analysis enabled the study to 
combine cross-sectional and time series data, resulting in greater variability, more 
informative data with more degrees of freedom and less collinearity to help detect 
more effects than a cross-sectional or time series analysis would reveal (Gujarati & 
Porter, 2009:592-593). 
 
In constructing the indexes, the guidance of Gompers et al. (2001) and their 
seminal work on the construction of an index in the broader governance field was 
followed, using dummy variables to score the indicators in the indexes. There are a 
number of prior South African studies on corporate governance that developed their 
own unique indexes (Abdo & Fisher, 2007; Ntim, 2009; Mans-Kemp, 2014; 
Ashwin, 2015). Ntim followed the guidance of Gompers et al. (2001) by developing 
a compliance index that used 50 corporate governance disclosure provisions linked 
to King II, using dichotomous 0 and 1 to score the index. In addition, Ntim 
(2009:26) also built an equilibrium variable model based on 11 corporate 
governance variables using hypotheses. Abdo and Fisher (2007:44) based their 
research on King II and used 29 variables to develop a G-score. The same G-score 
index was also used by Opperman (2009) in a study that included 20 companies, 
and by (Kolobe, 2010) in a study on 74 companies. Abdo and Fisher (2007:44) 
added a quality of disclosure component scored between 0 for no disclosure, 1 for 
disclosure, and 2 for evidence of implementation and monitoring. Mans-Kemp 
(2014:5 & 160) based her corporate governance score on 39 corporate governance 
factors from King II and the PIC investment evaluation instrument considering 
disclosure as well as acceptability dimensions and also using dichotomous 0 and 1 
to score the dimensions for her corporate governance score. Ashwin (2015:11) used 
dichotomous 0 and 1 to score 10 qualitative questions for an index based on King 
III. 
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This study builds its own indexes which focus on boards as a governance 
mechanism in the two constructs (CI and MLI) in the context of the South African 
environment. One of the criticisms of commercial corporate governance rankings 
is that because they are standardised they are unable to reflect institutional, cultural 
and contextual differences (Ntim, 2009:22). In recent prior South African corporate 
governance research (discussed above) the researchers compensated for the lack of 
localisation of commercial governance indexes by building their own corporate 
governance indexes (Abdo & Fisher, 2007; Ntim, 2009; Mans-Kemp, 2014; 
Ashwin, 2015), despite the labour-intensive process needed to build these indexes. 
However, none of these studies resulted in a maintained South African corporate 
governance index that can be compared to the Horwath report developed in 
Australia and subsequently used in governance-related Australian studies (Psaros 
& Seamer, 2002; Yarram, 2015:162). This study follows the local practice of 
building unique indexes with 25 indicators consolidated into the CI index and 23 
indicators into the MLI index. The relationship between the board as a governance 
mechanism (using CI and MLI) can be assessed using panel data analysis methods. 
Gujarati and Porter (2009:593-594) note that panel data can be assessed with the 
aid of four possible methods of analysis: 
 
1. Pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model that neglects the 
cross-sectional and time series nature of the data. 
2. The Random Effects model that assumes that the intercept values 
are randomly drawn from a population of intercepts 
3. Fixed Effects least squares dummy variable model, where all the 
observations are pooled, but the cross-sectional units have their 
own (intercept) dummy variable. 
4. The Fixed Effect within group model that pools all the 
observations and expresses each variable as a deviation from its 
mean value and estimates the OLS regression on the de-meaned 
or mean corrected values. 
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The CI and MLI indexes measure board-level controls used by the board as a 
governance mechanism in the corporate control and managerial labour constructs. 
Measuring board-level controls enable the study to assess the relationship between 
the board and firm value. The assessment is based on data from 84 subjects over a 
three-year period in a balanced panel enabling the study to use Fixed and Random 
Effects estimation methods. 
 
1.8.3 Firm value proxies  
Various prior international and local studies in the broader corporate 
governance field as well as on board characteristics have used econometric methods 
with various proxies for firm performance or value as the dependent variable 
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; Ntim, 2009; Mans-Kemp, 2014; 
Tshipa, 2017). A summary of prior studies with their dependent variables are 
included in Table 1.1. This study uses a combination of accounting and market-
related proxies for firm value to compensate for the lack of consensus on firm value 
measures (Walsh & Seward, 1990:423). In total four firm value proxies have been 
identified considering recent prior studies as summarised in Table 1-1.  
 
Table 1-1 Proxies for firm value 
Dependent variable 
proxy for firm value 
References to prior studies 
Enterprise value per 
share (EV) 
Meyer & De Wet, 2013 
Return on Assets 
(RoA) 
Firer, 2003; Firer & Stainbank, 2003; Kyereboah-
Coleman, 2008; Ehikioya, 2009; Ntim, 2009; Renders, 
Gaeremynck & Sercu, 2010; Geletkanycz & Boyd, 
2011; Ibrahim & Samad, 2011; Ntim & Oseit, 2011; 
Mohammed, 2012; Semosa, 2012; Fosu, 2013; Mans-
Kemp, 2014; Waweru, 2014a; Ashwin, 2015; Tshipa, 
2017. 
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Table 1-1 Proxies for firm value - continued 
Dependent variable 
proxy for firm value 
References to prior studies 
Return on Equity 
(RoE) 
Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Kajola, 2008; Ehikioya, 
2009; Renders et al., 2010; Semosa, 2012; Mans-Kemp, 
2014; Muniandy & Hillier, 2015; Muchemwa et al., 
2016; Tshipa, 2017. 
Tobin’s Q Yermack, 1996; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008; Ehikioya, 
2009; Ntim, 2009; Christensen, 2010; Daines, Gow & 
Larcker, 2010; Renders et al., 2010; Yammeesri & 
Herath, 2010; Ibrahim & Samad, 2011; Ntim & Oseit, 
2011; Semosa, 2012; Fosu, 2013; Meyer & De Wet, 
2013; Ashwin, 2015; Muchemwa et al., 2016; Tshipa, 
2017. 
 
The accounting focused proxies use accounting metrics to develop the ratio 
of firm performance to assets (return on assets) and to equity (return on equity) as 
a proxy for firm value. Return on assets is also a mechanism to measure the effective 
and efficient use of assets by the board (the asset utilisation ratio) and have been 
used in the calculation of agency cost (Rashid, 2015:181). A possible disadvantage 
of accounting ratio’s is that it can be more readily influence by the accounting 
practices deployed by the CFO, which is why it is important to also consider 
market-based measures. The use of multiple proxies enabled the study to test the 
robustness of the findings for both accounting and market-based measures.  
 
As is evident from Table 1-1, Tobin’s Q is the most popular proxy for firm 
value and represents a mix between accounting and market measures; it is followed 
by RoA, an accounting measure for management, RoE, an investor-focused 
accounting measure and EV, a market-focused measure. This study uses EV despite 
its lower level of popularity as a proxy for firm value because of its market focus. 
It is nevertheless also possible to consider measures that are more closely related to 
the organisation, such as employee turnover, absenteeism and illegal acts or 
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penalties, as proxies for performance (Walsh & Seward, 1990:423). However, the 
results of organisational measures are generally reflected in the accounting and 
market valuation methods used in this study. Using ratios as a comparative tool 
enables comparison between firms irrespective of the size of the firms or the 
industries in which they operate. More detail on the formulas used for RoA, RoE, 
Tobin’s Q and EV are included in Appendix 3.  
 
Accounting-based methods such as RoE and RoA are commonly used 
methods to measure performance; however accounting policy or method choices 
could influence the results of these measures. RoA measures how effectively a 
company uses its assets to generate profit, while RoE measures how effectively a 
company uses its equity, including an assessment of the cost and benefit of finance 
or leverage to generate profit (Brown, 2016). As investors understand the 
limitations of accounting ratios that are based on historic accounting results, the 
study also uses more market-based ratios, namely Tobin’s Q and EV. Tobin’s Q 
regards the market value of a firm as a ratio of its replacement cost and includes 
debt considerations like RoE, assessing the effective use of assets to create value 
for the shareholders (Tobin, 1969). EV is considered to be a better valuation of firm 
value as it “is a more accurate estimate of takeover cost” and includes “factors such 
as preferred stock, debt”, while excluding cash resulting in a strong takeover 
valuation (Kennon, 2018). 
 
1.9 Organisation and layout of the study 
 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows: Chapter 2 described the 
South African context, considering the diversity of the country, its status as a 
developing country, the market, regulatory and legislative environments. Given the 
developmental context the discussion on the South African highlights how the 
strengths of the First World elements contrast against the developmental challenges 
of the Third World elements. 
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Chapter 3 started with the evolution and development of the agency theory 
from the identification of the challenges posed by the separation of ownership and 
control to the causes of goal divergence and the continued relevance thereof.24 The 
challenge posed by cooperative production with the development of agency cost as 
a method of managing the goal divergence problems using monitoring and bonding 
was identified. To put the historical development of the agency theory into context, 
the current relevance of the separation of ownership and control that forms the 
cornerstone of agency theory was discussed with the emphasis on recent local 
examples. Lastly, the chapter discussed prior local research that also developed 
indexes in the broader corporate governance field and ended by summarising the 
variables used by recent studies that considered board-related variables. 
 
Chapter 4 introduced corporate control as a construct expanded on the use of 
control variables and board-level control indicators. In so doing, controls that can 
be used by the board taking into account separation of duties and oversight were 
highlighted and used in the development of a CI index for the corporate control 
construct. 
 
Chapter 5 introduced managerial labour as a construct that focuses on the 
control and direction of the board’s labour. The different roles of the board were 
considered with their tenure, age, meeting attendance performance evaluation and 
the value and timing of their remuneration were identified and used in the 
development of an MLI index for the managerial labour construct. 
 
In chapter 6, the research methodology and design were expanded upon. The 
model, statistical and econometric methods used to assess the relationship between 
the board as a governance mechanism and firm value were discussed. The data 
sources and construction process used in the extraction of the data for the indexes 
and other variables were explained to set the background for the data analysis and 
discussion section.  
                                                 
24 The undergraduate and honours degrees in the broader field of accountancy in South Africa focus 
on strong technical competencies but have poor theoretical underpinnings. Therefore, this thesis 
explains the historical development of agency theory in detail in chapter 3. 
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Chapter 7 described the results of the data extracted and the analysis thereof 
and also discussed the results of the various estimation methods used. The summary 
and conclusion of the study were provided in chapter 8. This last chapter also 
highlighted the limitations of the study and areas for future research. 
 
A graphical layout of the different chapters in this study is shown below in 
Figure 1-1 Study layout: 
 
Figure 1-1 Study layout 
 
1
• Introduction
2
• South African context
3
• Agency theory background
4
• Corporate control
5
• Managerial labour
6
• Research methodology
7
• Results
8 • Conclusion
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CHAPTER 2: SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
 
“Our human compassion binds us to one another – not in pity or patronizingly, but as human 
beings who have learnt how to turn our common suffering into hope for the future.” 
Nelson Mandela 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter is to highlight the relevant contextual 
characteristics applicable to South Africa. Context is an important lens to use in 
considering the influence of country-specific characteristics such as the market, 
regulatory and legislative environments on the board as a governance mechanism. 
The sophistication of the South African economy sets it apart despite its status as 
an emerging market or developing economy (Andreasson, 2011b:654). The 
importance of context is highlighted by Johns (2001:31), who explains that the 
context of a phenomenon is important as it helps us to interpret results. In addition, 
country characteristics can be used to help explain the variance in governance 
mechanisms and ratings between countries. This is especially applicable in 
countries that differ in respect of legal protection and minority shareholder rights 
(Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz, 2007:1). Country differences therefore make standard 
commercially available governance rating metrics less applicable to developing 
countries. Udayasankar and Das (2007:263) find that better legal systems have a 
positive impact on governance. In a study on corporate governance in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Waweru (2014a:456) states that structural characteristics of developing 
countries require a different governance model to address the developing context, 
highlighting the importance of the development of suitable governance codes. This 
chapter focuses on South African-specific characteristics that influence the broader 
corporate governance environment applicable to listed companies and more 
specifically to the boards of those companies. 
 
The uniqueness of the South African situation is explained in this chapter. 
Section 2.2 begins with a brief overview of the historical background in order to 
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explain the reasons that have led to the change in some of the current governance-
related legislation and regulation. This is followed by a more in-depth discussion 
on the First World (section 2.3) and Third World (section 2.4) elements that 
influence governance. Lastly, section 2.5 summarises the importance of the South 
African context for the board as a governance mechanism. 
 
2.2 South African historical background 
 
The journey from colonialism to democracy has left South Africa with an 
unusual legacy of a mix between First and Third World elements (Simon, 
2001:377), making South Africa a “particularly interesting emerging market to 
analyse” (Ntim et al., 2015:195). In the run-up to the 1990s, the discovery of 
mineral deposits led to the development of a strong private sector dominated by a 
few mining houses with the capital and money markets dominated by large 
mutually owned insurance and pension funds (Armstrong et al., 2005:10). The 
colonial past helped to lay the foundation for a strong legislative environment and 
the dominance of a few firms in the affluent mining and finance sectors helped to 
sculpt a sophisticated market. The strength of the legislative environment and the 
market led to their classification as First World elements. The sophistication of the 
market helped the country to establish highly developed pockets of business 
excellence, despite the funding constraints that stemmed from isolation as a result 
of sanctions, which discouraged foreign direct investment (FDI) (Carmody, 
2002:256 & 259). As the South African merchant and investment banking industry 
focused on maintaining an independent relationship with banking clients, they 
generally did not function as an external governance mechanism (Rossouw, Van 
der Watt & Malan, 2002:294), and will therefore not be discussed as a First World 
element despite the fact that they are one of the First World elements. However, 
this study does not exclude any industry sectors as all sectors have their own 
legislative requirements and the JSE listing requirements have the same disclosure 
expectations for all industries. A First World banking sector has had its advantages 
as it resulted in a “stable banking sector” through the 2008 global financial crisis 
(Bussin, 2015:238). The financial infrastructure available in South Africa is 
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considered to be “extraordinary for an emerging market” (Andreasson, 2011b:654). 
The strong financial sector enabled the broader banking sector to adapt well to a 
more competitive environment and increased its contribution to the growth of South 
Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP) from 17% in 1994 to 24% in 2012 (Bhorat 
et al., 2013a:3). Despite the dominance of the insurance and pension funds 
(Armstrong et al., 2005:10), the role they played as institutional investors only came 
to the fore in 2012 with the introduction of the Code for Responsible Investing in 
South Africa (CRISA). This is discussed in more depth in chapter 4.  
 
The advantage of strong mineral deposits fuelling the mining sector helped to 
establish a strong market economy, but the “political disaster of apartheid” resulted 
in developmental challenges (Malherbe & Segal, 2001:10). Together the above 
factors helped to sculpt the need for improved governance practices in South Africa, 
including a need for societal transformation. Andreasson (2011a:1171) noted that 
this helped South Africa to develop the strongest economy in Africa at the time of 
democratisation. However, in comparison to the size of other developing economies 
in BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) the South 
African economy is relatively small. Retaining the number one spot (in Africa) has 
proved to be a challenge as South Africa was upstaged by Nigeria in 2014 and even 
by Egypt before reclaiming first place in 2016 (Rossouw, 2016).  
 
The changes in the political environment of the 1990s led to a need to change 
the social and economic environment. Armstrong et al. (2005:11) say that the 
“dismantling of the racially-based political system” in 1994 led to economic 
liberalisation using macro-economic reform to reduce the budget deficit, contain 
inflation and interest rates and improve transparency while reintegrating the country 
into the global economy.  
 
The transition to a more ethical globally competitive business environment 
was guided by establishing a corporate governance code, King I (IoDSA, 1994). 
South Africa was the first developing country to develop a corporate governance 
code (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009:377). This helped to establish the country 
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as a leading developing country on the corporate governance front. King I resulted 
in the institutionalisation of ethics and good corporate governance principles to 
guide the business transformation process towards a globally competitive 
environment (Nkomo, 2003:129).  
 
The level of acceptance of the King recommendations in South Africa further 
underscores the uniqueness of the King codes and reports as corporate governance 
is generally not strongly institutionalised in emerging markets (Andreasson, 
2011b:648). Although the separation of ownership from control, central to the 
agency theory, is acknowledged in King I, it also highlights the need to hold 
managers accountable and “encourages enterprise with integrity”, giving South 
African governance an ethical grounding (IoDSA, 1994:1-3).  
 
This ethical focus helped the country to address internal developmental 
objectives, namely to establish a more inclusive non-discriminatory labour and 
business environment, to help transform and grow the economy, reduce 
unemployment and redress past inequalities, and improve the Third World 
elements. Although growth and the “efficient creation of wealth” are important 
societal outcomes, unconstrained profit maximisation would be counterproductive 
as the rights of the public should also be considered (Pretorius, 2004:73), which 
imposes ethical or moral limits on the maximisation of self-interest.25 Marx and Els 
(2009:5) say that the value of ethical business is that it contributes “to short-term 
profitability of a business” as well as “its long-term survival”. Thus, an ethical focus 
can be beneficial to shareholders in both the short- and long-term. An ethical and 
longer time horizon can help counter the temptation to adopt a short-term focus. 
Tullberg (2013:128) states that the increased reporting requirements, mergers and 
acquisitions, and short-term bonuses encourage a short-term view in CEOs. This 
study includes an ethical focus and consequently deviates from the view of some 
prior research in developed countries (Anderson, 1989:1; Blair & Stout, 2001:405; 
                                                 
25 The societal limits are evidenced in the public outcry against “state capture” around the end of 
2016 (Pather, 2016). As the “state capture” debate occurred after the focus period of this study and 
is ongoing it is not discussed in this study. 
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Robé, 2012:3) that goal divergence implies a blind move that focuses only on 
maximising utility.  
 
First World elements were used to assist with the transformation or 
improvement of Third World elements with varying degrees of success. The 
legislative environment (a First World element) was influenced by South Africa’s 
colonial past and was adapted to help the country transform to a more inclusive 
society after apartheid. Another First World element is the JSE in its capacity as the 
market for corporate bonds and shares. The market can be used to attract FDI and 
enable companies to attract funding by encouraging the application of sound 
corporate governance principles.  
 
The Third World elements that influence governance options include 
inequality of skills coupled with a high unemployment rate and corruption,26 all 
requiring societal transformation to improve. The mix between First and Third 
World elements as discussed above is summarised in Figure 2-1. 
 
Figure 2-1 First and Third World elements 
 
 
Due to social inequality after 1994, businesses were confronted with the need 
to transform in order to address the inequality gap, as inequality in a marketplace 
                                                 
26 The discussion of First and Third World elements is not exhaustive and focuses on the key aspects 
deemed necessary to understand the governance landscape applicable to boards within the South 
African context. 
South Africa
First World
Legislation
Governance 
regulation
Market - JSE
Third World
Transformation Unemployment Corruption
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influences both local available labour and customer bases. The transformational 
objectives of South African society in relation to governance were addressed from 
two sides by using legislation and governance regulation to guide the 
transformation process. The First World elements are discussed in more detail in 
section 2.3. 
 
2.3 First World elements 
The legislative environment in South Africa, coupled with the judiciary, is 
one of the strengths of South Africa and forms part of the external governance 
mechanisms in the country along with the well-developed market in the JSE. 
External governance mechanisms include the legal environment (influenced by 
institutions like the state and the judiciary), the regulatory environment with its 
governance codes, and the marketplace facilitated by the JSE which operates the 
stock exchange (Rossouw, 2008:29). Some of the First and Third World elements 
applicable to South Africa are highlighted in Table 2-1, which is based on the World 
Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) for the periods 
2012-2013 and 2016-2017.  
 
Table 2-1 Selected South African GCI rankings for 2012 and 2016 
GCI index factor description GCI 
ranking 
2012/2013 
GCI 
ranking 
2016/2017 
Strength of auditing and reporting standards 1/144 1/138 
Efficacy of corporate boards 1/144 3/138 
Regulation of security exchanges 1/144 3/138 
Legal rights index 1/144 5/138 
Protection of minority shareholders 2/144 1/138 
Soundness of banks 2/144 2/138 
Female participation in the workforce 85/144 69/138 
Favouritism in decisions of government officials 110/144 115/138 
Pay and productivity 134/144 98/138 
Co-operation in labour-employer relations 144/144 138/138 
(WEF, 2012-2013; WEF, 2016-2017) 
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South Africa’s overall position in the 2012-2013 GCI rankings was 52 out of 
144, and 47 out of 138 in 2016-2017 (WEF, 2012-2013:324-325; WEF, 2016-
2017:324-325). It appears from the above table that, although there have been slight 
changes in the GCI rankings, the overall rankings of the legislative and governance 
factors remain high. Given the high rating on auditing and reporting, South Africa 
differs from other developing countries which suffer from a lack of skilled people 
in the broader accounting field (Waweru, 2014a:455) and could have difficulty in 
staffing external audit firms or finding skilled people to serve on audit committees. 
The ratings of female participation in the workforce and pay and productivity have 
improved, possibly indicating an improvement on the transformation front, while 
co-operation in labour-employer relations remained in the lowest position. 
Improved labour relations legislation, including the right to form trade unions and 
the right to strike, came at a price in terms of reduced competitiveness. Annual 
strikes by workers demanding improved wages have resulted in a “strike season” 
in South Africa where powerful unions claim higher wages to redress inequality 
while youth unemployment remains high (Molefe, 2011).  
 
Favouritism in decisions by government officials in 110 out of 144 rankings 
(2012/2013), and 115 out of 138 (2016/2017) continue to reduce competitiveness.27 
The extent of the challenges is illustrated by the Auditor-General of South Africa 
(AGSA), who reported “that almost half of the departments and a third of public 
entities materially did not comply with SCM [supply chain management] legislation 
in their procurement processes”, and that the majority of the adverse audit findings 
centred on “[u]ncompetitive or unfair procurement processes” (AGSA, 
2013/2014:58-59). However, as this study focuses on the SRI companies in the 
private sector, the impact of government as a stakeholder is limited to the legislation 
enacted by the state. 
 
                                                 
27 The level of favouritism that resulted in allegations of corruption by state-owned companies in 
particular started to dominate the news in 2017 and is not included in this study as apart from 
Optimum Coal (who are excluded from this study as the company delisted in 2012) the SRI index 
companies were not implicated in the allegations. 
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Although the South African banking sector is highly sophisticated, this sector 
was excluded from the discussion in this chapter as the sector’s tradition of 
independence has resulted in the sector playing a low governance control role 
(Rossouw et al., 2002:294). The breakdown of the First World elements is 
described in greater detail, starting with the amendments to governance-related laws 
to support a democratic society and its transformation needs (discussed in section 
2.3.1). Secondly, the discussion focuses on the establishment of a code to guide 
governance including transformation (discussed in section 2.3.2) and ends with a 
discussion of the JSE as the market (section 2.3.3). South Africa has used its First 
World strengths to assist with the process of transformation towards a more 
democratic society.  
 
2.3.1 South African legislative environment 
Early legislative endeavours such as the Companies Act 61 of 1973, the 
Financial Markets Control Act 55 of 1989 and the Stock Exchange Control Act 1 
of 1985 focused on establishing markets with a level of protection against market 
abuse (Chitimira, 2014:939). Legislation is one of the mechanisms used to bind or 
limit the options of a board through setting legal obligations requiring the board to 
act or refrain from acting in a prescribed manner. Thus, the maximisation of self-
interest principle in agency theory should not be viewed as unconstrained since as 
a minimum it is curtailed by legislation. This limitation influences the options 
boards have regarding how they can maximise their self-interest as well as how they 
can direct and control the activities of a company.  
 
Together with the legal principles grounded in the common law such as the 
protection of property rights, the provisions of the 1973 Companies Act initially 
provided governance guidance by establishing legal principles that helped control 
corporate activities to protect the capital gathered by a firm (Mongalo, 2003:173-
174). These controls are compatible with the principles of managing goal 
divergence in agency theory as they centre on the protection of the rights of 
shareholders. For example, the 1973 Companies Act contained sections aimed at 
governing the relationship between shareholders and directors. These provisions 
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included the appointment and dismissal of directors by shareholders, and 
shareholder approval for selling the whole or substantially the whole of the 
company (RSA, 1973: sections 208-210, 228 & 234), both measures designed to 
help protect shareholders. The 1973 Companies Act was an improvement as 
company law was initially based on the English system. However, the 1973 Act did 
not deal adequately with governance matters (King, 2010:446). This gave rise to a 
need for legislative renewal. 
 
2.3.1.1 Legislative renewal  
Breaking out from the “shackles of apartheid” also resulted in a need for 
legislative review, to repeal apartheid laws and enact non-discriminatory and 
transformational laws. To help meet society’s transformational needs, labour 
relations were one of the first focus areas for updated and improved legislation, 
given the alliance between the ANC, organised labour in the form of the Congress 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party 
(SACP) (Michie & Padayachee, 1998:632-633). The first laws to be amended 
related to labour; in fact, the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 legitimised organised 
labour. The Act applies to the employer-employee relationship and grants rights to 
trade unions (RSA, 1995). Other legislation promulgated to assist with 
transformation included the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 and 
the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EE). Rossouw et al. (2002:296) describe 
the transformational focus as an endeavour to “advance economic development, 
social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace”. To lay the 
foundation for continued legal reforms, a new Constitution was adopted in 1996 
(RSA, 1996) with a Bill of Rights28 that included property rights and specified the 
following “values:  
a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms. 
b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
                                                 
28 South African legislation divides the different Acts into chapters, which should not be confused 
with the chapters in this study. For example, the Bill of Rights is in Chapter 2 of the Constitution 
although it is also discussed in chapter 2 of this study. 
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c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.” (RSA, 
1996: section 1) 
 
The Constitution necessitated the amendment of other laws in a manner that 
promotes compliance with the Bill of Rights. In addition, the protection of property 
rights in the Constitution is important (RSA, 1996: section 25), as property rights 
are seen as an important component of good governance for a country. The 
Constitution was followed by various laws in which the state guided transformation. 
As the “Bill of Rights represents a value system” it also helped to update common 
law principles set through precedents as all precedents have to abide by the 
principles of the Constitution (Brand, 2009:72-73).  
 
Labour market transformation was influenced by the Employment Equity Act 
(EE) 55 of 1998, which encouraged the employment of people from previously 
disadvantaged groups (RSA, 1998b), and the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act (B-BBEE) 55 of 2003, which encouraged increased ownership 
in companies by the African29 majority. In response to criticism, the move to B-
BBEE followed a more broad-based approach requiring companies to disclose their 
transformation efforts (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013:123), from employment to 
procurement. The above legislative changes promoted transformation as well as 
improved control over managerial power (Mongalo, 2003:176). Although various 
legislative changes were promulgated after the Constitution, this study focuses on 
legislation that directly influences the governance role of boards. 
 
2.3.1.2 Market focused legislation 
Legislation centred on preventing market abuse includes the prevention of 
insider trading. The Insider Trading Act 135 of 1998 improved market confidence 
but it was hampered by inadequate and ineffective implementation and 
enforcement, which resulted in the enactment of the Securities Services Act 36 of 
2004 to prevent insider trading (Chitimira, 2014:940). The Securities Services Act 
                                                 
29 The terms “Black” and “African” are used to refer to the indigenous tribes of Africa; however, the 
legal requirements linked to B-BBEE only apply to South African citizens. 
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“resulted in new policies and approaches among listed companies and their 
advisors, and has led to a sharp reduction in the perceived incidence of insider 
trading” (Wilson, 2011). 
 
The change in the economic and legislative environment necessitated 
improvements to corporate laws. In 2003 the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) started a broad legislative reform initiative that culminated in a policy paper, 
South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Reform 
(DTI, 2004). The policy paper identified key shortcomings in the 1973 Companies 
Act that included a need for a more simplistic and accessible framework and 
improved accountability of directors (Pretorius, 2004:67-68). The aim was to “align 
the Companies Act with 21st century thinking and practice” (Barac & Moloi, 
2010:21). Pretorius (2004:70) highlighted the four rights of shareholders included 
in the policy paper as the right to capital, to income, to vote and to information. The 
policy paper led to the enactment of the new Companies Act in 2008. Delport 
(2009:2-3) summarised the purpose of the new Companies Act as to: 
“promote compliance with the Bill of Rights” and the “development 
of the South African economy by: 
 encouraging entrepreneurship and enterprise efficiency; 
 creating flexibility and simplicity in the formation and 
maintenance of companies; 
 encouraging transparency and high standards of corporate 
governance as appropriate, given the significant role of 
enterprises within the social and economic life of the nation; 
 promote innovation and investment in the South African markets; 
 re-affirm the concept of the company as a means of achieving 
economic and social benefits; 
 continue to provide for the creation and use of companies in a 
manner that enhances the economic welfare of South Africa as a 
partner within the global economy; 
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 promote the development of companies within all sectors of the 
economy, and encourage active participation in economic 
organisation, management and productivity; 
 create optimum conditions for the aggregation of capital for 
productive purposes and for the investment of the capital in 
enterprises and the spreading of economic risk; 
 provide for the formation, operation and accountability of non-
profit companies (NPC) in a manner designed to promote, 
support and enhance the capacity of such companies to perform 
their functions; 
 balance the rights and obligations of shareholders and directors 
within companies;  
 encourage the efficient and responsible management of 
companies;  
 provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of financially 
distressed companies, in a manner that balances the rights and 
interests of all relevant stakeholders, and  
 provide a predictable and effective environment for the efficient 
regulation of companies” (Delport, 2009:2-3). 
 
The 2008 or ‘new’ Companies Act affirms the importance of corporate 
governance, as well as the company as a means of achieving economic and social 
benefits, enhancing economic welfare, encouraging investment of capital in 
enterprises, balancing the rights and obligations of shareholders and directors and 
making provision for relevant stakeholders (employees and creditors) in business 
rescue events. The Act supports capital investment and enterprise and protects the 
rights of shareholders as well as other stakeholders through accountability. The 
consideration of social and economic welfare highlights the importance of 
companies’ catering for a mix of business and societal needs, including the rights 
of directors, shareholders and stakeholders. The consideration of broader rights 
deviates from the classical capitalistic model by focusing on stakeholders. South 
Africa applies a more holistic view in line with the African world view that is based 
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on the guiding principle of “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (I am a person through 
other persons)”, also referred to as ubuntu (Dolamo, 2013:2).  
 
Unfortunately, despite this society-centred African world view or philosophy, 
people are not immune to the maximisation of self-interest. Scholtz and Smit 
(2012:27) note that there is a growing concern that company directors and 
executives are using their position in their companies to pursue their own objectives 
rather than focusing on what is best for the company and its shareholders. The 
maximisation of self-interest is not limited to executive directors; it is reflected in 
the financial news, with estimated “losses between R25 bn and R30 bn each year to 
corruption, incompetence and negligence in the public service” (Silke, 2016; 
Nyathi, 2017). Thus, although the maximisation of self-interest is not in line with 
the African world view it is a factor in the South African environment and supports 
the use of an agency theory perspective in this study. 
 
The transition from the 1973 to the 2008 Companies Act took longer than 
expected and required a stepping stone in the form of the Corporate Laws 
Amendment Act 24 of 2006. The Corporate Laws Amendment Act distinguished 
between widely held and limited interest companies, allowed the use of electronic 
aids in furnishing information, allowed financial assistance for the purchase of 
shares, added new provisions for the appointment of auditors and audit committees, 
provided for the Security Regulations Panel and included mechanisms for dealing 
with non-compliant financial reports (RSA, 2006). Barac and Moloi (2010:21) 
explain that the incorporation of some of the recommendations of King II into the 
Corporate Laws Amendment Act “provided statutory backing to corporate 
governance practices”. The 2008 Companies Act continued the practice to 
incorporate governance recommendations from King II, including the requirement 
that the audit committee should include a report in the annual financial statements 
(section 94(7)(f)(iii)) (RSA, 2008a). The move to legislate governance regulation 
increased the legislative requirements applicable to boards. In the period 2006 to 
2012 the number of changes in corporate law as well as governance regulations led 
to increased debates around the proposed and enacted changes which increased 
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general awareness. This made companies more responsive to the need to adapt to 
change. The advantages of the fact that boards have the ability to direct companies 
in a changing environment are reflected in the strong rating for efficacy of boards 
in the GCI (WEF, 2012-2013:325). The high board efficacy rating is not surprising 
as Yoshikawa and Resheed (2009:254) note that effective governance systems are 
dependent on strong legal systems. The improved responsiveness to changed 
guidelines, together with the country’s strong auditing and accounting standards in 
the GCI (WEF, 2012-2013:325; WEF, 2016-2017:325)30, is possibly another of the 
reasons why South African companies were able to adapt so quickly to integrated 
reporting (Makiwane & Padia, 2013:422). 
 
Although the 2008 Companies Act was approved in 2008, there was an 
immediate need for clarity and improvement, despite the consultative process 
followed and the Act only came into effect after amendments had been approved 
and legislated in 2011 (RSA, 2011). As a result, 2012 was the first financial year in 
which the 2008 Companies Act came into effect. Immediate amendment is not 
unusual – the 1973 Companies Act was also amended in the year after its enactment 
(Pretorius, 2004:74).  
 
The 2008 Companies Act included new aspects, for example the option to 
have share classes with different rights (section 35), protection of whistle-blowers 
(section 159), and alternative dispute resolution and business rescue (sections 128-
156), the focus of this study is on the sections that influence the board as a 
governance mechanism. This study argues that the increased legislation influences 
the rigour with which boards approach their duties to limit any future liability 
claims. For example, the directors’ standard of conduct and accountability (sections 
76 & 77) (RSA, 2008a) introduced a “business judgement rule” to aid in evaluating 
whether a director has acted with the “necessary care, skill and diligence” (Barac & 
Moloi, 2010:21). The latter can be used to aid directors in the application of ‘care 
and skill’ but can also be used to hold them accountable. Other examples of sections 
                                                 
30 South Africa’s ratings deteriorated in the 2017-2018 report, however as the revised ratings are 
well outside the focus period of the study they are not discussed. 
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of the 2008 Companies Act that influence the board as a governance mechanism 
include the requirement that public companies should be independently audited31 
(section 90), the establishment of the statutory audit and S&E committees (sections 
72 & 94), and sections that directly relate to directors (sections 66-78) (RSA, 
2008a). Section 94(4) defines the independence criteria that must be met for 
directors to be eligible to serve on the audit committee, however, the Act does not 
use the term independent directors it only refers to directors (RSA, 2008a). The 
requirements regarding audit and S&E committees are only applicable to larger 
companies and public companies. As the Companies Act do not differentiate 
between the different types of directors, the accountability requirements apply to 
all directors.  
 
The rights of shareholders in terms of their beneficial interest are defined in 
the Companies Act as the right of a person to receive any distribution and exercise 
the rights attached to any security (section 1). Protection for minority shareholders 
(Chapter 5),32 and remedies (Chapter 7) are also included in case of any complaints 
or disputes (RSA, 2008a). As a company is a separate legal entity, the board is 
bound by the Companies Act to act “in good faith and for a proper purpose” and 
“in the best interest of the company” (RSA, 2008a: section 76). As the Act does not 
differentiate between the different types of directors it supports the practice of using 
a unitary board of directors, in line with the Anglo-American model. The enhanced 
governance requirements in the Companies Act include “a chapter on 
accountability and transparency” and set out directors’ duties of good faith, care, 
skill and diligence (King, 2010:446), helping to encourage a more rigorous 
approach to governance by directors. Enhanced governance expectations of the 
board in the 2008 Companies Act is more prescriptive and directors conduct 
                                                 
31 The requirement for financial statements to be audited is not new; however, the exception of not 
requiring an audit for companies where all the shareholders are directors is new, as is the amended 
provision which makes the audit committee a statutory committee where the shareholders need to 
appoint independent directors to the audit committee and the audit committee needs to report back 
to the shareholders. The establishment of a statutory social and ethics board committee is also a new 
requirement. 
32 The Companies Act is set out in chapters to distinguish between the various concepts dealt with 
in the Act; these references to chapters refer to the different chapters in the Companies Act and not 
to the different chapters in this study. 
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(section 76) and directors liability (section 77) have been highlighted, increasing 
the risk of legal action against board members (Carciumaru, 2010:251). The 2008 
Companies Act retained requirements on financial record keeping but added the 
requirement that financial statements should be aligned to reporting standards 
(sections 28 & 29), with increased guidance on company secretaries (sections 86-
89), external audit (sections 90-93) and audit committees (section 94) (RSA, 
2008a). However, small or private companies were relieved of the audit 
requirement unless their public interest score required otherwise (RSA, 2008a: 
section 90). As the 2008 Act included “issues of corporate governance” it provided 
added impetus to update South African corporate governance guidelines, resulting 
in the issue of King III on 25 February 2009 (King, 2010:447). 
 
The 2008 Companies Act used the best interests of the company as the focal 
point for directors’ fiduciary duties, with the result that shareholders were no longer 
the main focus (RSA, 2008a: section 76). This was a shift away from the commonly 
accepted management theory “that the board represents and safeguards the interests 
of the dispersed shareholders” (Sur, Lvina & Magnan, 2013:373). Shareholders 
should, however, be taken into consideration as business enterprises control the 
employment of capital provided by shareholders to reap rewards (IoDSA, 1994:6). 
This emphasises the importance of the role of shareholders. 
 
The 2008 Companies Act “sets the framework in which the company operates 
and the recommended practice set out in King III [discussed in section 2.2.1.2] 
provide guidance for directors as to how they should direct the business of the 
company” (King, 2010:446). The initial use of legal developments as early 
governance controls was not fully supported by a parallel development of corporate 
governance practices or codes. As there “is always a link between good governance 
and the law” (IoDSA, 2009b:10), the following section focuses on the development 
of governance guidelines in the various King reports to address the gap in 
governance practices. 
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2.3.2 South African corporate governance regulatory environment 
Armstrong et al. (2005:10-11) state that until the early 1990s stringent 
exchange controls coupled with political and financial sanctions impaired the 
proper functioning of market mechanisms, resulting in “excessive rent-seeking by 
both government and private sector management” generally at the “expense of 
employees and shareholders”. This highlights the negative consequences of 
ineffective oversight at board-level and the need for improved governance 
practices. With the end of apartheid and international sanctions, companies in South 
Africa were confronted with a different business environment that required them to 
adapt from an isolated economy to a global competitive business economic 
environment. Isolation had led to “bloated unfocused” companies managed by 
“entrenched and complacent managers” while South African corporate governance 
practices started to lag behind international norms in the 1980s and early 1990s 
(Malherbe & Segal, 2001:3).  
 
2.3.2.1 Introduction of governance guidelines 
To address corporate governance shortcomings, the Institute of Directors in 
Southern Africa (IoDSA) formed the first King Committee to consider the “special 
circumstances prevailing in South Africa” and “make recommendations on a Code 
of Practice on the financial aspects of corporate governance in South Africa”, 
considering simpler reporting, ethical guidelines, and the entrance of disadvantaged 
communities as entrepreneurs (IoDSA, 1994:3, 43). This resulted in the issue of the 
King Report on Corporate Governance (King I) in 1994, the same year as the first 
democratic elections (IoDSA, 1994). King I's issue was timely and it helped guide 
South African business out of a period of isolation towards a market-focused 
competitive economy while creating “unprecedented interest in corporate 
governance in South Africa” (Rossouw et al., 2002:289). With the issue of King I, 
South Africa became the first developing country to frame a corporate governance 
code (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009:377). King I was “hailed internationally 
as a seminal work on corporate governance” (Barac & Moloi, 2010:20). In support 
of this, Wanyama, Burton and Helliar (2009:162) described South Africa as one of 
the leaders in corporate governance in Africa and globally. Armstrong et al. 
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(2005:9) noted that the motivation behind King I was unusual as it was not 
developed because of corporate crises, but to help guide the competitiveness of the 
private sector following its re-admission to the global economy after the collapse 
of apartheid. Not only did the governance guidelines help managers adapt to a 
changed competitive business environment, but they also helped to attract funding 
through FDI with inflows at R5.7 billion in 1995 improving to R17.9 billion in 1998 
(Alessandri, Black & Jackson, 2011:231-232). This illustrates the way a First World 
element such as strong governance can help to transform society by reducing 
unemployment, a Third World element.   
 
King I highlighted the fact that the board (i.e. a single board) is responsible 
for controlling the company and monitoring management while ensuring that it 
oversees decisions on material matters, with a balance between executive and non-
executive directors (IoDSA, 1994: Chapter 4)33. Reinecke (1996:11) identifies four 
activities available to boards to accomplish the above, namely, directing (towards a 
long-term strategy), executive action (decisions that impact the company and its 
business), accountability (the board is accountable for the actions of the company) 
and supervision (oversight and monitoring of management’s performance). This 
emphasised the importance of the role of the board as a governance mechanism. 
Guiding boards in improved governance in developing countries is considered 
critical, as it is a mechanism for encouraging economic reform and growth 
(Chakrabarti et al., 2008:63). This is in line with the principle of applying ethical 
leadership characterised by the “ethical values of responsibility, accountability, 
fairness and transparency” towards “enterprise with integrity” introduced by King I 
(IoDSA, 1994:1-3). The foundation of all the King reports is ethical and effective 
leadership that is aligned to the African model of corporate governance or ubuntu 
(Andreasson, 2011b:647). It is possible that ethical leadership can help to curtail 
the maximisation of self-interest by reducing misuse of resources and rent 
extraction as South Africa remains vulnerable to the negative consequences of the 
maximisation of self-interest (Cameron, 2007; Gumede, 2015; Kew & Bonorchhis, 
2015; Cameron, 2016).  
                                                 
33 King I use chapters to distinguish between different sections in the report. 
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A concern regarding the shortage of skills34 influenced the recommendations 
in King I by limiting the number of independent directors to two while encouraging 
a balanced board. Other recommendations included a list of 10 general functions of 
a board (Chapter 4), 19 guidelines to directors and eight recommendations for 
improved transparency relating to the responsibilities of a board (Chapter 5) 
(IoDSA, 1994).  
 
To help achieve the transformational goal of South African society at the 
time, and address skills shortages, King I included guidelines on affirmative action 
that centred on eradicating workplace discrimination and recommending actions by 
businesses to broaden the skills base for all, as well as recommending worker 
participation in governance decisions (IoDSA, 1994:7 & 67). The affirmative action 
recommendation was followed by transformational legislation, including the 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (RSA, 1998b) and the Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act 55 of 2003, which encouraged increased economic 
activity and company ownership by the African majority (discussed in section 
2.3.1). 
 
Although King I acknowledged that shareholders need an acceptable return 
on their investment, it also acknowledged the existence of various stakeholders like 
suppliers, workers and customers (considering a more inclusive approach), and 
emphasised that successful companies lead to successful economies (IoDSA, 
1994:2).  
 
Given the transformational needs in South Africa, the governance 
accountability expectation moved from a shareholder focus over time to a more 
inclusive stakeholder approach. It started by including contracted stakeholders, 
such as employees, suppliers, customers and the providers of finance and moved to 
                                                 
34 The shortage of skilled specialist managers and directors in South Africa is discussed in section 
2.4. 
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a broader stakeholder35 view of the company as a social institution responsible to 
society and the environment (Rossouw et al., 2002:290). The promotion of other 
stakeholders (IoDSA, 1994:2) started a movement towards a more comprehensive 
view of governance that was expanded upon in the revisions of the King reports 
(IoDSA, 2002; IoDSA, 2009a; IoDSA, 2016). The stakeholder view of South 
African governance does not detract from the agency theory perspective used in this 
study, as using a theory different from the perceived theory applied by managers 
can result in enhanced insight into why some boards perform better than others.  
 
2.3.2.2 Continuous updating of governance guidelines 
The importance of strong governance practices countrywide was highlighted 
in 1996 when the currency (Rand) deteriorated sharply, which in turn led to a 
change in economic policy and trade liberalisation (Carmody, 2002:258-259). 
Trade liberalisation helped business ensure continued access to supplies and 
through a reduction in consumer prices it helped to improve liquidity available to 
consumers; however, it also required business to adapt to an internationally 
competitive environment (Carmody, 2002:259). South Africa was not without its 
share of corporate disasters, which led to the demise of companies such as Leisure-
net and Regal Bank and increased the urgency of updating governance guidelines 
(Barac & Moloi, 2010:21). The changed economic circumstances also highlighted 
the importance of updating governance practices to stay relevant. King II (the King 
Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2002) came into effect on 
1 March 2002 (IoDSA, 2002), after extensive consultation (Kakabadse & Korac-
Kakabadse, 2002:310). 
 
King II extended the stakeholder perspective of King I to a more integrated 
approach that included the “fundamental principles of good financial, societal, 
ethical and environmental practices” (IoDSA, 2002:7). Although King II followed 
                                                 
35 The fact that South Africa used a broader stakeholder inclusive approach to corporate governance, 
should not be viewed as contradictory to the agency theory focus of a research study. This study 
argues that, even though the board will need to consider the views of broader stakeholders to be able 
to successfully manage the business on an operational level, it will do so strategically and in a 
manner that maximise the long-term utility of the shareholders who appoint the board. 
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a more stakeholder-centred approach it still highlighted shareholders specifically 
and emphasised the importance of “entrepreneurship and enterprise” as drivers of 
business (IoDSA, 2002:8 & 46). King II dealt with the different stakeholder views 
by explaining that a board is accountable, in terms of “common law and the statute”, 
to the company it is responsible to and may be called to account to the shareholders, 
but it cannot be “accountable to all legitimate stakeholders” as asking “boards to be 
accountable to everyone would result in their being accountable to no one” (IoDSA, 
2002:7).  
 
The move towards more integrated governance, including the environmental 
aspects, does not detract from the profit or entrepreneurial motives of a business. 
Instead, King II uses the triple bottom line reporting concept in a more integrated 
approach that embraces social, environmental and financial or economic aspects to 
ensure the long-term sustainability of the enterprise (IoDSA, 2002:9). Faure and De 
Villiers (2004:73) found that the Top 100 industrial companies on the JSE were 
early adapters in the movement towards integrated sustainability, with 95% of the 
companies disclosing their code of conduct and 86% reporting on sustainability 
matters. 
 
As the South African environment is important in the context of this study, it 
is important for businesses in South Africa to recognise that it is an environment 
where “many of the country’s citizens disturbingly remain on the fringes of 
society’s benefits” (IoDSA, 2002:18).36 This encourages a more transformational 
process using an inclusive system with consultation on all levels (IoDSA, 2002:19), 
thereby encouraging transformation through the acceptance of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) in the management of businesses by adopting a more inclusive 
stakeholder view. Oliveira, Ceglia and Filho (2016:5) state that the consideration 
of stakeholder interest differentiated South Africa from the “dominant Anglo-
American model”. This helped South Africa to develop an African model for 
                                                 
36 The high unemployment rates that persist indicate that this is societal problem that still needs to 
be addressed. 
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corporate governance, in line with the African world view (Andreasson, 
2011b:647).  
 
To guide the board, King II included several recommendations that focused 
on the board. These recommendations centre on using a balanced unitary board with 
a majority of non-executive directors with sufficient independence to protect the 
shareholders’ interests, an independent chair for the board as well as its committees, 
and annual board and director evaluations (IoDSA, 2002:22-30). The use of 
independent directors as monitors is therefore seen as a mechanism to help control 
goal divergence in line with global practices (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010:943). 
 
The sustained process of updating corporate governance guidelines resulted 
in governance guidance being updated in tandem with the process of developing 
the new Companies Act and culminated in King III. King III consists of two 
publications: the King Code of Governance Principles for South Africa 2009 
(IoDSA, 2009a) and the King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009 (IoDSA, 
2009b). Barac and Moloi (2010:22) explain that for the first time the 
recommendations of King III applied to all businesses following an ‘apply or 
explain’37 approach (IoDSA, 2009b).  
 
To align King III’s recommendation to the 2008 Companies Act, the word 
“must” was used to indicate governance principles aligned to the Act, and “should” 
was used for recommended practices (King, 2010:447). King III included specific 
recommendations regarding the composition and governance of the board. Among 
other principles it required that the majority of the directors should be non-
executive, and that the majority of non-executive directors should be independent 
(principle 2.18), with at least two executive directors (CEO & CFO) (principles 
                                                 
37 This basis considers the “legal duty of the board to act in the best interest of the company” and 
leaves the power to select the best control mechanisms to govern the company to the board by 
requiring explanations as to how the 75 principles of King III were applied or reasons why they were 
not applicable, highlighting the importance of applying the underlying principles (IoDSA, 
2009b:12). 
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2.17 and 2.18, paragraph 73), and the board chaired by an independent non-
executive director (principle 2.16).  
 
It also required that one-third of the non-executive directors should retire by 
rotation annually (principle 2.18, paragraph 75),38 that self-governance should be 
applied though an evaluation of director independence (principle 2.18, paragraph 
76), that there should be a board self-evaluation (principle 2.22) and performance-
based remuneration linked to fair short- and long-term rewards while non-executive 
directors get a fixed fee and a fee for attending meetings (principle 2.25)39 (IoDSA, 
2009b). King III also acknowledged that “[g]overnance, strategy and sustainability 
have become inseparable” and moved in the direction of integrated reporting to 
extend the reporting on finance to include sustainability (King, 2010:446).  
 
King IV came into force towards the end of 2016 and continued the process 
of updating governance recommendations so that they remained current and 
encouraged continued competitiveness (IoDSA, 2016). The revision considers three 
main shifts, namely a change from “financial capitalism to inclusive capitalism”, as 
evidenced in the move “from siloed to integrated reporting”, and a shift from “short-
term capital markets to long-term sustainable capital markets” (IoDSA, 2016:4-5). 
To better guide continued improvement, King IV consolidated the 75 principles 
used in King III into 17 principles using an outcomes-based approach to “apply” 
the principles “and explain” the practice, included sector-specific guidelines and 
                                                 
38 Retire by rotation is applied in South Africa and takes the form of requiring approximately one-
third of the non-executive directors to retire every year to enable the shareholders to revisit their 
appointment in three-year cycles. The objective of the method is to help maintain an independent 
mindset for non-executive directors in a manner that also ensures that tacit knowledge of the board 
and its operation is not lost. Rotation can also be transformational through the inclusion of some less 
experienced directors to give people from previously disadvantaged backgrounds opportunities to 
gain experience. Executive directors tend to have longer employment contracts as they are also 
employees of the company. Although the rotational element has some characteristics in common 
with the structured boards popular in the USA, retirement by rotation is not a takeover defence. 
39 Non-executive director remuneration must be approved in advance by the shareholders using a 
special resolution (the directors part of directors’ remuneration must be approved by shareholders; 
the employee part of executive directors’ remuneration is determined in line with the remuneration 
policy for employees and disclosed). Non-executive director remuneration must be pre-determined 
depending on their work as monitoring directors (although a fixed and meeting attendance fee is 
recommended, most companies develop an inclusive fee as a monitoring role is not limited to 
meeting attendance) and cannot be linked to the performance of the company. 
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used the term “governing body” and not “board” to ensure its guidelines are more 
user-friendly to a wider variety of different entities (IoDSA, 2016:3-7). King IV did 
not deviate significantly from King III and retained the key focus on ethical 
leadership, a societal view, CSR and sustainability with integrated reporting (PwC, 
2016). Although King IV has retained the focus on independent oversight of the 
board, an independent chairperson, statutory audit as well as S&E committees, the 
report also encourages “integrated thinking” (IoDSA, 2016:28-32). The shift to 
“integrated thinking” accommodates interconnectedness and interdependencies in 
business to ensure that the organisation can continue to “create value over time” 
(PwC, 2016).  
 
Despite the fact that the various King guidelines are not legislative 
requirements, listed companies tend to apply them and disclose compliance as this 
is a listing requirement (JSE, 2011). However, the general level of increased 
acceptance over time could also be an indication of societal pressures to transform 
into a more inclusive society leading to a more competitive economy (Andreasson, 
2011b:656). Although compliance with the King reports is voluntary, widespread 
acceptance of the principles has helped to establish best practices that can be upheld 
in a court of law and become part of the common law (PwC, 2016). 
 
Given the high efficacy score of corporate boards in the GCI of first out of 
144 and third out of 138, it is evident that the use of legislation coupled with 
governance guidelines over time has helped to improve competitiveness in 
governance (WEF, 2012-2013:324; WEF, 2016-2017:324). This study uses the 
guidance of King III to identify control mechanisms available to the board to help 
control and direct the business of a company as King III’s recommendations apply 
to the period of the study. Despite the early use of governance guidelines in South 
Africa with the introduction of King I, academic research into the broader corporate 
governance field as well as the board as a governance mechanism got off to a slow 
start. 
 
  
66 
 
 
2.3.2.3 Prior South African research 
In comparison to the extensive literature on governance, South African 
research on corporate governance is limited in depth. The variety of local studies 
on corporate governance highlight the broad reach of the corporate governance 
field. Appendix 10 summarises South African studies that centred on corporate 
governance by highlighting the focus and findings of the studies. Prior South 
African research on the board as a governance mechanism was significantly sparser 
in comparison with governance research, and generally focused on specific board-
related variables. However, the findings of board-related variables are more 
pertinent to the focus of this study.  
 
No prior South African study could be found that performed and in-depth 
assessment of the relationship between the board and firm value. Thus, although 
the corporate governance body of knowledge suggests that good governance by the 
board should be positively related to firm value, the changed legislative and 
regulatory environment means that the new reality needs to be assessed as the past 
cannot always be used to predict the future. Table 2-2 focuses on discussing the 
variables and findings of prior South African research that centred on the board and 
board-related variables. 
 
Table 2-2 Board-related studies in South Africa 
Author and 
year 
Focus of the study Key findings 
Swartz and Firer 
(2005) 
Examined the relationship 
between board structure in 
terms of gender and ethnic 
origin and intellectual capital 
performance. 
Found a significant positive 
relationship between ethnic 
diversity and intellectual capital 
performance, while the 
relationship with gender did not 
appear to be significant. 
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Table 2-2 Board-related studies in South Africa - continued 
Author and 
year 
Focus of the study Key findings 
Ntim and Oseit 
(2011) 
Investigated corporate board 
meetings on performance. 
Uncovered a statistically 
significant relationship between 
the frequency of meetings and 
performance. 
Scholtz and Smit 
(2012) 
Considered the relationship 
between short-term executive 
compensation and company 
performance. 
Found a strong relationship 
between executive remuneration 
and company performance 
variables such as total assets, 
turnover and share price.  
Ntim and 
Soobaroyen 
(2013) 
Investigated the relationship 
between BEE disclosure and 
institutional ownership and 
board diversity. 
Institutional ownership was 
negatively associated with BEE 
disclosure whereas board diversity 
and dual leadership structures 
were not significantly associated 
with BEE disclosures. 
Muniandy and 
Hillier (2015) 
Considered the association 
between firm performance, 
board independence and 
growth options before and 
after the introduction of 
King III. 
The transition to King III had a 
positive impact on the relationship 
between independent non-
executive directors and the growth 
potential for firm performance. 
(Mans-Kemp & 
Viviers, 2015a) 
Considered the relationship 
between female and black 
board members and earnings 
per share or total shareholder 
return. 
Found an increased percentage of 
female and black directors on the 
JSE, with a positive relationship 
between female and black 
directors and earnings per share, 
but a negative relationship to total 
shareholder return. 
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Table 2-2 Board-related studies in South Africa - continued 
Author and 
year 
Focus of the study Key findings 
Ntim et al. 
(2015) 
Investigated the association 
between board size and firm 
value. 
Found a positive association 
between board size and firm 
value. 
Scholtz and 
Engelbrecht 
(2015) 
Investigated whether 
corporate governance 
measures influence executive 
directors’ remuneration. 
Found that institutional 
shareholders had a monitoring 
effect on share options and that 
non-executive directors on the 
remuneration committee 
moderated executive 
remuneration through the number 
of remuneration committee 
meetings.  
Smit (2015) Investigated whether 
monitoring by non-executive 
directors improves earnings 
quality in the AltX 
companies. 
Quality of earnings did not 
improve with monitoring by a 
higher percentage of non-
executive directors. 
Viviers (2015) Investigated the nature of 
executive remuneration 
issues raised by shareholder 
activists.  
Found that institutional 
shareholder activism mainly 
occurs via private negotiations 
and proxy voting. 
Viviers and Smit 
(2015) 
Investigated proxy voting as 
a form of shareholder 
discontent. 
Companies excluded from the 
JSE’s SRI index in 2013 attracted 
significantly more opposition 
when seeking shareholder 
approval of the election or re-
election of directors and the 
placing of shares under the control 
of directors. 
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Table 2-2 Board-related studies in South Africa - continued 
Author and 
year 
Focus of the study Key findings 
Muchemwa et al. 
(2016) 
Hypothesised a positive 
relationship between the ratio 
of non-executive directors 
and executive directors and 
board size to firm value. 
Found that the proportion of non-
executive directors and board size 
was not significantly related to 
Tobin’s Q. However, the 
proportion of non-executive 
directors was found to be 
positively linked to RoE, and 
board size was positively linked to 
RoA. 
 
As the board is one of the many governance mechanisms used in corporate 
governance studies; the sections in corporate governance studies that include board-
related variables were also considered in this study. It is apparent from the above 
tables that prior studies that focus on the board generally have a narrow focus and 
use only a few variables. In addition, the board has not been as extensively studied 
as corporate governance, thus there is a dearth of South African studies that 
considered the board as a governance mechanism in-depth. This chapter focuses on 
the South African context, which uses a hybrid governance system (PwC, 2016), to 
establish the correct context to serve as a backdrop for the study. The various board-
related indicators that form the basis of the board as a governance mechanism are 
defined in the corporate control and managerial labour chapters to enable the 
development of indexes (chapters 4 and 5). 
 
2.3.2.4 Uniqueness of South African corporate governance 
It is important to consider how the guidance of the King reports fits into the 
global governance landscape. Recent South African studies differentiated between 
the shareholder or agency model and the stakeholder model and followed a 
stakeholder model approach justified by the use of a stakeholder perspective in the 
King reports (Mitchell & Hill, 2010; Mans-Kemp, 2014). The discussions on the 
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shareholder versus stakeholder supremacy debates focus on benefits by considering 
“for whose benefit a company should be managed” (Blair & Stout, 2001:403; 
Bratton & Wachter, 2008:100-104; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008:1071-1073). These 
studies did not consider governance in the context of ethical leadership or the 
difference between the South African hybrid model and the classical shareholder 
versus stakeholder model. Figure 2-2 illustrates the contrast between of the 
shareholder and stakeholder models. 
 
Figure 2-2 Shareholder versus stakeholder models 
 
Adapted from Rossouw (2008:31) and Walsh and Seward (1990:423). 
 
The two different views can be merged by adopting the perspective that 
shareholder wealth is “subject to the constraints that the interest of the other 
claimants [stakeholders] are reasonably met” (Walsh & Seward, 1990:423). Given 
the continued shareholder prominence with the inclusion of a stakeholder focus and 
ethical leadership with its expectations of societal fairness, South Africa developed 
a hybrid model made up of elements from both the shareholder and the stakeholder 
perspectives.  
 
The adoption of an African world view could help to embed societal 
expectations through the consideration of CSR in a strong legislative and market 
environment in a manner that encourages enterprise towards improved shareholder 
wealth, especially over the long-term. This study argues that even when 
stakeholders are considered, especially in the day-to-day management of the 
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enterprise which directly involve the stakeholders as suppliers, customers, 
employees it is done in a manner that is subservient to the shareholders using a more 
strategic longer term view in line with the enlightened shareholder logic (Lok, 
2010:1309). The South African stakeholder view differs from the European or 
Japanese model as it is not bank-centred, it highlights the importance of considering 
all role players in the continued success of any enterprise. The hybrid model is 
illustrated in Figure 2-3 – South African hybrid governance. 
 
Figure 2-3 South African hybrid governance  
 
 
South Africa’s governance model is influenced by ubuntu, which highlights 
the importance of the community and is critical on an operational level as customers 
and employees are generally from the community. In addition, it operates in a 
market driven by a capitalistic-focused economy supported by a strong legislative 
environment. The capitalistic focus is underscored by the use of capitals in 
integrated reporting (IIRC, 2013), however, using integrated reports to 
communicate with a variety of stakeholders remains a challenge (Rensburg & 
Botha, 2014:152). Together with the limitations posed by legal and governance 
requirements, the maximisation of self-interest is bonded on an ethical level by 
“encouraging enterprise with integrity” in an environment with coordinated social 
upliftment expectations or CSR (IoDSA, 2002; IoDSA, 2009b). There is tension 
within this context as the board is accountable to the shareholders (establishing a 
shareholder relationship exposed to the normal agency problems), but also needs to 
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ensure that the company’s enterprises flourish in an environment with social 
upliftment challenges. Thus, in the day-to-day management (operational 
management) of the company, the board needs to consider the impact of the 
stakeholders and resources on the company’s enterprises. The board’s direction and 
control of the company takes place on a strategic level as the board is accountable 
to the shareholders and, therefore, goal divergence needs to be considered. This 
tension between shareholders and other stakeholders needs to be mediated by 
boards to ensure that they direct and control the enterprise in a manner that serves 
the best interests of their companies in the short-, medium- and long-term. By 
considering the broader community or stakeholders, the board can also benefit the 
shareholders through improved firm value over the long-term, as firms with a longer 
life expectancy are more valuable. One of the methods used to value a business is 
the net present value (NPV) of future cash flows (Steiger, 2008:1). 
 
In the above formula, N is the total number of periods, Rt the net cash 
flow in period t, and i the rate used to discount the cash flows. A longer-
term focus is therefore useful to shareholders as it can result in a higher 
present value valuation of the firm.  
 
Classic agency theory precludes companies from investing in CSR projects 
as it would be at the cost of both managers and shareholders, whereas stakeholder 
theory would be more likely to embrace CSR (Esser & Dekker, 2008:157). Thus, if 
South African governance was successful in marrying the agency and stakeholder 
perspectives, B-BBEE share deals would increase firm value. B-BBEE deals 
require extensive resources to fund the discounted value of the shares offered in the 
deal, and the commitment of a lot of management time to the assembling of the 
deal, as the offer is made to less sophisticated users (Alessandri et al., 2011:236). 
These additional costs make the deal costly and could clash with the shareholder 
view when the cost exceeds the benefit. However, from a social and wealth 
perspective, sacrificing short-term profit for long-term social improvement could 
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result in increased profitability over the long-term and improved firm value (Esser 
& Dekker, 2008:158).  
 
When event study was used to determine the market reaction to Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) or B-BBEE deals, Alessandri et al. (2011:239-
240) found that “BEE deals completed at a discounted equity price resulted in 
positive stock returns for the participating firm, while BEE deals completed at a 
premium resulted in negative stock returns”. Thus, even though transformational 
practices like BEE CSR projects are expensive, they can be to the benefit of the 
shareholders where they result in real upliftment. However, not all deals resulted in 
improvements as Ferreira and De Villiers (2011:36) found a negative relationship 
between BEE levels and share returns in one year.  
 
Although shareholders could also be viewed as one of the stakeholders, in 
practice shareholders have a predefined power, stemming from both governance 
regulation and legislation, that gives them an advantage. The manner in which the 
King reports highlight the role of shareholders, to appoint, remunerate and hold the 
board accountable, supports the use of an agency theory perspective for the 
evaluation of the relationship between the board and firm value. However, this 
study acknowledges that the board will consider stakeholders in directing and 
controlling the operational activities and enterprise of a company. While a more 
strategically focused shareholder approach with its accompanying agency problems 
will be used to manage the shareholder relationship as shareholders have the power 
to appoint and dismiss the board. The focus of this study is on the relationship 
between the board as a governance mechanism and firm value using an agency 
theory perspective.40 
 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009:376) state that the increase in 
governance codes by “mid 2008” and the accompanying increased research show 
the importance of codes in encouraging good governance practices. South Africa is 
                                                 
40 The relationship between the board and the various stakeholder relationship is an area for future 
study. 
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possibly an example of how the use of governance guidelines helped companies to 
adapt to a competitive environment. Care should be taken not to use a “one size fits 
all” approach to governance codes as companies and their businesses vary (IoDSA, 
2016:29). Wu et al. (2015:251) found that importing “good governance” principles 
by a developing country would not yield the expected results if the implementation 
is ceremonial in nature. The risk of looking compliant while ignoring the underlying 
control principles is the reason why an important element in South African 
governance codes is the continued emphasis on “entrepeneurship and enterprise” 
(IoDSA, 2002:8), “economic value” and “positive performance of the company in 
creating value”, linked to the voluntary nature of the codes (IoDSA, 2009b:12, 41 
& 54). Boards were required to apply governance principles in the best interests of 
the company and the adoption of an ‘apply or explain’ approach implied that the 
governance process implemented is deemed by the board to be in the best interests 
of the company (IoDSA, 2009b:12), and is expected to result in improved firm 
value. With the opening up of the economy, the choices made by boards are subject 
to eventual judgment by the JSE in its capacity as the market. To aid in the process, 
the JSE included disclosure on the level of compliance with the King codes as a 
listing requirement (JSE, 2010a). The next section discusses the JSE. 
 
2.3.3 The JSE as the market for corporate control  
The legislative environment, especially after the passage of the Financial 
Markets Control Act 55 of 1989 and the Stock Exchange Control Act 1 of 1985, 
supported the existing well-established stock exchange. Malherbe and Segal 
(2001:25) note that the JSE is “one of oldest stock exchanges outside Europe and 
North America”.  
 
The development of a strong local market in the JSE can be attributed to the 
need for capital in deep-level mining, especially considering the limitations 
imposed by exchange controls and international sanctions in the latter part of the 
20th century (Carmody, 2002:262). Malherbe and Segal (2001:25) note that early 
on the JSE established a strong equity culture supported by “[s]trong non-bank 
financial institutions such as pension funds and life insurance companies” that 
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“channelled a large part of household savings into equity”. This made the JSE the 
largest stock exchange in Africa (Londt, 2005:60). The prominence of the JSE is 
underscored by its ranking as “the 19th largest stock exchange in the world by 
market capitalization” (JSE, [S.a.]). Access to funding via the JSE in an isolated 
environment resulted in the South African market being dominated by large groups 
or pyramids and in a tendency for smaller groups to be formed where the holding 
company is separate from the operating structure (Davidson, 1997:51-52). 
 
Opening the market after 1994 also resulted in some companies establishing 
primary listings outside South Africa, which increased the global footprint and 
improved access to funding for those companies (Rossouw et al., 2002:291-293; 
Armstrong et al., 2005:23). Among the companies that moved their primary listing 
to London to help access capital and expansion opportunities are Anglo American, 
Old Mutual and SA Breweries (Carmody, 2002:263).  
 
The move towards global competitiveness and the restructuring of some of 
the South African companies resulted in a reduction in the number of companies 
listed on the JSE; this number fell from 668 in 1998 to 620 in 2000, 426 in 2004 
and 401 in 2011, possibly due to consolidation and a reduced demand for equity in 
the domestic market (Rossouw et al., 2002:290-291; Armstrong et al., 2005:24; 
Makiwane & Padia, 2013:428). Governance concerns, the increased 
competitiveness that resulted from the opening of the South African markets, 
coupled with the transformational demands of the South African economic 
environment, resulted in the unbundling of the dominant control over South African 
companies, with a dismantling of complex control structures in order to remain 
attractive to investors (Bebchuk, Kraakman & Triantis, 2000:313; Malherbe & 
Segal, 2001:3). However, despite the dramatic change in ownership structures little 
subsequent South African research focused on identifying controlling shareholders 
(Steyn & Stainbank, 2013); most focused on the use of blockholders with a 5% or 
more shareholding (Abor & Biekpe, 2006; Mangena & Chamisa, 2008; Ntim, 2009; 
Ntim et al., 2015), but reported the more concentrated share ownership and pyramid 
structure as differentiating characteristics of the South African market (Fosu, 2013). 
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South African governance is differentiated by its continuation of an equity culture 
where long-term investment and insurance companies continue to channel public 
savings into equity investments including via pension funds (Thom, 2014). The 
practice of using group structures that separate the holding company from the 
operating companies persists and can complicate the analysis of results as the 
holding company need not have any own sales41 as it focuses on legal and financial 
matters whereas the underlying operating company focuses on operational matters 
that generate income. In line with the European model, institutional shareholding 
in South Africa may result in large total shareholdings with Kyereboah-Coleman 
(2008) reporting a mean institutional shareholder presence of 56%.  
 
Despite an entrenched culture of using equity to fund firms, new equity for 
small and medium-sized firms became difficult to attract, possibly due to concerns 
about the governance and leadership of smaller firms (Malherbe & Segal, 2001:4). 
To assist smaller entities, the JSE launched the AltX division for high-growth 
smaller companies (JSE, 2010a). This successfully encouraged smaller growth 
companies to use the JSE market to attract funding via equity as by 2012 more than 
R1.25 billion had been raised and the 100th company had been listed on the AltX 
in August 2012 (Minney, 2012).  
 
To ensure that the market kept abreast with global practices, the JSE 
comprehensively revised its listing requirements in 1995 and 2000 (IoDSA, 
2002:9). In addition, the JSE also implemented many of the recommendations made 
by the various King reports by incorporating them into the listing requirements 
(Mongalo, 2003:175; JSE, 2010a; JSE, 2011).  
 
The JSE is also subject to regulation and needs to apply annually to “the 
Minister of Finance for an operating licence”, is “under the control of the Financial 
Services Board” and operates “under the Security Services Act No. 36 of 2004” 
(Londt, 2005:63). Rossouw et al. (2002:294) note that the South African regulatory 
                                                 
41 As a number of holding companies are large listed companies a better measure for firm size is 
total assets as sales might not be the best measure of size where a holding companies does not have 
its own sales. 
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system followed the development of the financial system in its evolution. This 
helped the country to adapt to the competitive global business environment. Thus, 
using legislation and governance regulation or guidance, South Africa guided its 
businesses towards transformation to enable them to adapt to a more competitive 
market. The value of improved governance and the strength of the markets are 
evident in the overall performance of the JSE all shares for the period 1994 to 2015, 
as illustrated in Figure 2-4. 
 
Figure 2-4 JSE closing price 1994-2015 
 
 
With the JSE as the market, companies had access to funding and prospective 
investors were able to access shares, enabling an agency relationship. As a result of 
legislation and governance guidance, the agency relationship was not unfettered as 
the board were accountable and responsible to the shareholders via their 
shareholding and the power to appoint, dismiss and approve the remuneration of 
the board rest with the shareholders (RSA, 2008a: sections 61, 66 & 71). Through 
legislation, regulation and the market the external First World elements restricted 
the governance options of the board, and limited maximisation of self-interest 
within the specific context applicable to South Africa.  
 
The First World elements were also used to help address the need for societal 
transformation (discussed in section 2.4) and the improvement of the Third World 
elements. The Third World or developing country elements highlight key 
differences between developing and developed countries in terms of broader social 
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responsibility. Rossouw (2002:417) noted that companies in developing countries 
“often need to take on responsibilities that are not normally considered the 
responsibility of companies” to help “to ensure stable and strong communities in 
which they can operate”, thus involving “themselves in matters such as eradicating 
backlogs in education, training, health care” to name a few examples. 
 
2.4 Third World elements 
 
The legacy of colonialism followed by apartheid resulted in a South African 
society divided “along racial and economic lines” (West, 2006:435), thus creating 
a need to transform the country. The ANC-led government responded with 
“sweeping reforms” that helped to alter the South African social, political and 
economic climate and brought an end to sanctioned economic isolation (Alessandri 
et al., 2011:231). Bhorat et al. (2013a:2) state that this need for transformation was 
compounded by the expectation that political freedom would result in economic 
prosperity.  
 
The transformation process was kick-started by using labour-focused 
legislation, moving to empowering broader share ownership (section 2.3.1) and 
using economic policies (section 2.4.2) aimed at growing the economy to create 
more employment. The urgent need for social development, grounded in the 
expectation that political freedom would result in economic prosperity, resulted in 
CSR and the role of corporations in transformation becoming increasingly salient 
in the broader governance debate (Andreasson, 2011b). To understand the scope 
and demands faced by a transformational process, it is important to consider South 
Africa’s demographics to better understand the need for social upliftment through 
transformation (section 2.4.1). Thereafter transformation is discussed in section 
2.4.2, followed by unemployment (section 2.4.3) and corruption (section 2.4.4) as 
the last Third World element. 
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2.4.1 Country demographics 
South Africa is a diverse developing country with eleven official languages 
and a population of 51 million people in 2011 (Statistics South Africa, 2012:12). A 
summary of the demographic details is given in Table 2-4. The table shows that 
nearly 80% of the population is African42 with an average age of 24 years and a 
labour participation rate of only 64%. In contrast, the White, Indian or Asian and 
Coloured population groups make up 20.3% of the population with an average age 
of over 30 years. The White population has the highest labour participation rate at 
76.8%.  
 
The poor labour participation rate of the other groups highlights the country’s 
Third World elements, namely the continuing need to address transformation, 
including in the areas of education (section 2.4.2) and unemployment (section 
2.4.3). It is clear from Table 2-3 that after more than two decades the country is still 
trying to deal with racial inequality. However, the age median should be taken into 
consideration as older people generally have more experience and are more 
employable. 
 
Table 2-3 Summarised South African demographical information 
  Percentage of the 
population 
Median age in 
years 
Expanded labour force 
participation rate 
African 79.2 24 64.4 
Coloured 8.9 27 68.5 
Indian/ 
Asian 
2.5 32 66.4 
White 8.9 39 76.8 
Other 0.5 
  
(Statistics South Africa, 2012:17, 22 & 51) 
 
 
The Third World elements that differentiate South Africa include the need for 
transformation to address past inequalities and unemployment problems in an 
                                                 
42 The indigenous people from Africa are referred to as “African” or “Black”, in Table 2-4. Statistics 
South Africa uses “African” whereas in the context of BEE or B-BBEE the term “Black” is used to 
indicate the racial or ethnic group.  
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environment where corruption and misuse of resources are threats that could 
hamper transformation goals.  
 
2.4.2 Transformation 
The main process used for transformation was the revision of South African 
laws (refer to section 2.3.1). The more significant transformational laws are labour-
related and are discussed in section 2.4.3.  
 
The move to use legislation for transformational purposes was possibly 
motivated by the slow pace of change immediately after 1994. Michie and 
Padayachee (1998:623-624) say that the slow delivery of social and physical 
infrastructure was also centred around financial difficulties at regional and local 
government level “exacerbated by a culture of non-payment for services” and the 
lack of capacity to “coordinate and implement the changes”, complicated by 
growing corruption. However, non-income indicators of welfare such as improved 
access to basic services such as water, electricity and sanitation did increase after a 
slow start (Bhorat et al., 2013a:16). Access to piped water and electricity as per the 
2011 census is summarised in Table 2-4, showing the levels of improved access 
from the 1996 census results to the results of the 2011 census. 
 
Table 2-4 Access to water and electricity 
Year Electricity Piped water 
1996 58.2% 60.8% 
2001 69.7% 62.3% 
2007 80.1% 69.4% 
2011 84.7% 73.4% 
(Statistics South Africa, 2012) 
 
 
The initial improvement in the delivery of services, albeit slow, did make a 
“palpable change to many people” though improved access to water for four 
million, the provision of sanitation for three million, the establishment of 600 
clinics, and the provision of electricity to 1.5 million houses (Aliber, 2003:476). 
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Although access to basic services has improved, local government still finds it 
difficult to sustain service delivery to the people. Ababio, Vyas-Doorgapersad and 
Mzini (2008:5) caution that deficiencies in the internal control system that forms 
the basis for public accountability43 can negatively affect service delivery. They 
link poor service delivery via deficient internal controls to insufficient 
accountability. The culture of civil action using “mass-scale violence” in the 
struggle for freedom (Andreasson, 2011a:1177) has helped to establish a societal 
precedent for civil protests as a corrective control. Thus, protest action is believed 
to be an acceptable mechanism by which to voice discontent44 and spur government 
towards improved service delivery.  
 
Unfortunately, “rent-seeking” behaviour is becoming an increasing bigger 
problem where politically connected people are appointed to positions “when they 
do not have the competence” and could “cause waste, mismanagement and 
inefficiencies” (Gumede, 2015). The lack of competence highlights the ongoing 
need for training and improved control over deliverables. Despite the high levels of 
unemployment and improvements in education, the shortage of skilled resources in 
South Africa remains a major societal challenge (Herringer et al., 2009:18). 
Training needs also extend to the pool of specialist managers whose task it is to 
provide training in the use of monitoring controls. Training costs could be reduced 
by ensuring that competent appointments are made for board positions; 
alternatively, companies could make transformational appointments and add 
training to upskill promising individuals. Improved introduction of specialist 
managers into the country’s pool of skills coupled with improved education and 
performance evaluation could help to develop a pool of skilled specialist managers, 
in line with the recommendations of Agyemang and Castellini (2015:52). 
 
                                                 
43 This principle is pervasive as board-level controls forms the basis of the board’s accountability to 
its shareholders. 
44 The acceptability of protest action as a mechanism for demonstrating grievances by the public 
also means that protest action will be used against companies to address perceived grievances, 
enabling society as a broad stakeholder to oversee company activity. Currently protest action is more 
frequently used as part of labour negotiations during the strike season. However, the 2016 
#FeesMustFall protest action by some students was a form of protest action against an industry.   
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Transformation on all levels is important. Seekings and Nattrass (2002:26) 
state that in a society that depends on wages, transformation requires “an effective 
educational system, broader access to employment (through job creation) and 
reforms to the welfare system”. For transformation to occur effectively, the basic 
infrastructure needs to be in place. Grant (2014) highlights the importance of 
implementing ground-level improvements as protests have been increasing “since 
2004, and since 2009 became more violent” with the chief grievances centring on 
“housing, water and sanitation, political representation and electricity”, as well as 
the high level of unemployment among young people and corruption. The 
continuing dissatisfaction is a worrying sign as it highlights ineffective practices. 
Gumede (2015) explains that rent-seeking focuses on accumulating personal wealth 
quickly and tends not to build companies or encourage industrialisation, which are 
needed for growth and job creation. In addition, it would be difficult to increase the 
pool of specialist managers or implement other transformational initiatives in 
situations where people are still battling to obtain necessities such as access to 
water. The application of strong corporate governance principles in the private and 
public sectors of a country is important as it helps to allocate resources efficiently, 
which is critical in developing countries that need to reduce poverty (Agyemang & 
Castellini, 2015:54-55).  
 
Increased protest action is used by communities to showcase their level of 
frustration with unfulfilled political promises (Bhorat et al., 2013a:2). However, the 
sustained protests also increase the need for continuous transformation and 
upliftment to reduce the level of unemployment and increase the proportion of 
economically active people. Aliber (2003:475) summarises the 1994 vision of how 
the African National Congress (ANC) aimed to reduce poverty by improving 
“access to water, jobs, land, education and healthcare”. To address the Third World 
challenges, economic policy was largely focused on adapting to the competitiveness 
of the global market in order to attract FDI to fund economic growth. Growth should 
in turn lead to improved employment opportunities, coupled with improvements in 
the infrastructure and a human development programme. Economic development 
was critical as the transition occurred during “difficult economic conditions” 
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compounded by increased international competition where trade agreements were 
used to force developing countries to open their markets to imports (Michie & 
Padayachee, 1998:624).  
 
The first economic strategy applied was the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP). The RDP had the following aim: 
“The RDP integrates growth, development, reconstruction and 
redistribution into a unified programme. The key to this link is an 
infrastructural programme that will provide access to modern and 
effective services like electricity, water, telecommunications, 
transport, health, education and training for all our people. This 
programme will both meet basic needs and open previously 
suppressed economic and human potential in urban and rural 
areas. In turn, this will lead to an increased output in all sectors 
of the economy, and by modernising our infrastructure and 
human resource development, we will also enhance export 
capacity. Success in linking reconstruction and development is 
essential if we are to achieve peace and security for all” 
(O'Malley, [S.a.]). 
The RDP was a concept that proved to be challenging to implement. In 
addition, it was discovered early on that a 3% economic growth rate would not be 
enough to address the unemployment crisis or improve the level of resources 
needed to expand social services or allow for an equitable distribution of income 
and wealth (O'Malley, [S.a.]).  
 
Together with a sharp depreciation in the value of the Rand in 1996, the above 
realisation led to changes in economic policy in the direction of improved trade 
liberalisation (Carmody, 2002:258-259). This led to the development of the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme. In essence GEAR 
was a conventional neoclassical macroeconomic recipe for economic growth 
applauded by business for its fiscal restraint and control of inflation and interest 
rates (Aliber, 2003:475). GEAR aimed at growing the economy at 6% and jobs by 
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400 000 per year by 2000 and centred on “monetary and fiscal conservatism” to 
reduce inflation, government spending and the deficit (Michie & Padayachee, 
1998:625-627). To assist GEAR, the EE policies were extended by introducing B-
BBEE legislation (refer to section 2.3.1) to help address the socio-economic gap 
(West, 2006:435). However, although GEAR reduced the fiscal deficit its growth 
was disappointing and instead of creating jobs in the formal sector there were job 
losses, and instead of fuelling the economy through FDI, there were more capital 
outflows between 1994 and 2000 with the easing of exchange controls (Aliber, 
2003:476). 
 
This led to the reassessment of developmental policy and resulted in the 
National Development Plan (NDP), which was issued on 15 August 2012 (National 
Planning Commission RSA, 2012). The NDP built on the following shortcomings: 
“The Commission’s Diagnostic Report, released in June 2011, set 
out South Africa’s achievements and shortcomings since 1994. It 
identified a failure to implement policies and an absence of broad 
partnerships as the main reasons for slow progress, and set out 
nine primary challenges: 
 
1. Too few people work  
2. The quality of school education for black people is poor  
3. Infrastructure is poorly located, inadequate and under-
maintained  
4. Spatial divides hobble inclusive development  
5. The economy is unsustainably resource intensive  
6. The public health system cannot meet demand or sustain 
quality 
7. Public services are uneven and often of poor quality  
8. Corruption levels are high  
9. South Africa remains a divided society” (National Planning 
Commission RSA, 2012:15). 
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The NDP’s executive summary “presents a long-term strategy to increase 
employment and broaden opportunities through education, vocational training and 
work experience, public employment programmes, health and nutrition, public 
transport and access to information” (National Planning Commission RSA, 2012). 
In essence the NDP has maintained the principle that increased economic growth 
will result in more job opportunities which will in turn help to uplift the poor. 
Hassen (2014) cautions that growth at an average rate of 7% would have to be 
achieved to reach the NDP goal of reducing unemployment to 6% by 2030, and that 
so far attempts to grow the economy have “failed to widen access to economic 
opportunities for the poor”.  
 
The various economic policies implemented by the ANC through the RDP, 
GEAR and the NDP led to record levels of positive economic growth with an 
annualised real economic growth rate in real GDP of 3.28% for the period 1994-
2012, with 2005-2007 achieving rates exceeding 5% (Bhorat et al., 2013a:3). 
However, this was not matched by increased employment opportunities. Key 
economic data showed a slowing of economic growth under the NDP, an increased 
unemployment rate, increased public debt, a deteriorating exchange rate and a rising 
interest rate. These are highlighted in Table 2-5.  
 
The underperforming economic data are warning signals that the NDP’s 
implementation is unlikely to achieve its objectives and that the root causes need to 
be corrected to get South Africa back on track. Poor economic performance has a 
ripple impact on businesses and the available pool of talented specialist managers 
who have scarce skills and can follow more lucrative offerings. Following a 
Keynesian-type strategy to grow the economy through public spending is also 
unsustainable in the long-term due to its impact on public debt. Public debt has been 
increasing steadily, as Table 2-5 shows. 
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Table 2-5 South Africa Economic Data 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Population (million) 51.6 52.3 53.2 54 54.9 
GDP per capita (USD) 8,66 7,62 6,698 6,608 5,994 
Economic Growth  
(GDP, annual variation in %) 
3.2 2.2 2.2 1.6 1.3 
Unemployment Rate 24.8 24.9 24.7 25.1 25.4 
Public Debt (% of GDP) 38.2 40.9 44.2 47.1 50.1 
Inflation Rate (CPI, annual variation 
in %) 
5 5.7 5.8 6.1 4.6 
Policy Interest Rate (%) 5.5 5 5 5.75 6.25 
Exchange Rate (vs USD) 8.07 8.48 10.47 11.57 15.5 
(Focus Economics, 2016) 
 
 
Unfortunately, the end of apartheid did not translate into improved growth 
with reduced unemployment. Carmody (2002:256) noted that “internal economic 
conditions, external competition and capital flows” resulted in “deepening 
economic dualism and marginalization”, worsening the job crisis. In the more than 
two decades of democracy “[e]conomic growth has been volatile” and while 
“inequalities in public services have been reduced, income inequality has increased, 
and poverty levels have remained stagnant” (Bhorat et al., 2013a:2). Poor 
transformation has led to calls for increased socioeconomic transformation despite 
labour-focused legislative changes which have included employment equity and B-
BBEE (Andreasson, 2011b:655). The legislative efforts to address past imbalances 
are identified by Esser and Dekker (2008:157) as culminating in the Labour 
Relations Act, the Promotion of Access to Information Act, and the B-BBEE Act, 
but transformation remains a challenge.  
 
To address the increased social pressures, one of the methods used by the 
Companies Act to ensure that ethical social considerations (like transformation) are 
given their rightful place is the requirement in section 72 (RSA, 2008a) that a Social 
and Ethics (S&E) board committee should be established. Transformational 
objectives can be addressed by growing companies to create more employment, 
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thereby contributing to social upliftment by addressing the unemployment 
challenges. 
 
2.4.3 Unemployment 
After the 1994 change in government, sweeping changes were implemented 
to transform South African society and these resulted in an altered “social, political 
and economic” environment (Alessandri et al., 2011:231). The main mechanism for 
transformation was the passage of legislation which resulted in the encouragement 
of more democratic labour practices via the Labour Relations Act, while the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act empowered the minister to set minimum terms or 
conditions of employment, including minimum wages in specific sectors (RSA, 
1995; RSA, 1997).  
 
The Labour Relations Act established worker rights and included 
mechanisms to encourage labour stability by establishing a dispute resolution 
process through negotiation, in order to reduce the prevalence of labour 
confrontations (Michie & Padayachee, 1998). From an economic supply and 
demand perspective the question could be asked: if labour relations are subjected to 
more control and basic conditions, including minimum wages, are legislated, would 
this influence the demand for labour? The introduction of a minimum basic wage 
in some sectors did result in real wage increases (Bhorat, Kanbur & Mayet, 
2013b:23). However, especially in the agricultural sector the introduction of basic 
conditions of employment resulted in a 17% increase in wages, with reduced total 
employment (Bhorat, Kanbur & Stanwix, 2014:1402). It is possible that the 
phenomenon of jobless growth (Aliber, 2003:476) could be a consequence of labour 
transformation, increasing real wages while reducing the total demand for labour. 
Given the labour union practice of using an annual “strike season” in their wage 
negotiations (Molefe, 2011), the move by business towards higher paid and better 
skilled labour in order to remain competitive is not unexpected. Carmody 
(2002:269) states that the job losses could also be due to the “hassle factor attributed 
to excessive labour regulation”. This is evident from the poor GCI rating (Table 2-
6) for labour competitiveness, which shows poor labour cooperation and limited 
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wage flexibility with uncompetitive hiring and firing practices stemming from 
excessive labour legislation and powerful unions. 
 
Table 2-6 GCI labour competitiveness 
GCI index factor GCI rating for 
2012-2013 
GCI rating for 
2016-2017 
Cooperation in labour-employer 
relations 
144/144 138/138 
Flexibility of wage determination 140/144 135/138 
Hiring and firing practices 143/144 135/138 
(WEF, 2012-2013; WEF, 2016-2017) 
 
To encourage transformation, extreme transformational economic 
interventions were introduced in the form of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
followed by B-BBEE. The process started with the promotion of “black people into 
positions of greater responsibility in the economy [including board-level], in the 
public and private sector” and moved on to the “transfer of ownership of economic 
assets to black South Africans” (Bhorat et al., 2013a:14). Initially BEE involved 
companies selling equity to “black empowerment groups or other black investors” 
to diversify ownership. This resulted in 834 completed deals to the value of R140.83 
billion between 1993 and 2005 (Alessandri et al., 2011:232). BEE was an initial 
transformational success as the proportion of shares held by black economic 
empowerment companies changed from 0.5% to almost 20% between 1995 and 
1998. However, these purchases were funded by debt and this resulted in financial 
difficulties when the interest rate increased to 25% after the Asian crises (Carmody, 
2002:264-265). The main concern with BEE deals was that only a small proportion 
of the black population were benefiting (Alessandri et al., 2011:233). 
 
BEE deals were also an opportunity for companies to signal their social 
commitment and the use of B-BBEE certificates forms a key part of most tenders 
(Drake, 2016). The application of BEE principles was clearly useful in helping 
companies to grow. Growing the economy to grow job opportunities did result in a 
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0.69 % increase in jobs for every 1% increase in GDP between 2000 and 2008 
(Bhorat et al., 2013a:4). Efforts to create employment were severely impacted by 
the global financial crises that led to a decrease of 0.16% in employment for each 
1% increase in GDP, thereby resulting in the retention of the high unemployment 
rate (Bhorat et al., 2013a:4-5). South Africa found it difficult to improve 
employment after the financial crises and the unemployment rate worsened slightly 
between January/March of 2015 and 2016 from 26.4% to 26.7% but was an 
improvement on the 29.8% recorded in the 2011 census (Statistics South Africa, 
2012:49; Statistics South Africa, 2016a:iv). 
 
The variation in the labour participation rate in the demographics (Table 2-3) 
could be an indication that the transformational process has not been sufficiently 
effective at an educational level. In Figure 2-5 South African statistics show that 
educational factors improved slowly between 1996 and 2011, with a general 
increase in the percentage of learners up to the age of 15 years who attended 
educational institutions between 1996 and 2011. This shows the impact of free 
education up to grade 9 given that 92.7% of learners used government education 
(Statistics South Africa, 2012:31).  
 
Figure 2-5 Highest level of education attained amongst persons aged 20 years 
and older by population group: Censuses 1996, 2001 and 2011 
 
(Statistics South Africa, 2012:33) 
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The educational disparity at the higher education level has contributed to 
nationwide protest action by students calling for free tertiary education for all, also 
referred to as the #FeesMustFall campaign (Pather, 2016). The recourse to public 
activism in areas where South Arica is lagging behind is possibly an indication of 
the level of frustration experienced by ordinary people regarding the pace and lack 
of effectiveness of some interventions. However, the effective and efficient use of 
educational resources might be a concern as the educational sector attracts 
considerable funding via the government budget with R189.5 billion which was 
allocated to basic education and R56.6 billion to post-school education and training 
in the 2014-2015 budget (PwC, 2015). The education challenge has skills 
implications for companies in terms of identifying both suitably skilled workers and 
suitably skilled board members. In turn companies benefit from communities with 
higher levels of education and employment as this can increase their stakeholder 
pool. 
 
Concern around the ability of education to assist with transformation goals 
and contribute to the competitiveness of the country is highlighted by the GCI. An 
inadequately educated workforce was listed as the most problematic factor in 2012-
2013, followed by restrictive labour regulations (WEF, 2012-2013:324). In the 
2016-2017 GCI report the top problematic factors were inefficient government 
bureaucracy, restrictive labour regulations and an inadequately educated 
workforce (WEF, 2016-2017:324). Table 2-7 shows that educational factors remain 
improvement areas.  
 
Table 2-7 GCI for educational areas 
GCI index factor GCI rating for 
2012-2013 
GCI rating for 
2016-2017 
Secondary education enrolment 53/144 67/138 
Tertiary education enrolment 101/144 99/138 
Quality of the educational system 140/144 134/138 
Quality of math and science education 143/144 138/138 
(WEF, 2012-2013; WEF, 2016-2017) 
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The competitiveness of the quality of secondary education and maths and 
science education deteriorated, which is a concern as poor secondary education 
reduces the likelihood of tertiary education compounding the transformation 
agenda. Unfortunately “South Africa remains a country where poverty is declining 
slowly and inequality is extremely high” (Bhorat et al., 2013a:13). Developing 
countries need to plan to transform towards a more developed state. However, 
inefficiencies in the transformational process coupled with the misuse of resources 
and corruption are major threats and are discussed in section 2.4.4. 
 
2.4.4 Corruption 
In recent years, South Africa maintained a corruption index rating45 of 
between 42 and 44 for the 2012-2014 period (Transparency International, [S.a.]) 
indicating continuing corrupt activities despite the strong legal systems in place. 
Continued corruption is a concern and a damper on economic growth. As corruption 
signals a siphoning of resources away from developmental goals it is not surprising 
that the unemployment rate remains around 25% (Van der Berg & Van 
Broekhuizen, 2012:11). In addition, corruption is not a victimless crime as the 
siphoning of resources tends to result in reduced resources for service delivery. 
Although “effective rule of law reduces corruption” and has helped to improve 
South Africa’s corruption score in the World Justice Project (WJP) Role of Law 
Index 2015, more still needs to be done to curtail corruption (WJP, 2016:21).46  
 
Corruption is more rampant in the public sector in South Africa, resulting in 
the “breakdowns in governance” integral in fraud and corruption prevention 
(Powell, O'Donovan, Ayele & Chigwata, 2014:5). As money was siphoned away 
from the operational requirements, service delivery deteriorated and this resulted in 
                                                 
45 A corruption score of 43 indicate endemic corruption in a country’s public sector (Transparency 
International, [S.a.]). 
 
46 Claims of “state capture” since the latter part of 2016 with widespread allegations of corruption 
by state owned companies (SOCs) coupled with political uncertainty led to the downgrade of the 
local currency to junk status in 2017. 
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service delivery protests. Grant (2014) says that service delivery protests have been 
increasing since 2004 with an escalation to more violent protests after 2009 and 
have now become an endemic “feature of the national landscape” (Bernstein, 
2014:21). 
 
Corruption also occurred in the private sector, where the most prominent 
example has been the corruption in the South African construction industry 
(Bowen, Edwards & Cattell, 2012). In addition to being illegal, corruption is also 
against the ethical leadership principles used in South African corporate 
governance. Wanyama et al. (2009:159) note that corruption hampers efforts to 
improve governance practices and recommend the use of strong enforcement 
mechanisms to counter corruption. Fortunately, South Africa has strong regulatory 
and legal systems, and this has resulted in several corrective measures. One 
example is the power of the competition commission to investigate and penalise 
uncompetitive behaviour. Despite the warning signs of uncompetitive behaviour in 
the construction industry identified by Bowen, Akintoye, Pearl and Edwards 
(2007), prominent companies in the industry were fined R1.46 billion for collusive 
tendering related to the 2010 soccer world cup stadiums (Greve, 2013). Thus, if the 
board is to be an effective governance mechanism it is important to encourage 
ethical and legal business practices and discourage illegal practices. The latter can 
be enforced by the use of a whistle-blowing hotline to report unethical and illegal 
behaviour given the protection of whistle-blowers in section 159 of the Companies 
Act (RSA, 2008a). 
 
2.5 Summary of the First and Third World elements 
 
Yoshikawa and Resheed (2009:254) state that national governance systems 
consist of a combination of laws and regulation, coupled with political, economic 
and societal constraints that influence the governance and control options of boards. 
South Africa uses a unitary board with a hybrid governance model. The strength of 
the South African position lies in a strong legislative, regulatory and market-driven 
economy that assists boards to guide companies from isolation to a more 
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competitive environment. However, the strong level of legislation and regulation 
also demand increased accountability of boards with a coupled increased liability. 
Given the changed legislative environment the study proposes that boards would 
act with increase diligence and rigour to comply with the requirements and reduce 
the likelihood of possible liability claims. Boards need to ensure that companies are 
directed and controlled in a manner that ensures compliance with the legal and 
governance framework to maximise the ability of the market to attract funding for 
growth.  
 
The main changes that the 2008 Companies Act brought forth that impact 
boards relate to the increased governance requirements, the establishment of 
statutory S&E and audit committees and the importance of independent oversight 
by the audit committee. In addition, King III also require boards to apply ethical 
leadership principles, use independent board members to monitor the CEO and the 
board, separate the duties of the CEO and CFO, encourage independence and tacit 
knowledge with a third of the non-executive directors retiring every year to 
encourage renewal and to use performance-based remuneration for executive 
directors over the short- and long-term to reduce goal divergence. 
 
Despite the use of First World elements to help transform and improve Third 
World elements as described above, Bhorat et al. (2013a:13) sum up the situation 
by stating that “South Africa remains a country where poverty is declining slowly, 
inequality is extremely high”. Although these challenges need to be addressed 
through clear political policies, boards, through the companies they control, can 
contribute to transforming society in line with ubuntu. Contributing to the 
transformation of South African society is not selfless as a more economic active 
transformed society improve the labour, customers and shareholders pool.  
 
The Third World elements complicate South African governance options 
available to boards as societal poverty and inequality negatively influence the 
broader economic environment and the pool of customers, employees and board 
members. The development of a unique South African governance model linked to 
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ubuntu can be leveraged to help to address inequality in a limited manner. Boards 
can use ethical leadership to guide the enterprises of their companies in a manner 
that takes cognisance of societal challenges and stakeholders in order to ensure 
sustainable business practices and thereby maximise firm value in the long run and 
therefore also maximising shareholder value. 
 
In the South African environment, corporate governance and the board as a 
governance mechanism can help a company to control and direct its business in a 
manner that accommodates both worlds. Businesses cannot be successful over the 
long-term in an impoverished society as activism will continue to have a negative 
impact on the broader business environment and can impact any industry with little 
warning.  
 
This chapter focused on describing the strengths of the First World elements 
and the challenges of the Third World elements that have caused South Africa to 
sculpt a hybrid governance system to help boards to continue to guide their 
companies in a more regulated economic environment with social developmental 
challenges. Chapter 3 describes the historical development of the agency theory 
with local relevance. 
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CHAPTER 3: AGENCY THEORY  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the contextual setting of this study, which focuses on the 
board as a governance mechanism in South Africa given the challenges posed by 
the Third World elements and the advantages offered by the First World elements. 
It also summarises South African studies on corporate governance (Appendix 10) 
and local board-related studies in Table 2-2. The objective of this chapter is to focus 
on the historical development of agency theory highlighting its current relevance in 
South Africa. Agency theory forms the theoretical lens used in this study.  
 
Kiser (1999:147) describes an agency relationship as the delegation of 
authority by a “principal” to an “agent” for specific services. This delegation of 
authority occurs when the shareholders appoint the board to manage the affairs of 
the company as per the requirements of section 68 of the 2008 Companies Act 
(RSA, 2008a). In the context of agency theory, agency cost refers to the cost of 
aligning the goals of the board to the goals of the shareholders. Engelen (2015:928) 
sums up agency cost as the cost that “arise[s] from a misalignment of the interest 
of management and shareholders as well as conflicting interests of dominant and 
minority investors”. 
 
This study uses an agency theory perspective to assess the relationship 
between the board as a governance mechanism and firm value, in a more regulated 
developmental environment. The study uses companies on the SRI index as this 
index represents relatively large listed companies that tend to follow transparent 
disclosure practices. Prior studies on the SRI index focused on social or sustainable 
objectives (Heese, 2005; Sonnenberg & Hamann, 2006; Herringer et al., 2009; 
Maubane et al., 2014). Following an agency theory perspective to investigate the 
board as a governance mechanism using the SRI index is therefore a relatively new 
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line of research in South Africa.47 The sustained use of agency theory in recent 
studies (Muniandy & Hillier, 2015:111; Pepper & Gore, 2015; Rashid, 2015; Rispel 
et al., 2015; Mans-Kemp et al., 2016) shows that it remains a popular research 
theory.  
 
There is a profusion of available literature debating the influence of agency 
theory on firms since its development in the previous century. This chapter begins 
with the historical development and key assumptions of agency theory using 
seminal sources and expands on the development to show the current relevance of 
agency theory in a South African context.  
 
3.2 Background to agency theory 
 
From the discussions in section 1.7, agency theory can be summarised as the 
use of mechanisms by both parties in an agency relationship where there is 
separation of ownership and control in order to reduce goal divergence by 
minimising agency cost (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:308). As agency theory is based 
on the assumption that the parties involved will act as self-interested utility 
maximisers (Clarke, 2004:5), its theoretical underpinning helps to address goal 
divergence problems by using controls to achieve goal alignment in a manner that 
minimises agency cost. The challenge of utility or self-interest maximisation can 
lead to an increased risk of goal divergence and moral hazard, where the divergent 
parties might not act in good faith or might act against the principles previously 
agreed upon to maximise their own benefit. Goal divergence is a “feature of all 
agency relationships”; once power is delegated, controlling the agent becomes 
difficult and agency problems or goal divergence emerge (Kiser, 1999:146). From 
the above, the key assumptions include separation of ownership and control which 
forms the foundation of the agency relationship and the maximisation of self-
interest which in turn leads to goal divergence. The increased risk of goal 
                                                 
47 Prior corporate governance studies that focused on the Top 100 or other large companies did 
include companies on the SRI index. However, they did not differentiate in the interpretation or 
analysis of their results between companies that were on the SRI index and those that were not. 
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divergence can be reduced through controls such as legislative or contractual 
bonding or monitoring to reduce the agency cost associated with goal divergence. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976:308) say that monitoring and bonding are the two main 
control methods available to the board to control the agency problem. Chapters 4 
and 5 contain a more detailed discussion of the control mechanisms available to the 
board to reduce agency cost. 
 
The development of agency theory and the use of agency cost to control goal 
divergence are discussed in section 3.4. This is preceded by a discussion on agency 
theory assumptions (section 3.3), including the maximisation of self-interest 
(section 3.3.1), followed by the separation of ownership and control (section 3.3.2), 
controlling (section 3.3.3), and goal divergence (section 3.3.4). Although this 
chapter focuses on the historical development of agency theory, it is linked to the 
current South African context where relevant. 
 
3.3 Agency theory assumptions 
 
Agency theory rests on two main assumptions, namely separation of 
ownership and control and utility maximisation or maximisation of self-interest. 
The combined impact of these assumptions has led to goal divergence, also referred 
to as the agency problem. The separation of ownership and control is discussed 
against the backdrop of the historical development of enterprises, starting with the 
maximisation of self-interest. 
 
3.3.1 Maximisation of self-interest 
The concept of an economic man was developed to enhance the general 
understanding of the economic environment in the 19th century. Berle and Means 
(1933:2) explain that the typical “business unit of the 19th century was owned by 
individuals or small groups; was managed by them or their appointees; and was, in 
the main, limited in size by the personal wealth of the individuals in control.” The 
economic man is defined as “an imaginary individual created in classical economics 
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and conceived of as behaving rationally, regularly, and predictably in his economic 
activities with motives that are egoistic, acquisitive, and short-term in outlook” 
(Merrian-Webster, [S.a.]: s.v. economic man). The assumption of self-interest 
through utility maximisation on which agency theory is based is implicit in this 
definition. Clarke (2004:5) notes that agency theory assumes self-interest and the 
use of the efficient market theory, as part of the solution to the agency theory 
problem. Complete market information is, however, not always possible. The result 
is information asymmetry problems as the board has better information on the 
performance of the company and their ability to manage than the shareholders. 
Adam Smith describes the interdependence of man and his self-interest in trade in 
the following terms: 
“… man has almost constant occasion for help of his brethren, and it is 
in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be 
more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and 
shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he 
requires of them.” (Smith, 1776/2003:23). 
 
Although the principle of self-interest has been criticised and debated in the 
literature, it still plays an important role (Jensen, 1994b; Mihret, 2014). The 
capitalist system relied on the self-interest of the economic man or entrepreneur to 
maximise the economically efficient manner in which resources are used to 
maximise profit, subject only to the constraints of supply, demand and competition 
(Berle & Means, 1933:8). This description is an oversimplification as it ignores the 
influence of societal values (like ethical leadership, or religious values) as well as 
legal limitations acting as natural constraints. Self-interested behaviour is still part 
of today’s organisational culture, as Gotsis and Kortezi (2011:450) mention that 
people use organisational politics “to enhance or secure self-interest, either at the 
individual or at the group level”. In addition, Healy and Palepu (2001:406) state 
that the “demand for financial reporting and disclosure arises from information 
asymmetry and agency conflicts between [executive directors] and outside 
investors” to counter self-interest maximisation and moral hazards through 
transparency. The focus on utility maximising or self-interest of the directors as 
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executive managers versus the self-interest or utility maximising of the 
shareholders as owners in a company is the reason why the separation of ownership 
and control creates challenges or goal alignment problems.  
 
The question is whether or not current practices still support the assumption 
of self-interest. Continuous research into governance mechanisms and the push for 
improved mechanisms after corporate failures is evidence of an inability to fully 
address goal divergence problems on both a global and a local level. In 2007, the 
average American earned approximately $34 000 per annum, whereas the CEO of 
Countrywide Financial earned $102.8 million for the year but, slightly more than a 
year later, the company needed to be rescued during the fallout from the global 
financial crisis (Ferguson, 2009:1-3). This disparity sounded a warning that 
excessive remuneration may have a detrimental influence on the long-term survival 
of a company. Naidoo (2009:148) refers to the cost of excessive remuneration that 
signifies the maximisation of self-interest as top executives of failed USA 
companies amassed over $3.3 billion in the months before liquidation, wiping 
billions off shareholder value with a loss of over 100 000 jobs, while in the United 
Kingdom (UK), the top ten directors of companies that subsequently failed 
collectively earned more than £80 million despite a sharp decline in share prices a 
year before the companies were liquidated.  
 
There are many South African examples criticising high executive 
remuneration in the media (Prophet, 2013; Lamprecht, 2014; Rossouw, 2015), 
suggesting a general concern that executive directors might be manipulating 
remuneration to maximise their self-interest. The above examples may indicate the 
continued existence of the maximisation of self-interest that needs to be addressed 
on an ongoing basis. Tullberg (2013:128) says that recent corporate failures and 
scandals show that executives have the ability to “favour their self-interest over the 
interests of the shareholders”. A current example is Steinhoff, which lost extensive 
market share on claims of accounting irregularities48 (Bowker, 2017). 
                                                 
48 As the detail on the accounting irregularities are still under investigation this study does not delve 
deeper into the Steinhoff debacle. 
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The practice of manipulating reported results (information asymmetry) to 
maximise self-interest is not a new concept. Watts and Zimmerman (1979:277) 
describe instances of misuse of management compensation schemes in the 19th 
century, where management compensation was linked to operating cash flow (then 
viewed as profit) and executives reduced expenditure on repairs and maintenance 
to increase cash flow, thereby increasing their remuneration while eroding the value 
of the company or firm.  
 
Unfortunately, the risk that critical expenses may be cut remains. Poor 
maintenance led to widespread electricity load shedding49 in South Africa, despite 
the record salaries paid to top executives of the electricity supplier for the 2014 
financial year (SAPA, 2014b; Nicolaides, 2015). While the average annual 
household income in South Africa per the 2011 census was R103 204 (Statistics 
South Africa, 2012:41), the median total guaranteed pay for midsize listed 
companies’ CEOs ranged from R3.87 to R4.57 million in 2012 (PwC, 2012:34-60). 
These differences are not as dramatic as those in the USA. However, the difference 
shows the disparity between the guaranteed pay of a top executive in comparison 
with the average household income recorded in the 2011 census. Thus, even where 
the maximisation of self-interest may be unconstrained, societal values and the need 
for a fairer transformed society contribute to the tension in the management and 
control of agency cost in South Africa. 
 
In addition to the maximisation of self-interest, the seminal publications that 
form the historical origin of the agency theory and management of agency cost 
assume separation of ownership and control. The challenges caused by the 
separation of ownership and control were highlighted by the seminal publication by 
Berle and Means (1933) that focused on separation of ownership and control. This 
was followed by a publication by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) on the use of 
contracts in cooperative specialisation and the subsequent identification by Jensen 
                                                 
49 Load shedding is the practice of withholding electricity supply to pre-determined areas for a period 
to protect the electricity supply grid in situations where demand exceeds supply. 
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and Meckling (1976) of the advantages of using contracts and agency cost to 
manage the separation of ownership from control and the linking of the separation 
of management from risk bearing to the agency problem with the value of using 
monitoring and the market for labour, as expounded by Fama (1980). The origin 
and historical development of the challenges caused by the separation of ownership 
and control are described in the next section. 
 
3.3.2 Separation of ownership and control 
Initially, the economic man or entrepreneur was the provider and owner of 
the capital used in the business and he used his wealth or capital to generate outputs 
to maximise his returns through the generation of profit. He was motivated by 
profits as he was the only person who benefited from the returns he generated by 
using his wealth; therefore, he was motivated to deploy his capital efficiently. This 
single motivation changed with the development of corporations or firms. Outside 
of firms, the price mechanism of the market influences productive business 
activities using price movements to influence supply and demand, and production 
and consumption. However, within a firm the price mechanism is not effective and 
productive business activities are directed by the entrepreneur who coordinates all 
the factors of production (Coase, 1937:387-388). The changed relationship between 
the firm and the market led to a number of early studies on the nature of the firm 
(Coase, 1937) and the emergence of inactive owners (Veblen, 1923). These studies 
described the firm as the economic organisation of business through the deployment 
of property interests, the consideration of social classes and the price mechanism of 
the market.  
 
3.3.2.1 Introduction to separation of ownership and control 
The seminal work that helped lay the foundation of agency theory was The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property by Berle and Means (1933) (Cheffins & 
Bank, 2009:443). According to Berle and Means (1933:3), the development of the 
modern corporation is attributed to two events. The first emanated from the 
industrial revolution, which “brought an increasingly large number of workers 
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directly under a single management” and the second, which became the focus of 
their book, was the placement of the wealth or capital of many people or 
shareholders under the same central control that directs labour. In essence, they 
described the new aspect of the firm or corporation as the “means whereby the 
wealth of innumerable individuals has been concentrated into huge aggregates and 
whereby control over this wealth has been surrendered to a unified direction” (Berle 
& Means, 1933:2). This separation led to goal divergence where executives can 
govern without constraints (Engelen, 2015:930). Cohen and Uliana (1990:7) note 
that the separation also makes monitoring more difficult as the actions of the board 
are not readily observable by shareholders. Goal divergence became possible as the 
nature of the firm changed from: 
 a business organisation in which the owner or entrepreneur was 
motivated to generate profit using his wealth, resources or property 
rights to generate income and was the sole beneficiary of the 
resulting profit; to 
 a firm where the providers of the wealth were not able to direct or 
influence the activities that generated the income and profit from the 
provided wealth and the people who directed the wealth to generate 
income and profit were not the beneficiaries of the resulting profit. 
Bratton (2001:754-755) notes that the “split in the classical entrepreneurial 
function came to be seen as a problem”, a problem that has never been solved, but 
uses “a process of accommodation and adjustment between the mass-producing, 
management-controlled corporation and the wider economy and society” (Berle & 
Means, 1933:2-3). 
 
Despite the fact that more than eight decades have elapsed since the 
publication of The Modern Corporation and Private Property by Berle and Means 
(1933), the challenges caused by the separation of ownership and control in 
companies are still as relevant today as they were when they were initially described 
in this ground-breaking work. Even in the 21st century Berle and Means’s work is 
still relevant and their contribution is still valued, as the problems caused by the 
separation of ownership from control still persist (Bratton, 2001:738; Cheffins & 
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Bank, 2009:445). The longevity of The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
can be attributed to the well-articulated and strongly empirically and legally 
supported argument that clearly identifies the problem (Berle & Means, 1933; 
Bratton, 2001:737-740; Cheffins & Bank, 2009:445 & 449). Indeed, the current 
relevance of the contribution of Berle and Means is evident from the fact that 
references to them “show up in discussions of present problems” and not merely in 
a historical context (Bratton, 2001:738). The continued relevance of goal 
divergence could also be attributed to the change from industrialisation to the 
information age and to the knowledge economy, where knowledge is seen as a 
critical success factor (Van Buren, 2002).  
 
The great importance attached to the availability of transparent information 
increases the risk of moral hazards and information asymmetry, especially in an 
agency relationship. A more recent study on the separation of ownership and control 
in South Africa supports the continued practice of separation of ownership and 
control as nearly half of the listed companies assessed were managed by the board 
without a dominant shareholder (Steyn & Stainbank, 2013:8) as a moderating 
governance mechanism. Thus, the separation of ownership and control is still a 
feature of the current corporate reality for large listed firms.  
 
3.3.2.2 Challenges caused by separation of ownership and control 
The challenges posed by the separation of ownership and control that form 
the foundation of agency theory came to the fore at the turn of the 20th century with 
the establishment of corporations that sold their shares widely (Berle & Means, 
1933:6). Even in South Africa the challenges caused by the separation of ownership 
and control centre on establishing moderating controls to enable accountability of 
the board without sacrificing the necessary agility to enable the company to achieve 
its objectives (Naidoo, 2009:5). The development of companies with the potential 
to sell their shares widely helped to attract significant funding with a separation 
between the new shareholders and the executives of these firms (Berle & Means, 
1933:11). Shareholders can be financially unsophisticated individuals as most of 
the individual savings are managed via sophisticated institutional shareholders like 
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pension funds. In general, institutional investors form a formidable shareholders’ 
group; however, in South Africa institutional shareholders only became an active 
monitoring and voting governance mechanism with the establishment of CRISA, 
which entered into force from 2012 (IoDSA, 2011). Given the separation of 
shareholders from the board, payments made by the shareholders to the company 
for their shares act as bonds for contractual payments to other parties such as 
employees, customers and creditors, thereby funding the purchase of assets for the 
company. In essence this results in shareholders funding the activities of the 
company that are directed by specialist managers (the executive directors); 
shareholders commit their capital, whereas the executive directors commit their 
labour (Fama & Jensen, 1983a:330).  
 
A historic example from the USA of a firm with a widely held shareholding 
was the American Telephone and Telegraph company. The company was able to 
attract wealth from 567 694 shareholders to fund assets of almost $5 billion, while 
providing employment to 454 000 employees (Berle & Means, 1933:3). This led to 
a different relationship from the entrepreneurial model, where the owner risks his 
own wealth or capital but also directs the actions that generate the rewards he 
receives. This changed relationship is described by Berle and Means as follows: 
“The independent worker who entered the factory became a wage 
labourer surrendering the direction of his labor to his industrial master. 
The property owner who invests in a modern corporation so far 
surrenders his wealth to those in control of the corporation that he has 
exchanged the position of independent owner for one in which he may 
become merely a recipient of the wages of capital” (Berle & Means, 
1933:3).  
 
This separation of ownership from control brought about a different method 
of property use in respect of the attraction of capital and accumulation of wealth. It 
was also responsible for changes in the way economic activity was organised in that 
larger firms began to use executive directors as specialist managers to direct and 
control the firm. The executive director who directs the activities and resources of 
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the firm takes over the role previously played by the entrepreneur. Walsh and 
Seward (1990:421-422) caution that executive directors as “managers may be 
tempted to act according to their own interest rather than the owner’s interest”, 
highlighting the risk of maximisation of self-interest. Thus, even in a company with 
a dominant shareholder who has enough voting power to control the company, 
separation of ownership from control is still a reality that the other shareholders 
must take into consideration. Local examples of listed companies include Anglo 
Platinum, where Anglo American has significant controlling interest (about 80% of 
the ordinary shares) or Verimark, where more than 50% of the ordinary shares are 
held by a family trust (Profile, 2012).  
 
Cheffins and Bank (2009:445-446) found in their re-examination of the 
ownership and control of USA corporations that even in the USA there has never 
been total separation of ownership and control, but that the country has developed 
more extensive managerial hierarchies with a clearer separation of ownership and 
management. Berle and Means (1933:8-9) describe the challenge of achieving goal 
congruence in situations where there is separation of ownership and control as 
follows: 
“Those who control the destinies of the typical modern corporation own 
so insignificant a fraction of the company’s stock that the returns from 
running the corporation profitably accrue to them only in a very minor 
degree. The stockholders, on the other hand, to whom the profits of the 
corporation go, cannot be motivated by those profits to a more efficient 
use of property, since they have surrendered all disposition of it to those 
in control of the enterprise.”  
 
The above description might not be as applicable in the 21st century or to 
South Africa, as the practice of linking board remuneration to firm performance and 
using share options to help establish goal alignment is the norm, as found by a recent 
PwC (2012) study. The advantage of separation of duties is that the use of executive 
directors enables shareholders to invest capital that is managed by a specialist when 
the shareholders themselves might not have the required specialist financial 
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knowledge. Bratton (2001:740) states that “separation implies shortfalls of 
competence and responsibility”, resulting in capital being the only access barrier 
for shareholders. The separation of duties allows shares to be a transformational 
vehicle facilitating a broader-based, more representative shareholding as specialist 
knowledge is not required, thus entrepreneurial competence is not needed for 
shareholders. In South Africa, B-BBEE deals have been used to develop a broader, 
more inclusive share ownership among previously disadvantaged groups. In 2015 
there were nine B-BBEE schemes trading on the JSE with “about 800 000 direct 
shareholders”, with “assets to the value of R20 billion” held largely by individuals 
(Van Zyl, 2015a).  
 
Dispersed shareholdings can lead to shortfalls in responsibility when the 
shareholders cannot hold the executive directors accountable, enabling them to 
become the unbridled de facto controllers of the company. Although the board of 
directors has relative freedom regarding how it manages the company, it is 
accountable for its choices to the shareholders and non-performing board members 
can be removed in terms of section 71 of the Companies Act (RSA, 2008a). In 
addition, King III recommends annual board performance evaluations in Principle 
2.22 (IoDSA, 2009a) to help control for competence and responsibility at board-
level. Finding people with the appropriate skills set for executive directors in South 
Africa might be a challenge due to the smaller market and educational inequality 
noted in chapter 2.  
 
Although there has been progress on educational transformation, the low level 
of higher education influences the pool of available specialist managers qualified 
to be executive directors. Swartz and Firer (2005:158) noted that there was a 
relatively low level of ethnic representation on South African listed boards in 2003. 
In a subsequent study Mans-Kemp and Viviers (2015a:402-403) found a significant 
increase in gender (5.5%-16%) and ethical (13%-34%) diversity on boards over the 
2002-2012 period on the JSE, indicating that transformational efforts have achieved 
a degree of success. 
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Direction and control are the prerogative of executive directors who 
coordinate and re-contract with all the other stakeholders, initiating and 
implementing resource allocation decisions and specialist tasks important for the 
survival of the company (Fama & Jensen, 1983a:330). This prerogative is another 
reason why it is important to have “checks and balances [controls] in place to keep 
directors and management accountable” (Naidoo, 2009).  
 
The widespread use of share-based incentives in South Africa (PwC, 2012) 
might help to encourage goal alignment. It is, however, important for incentives to 
be designed and monitored to ensure actual goal alignment is achieved. Jensen and 
Murphy (1990:229-232) found a small increase in the remuneration levels of CEOs 
in contrast to the increased wealth of the shareholders generated by their direction, 
highlighting the need to continuously manage goal divergence. An additional 
concern is the extent to which economic power is becoming concentrated under the 
guidance of a limited number of executives (Bratton, 2001:752) – a situation 
described by Berle and Means (1933:18) as “a centripetal attraction which draws 
wealth together into aggregations of constantly increasing size, at the same time 
throwing control into the hands of fewer and fewer men”.  
 
The concentration of wealth can be a problem in South Africa given the 
limited size of the market. The South African market is smaller and less diverse as 
18 of the 620 companies accounted for 62% of the total market capitalisation at the 
turn of the century (Rossouw et al., 2002:291). Subsequently Taljaard, Ward and 
Muller (2015:430) found that only 104 companies were continuously listed in the 
period 2000 to 2013. The limited size of the market is further evident as in 2012 
there were only around 400 companies listed on the JSE’s main board.  
 
To complicate matters there is a limited number of local directors available 
as a PwC (2011:4) study found a shortage of skilled non-executive directors in 
South Africa. It is also possible that the talent required to excel as a director is rare 
(Carte, 2011). In addition, immigration controls have helped to “create an artificial 
shortage of company executives” in South Africa (Prophet, 2013:1). 
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It is clear from the above discussion that the increased diffusion of shares also 
represented a change in the role of the owner, from the entrepreneur who owned, 
funded and managed the business to the shareholder who owned and funded the 
business but used specialist managers (executives) to manage it – a change from an 
active to a passive role. In this passive role, the shareholder’s liability is limited to 
the cost of the shares with no responsibility for the management of the firm. 
Shareholders then rely on the board to increase and manage their wealth. The 
survival of companies is, on its own, evidence that the advantages of a company as 
an organisational form outweigh the problems caused by the separation of 
ownership from control. This can be attributed to the advantage of using shares as 
an investment vehicle with minimal entrance requirements, where in the case of a 
company with listed shares the shareholders can sell their shares, thereby enhancing 
the liquid nature of the shares but also resulting in a dependence on the market to 
facilitate trading in shares. This situation has led to the development of the market 
as a control mechanism and given shareholders another mechanism to control the 
board. The shareholders can simply sell their shares when they disagree with, or are 
disappointed in, the way the board directs the company. 
 
Although the separation of ownership from control creates challenges, it also 
has advantages. The main advantage is that it enables companies to attract 
significantly more funds through enhanced access to the financial markets by 
issuing shares or other financial instruments. However, the challenge caused by 
goal divergence that accompany the separation of ownership from control still 
needs to be managed. Since the publication of The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property by Berle and Means (1933), the fact that the separation of ownership from 
control produces executives who direct and determine corporate policy and 
activities and have different goals or agendas from the shareholders as owners and 
residual risk takers, has been extensively debated (Rediker & Seth, 1995:85; 
Cheffins & Bank, 2009:444; Lai, Chen & Chen, 2017:190).  
 
109 
 
 
The remaining challenge, namely how to manage the situation, has still not 
been resolved despite the development of various mechanisms or forms of control 
(Cheffins & Bank, 2009:443-444). Controlling for goal divergence caused by the 
separation between ownership and control can only be properly done once a clear 
understanding of the causes of goal divergence between the parties has been 
achieved and a way has been found to minimise goal divergence using controls. 
 
3.3.3 Controlling for goal divergence caused by the separation between 
ownership and control 
It is necessary to manage the challenges posed by the separation of ownership 
and control to ensure that companies are managed with clear goals in view. The 
various controls developed as solutions to goal divergence have resulted in mixed 
findings as to the actual contribution of individual control measures (Agrawal & 
Knoeber, 1996:378; Ma, 2009:2031; Afshan et al., 2011:83-85). Other studies 
produced varying results, depending on the proxy used for firm value (Mans-Kemp, 
2014; Ashwin, 2015). The mixed findings indicate a need for further research, 
especially as stricter regulations can help to control for the possible exploitation of 
shareholders by opportunistic decisions of the board, that is central to the control of 
the agency problem (Fama & Jensen, 1983b:312). Problems caused by divergent 
goals can arise when specific causes of goal divergence result in information 
asymmetry that could lead to adverse selections generated by moral hazard, risk 
aversion, the retention of earnings and the timing of cash flows, also referred to as 
the time horizon.  
 
Contracts can be used to address goal divergence problems by limiting the 
causes of these problems, using bonding and monitoring to encourage goal 
congruence as recommended by Jensen and Meckling (1976:308). Unfortunately, 
it is impossible to fully contract for all deviations and, owing to the associated costs. 
Monitoring and bonding only facilitate goal congruence up to the point where the 
marginal cost of monitoring and bonding is equal to the marginal benefit derived 
from them by the agents and principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:312).  
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Contracts also need to consider that various economic environments such as 
a loss of liquidity in the market can have a wide ripple impact, as was demonstrated 
by the financial crises (Acharya & Viswanathan, 2011:100). In addition, the 
motivation for using contracts stops when the marginal cost of the contract exceeds 
the marginal benefit, making ideal contracts with total control impossible. It is 
possible that the flexibility of the incomplete contracts is a key element required to 
allow for the innovative direction of a company in a manner that can maximise 
long-term firm value. Before methods of controlling goal divergence problems are 
discussed, it is important to first consider the causes of goal divergence between the 
shareholders and the board. 
 
3.3.4 Causes of goal divergence 
McColgan (2001:7) lists key problem areas that cause goal divergence or 
agency problems, namely: moral hazard, earnings retention, risk aversion and the 
time horizon. These four problem areas are discussed in more detail below50. 
 
3.3.4.1 Moral hazard 
Moral hazard is “where one party is responsible for the interests of another, 
but has an incentive to put his or her own interests first” (Dowd, 2009:142). Moral 
hazard can encourage the use of information asymmetry to hide misconduct such 
as a lack of managerial effort (shirking) or the unnecessary use of perquisites 
(perks) between people in an agency relationship (McColgan, 2001:8-9). Increased 
information asymmetry based on reduced disclosure or low levels of transparency 
is seen by investors as value reducing and results in lower firm values (Hope & 
Thomas, 2008:623). Dowd (2009:142) highlights the continued importance of 
moral hazard and states that it “played a central role in the events leading up to the 
[financial] crisis, and we need to appreciate this role if future reforms are to be well 
                                                 
50 A summary of the goal divergence problems described in this section was presented under the 
title “Goal divergence problems in corporate governance” at the International Corporate 
Governance Conference held at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg on 22-23 
October 2012. 
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designed and prevent further disasters down the line”. After the global financial 
crisis “[m]oral outrage centered on the imbalance between banks (too big to fail) 
profiting from excessive risk-taking in good times and taxpayers suffering the costs 
in bad times” (Claassen, 2015:527).  
 
The consumption of perquisites concealed by moral hazard can be significant; 
for example, the cost of the home security services for Warren Buffet in 2009 was 
$344 490, while his salary was $100 000 and his total remuneration package as 
disclosed by Berkshire Hathaway was $519 490 (Stempel, 2010). A South African 
example of the excessive use of perquisites is the costly security upgrades (+R246 
million) to the South African President’s private homestead (De Wet, 2015).  
 
Disclosing reliable information is critical because withholding or adapting 
information on account of moral hazard results in information asymmetry, where 
the board has access to the best information and the shareholders do not. 
Information asymmetry can result in shareholders making adverse selections owing 
to a lack of information as the options they choose are not optimal. The link between 
moral hazard, information asymmetry and asymmetric information is well 
established (Bajari, Hong & Khwaja, 2006:2; Hoque, 2014:81-82) and can be found 
in any contractually managed relationship (Vetter & Karantininis, 2002:271). In 
addition to the risk of shirking, the maximisation of self-interest can be applied 
positively and lead to executives’ directing the company in line with their personal 
talents to maximise the benefit to the company, the executive and shareholders.  
 
A disadvantage is that directing a company in a manner that is aligned to the 
personal talents of an executive can create a situation where the executive seems 
irreplaceable, thereby increasing the value of the executive to the company as well 
as the cost of replacing the executive (McColgan, 2001:8). Increased investment 
that grows a company can also be used by executives to maximise their 
remuneration, as larger firms are more complex to manage and tend to have higher 
levels of directors’ remuneration (Jensen & Murphy, 1990:255). With an increase 
in size the complexity of the company increases, enhancing the difficulty of 
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controlling the actions of employees to prevent shirking and the abuse of 
perquisites, as well as the difficulty of steering the company to move towards a 
common goal. McColgan (2001:9) acknowledges that outsiders find it especially 
difficult to quantify shirking of responsibilities by the board, as shirking is not 
easily observable by outsiders, which helps to explain why these problems are still 
unresolved and remain a governance enigma.  
 
A mechanism recommended by King III to improve goal alignment at board-
level is the requirements that the board should act in the best interests of the 
company (Principle 2.14), that the performance of the board and the board 
committees should be evaluated annually (Principle 2.22), that there should be a 
power balance at board-level (Principle 2.18), with oversight by independent 
directors to counter moral hazard problems (IoDSA, 2009b). Moral hazard can take 
many forms, one of the methods used to fund firm growth is retained earnings. 
However, this practice should be applied in a cost-beneficial manner as larger 
companies are more complex to control and direct. It is important to ensure that 
firm growth decisions are not based on motivations stemming from moral hazard. 
Earnings retention one of the funders of growth is discussed next. 
 
3.3.4.2 Earnings retention 
Earnings retention refers to the amount of earnings retained in the company. 
The retention of earnings reduces the earnings available for the payment of 
dividends to the shareholders. The board has the power to determine dividends 
(section 46) and to fund growth in the company from retained earnings (RSA, 
2008a). Internal funding, such as retained earnings, is a less risky source of funding 
(Koussis, Martzoukos & Trigeorgis, 2017:200) to the company than loans as it does 
not have set interest rates or repayment terms attached to it. Koussis et al. 
(2017:201) found that retained earnings are more important in situations where 
there are high finance costs and good growth expectations. However, indiscriminate 
attempts to grow a company can be damaging to the shareholders if the retained 
funds are invested inefficiently (in a way that is not cost-beneficial or at a lower 
rate than the existing investments) and can result in an erosion of the value of the 
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firm. Larger is not always more valuable and conglomerate mergers have been 
found to be frequently less profitable after the completion of the acquisition (Mover, 
1970:21).  
 
Growing the company will result in a larger company that will be more 
complex and sophisticated to direct and control and in which it will be more difficult 
to maintain good lines of communication in order to reduce information asymmetry 
and prevent moral hazard (Dowd, 2009:148). Thus, larger companies require higher 
levels of monitoring to help direct their activities. Inadequate monitoring can 
encourage the consumption of perquisites and shirking, thereby increasing moral 
hazard (McColgan, 2001:8-9). Executives could, for example, use retained earnings 
to fund research and development (R&D) projects, which could signal a focus on 
innovation. However, higher R&D spending do not necessarily translate into 
product innovation or increased future growth and profitability (Zahra, 1996:1716). 
The increased size and complexity in larger firms increase the difficulty of using 
contracts to achieve goal congruence and can lead to the inefficient use of assets 
(Mover, 1970:21; Jensen, 1994a:4; McColgan, 2001:8). Larger firms are more 
difficult to control and monitor the flow of funds or the actions of executives. Prior 
studies found that larger firms tend to pay higher executive remuneration 
(McColgan, 2001:10; Deschenes, Boubacar, Rojas & Morris, 2015:75). It is also 
more likely that the greater available liquidity in larger firms makes it easier for 
executive directors to consume more perquisites.  
 
A possible mechanism for countering moral hazard is ethical training and the 
development of a company code of ethics to guide conduct within the company and 
with its stakeholders (Claassen, 2015:528). In South Africa ethical leadership 
guidance has been included in the governance guidance and specifically in 
Chapter 1 of King III (IoDSA, 2009b). The use of a code of ethics linked to values 
by companies are already common practice and mostly disclosed on websites but it 
is possible that were ethical guidelines are more ceremonially applied, to create the 
impression of compliance without entrenching the values that such superficial 
ethical guidance would be ineffective protection against moral hazards. 
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The use of internal funding such as retained earnings can reduce the risk to a 
company as it does not need to compete for outside funding. This can help to create 
a larger company with a bigger powerbase and more prestige (McColgan, 2001:10). 
The latter can benefit the board but not the shareholders as lower risks tend to yield 
lower returns.  
 
3.3.4.3 Risk aversion 
The global financial crisis resulted in a “growing awareness and need for 
appropriate risk management techniques and structures within financial 
organizations” (Aebi, Sabato & Schmid, 2012:3213). Companies that fund assets 
by means of retained earnings, for example, could select safer assets with lower but 
steadier returns whereas high leverage firms could invest in riskier assets to help 
generate returns to fund loans. Thus, different views on risks can have a major 
impact on goal divergence. The importance of risk disclosure as a mechanism to 
reduce information asymmetry on goals is highlighted in the International <IR> 
Framework issued by the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) as 
“[a]n integrated report identifies the key risks and opportunities that are specific to 
the organization, including those that relate to the organization’s effects on, and the 
continued availability, quality and affordability of, relevant capitals in the short, 
medium and long term” (IIRC, 2013:27).  
 
Risk aversion has a bigger influence on the board, as shareholders can use 
portfolio theory to diversify their share portfolio risk while the executive director’s 
personal risk is closely linked to the performance of the company (Jensen, 
1972:358). The executive directors depend on the company for their remuneration 
and their human capital is tied to the performance of the company (Fama, 1980:291-
292). Zahra (1996:1715) recommends using the board to monitor and encourage 
long-term value creation by executive directors who may be reluctant, on account 
of risk aversion induced by fear of failure, to encourage enterprise innovation and 
growth as entrepreneurial failures could damage their reputation and increase the 
risk of unemployment. McColgan (2001:12) found that executive directors in high-
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risk companies prefer to reduce their personal wealth exposure in the company by 
holding as few shares as possible and that their risk increases when it is difficult to 
transfer their management skills to another company. The risk attached to 
transferring senior management skills to other companies increases for the company 
but is reduced for the director in labour market conditions where there is a shortage 
of executive directors, as in South Africa. Prophet (2012:7) notes that in South 
Africa the shortage of highly skilled labour has led to above-inflation increases for 
high-skilled workers since 2000.  
 
Michelberger (2016:142) found in a recent German study that risk-averse 
boards produce lower total growth in shareholder returns, which highlights the risk 
of risk-averse board behaviour for the shareholders. Risk-averse executives can be 
motivated to reduce their risk exposure by selecting lower risk investments with 
lower but surer returns for the company or selecting investments that better suit 
their talents, thereby increasing their personal value as executives. It is also possible 
to use compensation schemes to increase the willingness of executive directors to 
take risks, as evidenced by the extremely high bonuses paid to executive directors 
in the banking industry before the global financial crisis (Dowd, 2009:144; 
Ferguson, 2009:1-3). 
 
To counter risk-averse management practices, performance-based 
remuneration can be used to reduce managerial risk aversion and better align the 
objectives of executives to shareholders (Milidonis & Stathopoulos, 2014:453). 
IoDSA (2009b: Principle 4.1) states that the “board should be responsible for the 
governance or risk”, and “disclose how it has satisfied itself that risk assessments, 
responses and interventions are effective”. As executive directors can control the 
cash flow in the company, they can use it to maximise their short-term objectives 
to the detriment of the long-term value of the company, creating time horizon 
problems.  
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3.3.4.4 Time horizon  
Time horizon problems occur when executive directors’ focus on short-term 
goals are linked to their performance management systems, to the detriment of long-
term goals or the survival of the company. As people have different time horizons, 
these different views influence their views on risk. Panno, Pierro and Lauriola 
(2014:212) found that people “with a wider time horizon are less apt to take risks”. 
Thus, executives in a short- to medium-term contract are more likely to apply higher 
risk strategies in an attempt to maximise their rewards within the period of their 
contracts. Executives are more likely to focus on the timing of cash flows during 
their tenure, while the net present value of all future cash flows is important to 
shareholders when considering the value of the firm. As agents, the time horizon of 
the board could also be influenced by the time horizon of the shareholders. 
Controlling shareholders can monitor the board and are more likely to have a longer 
time horizon given the extent of their investment in the company. Zahra 
(1996:1716) notes that long-term controlling shareholders are in a position to 
encourage more vigilant boards and a commitment to entrepreneurship for 
continued growth. 
 
The use of contracts with shorter time lines could encourage short-term 
thinking with increased risk-taking while longer timelines could encourage a 
longer-term view. Time horizons can also influence shareholders, as an institutional 
shareholder representing pension funds might be more risk-averse than a day trader. 
A different time or risk perspective might increase goal alignment problems. This 
may occur when executive directors are close to retirement, for example, as their 
focus will be short term. Furthermore, because they are close to retirement the 
labour market will not have the same controlling influence as it would on younger 
executives. Weisbach (1988:438) found that in the four quarters before a CEO 
either resigns or retires, the market-adjusted returns are, on average, lower. The 
timing of investments and cash flow is also a source of conflict, as shareholders 
might have a long-term focus while the executives might aim to maximise the short-
term returns, increasing the risk of income management or creative accounting to 
create more information asymmetry (McColgan, 2001:11).  
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Time horizon problems include the timing of investments and other cash flow 
considerations such as decisions on the amount of income to retain and the amount 
to distribute to shareholders. The OECD (2009:10) found that there is still a need 
to align the boards’ interests to the long-term interests of the company. Size also 
plays a role in the use of cash flow as larger companies tend to have more available 
cash. Here the South African regulatory guidelines that encourage the use of 
executive bonuses linked to the long-term goals of shareholders should have a 
mediating impact, despite the shortage of executives which limits the mediating 
influence of the labour market (IoDSA, 2009b: Principle 158).  
 
Figure 3-1 Causes of goal divergence  
 
 
3.3.4.5 Goal divergence 
The different causes of goal divergence are summarised in Figure 3-1. 
Divergent interests or goal divergence makes the separation of ownership and 
control that exists in companies a critical condition which allows agency problems 
to occur. The board as the executives of the company do not derive benefits from 
the same source as the company’s shareholders and capital providers, which leads 
to goal divergence. As a result, it is possible that the board will engage in goal 
divergent activities that lead to information asymmetry. Recent failures of South 
African companies like African Bank and Protech Khuthele that required large 
subsequent write-offs highlight the cost of poor choices based on information 
asymmetry with a consequent erosion of shareholder wealth (Allix, 2014; Ziady, 
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2015). This is not new as the existence of goal divergence has traditionally been 
supported by the significant differences in the wealth attributed to directors in 
contrast to the increased wealth of shareholders. Jensen and Murphy (1990:225) 
found in a USA study that the wealth of the chief executive officer (CEO) increases 
by only $3.25 for each $1000 of increased shareholder wealth.51  
 
South African executive director remuneration practices are based on a “pay 
for performance principle”. In 2012 this resulted in the application of a 
remuneration mix that consisted of a total guaranteed pay component of +40%, plus 
short-term incentives of +30% and long-term incentives of +30% (PwC, 2012:6). 
The use of share-based remuneration as a control measure in South Africa is already 
strongly entrenched as a goal divergence control and has helped to fuel the move 
towards implementing good governance practices since King I as falling share 
prices also affected executive directors’ shareholdings and options (Malherbe & 
Segal, 2001:4). The use of performance-based incentives can be significant as 
average short-term performance incentives per director of R0.781, R3.72 and R8.25 
million were observed in small, medium and large companies in 2012 (PwC, 
2012:13).  
 
There is, however, a risk that the use of performance-based incentives could 
encourage excessive risk taking by executive directors to maximise their incentives. 
In a study on the global financial crisis, Dowd (2009:144) noted that the “absence 
of any deferred compensation” resulted in a short-term focus by executives with no 
clawback options to counter the increased moral risks. It is possible that the longer 
term focus of South African executive remuneration practices can control for moral 
hazard caused by a short-term view.  
 
The bonus component of executive remuneration is generally a significant 
portion. An analysis of the variable pay of local CEOs in 2012 and 2013 showed 
that roughly half of the CEOs received bonuses of 100% or more of their guaranteed 
                                                 
51 Performing a comparative study under current South African conditions to test for a correlation 
between the increase in remuneration of a CEO versus the increased shareholders’ wealth is an area 
for future research and is outside the scope of this study. 
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fixed pay (Lamprecht, 2014), which is an increase on the approximately 60% 
variable pay identified in the PwC (2012:6) study. The extent of the executive 
bonuses could result in more information asymmetry and increased agency cost as 
executive directors safeguard high bonuses in situations where there are no delayed 
or deferred compensation or clawback options. A more detailed discussion of 
executive directors’ remuneration is included in chapter 5. 
 
Agency theory can be used to address goal divergence problems. More detail 
on the origin and development of the agency theory, including agency cost, is 
provided in the next section. 
 
3.4 Agency theory 
 
Agency theory stems from the agency relationship, which is “one of the oldest 
and commonest codified modes of social interaction”; it is a relationship between 
two or more parties when the designated agent acts on behalf of the designated 
principal in a specific “domain of decision problems” (Ross, 1973:134). Section 
3.4.1 introduces agency as a concept; this is followed by section 3.4.2, which 
discusses cooperative production challenges, the development of agency cost 
(section 3.4.3), and the role of the markets in managing the agency relationship 
(section 3.4.4). Section 3.4.5 summarises the origin and historical development of 
agency theory in order to put the lens used by this study into context. 
 
3.4.1 Introduction to agency as a concept 
Kiser (1999:147) describes an agency relationship as the delegation of 
authority by a “principal” to an “agent” for specific services. It is therefore possible 
for multiple agency relationships to exist, for example, between the shareholder and 
the director or the employer and the employee. Shavell (1979:55) agrees with this 
and indicates that various “economic arrangements which involve problems of risk 
sharing and incentives may be described in terms of the principal and agent 
relationship”. Abor and Biekpe (2006:623) focused their South African study on 
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the agency relationship in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and found 
that there is effective monitoring where there is one institutional blockholder but 
not where there are more. Agency relationships therefore occur frequently in any 
relationship and exist at all levels of management in all organisations where 
cooperative effort is required (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:309; Shapiro, 2005:266). 
Although it is possible for agency problems to arise in any business relationship, it 
is more likely to occur in larger companies. This study focuses on the relationship 
between the shareholders as principals and the board as agents who manage the 
wealth of the principals for companies on the SRI index, which tend to be relatively 
large companies.  
 
The agency relationship is defined as “a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal) engage another person (the agent) to perform services on 
their behalf which involve delegating some decision making authority to the agent” 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976:308). This implies the application of the 
contractarianism view that models “governance of large firms with separate 
ownership and control as incidents of contracting among the rational economic 
actors to manage towards the efficient use of resources” (Nilakant & Rao, 
1994:649; Bratton, 2001:755). Although the use of a contract can help to align 
divergent interests, it is not the answer as it is impossible to write a perfect contract 
that takes every possible action of the contracting parties into account (McColgan, 
2001:4; Dalton et al., 2007:25). The value of the agency theory in research is 
highlighted by Walsh and Seward (1990:422), who state that the “agency theory 
has emerged as an important framework to help researchers understand the nature 
of this conflict between owners and executives as well as its possible resolution”.  
 
The development of the agency theory builds on the contribution of Berle and 
Means (1933), which focuses on the separation of ownership and control and goes 
on to consider the challenge posed by cooperative production (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972), the use of agency cost (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and the capital and labour 
markets used to address various agency problems (Fama, 1980). These are 
described in more detail in the following sections.  
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3.4.2 Cooperative production challenges 
With the development of large firms, a need arose for specialisation and 
cooperative production. Alchian and Demsetz (1972:777) state that owners achieve 
increased production through cooperative specialisation, resulting in a demand for 
firms that facilitate such production. In cooperative production it is more difficult 
to measure the contribution of individual members, as the outcomes have been 
produced by a team. Cheung (1983:9) explains that the “determination of prices is 
costly because of the number of transactions, because consumers lack detailed 
information on the use of each component or contribution to a commodity, because 
of the difficulty of measuring varied and changing activities, and the need to 
separate contributions”. The challenges of allocating output to the input of 
cooperative production could be solved by applying a “sharing rule”. The principles 
of applying an equal sharing rule could explain the criticisms levelled against high 
executive remuneration and the increased focus on the remuneration gap. However, 
not all people contribute equally in a company, and equal sharing can only be 
applied in situations where there is homogeneous input (Corchón & Puy, 1998:83-
84). As the board members have different roles which is also different to those of 
the shareholders which complicate goal alignment (Kaufman & Englander, 2005:9). 
 
The lack of detailed information is also a more pervasive problem within the 
company, as workers have a better knowledge of their contribution and shirking 
than the board, and the board has better information on the performance and 
position of the company than the shareholders, highlighting the information 
asymmetry problem caused by moral hazard. It is easier for individuals to shirk 
their duty when working as part of a team (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972:780). The 
same problem is also evident at board-level as the executive directors have more 
information than the independent directors, but this is also more of a problem in 
situations where the output cannot easily be verified. Fortunately, “humans have a 
marked inclination toward cooperation within groups” (Cordes, Richerson, 
McElreath & Strimling, 2008:126). To encourage cooperation and control for 
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slacking, performance evaluations can be used as a control mechanism to minimise 
the risk to the company.  
 
Another compensatory control is monitoring. The possibility of shirking 
makes it even more important to measure team or cooperative production. Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972:782) recommend the use of a monitor and suggest that for the 
monitor to be motivated to be more efficient, the monitor should share in the net 
earnings or residual rewards. This is often accomplished by using performance-
based remuneration. Monitoring is considered to be an acceptable control to help 
achieve goal alignment in team production and to address the problems caused by 
shirking (Nilakant & Rao, 1994:650). However, Friebel and Schnedler (2011:2-3) 
warn that monitoring might not be an effective control as excessive monitoring 
interventions could result in decreased performance. 
 
By focusing on cooperative production and monitoring within a firm, Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972) did not directly address the problem caused by the separation 
of ownership from control, but their system of using monitoring to measure the 
output of individuals in joint production and to identify shirking is also applicable 
to the management of the agency relationship. The principle of rewarding the 
monitor has been used in the development of incentive compensation systems to 
help align divergent interests (Wibowo & Evans, 2009:96), a system widely used 
in South Africa. However, in the development of an incentive system, the 
development of appropriate performance targets is critical (Lamprecht, 2014). 
Implementing controls, like an incentive system, to achieve goal alignment is not 
without cost. The result has been the development of agency cost as discussed 
below.  
 
3.4.3 The development of agency cost 
Jensen and Meckling (1976:308) define agency cost as “the sum of: 
(1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal 
(2) the bonding expenditures by the agent 
(3) the residual loss” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:308). 
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According to Watts and Zimmerman (1979:276), agency cost “arise[s] 
because the manager’s (the agent’s) interest does not necessarily coincide with the 
interests of shareholders”. Thus, agency cost “occur[s] from the misalignment of 
interests between the firm’s executives and the firm’s shareholders” (Ibrahim & 
Samad, 2011:18). Agency cost is therefore the cost of the goal divergence between 
the board and shareholders that stems from the separation of ownership and control.  
 
Control of the agency problem is considered to be an important survival factor 
for firms (Fama & Jensen, 1983a:327), and the manner in which firms continue to 
thrive suggests some success in controlling agency cost. However, recent research 
into agency cost, especially in developing economies (Singh & Davidson, 2003; 
Huang, Jiang, Liu & Zhang, 2011; Ibrahim & Samad, 2011; Rashid, 2015), suggests 
that designing appropriate controls is not straightforward. From the deconstruction 
of agency cost by Jensen and Meckling (1976), it appears that monitoring and 
bonding form the key control categories that help to achieve goal congruence.  
 
The contractual nature of the agency relationships, whether formal or 
informal, provides a means of negotiating expectations between the parties, to help 
achieve better goal alignment. Jensen and Meckling (1976:311) highlight the 
importance of using contracts to clarify expectations as companies are “simply one 
form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and 
which is also characterized by the existence of divisible residual claims on the 
assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold without 
permission of the other contracting individuals”. Negotiating contracts to include 
controls to allow for goal concurrence can therefore be used as a mechanism to 
align conflicting objectives of the parties involved. Such contracts with executive 
directors could include performance-based remuneration such as share options, for 
improved goal alignment to the shareholders (Abor & Biekpe, 2006:53). 
 
Active capital markets (like the JSE), where shares can be freely traded, 
reduce the risk to shareholders by enabling them to exit from the relationship at any 
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time without permission, reducing the need for additional controls and limiting 
agency costs. This strategy can help to reduce the overall risk to the shareholder, 
not only by facilitating entrance to and exit from shares, but also by allowing the 
shareholder to spread his wealth by holding shares in a number of companies, 
thereby reducing the shareholder’s overall risk, in line with the portfolio theory 
(Markowitz, 1991). The ability to trade unrestrictedly in a company’s shares helps 
to develop the capital market as an external monitoring mechanism using market 
enabled controls like takeovers (Fama & Jensen, 1983b:313).  
 
In contrast to the above, the board, who actively manage the company, rely 
on their remuneration as their reward and depend on the success of the company to 
bolster their reputation and future earning potential, making them more risk-averse 
as they are more exposed. The executive directors depend on the company for their 
remuneration and their human capital is tied to the performance of the company 
(Fama, 1980:291-292). Shapiro (2005:265) describes the risk orientation of the 
parties to an agency relationship as follows: “although principals are risk neutral … 
agents are risk averse, because they have placed all their eggs in one basket”. The 
latter risk generalisation might not always be true as some executives could engage 
in risky initiatives in the hope of higher returns despite being bonded to the 
company, while shareholders don’t always balance their investment risk also in the 
hope of increased returns. 
 
The continued prominence of agency cost in developing economies especially 
has been highlighted by recent studies that centred on agency costs (Huang et al., 
2011; Ibrahim & Samad, 2011; Rashid, 2015). There is a variety of controls that 
can be used to help achieve goal congruence, of which the market (JSE) for shares 
and the market for labour tend to be the most powerful.  
 
Using the market shareholders can reduce their risk by spreading their 
shareholding among diverse companies. Unfortunately, the reduced risk can lead to 
inactive or uninvolved shareholders who view their shareholding as an investment 
and sit back to reap the “wages” of capital. If the shareholders are the beneficiaries 
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of the growth of the value of the shares as well as the profit, there is little incentive 
for executives to actively seek new business opportunities for the company or other 
forms of innovation in the same manner as an entrepreneur would. In addition, the 
higher risk profile of the executives would further deter them from implementing 
new, risky business ventures or innovations, as they might further increase their 
personal risk. Not all new business ventures are successful, and the executives 
might prefer to use old and trusted methods with lower but surer returns; however, 
failing to invest in new business ventures or avoiding innovation would have an 
adverse impact on the ability of the company to increase its value over the long-
term and could even threaten its survival. The specification of individual rights 
during the contract negotiations in an agency relationship helps to ensure that there 
is clarity regarding how the risks, costs and rewards will be allocated among the 
parties in the agency relationship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:307-308). Singh and 
Davidson (2003:794) have found that “higher managerial ownership significantly 
and positively influences the corporate asset utilization efficiency”, which 
illustrates the moderating impact of goal congruence through executive 
shareholding. 
 
As monitoring is performed to assess whether the agent’s actions are in line 
with the expectations of the principal, the monitoring costs that form part of agency 
cost are similar to the cost of monitoring in cooperative production. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976:309) say that the “agency costs and their importance to the theory 
of the firm bear a close relationship to the problem of shirking and monitoring of 
team production which Alchian and Demsetz (1972) raise in their paper on the 
theory of the firm”. 
 
The monitoring of team production to minimise shirking is not the only form 
of monitoring required; it is also important to ensure that costs are controlled. Here, 
the excessive use of company resources (perquisites) by agents needs to be 
monitored and curtailed. This is acknowledged by prior studies that used asset 
utilisation as a proxy for shirking and expense ratios as a proxy for excessive 
perquisites (Singh & Davidson, 2003; Huang et al., 2011; Ibrahim & Samad, 2011; 
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Rashid, 2015). The benefits or utility that accrue to principals and agents are not 
only financial, as non-pecuniary aspects also play a role, such as working for, or 
owning shares in, a large, well-respected company, with a head office that is a 
landmark building, resulting in utility accruing to the people involved or associated 
with the company. Jensen and Meckling (1976:312) describe the achievement of 
the optimal mix of financial and non-financial or non-pecuniary rewards, ignoring 
taxation, as “when the marginal utility derived from an additional dollar or 
expenditure (measured net of any productive effects) is equal for each non-
pecuniary item and equal to the marginal utility derived from an additional dollar 
of after-tax purchasing power (wealth)”.  
 
The ability of an executive to attract non-pecuniary benefits or utility or 
consume perquisites increases the agency cost, as it requires additional monitoring. 
Thus, the consumption of excessive perquisites or the practice of shirking will 
attract additional monitoring as well as additional expenses caused by the consumed 
perquisites and cost of monitoring, resulting in lower profitability and a reduced 
share price. Firms are not limited to a supervisory monitoring role and can use a 
combination of complex methods such as requiring an audit, implementing control 
systems and budget restrictions and even aligning the remuneration of the executive 
more closely with that of the shareholder by using an incentive compensation 
system (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:323). Watts and Zimmerman (1979:278) note 
that “audited financial statements are useful devices to monitor” the agreements 
between the board and shareholders. The value of auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism is supported by the widespread use of audits before auditing became a 
legal requirement. Watts and Zimmerman (1983:614) found that audits were 
already used in the early stages of the “development of business corporations 
(1200)52 and evolved gradually into the type of audit required by the first English 
companies act (1844)”. 
 
                                                 
52 The year refers to the period in which evidence was found of the audit of early business 
corporations, followed much later by the introduction of the English Companies Act in 1844. 
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Not all the agency expenses need to be carried by the owner; some of them 
can be transferred to the executive as bonding expenses and these could take the 
form of a contractual guarantee or limitations on the decision-making powers of the 
executive (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:325). The use of bonds and penalties to control 
executives is not new – centuries ago, bonding resulted in fines being issued for the 
breach of an ordinance during the audit of a guild, with the balance of the cash 
bonds being returned to the retiring executive after the audit (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1983:618). In the 17th century, the treasurers of corporations such as the Spanish 
Company, the Levant Company and the Eastland Company were required to post 
bonds ranging from £400 to £1000 – substantial amounts at the time – as an early 
method of using bonding to control executives (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983:621). 
Any agreement with an executive to use fewer perquisites reduces expenses and 
monitoring costs can lead to increased profits. However, the executive will only 
give up perquisites if the net effect, because of the reduction in agency cost, 
increases his total gained utility as well. A prominent local example of a CEO who 
sacrificed short-term remuneration for share options is the agreement Koos Bekker 
had with Naspers. In the “17 years that he occupied” the chief executive position 
“he did not draw a salary or benefits and took stock options as compensation” 
(Steyn, 2015). This unusual arrangement netted him billions of Rands after his 
tenure as he developed Naspers into the largest media group outside the USA and 
China in his tenure (Gundan, 2014).  
 
It is also possible for shareholders to restrict the rights of agents or directors 
by requiring shareholder approval for the appointment of directors, the auditor, for 
mergers and new share issues (Fama & Jensen, 1983b:313). This is in line with the 
Companies Act requirements in South Africa, where legislation is used to bond the 
options of the board and shareholders (discussed in more detail in section 2.3.1). 
Thus, the use of monitoring and bonding towards goal alignment results in the use 
of monitoring controls to manage the agency problem caused by goal divergence. 
Corporate control focuses on identifying and evaluating how the agency problem is 
controlled and managed in a manner that ensures that the direction and control of 
128 
 
 
the company are aligned with the interests of its shareholders. This is discussed in 
detail in chapter 4.  
 
Monitoring is used to manage shirking and the excessive use of perquisites 
and bonding is used to reduce monitoring costs by establishing contractual 
guarantees and limiting the decision-making powers of executives. A summary of 
the above discussion on agency cost considerations that influence corporate control 
is presented in Table 3-1. 
 
Table 3-1 Agency cost aspects that influence corporate control  
Use of monitoring to reduce shirking 
Use of monitoring to reduce the use of perquisites that could increase costs 
Use of contractual bonding (like remuneration agreements) to reduce monitoring 
costs 
Use of bonding to limit decision-making powers 
 
It is evident from the above that goal divergence can be managed through 
controls by directing the labour of the board towards a common goal. The 
controlling of goal divergence is also discussed in more detail in chapter 4, which 
deals with corporate control, while directing is discussed in more detail in chapter 
5, which deals with managerial labour. Figure 3-2 is a graphical representation of 
the interaction of the three elements that make up agency cost within the overall 
control of the market. The market includes the capital market as well as the labour 
market.  
 
Figure 3-2 Agency cost and market forces 
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A more detailed analysis of the use of the markets to manage the agency 
problem is provided in the next section. 
 
3.4.4 The role of the markets 
Using monitoring and bonding to reduce agency cost does not always fully 
reflect the influence of the ultimate control of the markets. The main contribution 
of Fama (1980:289-292) has been to highlight the split between the management 
decision-making function (linked to the labour market, section 3.6.4.2) and the risk-
bearing function (linked to the share market, section 3.6.4.1). These functions were 
both previously performed by the entrepreneur. This split also reflects the 
differences between the principal and the agent in their attitudes to risk, a cause of 
goal divergence (Nilakant & Rao, 1994:652). The risk-bearing function could use 
portfolio theory to reduce risk through diversification and use the share market as a 
control mechanism. 
 
When risk to shareholders’ wealth is shared among many firms, it can result 
in more inactive shareholders who have little interest in overseeing the activities of 
the firm, resulting in a more efficient allocation of risk but with shareholders who 
exercise little control (Fama, 1980:290-291 & 293). The split between the functions 
of risk and management also enables the specialisation of risk and management. 
Furthermore, Smith (1776/2003:16-17) indicates that increased specialisation 
through division of labour results in improvements, as “those employed in each 
particular branch of labour should find out easier and readier methods of performing 
their own particular work”. He does, however, caution that division of labour is 
limited “by the extent of the market” (Smith, 1776/2003:27), which helps to explain 
why the separation of ownership from control only became a concern with the 
increase in size of corporations in a context with limited liability and diffused 
shareholders. A more detailed discussion on the share and labour markets, and the 
influence of the markets on agency relationships, is provided in the following 
sections.  
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3.4.4.1 Share markets 
The JSE as a share market is effective and competitive within the South 
African context, with a top 5 competitive rating by the WEF out of 114 countries 
in 2012-2013 and out of 138 countries in 2016-2017 (WEF, 2012-2013; WEF, 
2016-2017). A share market acts as a control mechanism by facilitating the trading 
of shares in three broad areas. The first is by helping individuals who have 
developed a company over time to liquidate some of their shareholdings. This can 
free up liquidity so that new investment opportunities can be developed. Secondly, 
allowing shareholders, especially institutional shareholders, the opportunity to 
apply portfolio theory to a diversified portfolio of shares reduces their overall risk 
exposure. Lastly, the JSE facilitates mergers and takeovers of existing companies 
to improve synergy and increase efficacies.  
 
The regulatory restrictions, coupled with the smaller size of the JSE and the 
lower level of liquidity in the South African market, result in few big takeovers 
(discussed in more detail in section 4.2.3) (Armstrong et al., 2005:24; Ntim et al., 
2015:199). In addition, regulations limit options through the bonding of merger- 
and acquisition-related activities or transactions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
takeovers of smaller companies are commonly practised as part of a growth strategy 
and are a less risky means of acquiring new innovations. In addition to the bonding 
impact of the JSE listing requirements (JSE, 2010a), mergers and acquisitions are 
also regulated in Chapter 4 of the Companies Act, in terms of which the required 
approval of shareholders and the takeover regulation panel acts as a constraint 
(RSA, 2008a; Douglas, Oppenheim & Gilfillan, 2013). It is also possible for 
companies to improve liquidity through unbundling or selling assets to refocus the 
enterprise of the company. 
 
Control mechanisms associated with the JSE are used in the South African 
share market and act as the final control where shareholders can buy and sell shares 
in response to the way a company is being managed. Recent examples of the value 
of selling shares include the sale by Koos Bekker of the bulk of the shares he 
accumulated as CEO for an estimated R20 billion the year after he retired (Steyn, 
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2015). Another example is the sale by Cyril Ramaphosa of his shares in Shanduka, 
an investment company, for an estimated $200 million to Pembani Group to prevent 
a conflict of interests between his political position and the operations of the 
company, thereby creating one of Africa’s largest black-owned investment groups 
(Nsehe, 2015).  
 
As a market requires sellers and buyers to be effective, the JSE allows for 
acquisitions, through mergers and takeovers, in addition to smaller investments 
made by the broader investing community on a continuous basis. Companies would 
be interested in merging or acquiring other companies if they consider the assets of 
the other company to be underperforming and expect to be able to address the 
reason for the underperformance. An example of a recent large acquisition of a 
company listed on the JSE is the acquisition of SAB Miller (listed on the LSE and 
the JSE) by Anheuser-Busch InBev for £79 billion, the biggest deal in British 
corporate history (Ambrose, 2016). The acquisition of Business Connection (BCX) 
by Telkom in a R2.6 billion deal is another example (Van Zyl, 2015b). Although 
hostile takeovers are rare in the South African market, Bidvest, a company that 
focuses on growing through diversifying its holdings, countered a “Chilean group's 
$1.2-billion bid for South African drug maker Adcock Ingram” by teaming up with 
“Community Investment Holdings (CIH) to offer R70 per share to raise its stake to 
as much as 34.5% of Adcock” in a hostile bid (Motsoeneng, 2013). In 2016 Bidvest 
unbundled its food services unit (57% of the group’s sales) to list it as a separate 
company on the JSE (Hill, 2016). Such an unbundling can help the new company 
to refocus its core business activities, using specialisation to improve efficiencies, 
as well as help improve liquidity in the parent company.  
 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that as a market the JSE can benefit 
both buyers and sellers of equity instruments irrespective of their position in an 
agency relationship since the market serves as a control mechanism. In addition to 
facilitating the buying and selling of equity instruments, the JSE also allows for 
trading in derivative instruments, which has further risk implications, but this fall 
outside the scope of this study. 
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The JSE as a market allows the current shareholders, who form part of an 
agency relationship, to easily exit from their relationship by simply selling their 
shares. The easiest way to exit as a board member is to resign. It is also possible for 
the shareholders to dismiss board members. Anecdotal evidence suggest a 
preference to pressure executive directors to resign, as evidenced by the resignation 
of CEOs of underperforming companies like African Bank, PPC and Steinhoff 
(Hedley & Derby, 2014; Ziady, 2015; Bowker, 2017). However, even when board 
members resign they can still be held liable for decisions taken and implemented 
during their tenure and are bonded by the legislative environment applicable to 
companies. Another limitation on board members is the labour market and its 
influence on their future employment opportunities as a director, and on the 
accompanying remuneration. The labour market is discussed in more detail below. 
 
3.4.4.2 Labour market 
Markets are influenced by normal economic supply and demand principles. 
Fama (1980) developed a solution to agency problems using the market, and the 
labour market, as a control mechanism. The market for labour still plays a role as it 
influences the availability and cost of executive directors to serve on the board. 
Managerial labour is discussed in greater detail in chapter 5.  
 
Fama (1980:289) notes that “the literature has moved toward theories that 
reject the classical model of the firm but assume classical forms of economic 
behaviour on the part of the agents within the firm”, where the “firm is viewed as a 
set of contracts among factors of production, with each factor motivated by self-
interest”. This highlights the contractarianism view of managing the agency 
problem (Nilakant & Rao, 1994:649; Bratton, 2001:755; Rajgopal, Taylor & 
Venkatachalam, 2012:119). Here the moderating impact of the market can be of 
assistance, especially for board members who wish to use the labour market to 
further their careers.  
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Executive directors are more likely to incur bonding costs in situations where 
there is an oversupply of suitable executives, and competition makes it difficult to 
obtain a board position. However, increased regulatory requirements are demanding 
more from directors and their specialist knowledge may be in short supply, globally 
as well as in South Africa. Linck, Netter and Yang (2009:3288) found that the 
additional demands placed on directors by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act resulted in a 
reduction in the supply of directors “due to the increased workload and risks of 
being a director”. In South Africa a PwC (2011:4) study found that there is still a 
shortage of skilled non-executive directors, and there is also an overall shortage at 
the executive management level (Prophet, 2012:7). In addition, Carciumaru 
(2010:251) found that in South Africa “director liability has in fact increased” and 
that the courts and society are more willing to hold directors accountable and liable. 
Specialist managers (executive directors) would be more likely to require a share 
of the profit in situations where their specialist skills are in high demand, as is the 
case in a situation where there is a shortage of other competing, qualified executive 
directors. In South Africa, the use of share-based remuneration as a control is 
already entrenched for executive directors (Malherbe & Segal, 2001:4). In principle 
2.25, paragraph 168, King III recommends the use of performance incentives 
including share-based incentives to help achieve goal alignment for executive 
directors’ remuneration (IoDSA, 2009b). Scholtz (2009:75) argues that share-based 
remuneration “as part of executive remuneration should be well managed to enable 
executive management to create long-term shareholder value”, highlighting the 
goal alignment role of share-based remuneration. Some control measures include 
delayed remuneration components and clawback options to control for moral 
hazard and information asymmetry risks. 
 
Overseeing contracts is still a challenge in developing economies as Haron 
and Akhtaruddin (2013:18) note that “there is an increasing call for the design of 
[an] incentive compensation scheme that ties executive pay to shareholders’ 
wealth” to counter excessive remuneration, highlighting the continued relevance or 
need to ensure that executive remuneration is reasonable and performance-based.  
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Fama and Jensen (1983b:304) found that effective control procedures are 
critical to prevent agents from taking actions that deviate from the interests of the 
shareholders. They state that an “effective system for decision control implies… 
that the control (ratification and monitoring) of decisions is to some extent separate 
from the management (initiation and implementation) of decisions” (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983b:304). Here, Fama and Jensen (1983b) allude to the critical 
importance of the separation of duties between people within a control system – 
especially between the monitoring of a decision and the implementation thereof – 
in ensuring that the control system is effective. In situations where a majority 
shareholder is also an executive director, the risk to the minority shareholders will 
increase as there is less separation of duties between the residual risk, decision 
management and decision control functions. This situation would increase the need 
of the minority shareholders to use independent directors as monitors.  
 
Knowledge considerations are also important, as decision management and 
control should be allocated to people with the necessary specific knowledge. Fama 
and Jensen (1983b:308) state that “specific knowledge in complex organizations is 
diffused among agents, diffusion of decision management can reduce cost by 
delegating the initiation and implementation of decisions to agents with valuable 
relevant knowledge”, reducing agency cost by “separating management (initiation 
and implementation) and control (ratification and monitoring) of decisions”. 
Methods that can be used to separate decision management from decision control 
include the application of decision hierarchies for ratification and monitoring, 
boards of directors that ratify and monitor the company’s most important decisions, 
including the hiring, firing and compensation of top decision management and 
incentive structures that encourage mutual monitoring among decision agents 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983a:332). Separation of decision management is done on board 
level by differentiating between the roles of executive directors and non-executive 
directors, whereas the Companies Act make specific provisions for ratification of 
decisions as discussed in section 2.3.1.2. The need for decision management 
highlights the challenges caused by information asymmetry, as in situations where 
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agents have better or more knowledge than the principals, they are more likely to 
act opportunistically.  
 
Methods of controlling the opportunistic actions of agents include the use of 
monitoring and hierarchies. In a formal hierarchy, the higher-level agents ratify and 
monitor the decisions of lower-level agents supported by control processes such as 
accounting and budgeting. In this case, monitoring makes use of the motivation of 
internal agents including the board to monitor each other, as the performance of the 
company is used to judge the value of their human capital in the labour market 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983b:310). 
 
The use of independent directors as referees is an additional monitoring 
control. Monitoring using independent directors is a more cost-effective solution 
when compared to takeovers (Fama, 1980:294). The use of independent directors 
enables a further split in the internal governance functions performed by the board 
between ratification and monitoring of decisions and initiation and implementation 
of the decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983b:302).  
 
Fama (1980:296) also highlights the use of perquisites and shirking by 
executives as problems, with the possibility of increased shirking or use of 
perquisites in situations where there are no performance evaluations or an 
“[a]ssessment of ex post deviations from the contract”. Thus, there seems to be a 
risk that a lack of performance management can result in shirking and the excessive 
use of perquisites, which results in a reduction of firm value. The managerial labour 
market uses the following assumptions to value the influence of shirking and the 
use of perquisites or consumption: 
1. As the executive’s talents and on-the-job consumption are 
uncertain, they are imputed by the labour market using information 
about the current and past performances of the executive; 
2. the labour market appropriately uses past information to revise 
future wages; and 
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3. the wage revision process is strong enough to resolve incentive 
problems (Fama, 1980:296-297). 
Although the above valuation of the future earnings potential of executives 
can be done by the labour market, the level of ex post balancing in the market can 
be shifted to the firm. Locally the performance of the board are guided by King III 
and are discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
 
A summary of the split between risk-bearing and management functions 
showing the use of capital and labour markets to help resolve agency problems is 
given in Figure 3-3, as the markets influence the control options available to boards. 
 
Figure 3-3 Addressing agency problems in the risk-bearing and 
management functions 
 
 
3.4.5 Summary of the origin and historical development of the agency theory 
The separation of ownership and control reduces the efficiency of the 
operation of a company and leads to additional monitoring costs to limit shirking 
and the use of perquisites, thereby increasing the agency cost and reducing the value 
of the company. Yet, despite all these disadvantages, companies still exist and, 
during the past eight decades since the publication of Berle and Means (1933), they 
have not only survived but have grown and flourished. Despite the decrease in 
efficiency, shareholders are still willing to invest in companies. This could possibly 
be explained by a lack of alternative investment options or by the superiority of 
returns from investments in listed shares. One of the advantages of the separation 
Risk-bearing function
(Capital market)
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of ownership and control is that shareholders can reduce their risk by holding a 
diversified portfolio of shares. Furthermore, they do not need to be involved in the 
management or monitoring processes as they can rely on boards to effectively and 
efficiently manage their wealth, despite the disadvantage of the incurred agency 
cost. Specialised board members are motivated to manage other people’s wealth 
efficiently, as the efficient and effective management of a company can improve 
the marketability and future earnings potential of the board members as well. 
 
Monitoring and bonding costs are also dependent on the influences of the 
market and if the shareholders are inactive they cannot be efficient monitors. The 
shareholders therefore need another monitoring mechanism to help them ensure that 
the board is focusing on directing the company in a manner that enhances the value 
of the company and their shareholder wealth. Such a mechanism for monitoring the 
board can include the labour market or the use of independent directors as specialist 
monitors. Fama (1980:295) finds that the “viability of the large corporation with 
diffuse security ownership is better explained in terms of a model where the primary 
disciplining of executives comes through managerial labor markets, both within and 
outside the firm, with assistance from the panoply of internal and external 
monitoring devices that evolved to stimulate the ongoing efficiency of the corporate 
form, and with the market for outside takeovers providing discipline of last resort”. 
The managerial labour market adjusts the future earnings potential of the board 
members according to the performance of the firms that used their specialist 
management skills. This practice may lead to the alignment of the interests of the 
board with those of the shareholders by board members who want to maximise their 
reputation and future earnings potential in the market. Even retiring CEO’s could 
be influenced by the market as they adjust to build a future career as a monitor. 
 
To date, there is still no clear-cut solution to agency problems. It is important 
to acknowledge that the ultimate balancing or correcting of agency problems occurs 
in the markets. However, the markets should be the last resort. It is clear from the 
above that the monitoring of the board is one of the most important controls that 
can be used to ensure that the actions of the board are aligned with the goals of the 
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shareholders. Monitoring can include oversight and performance evaluation, the 
appointment of outside or independent directors as referees, audits, outcomes-based 
incentive systems to align executive directors’ remuneration with the goals of the 
shareholders and the establishment of hierarchical controls with different levels of 
authority and oversight. 
 
Despite the prominence of the agency theory in prior research, an agency 
theory perspective is only relevant if the separation of ownership and control and 
the maximisation of self-interest that underpins the agency theory are still relevant. 
Thus, the discussion of the historical development of the separation of ownership 
and control and the development of the agency theory includes references to current 
practices to show current relevance in South Africa. 
 
3.5 Continued relevance of the challenges caused by the separation of 
ownership and control 
 
In recent years, there has been an increased focus on the role of the board as 
a governance mechanism (Yammeesri & Herath, 2010; Kaczmarek, Kimino & Pye, 
2012; Muniandy & Hillier, 2015; Muchemwa et al., 2016). This is further 
evidenced by continued emphasis on the oversight role of independent directors in 
particular, as well as emphasis on remuneration incentives applicable to executive 
directors in recent South African legislative and regulatory changes (RSA, 2008a: 
Sections 66 & 94; IoDSA, 2009a:45-49 & 56-58; IoDSA, 2016: Principles 8 & 14). 
This increased emphasis became more noticeable globally after the economic fall-
out of the global financial crisis of 2008 (Haspeslagh, 2010). After the global 
financial crisis, the OECD53 highlighted the “value of a strong and effective 
regulatory framework and proper supervision” and called for the updating and 
strengthening of governance and regulations (OECD, 2009:9). This is in line with 
past calls for enhanced governance that were sounded in the aftermath of the 
financial disasters or corporate scandals.  
                                                 
53 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
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Michelberger (2016:136) explains that the renewal of governance practices to 
protect shareholders’ interest is demonstrated by the continued linking of corporate 
failures to governance practices. The call for improved supervision and governance 
is also within the oversight/monitoring role which it is recommended that 
independent directors should fulfil (refer to chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion 
on the oversight role of independent directors). The OECD identifies the inability 
of companies to align the remuneration and incentive systems for executives and 
directors with the long-term interests of the company and its shareholders as one of 
the contributory factors to the global financial crisis (OECD, 2009:10). This 
highlights a problem area as the development of appropriate performance targets to 
align executive bonuses with firm performance is a challenge in South Africa 
(Lamprecht, 2014).  
 
Clearly, the practice of aligning executive directors’ remuneration with firm 
performance did not prevent the maximising of self-interest given the continued 
criticism focused on executive director remuneration (Bronkhorst, 2014). The 
concern around excessive executive directors’ remuneration is not limited to South 
Africa. Kemper and Martin (2010:229) say that post the 2008 financial crises the 
“focus on executive compensation” changed from viewing it as a symptom to 
viewing it as a contributory cause of the crises. Excessive remuneration also calls 
attention to the freedom of the board to control and direct the operations of a 
company as they see fit where there is a possible lack of accountability in companies 
with diverse shareholders (Blair & Stout, 2001:405) to serve as a moderating 
control. 
 
As South African governance guidelines have been developed proactively, 
and not re-actively, financial disasters merely feed into the normal improvement 
cycle and do not prompt a review of the existing regulation or legislation. However, 
the continued challenge of aligning remuneration and incentive systems indicates 
that the challenges caused by the separation of ownership from control still exist, 
given the regular claims of excessive directors’ remuneration and an increased 
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focus on the wage gap between the lowest and highest paid people in a company 
(Holmes, 2014). In considering the wage gap between executive directors and rank-
and-file employees, Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010:946) query whether the high 
executive remuneration is a labour market consequence based on a small supply of 
executive directors or a symptom of executive rent seeking. The wage gap has 
resulted in calls to cap executive salaries following examples in other developing 
countries like China that limited the wage differential between the lowest and 
highest paid employee in a state-owned enterprise (SOE) to 1:11 (Rossouw, 2015). 
Van Niekerk (2016) notes that the guaranteed remuneration together with short-
term bonuses of South African executives are around 36 times the remuneration of 
their employees, which is favourable when compared to international trends of a 50 
times ratio.54  
 
The practice of criticising executive salaries by adding context and linking 
their remuneration to that of stakeholders is not limited to criticism by employees 
but includes criticism by bondholders and society in general. Edcon’s CEO was 
criticised for receiving a basic salary of R12.5 million and a bonus of R7.5 million 
while asking bondholders to take a loss on their investment (Kew & Bonorchhis, 
2015), and Eskom, a state-owned company (SOC) with a monopoly as the sole 
electricity supplier in South Africa paid executive bonuses while the country was 
confronted with rising electricity costs and load shedding (SAPA, 2014b).  
 
Arguably the most criticised highly paid CEO in South Africa is Whitey 
Basson of Shoprite, who attracted attention in 2010 for a total package of R627.6 
million that included exercised share options of R594.5 million (Holmes, 2014). 
This made him the highest paid South African CEO. At the time Shoprite was 
ranked the 15th largest company in South Africa by market capitalisation (Carte, 
2011). In 2016 he again attracted attention with a R49.7 million basic salary along 
with a R50 million bonus. Despite some institutional shareholders voting against 
the remuneration policy, it was positively received by the market as the company’s 
                                                 
54 Reported wage gap ratios differ, depending on how the short- and long-term variable pay 
components of directors have been taken into consideration. 
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share price rose slightly after the announcement of the bonus (Cameron, 2016). 
Although the positive reaction of the share price is an indication that the 
shareholders, on average, are not dissatisfied with the performance of the company 
under his leadership, the broader South African societal inequality, together with 
the accompanying social challenges, is emphasised by the wage gap. The same 
group pays a casual worker R550 per week, and a basic salaried worker earns 
R270055 per month, highlighting the wage gap and the challenges still facing South 
Africa on a transformational level (Ntongana, 2016).  
 
The bonus of a CEO is generally linked to performance and the way the 
company was led, the Shopright group did become the number one retailer in South 
Africa under his leadership of more than 35 years (Carte, 2011; Cameron, 2016). 
Even if Whitey Basson had declined his R50 million bonus in favour of his 
employees, given the nearly 138 000 people employed in the group, an equal 
division of the bonus would merely have netted each employee R362.32. However, 
the criticisms of highly paid CEOs against low paid employees highlight the 
continuing challenge of rewarding labour in cooperative production in a manner 
perceived to be fair by society. 
 
Continuous emphasis on and research into executive remuneration is still 
needed as Prophet (2013:1-2) found that there is a considerable variation in CEO 
pay between companies when comparing remuneration to return on shareholder 
funds in South African companies. Lamprecht (2014) questions whether the 
performance criteria used to determine executive bonuses are challenging enough 
as “it seems relatively easy for executives to receive considerably variable pay 
packages”. 
 
Given the assumption of self-interest maximisation, the risk of excessive 
directors’ remuneration remains a key element that needs to be controlled. 
Excessive remuneration is also an indication that moral hazard on the part of the 
                                                 
55 Entry-level employees generally report their net monthly salaries as they highlight the cash 
component they receive, whereas the gross annual remuneration of executive members is reported. 
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possibly overpaid directors, compounded by the adverse selection of remuneration 
policies linked to the difficulty of overseeing the remuneration process efficiently, 
is still a challenge that needs to be more efficiently controlled. 
 
Goal congruence is important in this study since the board as a governance 
mechanism will only be effective as such if the results of their direction of the 
activities and resources of the company produce improved long-term performance. 
Although this study focuses on enhanced value for the shareholders, contractual 
relationships with other stakeholders such as employees, customers and creditors 
will also benefit a company that focuses on increasing its performance and value 
with a view to ensuring long-term survivability. The net present value of a company 
which is expected to survive in the long-term will exceed that of a similar company 
with a short-term focus. In addition, a longer focus also helps to develop improved 
business relationships with the other contractual stakeholders such as suppliers, 
customers and employees. Thus, focusing on improving firm value in the long-term 
is beneficial for the shareholders as well as other stakeholders.  
 
3.6 Chapter summary 
 
From the discussion in section 3.5, it can be noted that there are controls 
available to align the interests of the shareholders as principals to those of the board 
as agents, such as monitoring and bonding, and that using these controls contributes 
to agency cost. The available controls address the agency problem on two fronts, 
using monitoring as a control and performance management linked to remuneration 
to direct and control the board’s labour. Monitoring with separation of duties are 
used to control possible shirking or the excessive use of perquisites by the board, 
while bonding is used to reduce monitoring cost by establishing contractual 
guarantees and limiting the decision-making powers of executives through 
organisational structures or regulatory and legislative requirements. The use of 
evaluation and performance aligned remuneration to direct and bond the labour of 
the board in a manner that maximise firm value in the long-term is linked to the 
managerial labour construct discussed in detail in chapter 5. Whereas monitoring 
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and the separation of duties to oversee and bond the actions of the board are aligned 
to the corporate control construct discussed in detail in chapter 4.  
 
The origin and development of the agency theory included discussions on the 
separation of ownership and control, maximisation of self-interest and measures to 
encourage goal alignment. The study uses an agency theory perspective to explain 
the relevance of agency theory principles and contextualise the discussion on the 
origin and historical development by using examples of the current South African 
environment to establish the agency theory as the lens used in this study. A more 
detailed analysis of the controls used to address goal alignment in corporate control 
and managerial labour is provided in chapters 4 and 5 respectively. 
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CHAPTER 4: CORPORATE CONTROL CONSTRUCT 
 
“Control your own destiny or someone else will.” 
Jack Welch 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 described the current relevance of the agency theory, the separation 
of ownership and control, causes of goal divergence and the development of agency 
theory in the context of cooperative production challenges. It also discussed the 
challenges of achieving goal congruence by reducing agency cost, especially using 
monitoring as a control. The need for control is centred in the maximisation of self-
interest (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996:377) where directors might “substitute leisure 
or overindulgence in company perquisites for managerial effort”, thereby 
increasing agency cost and reducing firm value (Walsh & Seward, 1990:422).  
 
Corporate control focuses on board-level controls including oversight via 
monitoring and separation of duties used by boards to reduce goal divergence and 
agency cost whereas managerial labour focuses on the controls that control and 
direct the boards’ labour. This chapter focuses on how the board uses oversight and 
separation of duties as a control by identifying the defining control indicator (CI) 
to construct a control index. Constructing an index enable the study to assess the 
relationship between the CI index and firm value.  
 
As there are other factors or variables that also influences firm value it is 
important for the study to control for these other variables. These variables are 
referred to as control variables as it is important to statistically control for their 
relationship to firm value in order to isolate the relationship between CI and firm 
value in line with the ceteris paribus principle (Wooldridge, 2014:12). As this 
chapter focuses on control the identification and definitions for the control variables 
is discussed first before this chapter discusses the indicators for the CI index to 
represent board-level controls.  
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Control variables are variables not directly related to the board as a 
governance mechanism, that influences firm value and thus are an essential part in 
the analysis used by this study (discussed in chapter 7) to enable the study to isolate 
the relationship between the corporate control and managerial labour indexes that 
represent the board as a governance mechanism, and firm value. Figure 4-1 below 
summarises the control focus used in this study in relation to firm value. The 
controls related to managerial labour are discussed in chapter 5.  
 
Figure 4-1 Controls focus of the study 
 
 
The index of board-level control indicators (CI) considers the structure and 
composition of the board to oversee the board’s activities and ensure there are 
adequate oversight and separation of duties to manage goal divergence.  
 
Improved controls are generally only implemented when the expected benefit 
of the control exceeds the expected cost. During the initial introduction of improved 
controls, reduced wastage (the excessive use of perquisites) and slacking leads to 
more dramatic improvements in firm performance and value. As the improved 
controls mature they continue to maintain the new efficient system but the tempo 
of the improved performance will slow as the maintenance of the controls continues 
to manage moral hazard risks to prevent a slide back to previous inefficiencies. 
Thus, improved controls are expected to be positively associated with improved 
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firm value due to a reduction in agency cost in line with sub-hypothesis 1. However, 
the impact is not expected to be as dramatic as with the initial implementation of 
governance principles recommended by King I and II. 
 
The identification of control variables helps to ensure that the control 
activities of the board can be assessed separately. This chapter starts by identifying 
control variables56 that are linked to the broader corporate governance field and are 
reported influencers of firm value. Control variables are influenced by First World 
elements such as the market (discussed in sections 4.2.3.2-4.2.3.4), legal and 
regulatory environments as they relate to quality audit (section 4.2.3.5), bonding in 
industries (section 4.2.4) and longer term company-level control considerations 
(section 4.2.6) including board size and board independence that are influenced by 
shareholders who appoint the board. The latter enable the study to separate 
company-level control considerations from board-level controls such as oversight 
and separation of duties. The control variables are summarised in Figure 4-2 and in 
more detail in Appendix 4. 
 
Figure 4-2 Control variables 
 
 
After defining the control variables, the chapter describes control indicators 
available to the board. In a more recent study in developing countries Al-Akra, 
Abdel-Qader and Billah (2016:213) found that improved controls can be used to 
                                                 
56 Control variables are all coded using CV and a number to differentiate between the control 
variables and the variables used in the indexes. 
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maximise firm value. This study focuses on the level of control that is exercised by 
the board57 and not the power to control the board via the ability to select board 
members as in an early South African study by Cohen and Uliana (1990:9).  
 
This chapter expands on the board’s corporate control role and identifies 
control indicators that can be used to control agency cost and reduce goal 
divergence. The control indicators are used to develop an index of control indicators 
(CI) as summarised in Appendix 5. The focus of this chapter is to identify and define 
the control indicators available to the board to enable the construction of the CI 
index to achieve SO 1.  
 
SO 1 – to develop a CI index to measure the level of corporate 
control of the board. 
 
Developing the index of control indicators enable the study to identify the 
level of control used by the board in their corporate control role using the CI index 
and enable the study to test SH 1. 
 
SH 1 – there is a positive relationship between the CI index that 
measures the level of the board’s corporate control and 
firm value 
 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 describes the internal and 
external mechanisms in the corporate control construct and identifies the relevant 
control variables. In section 4.3 control indicators that are available to the board to 
monitor and control the firm are identified and defined to develop the CI index. The 
chapter ends with a summary of corporate control considering the control variables 
and the CI index in section 4.4. 
 
                                                 
57 As this chapter focuses on the control of the board, controls within the power of shareholders such 
as determining the board size as well as the number of non-executive and independent board 
members are part of the company-level control considerations (CCI), a control variable. 
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4.2 Internal and external mechanisms of corporate control 
 
Corporate control includes external and internal governance and control 
mechanisms or indicators that focus on controlling the agency problem. As this 
study focuses on the board as a governance mechanism, the aim of corporate control 
is to identify control variables that monitor and bond the board’s control options by 
identifying control variables (CV) and to identify control indicators available to the 
board to use in the development of a CI index. The control focus used by the study 
is visually summarised in Figure 4-1 and the CI index is developed in section 4.3. 
 
4.2.1 Introduction to internal and external mechanisms of corporate 
governance and control 
The board is an internal governance mechanism while legislation or 
regulations and the markets are external governance mechanisms. External 
governance mechanisms can be used as an ultimate control when the shareholders 
use the markets to buy and sell shares. Alternatively, external governance 
mechanisms can bond the directors’ actions when they are legally required to act in 
a specific manner, for example, to act with due care or be held liable for breaching 
their fiduciary duties (RSA, 2008a: sections 76 & 77). 
 
In general, the market for corporate control serves as a control of last resort 
when internal control indicators fail (Walsh & Seward, 1990:434). Jensen 
(1994a:15) describes the control forces that can be used for goal convergence as the 
capital markets, the legal, political and regulatory system, the market for products 
and the internal control system used by the board. The latter is the focus of this 
study. The most pertinent external governance mechanisms applicable in South 
Africa are the regulatory and legislative environment supported by the market. 
Based on the market, regulatory and legislative environments derived from the 
established First World elements discussed in section 2.3, South Africa has been 
able to establish a strong governance foundation. 
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Within the South African context, the board directs the internal governance 
mechanisms by establishing a control environment or internal control system using 
hierarchies. Organisational hierarchies bond the decision-making powers of 
managers by establishing and monitoring accountability. The First and Third World 
elements (described in chapter 2) have an impact on the nature and composition of 
South African boards and this could influence the effectiveness of the control 
indicators used. Ntim et al. (2015:199) state that South Africa’s transformational 
needs could result in the appointment of less qualified or less experienced board 
members and that this, coupled with low levels of shareholder activism, could result 
in a weaker monitoring role.  
 
However, increased accountability through legal bonding via the Companies 
Act (discussed in sections 1.1 and 1.3), coupled with a societal move towards 
holding directors accountable and liable (Carciumaru, 2010:251), are factors that 
encourage rigorous board monitoring for all board members. Increased 
accountability helps to improve monitoring and the efficient use of resources, 
thereby reducing agency cost.  
 
This chapter identifies control variables and indicators that can be used to 
control the agency problem. Control indicators consist mainly of controls that 
monitor and bond the board as specialist managers using internal control systems 
such as hierarchical structures that enable the separation of duties and 
accountability, enabling effective oversight through monitoring. Millson and Ward 
(2005:77) note that the maintenance of an effective internal control system is a 
critical part of monitoring. Governance mechanisms and methods that helps to 
manage goal congruence, along with their interdependent influences on corporate 
control, are shown in Figure 4-3 below.  
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Figure 4-3 Governance influences 
 
 
The legal environment influences governance mechanisms and limits the 
options of the board as selected control indicators must comply with the 
requirements of the legal environment. Over and above the protection offered by 
the Companies Act (RSA, 2008a), there are a myriad of laws influencing the 
markets, with a significant number of laws introducing protective measures, such 
as the encouragement of competition (RSA, 1998a), access to information (RSA, 
2000), prevention of insider trading (RSA, 2004), legislation for companies (RSA, 
2008a), and consumer protection (RSA, 2008b).   
 
The advantage of a strong legal environment is that it mimics the governance 
systems in developed countries by combining the advantages of the markets with a 
strong legal system, which has resulted in a robust corporate governance 
environment in South Africa. Shleifer and Vishny (1997:739) found that 
“corporations in successful market economies, such as the United States, Germany, 
and Japan, are governed through somewhat different combinations of legal 
protection and concentrated ownership”, which are methods that are also used in 
South Africa.  
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The regulatory environment is not as strong as the legal environment, 
although companies listed on the JSE also have to comply with its listing 
requirements, which include compliance with the recommendations of the King 
code and report (JSE, 2011). Governance principles described in the King III code 
and report, although applicable to all types of entities, are not compulsory as they 
follow an apply or explain approach, leaving the choice of how to govern a 
company with its board (IoDSA, 2009a:10; IoDSA, 2009b:12). However, as 
compliance with King III was a listing requirement during the period of the study 
(JSE, 2011), the more detailed guidance of King III could have been interpreted as 
a bonding requirement as companies disclosed their application or explained 
deviations from the 75 principles in King III (IoDSA, 2009b:12). In support of the 
assertion that there has been a move towards improved governance compliance, 
Waweru (2014a:469) found high levels of compliance in South African firms, 
suggesting more mature governance practices. This is in line with earlier studies 
(on King II’s recommendations) which also reported that corporate governance 
compliance had improved over time (Ntim, 2009:23; Mans-Kemp, 2014:197). The 
role of the external and internal governance and control indicators in corporate 
control is discussed in more detail in sections 4.2.2-4.2.5. 
 
4.2.2 Role of external governance mechanisms in corporate control 
External governance mechanisms include legislation, other regulations and 
the market, with the market operating within the constraints of the overall legal 
environment. Governance mechanisms can either bond or monitor the actions and 
options of parties in an agency relationship. More details on bonding are included 
in the following section. 
 
4.2.2.1 Bonding 
The strongest bonding mechanisms stem from legal restrictions which 
restrain managerial opportunism (RSA, 2008a: sections 75-77). Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997:743) concur that legal requirements curtail managerial opportunism. 
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Breaching fiduciary duties can result in adverse consequences as some of the 
settlements paid by independent directors of Enron and WorldCom were over $10 
million (Fich & Shivdasani, 2007:307). Being found guilty of breaching South 
African laws has resulted in jail time for executive directors found guilty of 
committing fraud (Davis, 2014). Laws have been used in South Africa to safeguard 
shareholders by requiring for example specific approval by shareholders to prevent 
the board from selling the greater part of the assets of the company without approval 
(RSA, 2008a: sections 112-114). Laws have also been used to help prevent the 
board from benefiting from inside knowledge by outlawing insider trading (RSA, 
2004). Legal bonding is not directly taken into consideration in this study as parties 
to an agency relationship are expected to abide by the applicable legal requirements 
given the strength of the legal environment in South Africa. However, the bonding-
legislated monitoring mechanisms, for example the requirement to appoint auditors, 
are taken into consideration. Other legislative bonding mechanisms are indirectly 
considered by controlling for industry differences in section 4.2.4. 
 
The regulatory requirements are guided by the principles in King III (IoDSA, 
2009a:31; IoDSA, 2009b:33) and are strengthened by the requirement that 
compliance with King III is a JSE listing requirement (JSE, 2011). The principles 
in King III (IoDSA, 2009b) that are applicable to the board and its committees 
(mostly described in Chapter 2 of the King report) inform the control mechanism 
available to the board and are discussed in section 4.3.  
 
The requirements of the JSE as well as the overall legislative and regulatory 
environment apply equally to all the SRI index companies over the period of the 
study and in general bond the actions of parties to the agency relationship. This mix 
of using the market and legislative environment to create a suitable environment for 
corporate governance is found in successful market economies (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997:739). However, despite the maturity of the JSE as a market, the limited size 
of the South African market has resulted in more concentrated share ownership and 
pyramid holdings (Fosu, 2013), in contrast to the dispersed shareholding reported 
in the USA and UK (Gilson, 2006:1643). Thus, despite the sophistication of the 
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South African market, its smaller size limits the economic control of the market and 
in turn increases the importance of monitoring as a control mechanism. 
 
4.2.2.2 Monitoring 
Monitoring can be used to align goals by monitoring the actions of agents (the 
board), resulting in monitoring costs that contribute to agency cost. Monitoring 
includes overseeing, observing and controlling agents to help to ensure that they act 
in the best interests of the company and its shareholders. However, the extent and 
strength of monitoring depend on multiple factors, including the size and 
complexity of the company (Watts & Zimmerman, 1979:277; Weisbach, 1988:452; 
Dalton, Daily, Johnson & Ellstrand, 1999:676).  
 
Monitoring aims to address the problems caused by information asymmetry, 
a moral hazard. Information asymmetry is a problem as, for instance, the managers 
have a better knowledge of their contribution, their shirking and their levels of 
consumption of perquisites than the shareholders. Information asymmetry exists on 
all levels in a company, not only between the board and shareholders, which makes 
it more difficult for the board to monitor and control the efficient use of assets and 
limit shirking and the excessive consumption of perquisites. It is just as difficult for 
shareholders to observe for themselves when directors are shirking their 
responsibilities, especially their responsibility to innovatively invest the assets of 
the company efficiently or to prevent the inefficient use of resources.  
 
This study controls for external monitoring by a dominant or controlling 
shareholder (section 4.2.3.3), oversight by institutional investors or blockholders 
with major shareholdings (section 4.2.3.2), directors’ shareholding (section 
4.2.3.4), as external monitoring by shareholders influences board options. Quality 
audit (section 4.2.3.5), highlights externally controlled oversight that can address 
information asymmetry problems between the board and shareholders. In addition, 
the study controls for differences in industries as different industries are bonded by 
industry-specific legislation (section 4.2.4).  
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4.2.3 External monitoring 
External monitoring by shareholders stems from their voting power, as well 
as the legislated responsibility to appoint the company’s board and external auditors 
(referred to as auditors). In addition to the shareholders’ voting power, markets are 
the ultimate control mechanism for shareholders, as the market enables the buying 
and selling of shares, including the facilitation of takeovers and mergers. 
Shareholders of shares traded on the market have few barriers to their decisions to 
buy and sell, making it easy to exit as a shareholder when a company 
underperforms.  
 
Different groups of shareholders, such as controlling shareholders, block-
shareholders or institutional investors and directors with significant shareholdings, 
are examined in this study. The choice of three shareholding groupings in this study 
is in line with a prior study by Cho and Kim (2007) and is discussed along with 
quality audit in sections 4.2.3.1-4.2.3.5. 
 
4.2.3.1 Market control 
The historic USA market for corporate control that was active in the railway 
sector early in the 20th century enabled the buying of shares on the open market in 
order to gain control over companies, thereby illustrating the power of the capital 
market as a market mechanism (Cheffins & Bank, 2009:447). When companies 
underperform, shareholders can sell their shares to exit the relationship with the 
company; such sales can lead to a fall in the share price and make the company a 
takeover target. Anderson (1989:46) notes that firms with excessive positive agency 
costs are targets for corporate acquisitions. South Africa, however, has a small 
market with concentrated and pyramidal ownership structures (Fosu, 2013:143) that 
influence the agency relationship (Hu, Tam & Tan, 2010:728). This results in an 
agency problem among shareholders, where institutional shareholders could act as 
monitors, in addition to the agency problem between the shareholders and the 
board. However, the First World strengths in terms of a strong market and 
legislative environment suggest an effective agency environment. Henry (2010:26) 
defines an effective agency environment as the existence of a national stock 
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exchange coupled with corporate legislation that sets a standard for shareholder 
protection and manages the takeover market. 
 
The complication of possible shareholder conflict is a common occurrence in 
developing countries (Waweru, 2014a:458), as they tend to have more concentrated 
ownership structures in contrast to the diverse shareholder profile in developed 
countries (Gilson, 2006:1643). However, it might be less of a problem in South 
Africa given its strong legal system which protects minority shareholders, and 
strong application of reporting standards which reduces information asymmetry. 
Thus, controlling shareholders as well as blockholders might be more motivated to 
act as monitors towards goal alignment and the maximisation of firm value than 
they would in other developing countries. 
 
In protecting shareholders, the capital market plays an important role as an 
external governance mechanism by enabling a free trading environment. The 
market enables shareholders to sell their shares and reduce their exposure in 
underperforming companies as an ultimate control action. This option is ideal for 
smaller shareholders who are not financially sophisticated, or shareholders mainly 
interested in a return on their investment and who do not want to perform an 
oversight or monitoring role. Thus, the risk of reduced share prices and takeovers 
can be a motivational force that encourages larger shareholders to monitor the board 
as well as for the board to improve their control, as a takeover could result in 
changes to the composition of the board. 
 
The power of shareholder control is supported by the market, as “shares with 
superior voting rights trade at a large premium” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997:759). 
With the introduction of the 2008 Companies Act, allowance was made in sections 
36 and 37 for companies to issue shares with different rights58 (RSA, 2008a). In 
addition, mergers and takeovers can be used to either grow a company or take over 
an underperforming company to improve the efficiency of its operations. Although 
                                                 
58 To consider whether shares with superior voting power will trade at a premium in South Africa or 
whether shares with different rights are prices differently, is an area of future study and falls outside 
the scope of this study 
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mergers and takeovers by larger companies of small companies are a commonly 
used growth strategy, mergers and takeovers of large listed companies in South 
Africa are rare. This is in line with the explanation by Ntim et al. (2015:199) that 
the South African “market for corporate and managerial control” is less active. 
 
As shares can be valued at the present value of future cashflows (Steiger, 
2008:1) shareholders are more likely to vote favourably on a takeover if they 
receive a premium. Mover (1970:22) notes that, in a merger, an acquiring firm can 
pay a 15% premium for shares. A subsequent study by Li and Ang (2000:7) 
identifies a merger premium of 18%. However, not all takeovers and mergers add 
value to the acquiring company and the extent of unlocked value might be less than 
the anticipated value due to information asymmetry. The hostile takeover of 
Adcock Ingram at +R70 per share by Bidvest (Motsoeneng, 2013) is an example of 
a costly takeover. The takeover did result in executive resignations and changes in 
top management as well as a successful repositioning of Adcock Ingram; however, 
it was expensive and Adcock Ingram’s share price was only +R47 per share three 
years down the line despite improved efficiencies (Motsoeneng, 2013; Mahlaka, 
2016). In South Africa, takeovers and mergers are regulated by a Takeover 
Regulation Panel under the provisions of chapters 5 and 7 of the Companies Act 
(RSA, 2008a).59 
 
Recent South African examples where takeovers were used to expand 
business opportunities are the takeover by Wal-Mart of the Massmart group for 
which a 19.2% premium was paid (Anonymous, 2011), and Anheuser-Busch 
InBev’s takeover of SABMiller for which they paid a 51% premium (Ambrose, 
2016; Thomas, 2016). The high premium paid for SABMiller was a reflection of 
the consistent above-average performance recorded by SABMiller over time, and 
the resistance by the market to the initial takeover offer (Martin, 2016). A 20% 
premium appears to be more common in the South African market as Telkom’s 
offer at a 20% premium for Business Connection (BCX) was approved by the 
                                                 
59 The South African share market’s takeover defences centre on legislation requiring approval from 
the Takeover Regulation Panel, the Competition Commission and the shareholders and are far less 
complex than the takeover defences available in the USA.  
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shareholders (SAPA, 2014a). Takeovers of large underperforming companies are 
unusual in South Africa, a rare recent example being the hostile takeover of Adcock 
Ingram by Bidvest (England, 2014). However, the main level of approval for any 
takeover or merger is the permission of the shareholders, a fact which could 
encourage shareholders with large shareholdings to monitor the board towards 
improved firm effectiveness and efficiency.  
 
Takeovers or mergers are not used as separate control variables in this study 
as they need the approval of shareholders and are indirectly controlled for via the 
consideration of various shareholdings in this study. Given the limited number of 
shares trading on the JSE, larger shareholders or blockholders (including 
institutional investors) could together hold the deciding vote.  
 
4.2.3.2 Blockholders 
Blockholders, such as institutional investors, are shareholders with a large 
enough shareholding to be classified as blockholders. Institutional investors are 
bonded by protective measures that originate from legal requirements (Terblanche, 
2011). Legal requirements can restrict market activities through requirements that, 
for example, limit investment, such as limiting USA insurance companies’ 
investment in equities to 20% of their investment with an additional limit of 2% in 
equities in any specific company (McColgan, 2001:33).  
 
In South Africa, pension funds are limited by regulation 28 of the Pension 
Find Act 24 of 1956 regarding both the percentage of assets they can invest in and 
a limit per issuer (Herringer et al., 2009:15; Terblanche, 2011). Heese (2005:733) 
explains that some of the factors that could influence companies on the SRI are an 
increased emphasis on the fiduciary duty of pension fund trustees that follow a 
conservative investment strategy as well as a need to develop skills to identify 
development-oriented investments on the part of the investment manager. The 
conservative guidelines include the limitation that a 25% investment in private 
equity should not be exceeded and listed equities are capped at 75% (Herringer et 
al., 2009). The pension fund limitations bond institutional investors through the use 
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of regulation to force them to hold more diversified portfolios that limit the risk 
exposure in individual companies. However, institutional investors such as pension 
funds need to continuously evaluate the available investment opportunities to 
ensure that they optimise their invested funds, giving them a continuous monitoring 
role as either an existing or prospective investor that can buy or sell shares. 
Anderson et al. (2007:781) find that there is increased monitoring by institutional 
investors in developing countries. Monitoring by institutional investors could be in 
their own interests as investing in high-performing shares will reflect positively on 
the institutional investor. 
 
Traditionally South African institutional investors have developed a practice 
of maintaining a level of independence from the companies they invest in. This has 
resulted in poor levels of activism, with increased activism only being used to 
protect financial value despite high levels of collective ownership (Heese, 
2005:733-734). Abor and Biekpe (2006:62) found in a South African study on the 
AltX companies that the existence of only one blockholder results in effective 
monitoring but that monitoring decreases with multiple blockholders highlighting 
a possible free rider problem. The importance of institutional investors or 
blockholders fulfilling a monitoring role have been emphasised by the introduction 
of CRISA in 2012 (IoDSA, 2011).  
 
Monitoring by institutional investors in South Africa was in the early stages 
of development in 2012 as it was only from 2012 onwards that institutional 
investors started to disclose compliance to CRISA and the way they voted. Viviers 
and Smit (2015:25) note that in 2013 few institutional investors considered the 
CRISA principles. Institutional investors are, however, becoming more active 
monitors since the implementation of CRISA. Examples include the Public 
Investment Corporation (PIC) 60 publicising the way they intended to vote on the 
                                                 
60 PIC is the largest institutional investor in South Africa as PIC is responsible for investing the 
government’s pension funds. In contrast to Ntim’s (2009) PhD study and subsequent publications, 
this study does not classify PIC as a government shareholding as PIC operates as an institutional 
investor. Companies with the government as a shareholder like Telkom SA SOC Limited have a 
direct government shareholding and are differentiated by the addition of SOC, which stands for 
state-owned company, in the name of the company, indicating state control. 
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Adcock takeover bid in 2014 and publicly backing the Pretoria Portland Cement 
(PPC) board’s recommendation on the appointment of a new CEO (Hedley & 
Derby, 2014; Mantshantsha, 2014). However, Viviers (2015:15-16) found that 
institutional investor activism is still emerging even through there has been a move 
to vote against possible excessive executive remuneration. Scholtz and Engelbrecht 
(2015:43) found a significant inverse relationship between institutional investor 
shareholding and voting on the remuneration policy and directors’ remuneration. 
As this study focuses on board-level controls blockholders is considered as a 
shareholder as one of the control variables. 
 
Except in situations where institutional investors are the controlling 
shareholder, this study includes institutional investors with 5% or more shares as 
blockholders together with other blockholders. Using a 5% shareholding cut-off is 
in line with a prior South African study by Abor and Biekpe (2006:54). Given the 
relatively new move towards institutional shareholder activism by South African 
institutional investors since the introduction of CRISA, the impact of active 
institutional investors as shareholders on the profitability of South African firms is 
an emerging research area. An early study on voting for executive director 
remuneration by Viviers (2015:15-16) found that institutional investor activism 
centres around private negotiations and proxy voting, which indicates that 
institutional shareholder activism still needs to mature.  
 
This study combines institutional investors with other large investors as 
blockholders, given the smaller size of the market and the more concentrated 
shareholding in South Africa. Blockholders, as a strong or major shareholder group, 
form part of the control variables used in the study as their combined voting power 
can be extensive. To accommodate the monitoring by strong or major shareholders, 
blockholders are used as a control variable (BLOCK)61, in this study. 
 
                                                 
61 Each control variable is identified using an abbreviation or acronym in capitals to identify the 
variable in the statistical analysis reported in chapter 7. 
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 CV1 = BLOCK is the percentage combined shareholding of 
blockholders who hold 5% or more ordinary shares in a company but 
who are not a controlling or dominant shareholder. The relationship 
between monitoring by blockholders and firm value is expected to be 
positive. BLOCK controls for the negotiating power of institutional 
or other large shareholders referred to as blockholders that are not 
controlling shareholders. Viviers and Smit (2015:23) found that 
institutional shareholders have the negotiating power to directly 
engage with the executives of companies they invest in. 
 
Recent South African studies that used blockholders as a variable, together 
with their definitions of blockholder, are listed in Table 4-1. 
 
Table 4-1 Blockholder variables 
Blockholder definitions References 
Percentage of shareowners with at least 5% of 
the firm’s common stock. 
(Abor & Biekpe, 2006:54) 
Percentage of common shareholders with at 
least 5% of the total company shareholdings. 
(Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
2013:130; Ntim et al., 
2015:201; Ntim, Lindop, 
Thomas, Abdou & Opong, 
2017:18) 
Number of shares held by shareholders with at 
least 5% holding scaled by the total number of 
shares. 
(Mangena & Chamisa, 
2008:36) 
Proportion of common shareholder funds 
owned by single institutions each holding 5% 
or more of the common shares. 
(Muniandy & Hillier, 
2015:115) 
 
While the above wording reflects slight differences in the definitions, the 
essence of the definitions for blockholders is the same. This study differs from prior 
studies in its limitation of the upper limit of shareholding for blockholders as 
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although the study uses the same entrance level of 5% to identify blockholders, the 
upper limit is capped to exclude controlling shareholders. Controlling for different 
groups of strong shareholders enables this study to control for the agency problem 
among shareholders in order to focus on the board as a governance mechanism. 
 
4.2.3.3 Controlling shareholders 
The legal environment influences the ability of the shareholders to control 
boards because shareholders have the power to appoint or remove directors from 
the board (RSA, 2008a: sections 66, 68 & 71). It is therefore possible for disgruntled 
shareholders to use shareholders’ meetings to address concerns regarding the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the direction and management of the company by 
the board without compromising their right to sell their shares.  
 
Shareholders can also use their power to replace board members. In a recent 
South African example, shareholders selected six board members from a nominee 
list of ten people coupled with the appointment of a new CEO after a public 
boardroom battle in a listed company (Hedley & Derby, 2014; Global Cement, 
2015). However, voting power can only be exercised to hire or fire directors in 
situations where the shareholders have enough shares to support their votes to give 
them the necessary power to approve decisions. Such large shareholdings attract 
their own agency cost as the company and the remaining shareholders have to be 
protected from possible exploitation by large shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997:739; Yeh & Woidtke, 2005:1858).  
 
Dominant or controlling shareholder exploitation is, however, curtailed by 
institutional investors or blockholders who can act as monitors. It is also controlled 
legally via the protection of shareholder rights in section 161 of the Companies Act 
(RSA, 2008a). Controlling shareholders can be an advantage as they are expected 
to apply active monitoring to maximise firm value. In their review paper Bebchuk 
and Weisbach (2010:940) note a strong relationship between large shareholdings 
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and firm performance and highlight the need to test the effect of shareholder 
activism on profitability.62 
 
Prior research on the different categories of shareholders has produced mixed 
results and is discussed in more detail below. Contrary to the expectation that 
controlling or major shareholders are monitors who ensure improved firm 
performance, a meta-analysis performed by Dalton, Daily, Certo and Roengpitya 
(2003:20) did not find any relationship between ownership and firm performance. 
In support Beiner et al. (2006:277) found in Switzerland that neither controlling 
shareholders nor large blockholders had a significant impact on firm value using 
Tobin’s Q. These findings could be an indication that in developed countries there 
is a lesser need for shareholders to act as monitors.  
 
The lack of a clear relationship between controlling shareholders and firm 
value is in contrast to the expected effect from an agency theory perspective, where 
the maximisation of shareholders’ interest by a controlling shareholder, or the 
monitoring by an active institutional blockholder, is expected to result in the 
maximisation of firm value. However, developing countries follow a different 
pattern. Cho and Kim (2007:247) find that ownership concentration in Korean firms 
increases firm performance as measured by RoA. In another study Ehikioya 
(2009:237-239) found that in Nigeria firms with high levels of ownership 
concentration have higher market valuations. The findings from studies in 
developing countries are in line with the agency theory expectations that large 
shareholders will act as monitors to improve firm value. Given the balance between 
First and Third world elements in South Africa, a local perspective could increase 
the body of knowledge on the monitoring of controlling shareholders as well as 
blockholders.  
 
Shareholders with larger shareholdings, or dominant shareholders, could play 
an additional monitoring or shareholders’ oversight role in monitoring the 
                                                 
62 Given the emerging nature of shareholder activism in South Africa, this remains an area for future 
research. 
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effectiveness and efficiency with which the board executes its duties, as they have 
the voting power to act on the results of their monitoring. Although blockholders 
could have a moderating influence on a controlling shareholder, they are confronted 
with the free rider problem as found in a South African study (Abor & Biekpe, 
2006:62). The free rider problem is where individual shareholders are not interested 
in a monitoring role and hope other shareholders will oversee the company’s 
management, enabling them to freely benefit from the expertise of the other 
shareholders who are prepared to monitor the board and participate in the 
governance of the company (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997:741). As shareholders 
appoint specialist monitors to manage and monitor the business of the company, 
they do not need the necessary management skills to properly evaluate the actions 
of the board.  
 
Although smaller shareholders would be wary of the possibility of misuse of 
power on the part of the large shareholder, they are seldom in a position to monitor 
the activities of the large shareholder. This risk is highlighted by Abor and Biekpe 
(2006:54-55), who state that “controlling shareholders may consider their own 
benefit and act against creditors and minority shareholders”. However, creditors 
and minority shareholders are protected because their rights are protected by law. 
In addition, minority shareholders could use the market and sell their shares while 
creditors could also use their trade contract to control their risk. 
 
Inactive shareholders rely on the ability of the specialist managers they 
appointed to the board to act as monitors to help control the agency problem. 
Companies with dispersed shareholders would therefore be expected to make 
greater use of independent directors to act as monitors on their behalf. Yeh and 
Woidtke (2005:1882) find that controlling shareholders do influence the board 
selection process, which highlights their monitoring role. This is in line with the 
description of the monitoring role of the board as to “constrain the opportunistic 
behaviour” of managers (Anderson et al., 2007:780). However, controlling 
shareholders could also appoint a board to serve their own interests, to the detriment 
of the minority shareholders, but this could be countered by blockholders.  
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From the above discussion around shareholders, it is clear that the dispersion 
of shareholders tends to have a ripple impact on the governance mechanisms used 
by companies. Denis, Denis and Sarin (1999:1075) find that the “equity structure 
affects the magnitude of agency problems”. Dispersed shareholders are more likely 
to make use of more independent directors to act as monitors on their behalf, 
possibly resulting in an increase in the size of the board and the percentage of 
independent directors. Dominant or controlling shareholders are more likely to have 
a reduced need for independent directors as monitors, possibly resulting in a smaller 
board with fewer independent directors, as there are fewer agency problems. A 
controlling shareholder is defined in this study as a shareholder with 25% or more 
shares in a company, in line with a prior South African study by Steyn and 
Stainbank (2013:6) where the lowest level of disclosed control from a controlling 
shareholder was 25.1%.  
 
Both dispersed and controlling shareholders are expected to encourage the 
use of a structure that will maximise their investment by maximising firm value. 
The dominance of a controlling shareholder (CONSHA) forms part of the control 
variables used in this study, as dominant shareholders can influence the size and 
composition of the board in a manner that would maximise firm value for them in 
addition to their monitoring role. This study used a dichotomous variable (also 
referred to as a dummy variable) to quantify a nominal variable into two mutually 
exclusive categories for statistical analysis (Devore & Berk, 2012:696). Thus, 
where a dominant shareholder monitors the board the increased oversight will result 
in a reduction of company-level and board-level controls reducing agency cost and 
increasing firm value, resulting in a positive relationship with firm value. 
 
CV2 = CONSHA is a dichotomous variable where a controlling 
shareholder is a shareholder with 25% or more shares in a company 
(coded as 1), and companies without a dominant shareholder are 
seen as companies with dispersed shareholders (coded as 0). 
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Companies where directors are also the controlling shareholder are 
coded as controlled by directors63.  
 
In situations where the controlling shareholder is a director or directors, the 
company would be classified as being without a dominant shareholder (coded as 0) 
as the company would be controlled by the board. Recent studies that considered 
controlling or dominant shareholders as a variable are listed in Table 4-2, along 
with their definitions of a controlling or dominant shareholder.  
 
Table 4-2 Dominant or controlling shareholder 
Dominant or controlling shareholder definitions References 
A dominant shareholder is a shareholder with a 
declared controlling interest in the form of a 
shareholding of 25.1% or more shares. A South 
African study. 
(Steyn & Stainbank, 
2013:6) 
A controlling shareholder is the largest shareholder 
with a shareholding of 5% or more, where the average 
controlling shareholding was 20.51%. A study on 
Asian firms. 
(Bae, Baek, Kang & Liu, 
2012) 
The proportion of shares held by the five largest 
shareholders to total shares. A Nigerian study. 
(Ehikioya, 2009:236) 
Controlling shareholders hold more than 50% of the 
equity capital. A Ghanaian study. 
(Agyemang & 
Castellini, 2015) 
 
4.2.3.4 Directors’ shareholding 
Directors’ shareholding can be used to align the motivation of the board with 
that of the shareholders to reduce agency cost and promote improved goal 
alignment. Such an alignment could reduce the board’s need to deploy control 
indicators as the agency cost has already been reduced to an acceptable level and 
could also influence the selection of an optimal capital structure. Directors’ 
                                                 
63 There were only two companies in the latter category and they are controlled by the person who 
started the company 
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shareholding has been referred to in prior studies as shares closely held or insider 
shareholding (Davidson, 1997:5; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007:21; Anabtawi & 
Stout, 2008:1255).  
 
In a South African study Abor and Biekpe (2006:59) found that high levels 
of directors’ shareholding resulted in low debt ratios, and low directors’ 
shareholdings were associated with high debt ratios. However, the results were not 
statistically significant, and the study focused on smaller companies. In addition to 
their shareholding, the board could also consider their labour reputation and follow 
a shareholder-friendly approach to market their skills to shareholders to improve 
their labour marketability (Levit & Malenko, 2015). The management of labour is 
discussed in more detail in chapter 5 under the managerial labour construct. To 
accommodate monitoring by directors’ shareholding, it is used as a control variable 
(DIRSHA) in this study. 
 
CV3 = DIRSHA is the combined directors’ shareholding as a 
percentage of the total shareholding. DIRSHA controls for the 
enhanced goal alignment in situations where directors are motivated 
in a similar manner as shareholders. 
 
Recent studies that considered directors’ shareholding as a variable are listed 
in Table 4-3, along with their definitions of directors’ shareholding.  
 
Table 4-3 Directors’ shareholding 
Directors’ shareholding definitions References 
Number of shares owned by directors and managers 
divided by total shares as a percentage. 
(Abor & Biekpe, 
2006:57) 
The percentage of total firm equity capital (excluding 
shares attributable to underlying bonus, incentive and 
option plans) held by all company directors. 
(Henry, 2010:30) 
Common shares held by directors and expressed as a 
percentage. 
(Ntim et al., 2017:18) 
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4.2.3.5 Quality audit  
Through bonding, the roles of the shareholders, directors and auditors are 
stipulated by legislation which regulates among other things the separation of 
powers of the shareholders and the board, monitored by an audit committee with 
oversight by the auditors over the transparency of the reporting practices. Zerni, 
Kallunki and Nilsson (2010:1174) explain that the value of auditing rests in its 
information asymmetry reducing role. Quality audit is thus the result of a complex 
balance between the appointment of the auditor by the shareholders, the 
establishment of internal control systems to support the dissemination of reliable, 
transparent information by the board, monitored by an effective audit committee 
with the auditors evaluating and reporting on the reasonableness of the reporting 
practices. To accommodate the complexity underlying quality audit, this study 
developed a quality audit score using the ground-breaking index building method 
of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). The development of a QAS differentiates 
this study as it consolidates the complex relationship linked to assurance in an index 
and positions the audit relationship as outside the control of the board as a control 
variable. 
 
a) Role of the shareholders 
Both the appointment of an external audit firm (section 90) and the 
appointment of an audit committee (section 94) are the responsibility of the 
shareholders (RSA, 2008a). The audit requirement and its monitoring via the audit 
committee prescribed by the Companies Act is the most pervasive legislative 
bonding mechanism applicable to listed companies in South Africa (RSA, 2008a: 
sections 90 & 94). The legislative requirement applicable to the audit committee 
helps to distinguish South African companies as the statutory requirements have 
elevated the audit committee to a statutory committee.  
 
Although the appointment of an audit firm is a legal requirement, the 
oversight function performed by the auditor is a form of monitoring that encourages 
boards to use transparent reporting practices to reduce information asymmetry. 
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Sengupta and Zhang (2015:1073) note that improved financial transparency can 
help to reduce agency conflicts. The shareholders can indicate the need for quality 
assurance by appointing one of the Big-4 audit firms64 to encourage reliable and 
transparent reporting practices. 
 
Despite the control yielded by shareholders, especially shareholders large 
enough to influence voting outcomes and act as monitors, there is still the risk of 
information asymmetry. Increased information asymmetry based on reduced 
disclosure or low levels of transparency is seen by investors as value reducing and 
results in lower firm values (Hope & Thomas, 2008:623). This risk can be reduced 
by obtaining assurances on the reasonableness of the information from an external 
audit. To help minimise information asymmetry, shareholders would be motivated 
to appoint a high-quality audit firm (Big-4) to reduce agency cost (Chang & Chen, 
2015:174).  
 
Prior research emphasises that the top audit firms, currently collectively 
referred to as the Big-4, are associated with superior audit quality (Carey & Simnett, 
2006:654). The appointment of one of the Big-4 audit firms can be used to indicate 
the use of a quality auditor to mitigate possible information asymmetry concerns by 
investors or shareholders (Zerni et al., 2010:1170). Waweru (2014a:470) found a 
small negative correlation between quality audit and firm performance, highlighting 
the cost of adding a control, although their study did not consider information 
asymmetry. Their study yielded consistent results in support of the use of either 
audit fee as a percentage on sales or a dummy variable for the Big-4 firm as proxies. 
Thus, the way shareholders respond to their bonded requirement to appoint an 
auditor could yield improved benefits for them through the use of quality audit 
considerations to achieve improved oversight to reduce information asymmetry, 
with an increase in monitoring costs. In turn, the board could use transparent 
financial reporting processes to reduce information asymmetry and thereby reduce 
the audit fee to reduce agency cost (Healy & Palepu, 2001:406). It is thus possible 
                                                 
64 The Big-4 audit firms are Deloitte, Ernst & Young (EY), KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC). 
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that a proportionally larger audit fee for a company could suggest the existence of 
possible information asymmetry concerns. 
 
b) Role of the board 
The quality audit signal sent by the appointment of a Big-4 audit firm could 
encourage the board to direct and control the company in a manner that showcase 
their expertise to the shareholders and the board’s commitment towards improved 
firm performance using transparent disclosure practices to reduce information 
asymmetry, and in turn reduce audit fees and agency cost.  
 
Bedard and Johnstone (2004:299) found that there is an increase in audit 
effort and cost for companies with a heightened earnings manipulation risk, 
indicating an increase in agency cost where there are increased information 
asymmetry risks. Increased information asymmetry is likely to result in an increase 
in audit effort and audit fees. As audits are already strongly entrenched as a bonding 
mechanism, increased audit fees are only likely to occur in situations where 
monitoring failed to sufficiently address information asymmetry problems. Zerni et 
al. (2010:1174) explain that the value of auditing rests in its role in reducing 
information asymmetry. Because directors use internal governance mechanisms to 
ensure that there is proper internal control and monitoring, a strong corporate 
control environment should lead to lower audit fees. Any increase in audit effort is 
a symptom that the internal governance mechanisms are not operating optimally, 
resulting in an increase in information asymmetry. As information asymmetry is 
not easily observed by outsiders, the audit fee as a percentage of total assets, to 
control for company size and contextualise audit fees is used as a proxy for 
information asymmetry. In a meta study, Hay, Knechel and Wong (2006:169) found 
firm size to be “the most dominant determinant of audit fees”, thus using the 
percentage of the current year’s audit fees to total assets65 may help to control for 
the influence of information asymmetry on audit fees.  
 
                                                 
65 This study uses total assets (and not total sales) as a proxy for firm size as the SRI companies 
include service-oriented firms such as banks and insurance companies that report on revenue and 
not sales. 
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Using control indicators to reduce information asymmetry has benefits. 
Beekes and Brown (2006:445) found in a study on Australian firms that “better 
governed firms make more price sensitive disclosures, they have a larger analyst 
following, analysts’ consensus forecast for better governed firms are less biased and 
more accurate”. Quality audit is further enhanced by the oversight of the audit 
committee.  
 
c) Role of the audit committee 
The controlling or monitoring value of audit committees in developed 
countries has been highlighted by prior research (Collier & Gregory, 1999:329-330; 
Abbott, Parker, Peters & Rama, 2007:808). Less research has been done on the 
value of an audit committee in developing countries. Agyemang and Castellini 
(2015:58) identified a well-qualified and independent audit committee as a key 
control to contribute to board effectiveness in a Ghanaian study, but found that 
controlling shareholders yield extensive control, negating the effectiveness of high-
level internal controls. Miko and Kamardin (2015:655) noted that in a Nigerian 
study audit committees and audit quality can reduce accounting manipulation using 
discretionary accruals. In an Asian study, Woidtke and Yeh (2013:1) emphasised 
that “audit committee independence alone may not be enough to enhance earnings 
informativeness” as “complete independence and financial or legal expertise” are 
needed “to increase investor confidence in accounting information” in situations 
where “ownership is concentrated”. Thus, in developing countries, concentrated 
ownership could influence the operation of an audit committee adversely if the 
members are not independent and knowledgeable. 
 
The monitoring ability of the audit committee has been found to add value as 
a prior USA-based study referred to by Brick and Chidambaran (2010:546) found 
a positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and the monitoring activity of the audit 
committee. Diligence through holding four or more meetings a year also helps the 
audit committee to be quality-focused in the execution of their duties, while 
financial expertise helps to ensure that audit risks are understood and clearly 
communicated (Abbott et al., 2007:806, 808). The value of independence and 
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financial expertise is further supported by Agrawal and Chadha (2005:400), who 
found that the probability of restating earnings is lower in companies where audit 
committees include an independent director with financial expertise. The 
importance of financial expertise in developing countries is underscored by Tarus 
and Ayabei (2016:1073), who found in a Kenyan study that financial skills help to 
contribute to audit committee effectiveness. Klein (2002:398) found a negative 
association between audit committee independence and abnormal accruals as a 
proxy for earnings management. The value of independence on audit committees 
has been further emphasised by the finding that fully independent audit committees 
are associated with a significantly lower cost of debt financing (Anderson, Mansi 
& Reeb, 2004:315), resulting in a direct cost saving linked to reduced information 
asymmetry. However, the same study found little evidence to support the need for 
financial expertise on the audit committee (Anderson et al., 2004:338). Agrawal 
and Chadha (2005:400) found that an audit committee with one director with 
accounting expertise is “less likely to restate” earnings, and Domnisoru and 
Vinatoru (2008:161) found that firms with audit committees with less accounting 
expertise are more likely to have internal control weaknesses. In summary, 
monitoring by audit committees is characterised by independent members who 
meet four or more times a year and include a member with financial expertise. 
 
However, the above research does not take the relationship between an 
effective audit committee and firm value into account. Brick and Chidambaran 
(2010:539 & 542) found that a change to a fully independent audit committee 
resulted in an increase in the level of board monitoring, which led to an increased 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. Anderson (1989:46) explains that a “specifically 
appointed audit committee provides extra monitoring that aids in controlling 
excessive agency cost”. In contrast, Brown and Caylor (2006:428) found no link 
between audit committee independence and firm value.  
 
In a study on the voluntary adoption of audit committees by UK companies 
Collier and Gregory (1999:329-330) found that CEO duality and the inclusion of 
executive directors on the audit committee had a negative impact on the audit 
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committee activities supporting the current practice of using only independent 
directors on audit committees. In a USA study, independent, diligent audit 
committees with financial expertise have been linked to internal and external audit 
quality that helps address the risk of misstatement (Abbott et al., 2007:808). Thus 
independence, diligence and financial expertise are considered to be key 
characteristics for the effective operation of an audit committee. These 
characteristics have been encapsulated by South African legislation and regulations. 
 
Clearly, past evidence on the value of an audit committee has been mixed 
(DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault & Reed, 2002; Brown & Caylor, 2006; Brick 
& Chidambaran, 2010), and a variety of characteristics regarding the composition 
of the audit committee have been identified (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005:400; Brick 
& Chidambaran, 2010:546; Woidtke & Yeh, 2013:1; Agyemang & Castellini, 
2015:58). These characteristics could influence the effectiveness of the monitoring 
role of the audit committee and are considered in the development of criteria used 
to evaluate the effectiveness of audit committees. In summary, the characteristics 
of audit committees highlighted by past studies centre on appointing independent 
people of whom at least one person must have financial expertise. The members of 
such committees should be diligent about attending meetings, with at least four 
meetings being held annually.  
 
The timeline of the above findings may indicate that over time the use of audit 
committees has become a minimum governance requirement, bonding companies 
to the use of independent audit committees as monitors. The disadvantage of 
bonding mechanisms is highlighted by Brick and Chidambaran (2010:546), who 
found a positive contribution through monitoring by audit committees in the pre-
SOX period which changed to a negative influence in the post-SOX period.  
 
The uniqueness of the audit committee in South Africa is encapsulated in the 
fact that its existence is legislated and the shareholders are required to appoint at 
least three directors who are independent to the audit committee (RSA, 2008a: 
section 94). The King III code recommends that the audit committee should report 
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to the board and shareholders on how it has discharged its duties (Principle 3.10) 
and meet at least twice a year66, or as often as necessary (Recommended Practice 
3.1.4) (IoDSA, 2009a). The audit committee members should be suitably skilled 
and experienced, and the committee should be chaired by an independent non-
executive director (Principles 3.2 & 3.3) (IoDSA, 2009a). In addition, the 
Companies Act requires the audit committee to report in the annual financial 
statements on the appropriateness of the financial statements, accounting practices 
and internal financial controls (section 94(7)(f)(iii) (RSA, 2008a). The 
independence of audit committee members is also specifically described in the 
Companies Act and King III as follows: 
 The Companies Act requires at least three directors (section 94(2)-
(4), who may “not be- 
(i) involved in the day-to-day management of the company’s 
business or have been so involved at any time during the 
previous financial year; 
(ii) a prescribed officer, or full-time employee, of the company or 
another related or inter-related company, or have been such an 
officer or employee at any time during the previous three 
financial years; or 
(iii) a material supplier or customer of the company, such that a 
reasonable and informed third party would conclude in the 
circumstances that the integrity, impartiality or objectivity of 
that director is compromised by that relationship; and  
(c) not be related to any person who falls within any of the criteria 
set out” above (RSA, 2008a).  
However, the recommendation of King III on independent directors focuses 
on excluding people with a relationship to the company or its stakeholders to ensure 
that independent directors are free from any conflict of interest (IoDSA, 2009b: 
Principle 2.18). King III qualified relationships as direct and indirect interests 
exceeding 5% equity or if less the interest must not be material to the personal 
                                                 
66 The recommendation of twice a year align to the local practice of publishing interim and final 
results in contrast to the quarterly results published in the USA. 
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wealth of the person (IoDSA, 2009b: Principle 2.18). This study applies a stricter 
definition of independence by re-classifying independent directors with any direct 
or indirect equity interest in the company as non-executive, to ensure the study 
focuses on independent directors free from any conflict of interest. 
 
The characteristics of the audit committee illustrated in the above discussion 
are used in this study to develop a measure of audit committee effectiveness. This 
measure is calculated by adding a point for each of the following: 
1. The audit committee is staffed by at least three directors to comply 
with legislative requirements; 
2. all the directors who are members of the audit committee are 
independent;  
3. the audit committee includes a member with financial expertise; 
4. the audit committee is chaired by an independent director who is 
not the chairperson of the board; 
5. the audit committee meets at least four times a year; and  
6. all the members of the audit committee attended all the meetings. 
This study considers an effective audit committee to be one that meets all of 
the above requirements. 
 
From the preceding discussion on the factors to be considered to ensure a 
quality audit, the following three pillars have been identified: 
1. The appointment of a Big-4 firm by shareholders to signal quality 
audits. 
2. The application of transparent reporting practices by the board, as 
reflected in the audit fee as a percentage of total assets. It is expected 
that transparent reporting practices result in a reduced audit fee.  
3. The oversight of an effective audit committee staffed by independent 
directors with financial expertise who are committed to performing 
their duties diligently. 
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This study develops a quality audit score (QAS) as an index to proxy for the 
use of a quality audit and an effective audit committee using the sum of the 
following factors as a percentage: 
1) The appointment of a quality or Big-4 audit firm as the external 
auditors. This is scored using a dichotomous variable where a 
quality audit as signalled by the appointment of a Big 4 firm is 
coded as 1, and companies not using a Big-4 audit firm are coded 
as zero (0). In situations where companies use two audit firms to 
assure their financial statements, both firms must be Big-4 firms 
for the company to be coded as 1.  
 
2) The current year’s reported audit fees as a proportion of the total assets of 
the company to accommodate the size and complexity of the company 
represent the cost of information asymmetry. Companies where the 
proportion of the current year’s audit fees to total assets is below the median 
of the proportion of the current year’s audit fees to total assets for the 
industry grouping are coded as 1 and the rest as zero (0). Allocating dummy 
variables according to a split in the groups using the median is in line with 
prior research (Henry, 2010:31; Smit, 2015:63). 
 
3) Audit committees who comply with all six listed characteristics are 
considered effective audit committees (coded as 1), and the rest of the audit 
committees are not considered effective and coded as zero (0).  
 
The audit committee characteristics are: 
 The audit committee consists of at least three members, 
 all the members are listed as independent directors, 
 at least one member has financial expertise, 
 not chaired by the chairperson of the board, 
 the audit committee meets at least four times a year, and  
 all the members attended all the meetings. 
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As information asymmetry is not easily observed by outsiders like 
shareholders, quality audit supported by an effective audit committee can help to 
reduce information asymmetry and increase firm value. This study used a quality 
audit score (QAS) as a control variable to proxy for information asymmetry as 
quality audit is related to quality governance that helps to reduce information 
asymmetry (Waweru, 2014b:567). 
 
CV4 = QAS is the sum of the three quality audit elements calculated 
as a percentage. The relationship between the quality audit and firm 
value is expected to be positive as it helps to reduce information 
asymmetry thereby increasing firm value. 
 
Recent studies that considered quality audit related elements as variables 
together with their definitions are listed in Table 4-4. 
 
Table 4-4 Quality audit 
Variables Definitions References 
Big-4 as a proxy for the 
appointment of a quality 
external audit firm. 
Dummy variable 1 if the 
firm is audited by a Big-4 
firm, 0 otherwise. 
(Mangena & Chamisa, 
2008:36; Waweru, 
2014a:475; Ntim et al., 
2015:201) 
Audit committee 
characteristics. 
Size of the committee as 
the number of members 
Independence is the ratio 
of non-executives to the 
size of the audit committee 
Intensity is measured by 
the number of meetings 
per year. 
(Kyereboah-Coleman, 
2008:11) 
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Table 4-4 Quality audit - continued 
Variables Definitions References 
Big-4 as a proxy for the 
appointment of a quality 
external audit firm. 
Dummy variable 1 if the 
firm is audited by a Big-4 
firm, 0 otherwise. 
(Mangena & Chamisa, 
2008:36; Waweru, 
2014a:475; Ntim et al., 
2015:201) 
Developed a sub-index 
for the audit committee. 
Company has an audit 
committee. Chair is a non-
executive director. 
Chairman of the board is 
not on the committee. 
Indicate the number of 
meetings held by the audit 
committee. 
(Munisi & Randøy, 
2013:92 & 108) 
Proportional audit fees 
as a proxy for 
information asymmetry. 
Statutory audit fees 
divided by the amount of 
sales. 
(Waweru, 2014a:468; 
Waweru, 2014b:564) 
 
 
4.2.4 External bonding 
Legislative bonding differentiates between companies based on their industry 
and any industry-specific legislation. Industry-specific legislation bonding the 
control options of the board. 
 
Companies are classified into industries that represent the nature of the 
company’s enterprise. Different industries have various legal and regulatory 
requirements that focus on protecting and guiding the specific industry. It is 
therefore possible that although the different industries have different regulatory 
requirements, the need for all the industries to be compliant could reduce the 
industry impact on the performance of a company as the cost of compliance is 
comparable from one industry to the next. A recent South African study on 
directors’ remuneration by Scholtz and Engelbrecht (2015:29) based on the Top 
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100 companies between 2009-2012 did not control for industry variation, possibly 
supporting the argument that compliance cost could negate industry variations. 
 
The latter is, however, an unproven assumption. To accommodate industry 
variation, industry (IND) forms part of the control variables used in this study. As 
all industries must comply with various regulatory and legislative requirements, this 
study uses a dichotomous variable to separate industries into two groups on the 
basis of their customers. In companies where customers are linked to the broader 
public such as where the company supplies customer goods or services, 
telecommunications, financial and medical services, the customers represent a large 
and very diverse group and the industry is coded as 1 for consumer industries. In 
contrast, in manufacturing, oil & gas, technology and mining customers represent 
a small group and the industry is coded as 0 for primary industries with less diverse 
customers. Grouping industries using dummy variables is in line with Swartz and 
Firer (2005:153-154). They excluded the financial industry and used three groups, 
one group for mining and industry, another for retail and the third for services 
(Swartz & Firer, 2005:153-154). This study extends Swartz and Firer’s industry 
grouping by further consolidating the industry groupings: retail and services are 
grouped together given their large customer base and include companies from the 
financial industry which also have a large customer base versus mining, oil & gas, 
technology and industry in the small customer group.  
 
CV5 = IND is a dichotomous variable where the primary sectors, 
such as mining (basic materials), oil and gas, technology and 
industrial (industrials) sectors with few customers are coded as 0 
(primary industries). The customer-centred sectors, such as 
consumer goods and services, health care, finance (financials) and 
telecommunication sectors with large customer bases are coded as 1 
(consumer industries). As all industries need to comply with 
legislative requirements, their control indicators are selected to 
maximise the performance of the company in the industries, and no 
specific relationship between industries and firm value is expected. 
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However, it is possible that broader economic circumstances could 
influence on industry and not the other. The classification of 
industries according to their broader customer basis is novel and an 
extension on the consolidated industries used by (Swartz & Firer, 
2005:154). 
 
Recent studies that considered industry as a variable are listed in Table 4-5, 
along with their definitions. 
 
Table 4-5 Industry 
Industry definitions References 
Dummy variables are used to code the different 
industries, using three industry groupings, one for 
mining and industry, another for retail and the third for 
services. 
(Swartz & Firer, 
2005:153-154) 
Dummy variables for the five main industry groupings: 
basic material plus oil and gas, consumer goods and 
services, health care, industrials, technology and 
telecommunication. 
(Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
2013:126; Ntim et al., 
2015:201; Ntim et al., 
2017:18) 
 
The importance of considering the customer base is discussed in more detail 
in the section on board size.  
 
4.2.5 External governance mechanisms summation 
External governance mechanisms can bond the participants in an agency 
relationship through legislative requirements. However, the same legal 
environment can encourage shareholders to monitor the board towards improved 
firm value.  
 
This study considers the more active monitoring role of a controlling 
shareholder (CONSHA) with a shareholding of 25% or more, coupled with 
monitoring by blockholders (BLOCK) with a shareholding of 5% or more but less 
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than 25% as control variables external to the board. Prior research using 
blockholders tends to focus on shareholdings of 5% or more, as listed in Table 4-1, 
but few studies focused on large controlling shareholders (listed in Table 4-2). In 
South Africa control of a 25% shareholding can lead to direct control as the standard 
quorum requirements include a 25% shareholding representation in section 64 of 
the Companies Act (RSA, 2008a). Directors’ shareholding (DIRSHA) is also 
considered as it could influence the control indicators the board implements to 
further manage agency cost. The examination in this study of different types of 
shareholding is consistent with a prior South Africa study by Ntim and Soobaroyen 
(2013:134), who found “that ownership and board characteristics” help to 
“significantly explain differences in BEE disclosures”. The monitoring role of 
shareholders is grounded in their voting power, which stems from the Companies 
Act and is beyond the direct control of the board. Henry (2010:35) found in an 
Australian study that different shareholder categories are substitute monitors where 
institutional shareholders are correlated with increased board independence and 
size, while directors’ shareholdings are negatively correlated with board 
independence and size. In a Swiss study Beiner et al. (2006:266) found that various 
“ownership structures do not have any significant impact on Tobin’s Q”, but that 
directors’ shareholding improves firm value up to a point.  
 
As the maximisation of self-interest is the motivation behind monitoring by 
shareholders, it is expected that all shareholder monitoring will have a positive 
relationship with firm value. Although the market can act as an ultimate control via 
takeovers, the smaller size and limited number of large takeovers coupled with 
stringent legislative requirements make takeovers a costly option. Because of the 
limited number of takeovers, they are not considered in this study as a control 
variable.  
 
The prior discussion focused on shareholder monitoring (BLOCK, CONSHA 
& DIRSHA) supported by the market. However, the legislative environment also 
addresses agency problems through reducing information asymmetry via disclosure 
and audit requirements. Shareholders can appoint a Big-4 audit firm for oversight 
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via quality audits to reduce information asymmetry and encourage the application 
of transparent disclosure practices. Quality audits imply oversight by an external 
audit firm to reduce information asymmetry by obtaining assurance on reported 
information and thereby improving transparency. Shareholders are also responsible 
for appointing the audit committee which oversees the assurance process which 
ensures that reliable information will be disseminated in a transparent manner. To 
accommodate the use of auditors and audit committees in an oversight capacity to 
reduce information asymmetry, this study developed a quality audit score (QAS) to 
encapsulate the complex nature of a quality audit. Although improved transparency 
could have a positive impact on firm value, the use of audits and audit committees 
is well established in South Africa as an oversight or monitoring control and is 
expected to be positively correlated with firm value as it reduces information 
asymmetry.  
 
Industry (IND) is linked to the legislative environment and is classified as an 
external control variable owing to the bonding cost of industry-specific legislation. 
This is used as a bonded variable due to the legislative influences that are industry-
specific as all companies must balance their control indicators against their legal 
compliance requirements. As different growth levels and market conditions 
influences different industries over time industry is a common control variable 
(Ntim et al., 2017:18). The control variables described above all stem from the 
external governance environment and are summarised in Figure 4-4. 
 
Figure 4-4 Control variables in the external governance environment 
 
 
EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE 
MECHANISMS
MARKET
(CV1) 
BLOCK
(CV2) 
CONSHA
(CV3) 
DIRSHA
LEGISLATION
(CV4) QAS
(CV5) IND
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The next section (section 4.2.6) highlights the last control variable, CV 6. The 
last control variable is a composite variable67 which consolidates a number of 
company-level control considerations that influence firm value in a company 
control index (CCI). Thereafter the internal governance mechanisms that form the 
basis of board-level controls and the CI index are discussed in section 4.3. 
 
4.2.6 Company-level controls 
To focus this study on the identification of the relationship between the board 
as a governance mechanism and firm value at specific points in time (using the 
normal annual reporting cycle to the AGM), other variables that influence firm 
value but are not specifically board-related monitoring controls or external 
governance mechanisms, must be taken into consideration to control for the omitted 
variable risk. Company control variables are variables that often stem from past 
strategic board decisions and bonding the options of the board in the current period. 
Some examples are the company’s strategy regarding risk, growth or asset 
retention. The current position reflects past strategies that bond encumbered board 
members to the consequences of past directions. The separate control of these 
variables is in line with prior studies (Beiner et al., 2006:277; Munisi & Randøy, 
2013:98).  
 
The following considerations are important for company-level controls: 
 risk as proxied by leverage (debt to assets),  
 growth as proxied by the market-to-book value,  
 performance as proxied by the average return on assets for the 
preceding two years, and 
 company size as proxied by total assets rounded in millions.  
 
In addition, board size and board independence are included as company 
controls as they are controlled by the shareholders who appoint the board. However, 
                                                 
67 The development of a composite company-level control variable differentiates this study by 
acknowledging the bonding effect of past decisions or shareholder decisions on the control options 
of the board in any specific year. 
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board size and composition decisions could be influenced by the board through the 
identification of prospective board members by the nomination committee for 
consideration and approval of the shareholders. Both the nomination committee and 
the shareholders need to consider the recommendations of King III and the legal 
requirements in sections 68 and 69 applicable to the eligibility and appointment of 
suitable board members (RSA, 2008a). King III recommends that the board consist 
of a “balance of power and authority”, with a “majority of non-executive directors” 
of whom a majority “should be independent” (Principle 2.18) (IoDSA, 2009b).  
 
As is evident from the definitions of company-level control considerations 
highlighted in the following discussion, that there is as yet no consensus on the use 
of proxies or their definitions. Waweru (2014b:568) referred to some of the 
variables used in the CCI as firm variables and found that “firm size, leverage and 
investment opportunities are main determinants of the quality of corporate 
governance”. This study uses widely applied proxies in line with the method used 
by Swartz and Firer (2005:156). Although the study also uses the most widely 
applied definitions for the variables, where appropriate, narrower definitions are 
used in response to the recommendation by (Ntim, 2009:377-378).  
 
To control for the above variables a company control index (CCI) is 
developed as a control variable. The CCI is based on the combined influence of the 
risk, growth, performance, company size, board size and board independence of the 
individual companies.  
 
CV6 = CCI represents the sum of the company control 
considerations, calculated as a percentage to form the company 
control index (CCI). Each company control variable is coded as 1 or 
0 using the industry median to separate the groups. The index 
construction methods using 0;1 dummy variables used in this study 
is in line with the methods used by Gompers et al. (2003) and 
subsequently used by Ntim (2009); Mans-Kemp (2014) and Ashwin 
(2015) in the indexes they developed.  
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Separating the CCI from the board-level control indicators in the CI index 
enabled the study to focus on the control indicators (section 4.3) used by the board 
to direct and control the company towards goal congruence. The company control 
variables used in the CCI starting with risk and ending with independence are 
discussed in more detail in sections 4.2.6.1-4.2.6.6. The detailed CCI coding and 
calculation of the CCI index are discussed in section 4.2.6.7.  
 
4.2.6.1 Firm risk 
Leverage is used as a proxy for risk because using loans to fund the enterprise 
to improve performance increases risk as the company must comply with the terms 
of the loan agreement (loan covenants). Unlike shares which do not require a fixed 
return, debt holders do require compliance with the loan agreement and are more 
exposed to risky investments by the company that could erode its available cash 
(Abor & Biekpe, 2006:53). Primarily companies obtain funding through share 
capital contributed by shareholders, external finance through loans and internally 
generated funds through retained income to fund the enterprise of the business.  
 
The capital structure balance and risk could be influenced by a controlling 
shareholder who might prefer increased leverage and risk with a view to possible 
increased returns whereas companies not dominated by a controlling shareholder 
might prefer to use retained income or equity funding that does not involve cash 
outflow demands (Abor & Biekpe, 2006:54). The bonding impact of debt could 
encourage the board to further reduce agency cost to manage their cash flow by 
reducing the use of perquisites or slacking (Henry, 2010:30). Increased risk via 
increased leverage does, however, hold the promise of increased return to the 
shareholder.  
 
Prior research has found that leverage can result in the lender becoming a 
monitor as “covenants and collateral” can “increase a lender's incentive to monitor” 
(Rajan & Winton, 1995:1113). A USA study found that “the cost of debt financing 
is inversely related to board independence and board size, indicating that lenders 
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could rely on existing board monitoring structures (Anderson et al., 2004:315; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins & LaFond, 2006). Bakar (2012:187) found during a study 
using USA debt contracts for 2006 that the level of board independence and the 
financial expertise on a board could influence debt covenants positively while CEO 
duality and director busyness did not. 
 
In South Africa banks do not play a direct governance role as they aim, as 
funders, to retain a level of independence from their customers. However, loan 
covenants are a bonding control mechanism that directs the repayment terms of the 
loan and can lead to disciplinary action in the event of noncompliance where 
liquidation is the severest form of corrective action. Loans are regulated in South 
Africa to help ensure that they are granted within a transparent and fair credit market 
(RSA, 2005b). This legislative protection serves to protect the banks (lenders) as 
well as their customers by legislating fair credit granting practices, which place 
pressure on customers to comply with the loan agreement terms to repay the loan 
as agreed, and pressure on the lenders to only approve loans that are affordable to 
their customers.  
 
Leverage can be used to limit the use of perquisites as a portion of the 
available cash flow must be used to repay the loan. The loan covenants could bond 
the board to maintain specific financial ratios as a loan requirement or for ease of 
access to funding options like overdraft facilities. The cost versus benefit of 
leverage needs to be balanced as the curtailing influence of loan covenants on the 
available cash could reduce the excessive use of perquisites, increase the risk of 
liquidation, and/or increase the cost of a new project, especially when interest rates 
are high.68 Loans could be used by the board as an indication of an increased risk 
profile and expected superior returns for shareholders. Such an indication could 
help to achieve goal congruence as shareholders might be prepared to accept riskier 
investments in a company while using their portfolio to balance their overall risk. 
                                                 
68 Historically, interest rates in South Africa can be volatile and high when compared to developed 
countries. “Interest rates averaged 12.78 percent from 1998 until 2017, reaching an all-time high of 
23.99 percent in June of 1998 and a record low of 5 percent in July of 2012” 
(www.tradingeconomics.com). 
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Increased leverage may also indicate that, due to cash flow constraints, the board 
will not engage in excessive use of perquisites that could further reduce the 
shareholders’ need for monitoring and result in a reduction in agency cost. Fosu 
(2013) summarised the benefits of leverage as increasing the disciplined use of 
resources to reduce the threat of bankruptcy and found that increased leverage in 
South Africa does result in improved firm performance. However, in a weak 
economy increased leverage could result in cash flow problems that threaten 
business continuity or force the business to sell assets to pay back its loans (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1992:1343). 
 
Using leverage to optimise the firm’s capital structure can improve firm value 
if the funds are invested in enterprise activities that yield returns that are higher than 
the cost of finance. Cheng and Tzeng (2011:30) say that agency cost can increase 
with increased leverage as information asymmetry increases, suggesting a negative 
impact on firm value. However, in a South African study Fosu (2013) found that 
financial leverage has a significant positive effect on firm performance, which 
could be a consequence of the practice of transparent reporting in South Africa. 
This also helps to explain why leverage was only rated at a medium level of 
importance in a study on perceptions of South African private equity analysts 
(Millson & Ward, 2005:79). The lower importance attributed to leverage in South 
Africa may be the result of the legislative protection of the lending market coupled 
with the existing practice of using equity funding. As leverage represents a 
balancing act between risks and rewards it is a useful proxy for risk. Leverage has 
been used as a proxy for risk in prior South African studies (Swartz & Firer, 
2005:157; Smit, 2015:63). Thus, risk as proxied by leverage forms part of the CCI 
variables used in this study. Risk is the ratio of total debt to total assets and was 
extracted from INET BFA/IRESS.  
 
4.2.6.2 Prior firm performance 
The value of a company is influenced by its performance, which generates 
income for the company. Firm performance is the result of past direction and control 
of the activities of a company by the board. In a study on companies in South 
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African and Kenya, Waweru (2014a:475) found that “high levels of firm 
performance are associated with good governance practices”. However, as it is 
unlikely that prior performance will instantaneously result in changed board-level 
controls, a lag is expected. 
 
It is likely that poor past performance could motivate the board to implement 
more controls to show their expertise in order to prevent being replaced by 
monitoring shareholders (Da Silva & Leal, 2005:7). Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2006:236) warn that “past performance is potentially a correlated omitted variable” 
and should therefore be controlled for, suggesting a relationship between past 
performance and current decisions.  
 
It is also possible that executive directors with share options could be 
motivated to implement mechanisms towards improved firm performance to 
maximise their share options, as share options are a control mechanism for reducing 
goal divergence. Millson and Ward (2005:76) note that it is also possible that the 
board might use more controls to prevent continued or future poor firm 
performance, especially in situations where their bonus payments or share options 
include continued firm performance metrics. The opposite is also possible that 
strong performance lead to reduce controls and slacking with poorer future 
performance.  
 
This study uses the average RoA for the preceding two years as a proxy for 
prior firm performance as past performances are likely to influence the control 
indicators implemented by the board to direct the current and future firm 
performance in the CCI. Performance is the average RoA for the preceding two 
years. 
 
4.2.6.3 Firm growth 
South African corporate governance highlights the value of sustainability of 
the enterprise and encourages the application and disclosure of integrated reporting 
principles to ensure that companies are managed in a holistic and sustainable 
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manner (IoDSA, 2009b: chapter 9). However, the increased legislative and 
regulatory requirements on sustainability and integrated reporting that cover both 
financial and non-financial aspects in a business could hamper growth through 
increased control demands, resulting in a more bureaucratic system (McCahery & 
Vermeulen, 2014:74).  
 
Growing a company can be achieved by various means, one method being 
takeovers of other companies (discussed in section 4.2.3.1). Other methods include 
the development of new patents or new products or extending the market to new 
customers. Company growth highlights the efforts of the board to direct the 
enterprise of a company and this direction can take various forms, which 
complicates a direct measurement of growth across various industries. Bushee, 
Carter and Gerakos (2013) found that institutional investors viewed board 
governance as critical for firms with high growth opportunities, possibly to help 
reduce the increased risk attributable to high growth strategies. As this study 
includes companies from various industries, growth proxies such as the 
development of new patents or the investment in R&D are not suitable as not all 
industries use patents or R&D as growth mechanisms.  
 
As growth efforts are not easily observable a priori this study uses a market-
influenced variable to proxy for growth by using the ratio of the market-to-book 
value (MVBV) of shares. MVBV represents the market’s view of the continued 
sustainability of the use of the assets to generate future income and thus grow the 
company beyond its current book value basis. Growth is the MVBV of the company 
and forms part of the CCI. 
 
4.2.6.4 Firm size 
The monitoring role of the board is influenced by the size of the company as 
larger companies tend to be more complex and more difficult to control and direct. 
Larger companies may therefore require a larger board to help control the increased 
size and complexity of the company’s operations. Larger companies could also 
require increased monitoring. The most common variable to proxy for firm size is 
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total assets, frequently transformed using its natural log to “improve the linear 
relationship” (Hay et al., 2006:169). More monitoring is usually required for larger 
companies, which is in line with prior studies (Bennedsen, Kongsted & Nielsen, 
2008; Guest, 2009). A Korean study found a positive correlation between company 
size and dispersed ownership (Cho & Kim, 2007:246), highlighting the need for 
more monitoring.  
 
In a South African study, Eccles, Pillay and De Jongh (2009:35) found a 
statistically significant relationship between accountability and company size using 
market capitalisation as a proxy for company size. Both the shareholders and board 
could benefit from a larger company as the larger asset base can be used to generate 
more income and a larger asset base is linked to increased firm value in that the 
liquidation value of the assets is more than that of a company with a smaller asset 
base. This study uses total assets in R millions as a proxy for firm size. Firm size 
forms part of the CCI. This study does not follow the practice of using the natural 
log of total assets, which is frequently used to improve the linearity of the 
relationship between firm size and firm performance or value, as firm size is part 
of an index.  
 
4.2.6.5 Board size 
Shareholders appoint the board from the list of nominations provided by the 
nomination committee. In appointing the board, shareholders must consider the 
question of optimal size for the board and they therefore control the board size. Yeh 
and Woidtke (2005:1882) find that controlling shareholders do influence the board 
selection process, which underlines their monitoring role. In addition to the 
influence of the shareholders, board size is also influenced by the size of the 
company. Bennedsen et al. (2008:1101) suggest that there is a positive correlation 
between larger boards and larger firms. Larger boards can add value; as Fields, 
Fraser and Subrahmanyam (2012:1540) found that borrowing rates were lower for 
larger boards. Larger boards can also distract from the enterprise or business of the 
company by making decisions more difficult as more people have to be consulted, 
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which can make decisive action more difficult, especially for executive directors, 
and decrease the efficiency of business decisions (McColgan, 2001:21).  
 
Research focusing on developed countries found that board size could 
increase as a result of new regulations. The introduction of governance regulations 
has been found to result in increased board sizes and higher levels of independent 
directors (Gillan, 2006). Board size can be influenced by the industry, where a 
consumer service-focused industry benefits from larger, more diverse boards. 
Brammer, Millington and Pavelin (2007:401) found that consumer industries had 
larger boards with more diverse, non-executive directors. In support of larger board 
sizes, Dalton et al. (1999:678) found a positive relationship between board size and 
performance using accounting and market-based measures.  
 
The board should, however, not become so large that it becomes difficult to 
make timely decisions. Bennedsen et al. (2008:1108) noted that the “right number 
of directors is a trade-off between the benefits of having sufficient competencies 
represented and the cost from increasing free-riding among directors”. Jensen 
(1994a:18-20) describes the ideal board size as a small board (7 to 8 people) with 
active and attentive directors who can exercise a monitoring function and provide 
criticism to the board, focus on maximising the long-term value of the company, 
separate the chairperson from the CEO and are able to respond early to failure. 
Bhagat and Black (1999:945) found that the average board in the USA has 11 
members, with 7 (63.6%) independent, 1 (9.1%) non-executive and 3 (27.3%) 
executive members, which is larger than the ideal size described by (Jensen, 
1994a:19). South African studies show an increase in board size over time, possibly 
in response to the increased governance recommendations. Swartz and Firer 
(2005:145 & 157) found an average board size of 10.3 in a 2003 study. Ntim et al. 
(2015:194 & 206) noted an average board size of 9.75 ranging from 4 to 18 for the 
period 2002-2011. A more recent study reported an average board size of 12.87 
before King III and 13.54 after King III with a maximum size of 24 for the period 
2006-2012 (Muchemwa et al., 2016:497 & 504). The trend towards increased board 
size as a response to increased governance regulations is in line with the finding by 
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McColgan (2001:24). However, board sizes cannot increase indefinitely to match 
increased regulations as boards would become unyielding, an optimal board size 
will re-emerge to ensure the company can be managed to improve firm value. 
 
In South Africa, the Companies Act requires a S&E committee,69 which is a 
new statutory board committee (RSA, 2008a: section 72(74)). Changes in laws are 
often the result of political pressure; Brick and Chidambaran (2010:534) note that 
legislation can result in increased board monitoring as board activity increased after 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. An increase in board size to include more directors to 
accommodate the skills set needed for the S&E committee is not necessarily an 
advantage as the cost of a larger board could have a negative effect on firm value. 
Prior research has shown mixed results, as Yermack (1996:209) found an “inverse 
association between board size and firm value” whereas Beiner et al. (2006:263) 
found a positive correlation between board size and firm value. The same principles 
might not apply in South Africa as a recent study by Muchemwa et al. (2016:506) 
found that board size is not significantly related to Tobin’s Q or RoE, but positively 
associated with RoA. The bonding of the board to form a S&E committee is, 
however, specific to the South African environment and it is still uncertain whether 
it will result in a positive impact linked to better social and ethical management or 
whether the additional monitoring and control cost will have a detrimental 
association with firm value. 
 
Larger boards can make use of more independent directors to act as monitors. 
Excessive monitoring can, however, be costly. King III cautions against a ‘one size 
fits all’ approach as it can be costly (IoDSA, 2009b:9) or deter managerial 
entrepreneurship. Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash (2011:161-164) found that excessive 
monitoring can reduce innovation and erode firm value. Larger boards can increase 
the possibility of shirking and free-riding on the board, as it is easier for independent 
directors to shirk their duties and become free riders, hoping that the other 
                                                 
69 The S&E committee is a new statutory board committee required by section 72(4) of the 
Companies Act that came into effect for the first time in 2012. This board committee is unique to 
South Africa. 
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independent directors will be more active monitors when they are part of a larger 
group.  
 
The monitoring ability of a larger board can have value. Anderson et al. 
(2004:340) found an inverse relationship between board size and cost of debt, and 
Beiner et al. (2006:277) found a positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and board 
size. In contrast Yammeesri and Herath (2010:288) found no relationship between 
board size and firm value. However, increasing the number of independent directors 
to act as monitors can result in too much monitoring and make the board unwieldy. 
Jensen and Meckling (1994:6) showed that one of the improved efficiencies of 
leveraged-buy-out companies was smaller, more active and better-informed boards. 
King III emphasises the importance of retaining the right balance and focus as the 
board needs to ensure, after considering the expectations of the stakeholders and 
regulatory requirements, that the overriding factor is the need to act in the best 
interest of the company (IoDSA, 2009a:5-6).  
 
A review of the literature on the influence of board size on firm value yields 
mixed results. De Andres and Vallelado (2008:2576) found a U-shaped relationship 
between board size and firm value where initially more directors added value but 
after 19 directors the addition of more directors started to reduce value. Their 
findings indicate a possible optimum board size. Conversely, Yermack (1996:186) 
found that companies with smaller boards have higher market valuations, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q, indicating that small boards might be more efficient. In 
support Wijethilake et al. (2015:263) found a negative relationship between board 
size and performance. Brick and Chidambaran (2010:544) believe that “Tobin’s Q 
is not related to board size, board independence,” and combining the role of CEO 
and chairperson, whereas Brown (2005:329) found larger boards to be more 
contextual, strategic and adept at monitoring; however, he did not consider firm 
value.  
 
In South Africa studies on the relationship between board size and firm value 
have shown mixed results. Prior local studies on the size of the board found that 
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board size is positively related to Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value (Meyer & De 
Wet, 2013:37; Ntim et al., 2015:215). In contrast, another local study found that 
board size is not significantly associated with firm value variables such as Tobin’s 
Q or RoE but it is positively associated with RoA (Muchemwa et al., 2016:506). 
To maximise their investment, the shareholders would elect a board to best 
complement the company and one that is suitable for the size of the company. This 
study takes the total number of people on the board as board size that forms part of 
the CCI.    
 
4.2.6.6 Board independence 
To address goal divergence, the board could monitor the actions of managers 
to help reduce goal divergence and increase firm value. The use of specialist 
monitors is in line with one of the recommended methods of reducing shirking in 
team production (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972:781). Independent70 directors can, 
therefore, be used as specialist monitors over the actions of executive directors. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006:204) explain that governance mechanisms can be 
used “to increase the monitoring of management’s actions to promote effective 
decision making, limit their opportunistic behaviour and reduce the information 
asymmetry between the firm and its external stakeholders”.  
 
This might not always be the case as Smit (2015:69) found that an increase in 
non-executive directors on the board of AltX companies did not result in improved 
reported earnings. Waweru (2014b:568) found a significantly positive relationship 
between leverage, board size and non-executive directors, highlighting the value of 
their monitoring role. As shareholders appoint the board it is also in their power to 
choose the types of directors they appoint. This study differentiates between 
executive directors, non-executive directors and non-executive directors who are 
independent (referred to as independent directors). In addition, this study deviates 
from other studies which focused on the proportion of non-executive directors on 
                                                 
70 In South Africa, non-executive directors who are independent of the company are called 
independent directors. Other countries and studies might use different labels such as outside 
directors or unrelated directors, but this study uses the term independent directors. 
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board as monitors (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008:1071-1076; Ntim, 2009; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013:130; Waweru, 2014b:564; Ntim et al., 2015:203; Smit, 2015:63) 
by focusing on independent directors. Although true independence is not easy to 
determine, directors are considered independent when their only relationship with 
the firm is as an independent director with fixed remuneration and no shareholding 
or other involvement. This study regards any shareholding held by a non-executive 
director as a factor that negatively influences independence.  
 
Although non-executive directors may have a level of independence from the 
executive directors, they might not be totally independent in mental attitude as they 
might have a trading relationship with the company or represent a shareholder that 
could bias their monitoring. As the use of independent directors as monitors is 
already an established practice, it is possible that the appointment of independent 
directors has lost its initial competitive value and became commonplace. 
Muchemwa et al. (2016:504) reported that the percentage of independent directors 
is not statistically associated with Tobin’s Q or RoA but is positive and significant 
for RoE. Zahra (1996:1718) explains that independent directors who hold shares in 
the company will be more motivated to act as monitors; however, local guidelines 
require independent directors to be independent of the company to enhance 
objective oversight. The requirements for independent directors can be summarised 
as follows: An independent director: 
 is not a representative of a shareholder who can control or 
influence the board, 
 does not have a direct or indirect interest in the company that 
exceeds 5% of the group’s shares, 
 does not have a direct or indirect interest in the company that 
is less than 5% of the group’s shares, but material to his 
personal wealth, 
 has not been appointed in any executive capacity by the 
company or as the audit partner or legal adviser for the 
preceding three financial years, or is not an immediate family 
member of such a person, 
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 is not a professional adviser to the company other than in the 
capacity as a director, and 
 does not receive remuneration contingent on the performance 
of the company (IoDSA, 2009b: Principle 2.18). 
 
Consistent with the findings of Zattoni and Cuomo (2010:70), South African 
requirements regarding high levels of independence for independent directors are 
in line with the strong local legal environment. 
 
Shareholders appoint independent directors to the board to monitor and 
control the action of the executive directors in order to control the consumption of 
perquisites by executive directors, which would prevent the expropriation of 
shareholder wealth. It is to the advantage of dispersed shareholders to appoint 
independent directors to monitor the executive board members in order to reduce 
goal divergence. Independence is increasingly valued and encouraged through 
governance regulation (Zattoni & Cuomo, 2010:63). King III report recommends 
in Principle 2.18 the use of “a majority of non-executive directors” of which the 
majority should be independent directors (IoDSA, 2009b:73).  
 
In the RMB Holdings’ integrated report independence is defined in line with 
the King III recommendations. The following extract shows improved transparency 
regarding how the company views independence principles: 
 does not participate in a share incentive scheme/option scheme of 
the company; and 
 is free from any business or other relationship which could be seen 
by an objective outsider to interfere materially with the individual’s 
capacity to act in an independent manner (RMB Holdings, 
2012:23). 
 
The last section ties in with the more succinct description of the independence 
principle as “the absence of undue influence and bias which can be affected by the 
intensity of the relationship between the director and the company” (IoDSA, 
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2009b:236). The independence definition used by King III is in line with global 
trends that require independent directors to avoid relationships that could influence 
their independence (Zattoni & Cuomo, 2010:68). Cheffins and Bank (2009:444) 
view the monitoring by independent directors as one of the mechanisms available 
to help align the interests of the board with those of the shareholders. In a review 
of codes on non-executive directors, Zattoni and Cuomo (2010:76) found a greater 
emphasis on independence than on competence or incentives. Studies by both 
Dalton et al. (1998:278) and Dalton et al. (2007:33), however, found no link 
between independent board members and financial performance. Yammeesri and 
Herath (2010:289) found that executive directors and not non-executive directors 
improve firm value 
 
This study focuses on the proportion of independent directors appointed by 
shareholders because shareholders, who could also act as monitors, might appoint 
fewer independent directors as they don’t need independent directors’ oversight, 
whereas dispersed shareholders are more likely to appoint more independent 
directors to act as monitors on their behalf. This study uses a more stringent 
definition for independent directors by extending the definition in King III to ensure 
independent directors have no other relationship with the company including no 
equity or equity rights. The proportion of independent directors is calculated as the 
number of independent directors divided by the total number of board members and 
reduced to a percentage; this forms part of the CCI used in this study. 
 
4.2.6.7 Company control index (CCI) 
The CCI is a consolidation of the following variables: 
 risk as proxied for by using leverage, (debt to assets), a proxy used in 
a number of recent studies (Waweru, 2014a:468; Waweru, 
2014b:564; Scholtz & Engelbrecht, 2015:37). 
 growth as proxied for by using the market-to-book value (MVBV), 
in line with recent studies (Muniandy & Hillier, 2015:115; Scholtz & 
Engelbrecht, 2015:37; Smit, 2015:64). 
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 prior performance as proxied for by using the average return on assets 
for the preceding two years, as it is important to consider the 
relationship of the past on the future in the model (Fosu, 2013:144; 
Wooldridge, 2014:274) 
 company size is proxied for by using total assets in millions, a proxy 
used in prior studies, the proxy used by prior studies used the natural 
log transformation to improve linearity (Muniandy & Hillier, 
2015:115). This study does not transform total assets as the value is 
part of an index. 
 board size as the number of people on the board in line with recent 
studies (Meyer & De Wet, 2013:37; Smit, 2015:64). 
 board independence as the number of independent board members 
divided by the number of people on the board and expressed as a 
percentage (Muchemwa et al., 2016:504). This study uses a more 
stringent definition for independent directors by extending the 
definition in King III to ensure independent directors have no other 
relationship with the company including no equity or equity rights. 
 
The CCI is calculated by coding companies as 1 for results equal to or above 
the median per industry grouping and as 0 for results below the median. The sum 
of the results of all the company controls represent the CCI score are converted to 
a percentage to represent the CCI score. Allocating dummy variables according to 
a split in the groups using the median is in line with prior research (Henry, 2010:31; 
Smit, 2015:63).  
 
Recent South African studies that considered company-related control 
variables together with their definitions are listed in Table 4-6. 
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Table 4-6 Company-related control variables 
Control 
variables 
Definitions References 
Leverage Total liabilities divided by 
total assets at year-end 
(Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008; 
Fosu, 2013; Waweru, 2014a:468; 
Waweru, 2014b:564; Scholtz & 
Engelbrecht, 2015:37) 
Leverage  Percentage of the ratio of 
total debt to total assets 
(Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013:130; 
Ntim et al., 2015:201; Ntim et 
al., 2017:18) 
Leverage Debt-to-equity ratio (Millson & Ward, 2005) 
Leverage Non-current liabilities 
divided by shareholder 
funds 
(Firer & Stainbank, 2003:30; 
Muniandy & Hillier, 2015:115) 
Performance Profitability is the 
percentage of the ratio of 
operating profit to total 
assets 
(Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013:130) 
Performance RoE (Swartz & Firer, 2005:157; 
Muniandy & Hillier, 2015:115; 
Scholtz & Engelbrecht, 2015:37) 
Performance RoA (Swartz & Firer, 2005:157; 
Waweru, 2014a:468; Waweru, 
2014b:564) 
Performance Two-year moving average 
RoA 
(Fosu, 2013) 
Growth Percentage of the current 
year’s sales minus the 
previous year’s sales scaled 
by the previous year’s sales 
(Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013:130; 
Ntim et al., 2015:201) 
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Table 4-6 Company-related control variables - continued 
Control 
variables 
Definitions References 
Growth Change in sales and 
operating revenue divided 
by turnover 
(Muchemwa et al., 2016:502) 
Growth Market-to-book value of 
equities or the ratio of 
market capitalisation to 
ordinary shareholders’ 
interest 
(Muniandy & Hillier, 2015:115; 
Scholtz & Engelbrecht, 2015:37; 
Smit, 2015:64) 
Firm size Natural log of total assets (Fosu, 2013; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013:130; Waweru, 
2014a:468; Waweru, 2014b:564; 
Muniandy & Hillier, 2015:115; 
Ntim et al., 2015:201) 
Firm size Total assets (Swartz & Firer, 2005:156; 
Muniandy & Hillier, 2015:115) 
Firm size Sales (Muchemwa et al., 2016:502) 
Firm size Natural log of sales for the 
year 
(Scholtz & Engelbrecht, 
2015:36) 
Firm size Market value of equity (Eccles et al., 2009; Smit, 
2015:63; Muchemwa et al., 
2016:5.2) 
Board size Natural log of the total 
number of directors on the 
board 
(Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013:130; 
Ntim et al., 2015:201) 
Board size Number of directors on the 
board 
(Swartz & Firer, 2005:157; 
Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008; 
Waweru, 2014b:564; Smit, 
2015:64) 
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Table 4-6 Company-related control variables - continued 
Control 
variables 
Definitions References 
Board 
independence 
Number of independent 
non-executive directors 
divided by the number of 
directors on board 
(Muniandy & Hillier, 2015:115) 
 
The next section discusses the internal control indicators that are available to 
the board to control the activities of the company in order to reduce goal divergence 
and improve firm value, followed by the developing and defining the CI index in 
section 4.3. 
 
4.2.7 Role of the internal control indicators in corporate control 
Internal control indicators rely on the internal control systems to direct and 
control the activities of the company, including reporting the results of the activities 
to the decision agents or boards and, ultimately, to the shareholders. There is a close 
relationship between shareholders, directors and internal control indicators that 
needs to be balanced to control agency cost and maximise firm value. This 
balancing is evident in an Australian study where Henry (2010:26) found that 
greater compliance with the governance index reduced agency cost irrespective of 
the firm ownership characteristics. Given the smaller South African market with its 
more concentrated ownership and the country’s developmental state, the role of 
internal control indicators increases in importance as it can be used to compensate 
for weaknesses in the external governance mechanisms.  
 
In corporate control this study focuses on developing an index of control 
indicators (CI) that the board could use to steer the enterprise of a company towards 
the strategic direction set by the board. To support these controls the board uses 
internal control indicators that focus on separation of duties, monitoring and 
oversight. Shleifer and Vishny (1997:738) highlight the importance of internal 
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control indicators when they caution that although market competition is a powerful 
corrector of economic inefficiencies, it alone is not a solution to corporate 
governance problems. In addition, prior research centred on controlling risks related 
to directors’ shareholding, CEO duality and large boards by using monitoring via 
independent directors. However, despite “rigorous research on board effectiveness” 
there is still no clarity on the effectiveness of board-level controls (Kim & Cannella, 
2008:282). Thus, an examination of the control indicators used by the board is 
especially relevant given mixed prior findings, and the higher levels of shareholding 
concentration in a less active market for corporate control via takeovers in South 
Africa.  
 
Internal control indicators are influenced by the methods selected by the 
board to maximise the value of the firm in the context of the company’s business 
environment. Such internal control indicators are mainly controls that monitor, 
control and bond the board as specialist managers using hierarchical structures that 
use separation of duties to enable effective monitoring oversight. More detail on the 
specific control indicators is given in section 4.3.  
 
Different firms are expected to use different combinations of internal control 
indicators to address goal divergence by structuring their internal control systems 
to maximise firm value. As the responsibility for the proper operation of the 
governance and control systems rests with the board, it is their responsibility to 
ensure that the control system supports their governance objectives and minimises 
agency cost. McColgan (2001:14) agrees with the importance of adapting control 
indicators to suit the situation as the “contracting nexus varies dramatically from 
one firm to the next, what is optimal for one, need not be optimal for another”. In 
companies following a cooperative production system, as is the case in large 
companies, it is more difficult to measure the contribution of individual members 
because a team produced the outcomes and monitoring is considered to be an 
efficient manner of controlling the challenges posed by team production (Nilakant 
& Rao, 1994:650). 
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Internal governance mechanisms are more important in firms with greater 
agency problems (Markarian et al., 2007:296). One of the key mechanisms 
available to the internal governance system is adding a control level with increased 
oversight at board-level. This oversight includes monitoring of executive directors 
by independent directors and monitoring of the CEO by the chairperson. Oversight 
or monitoring via the internal control system should enhance firm value as it can 
help to protect the company and its shareholders against: 
 wasteful managerial behaviour;  
 inefficient investments; 
 overly generous remuneration for executives; and 
 a focus on short-term operating decisions that could be harmful to 
the company and its stakeholders in the long-term (Crutchley & 
Hansen, 1989:37; Jensen, 1994a:15-22; Abor & Biekpe, 2006:53).  
 
Control indicators that can be used by the board to align the interests of the 
agents and principals include the development of structures such as internal control 
systems that limit the decision powers of individuals and guide their actions towards 
goal alignment and improved disclosure practices as prescribed by the JSE listing 
requirements (JSE, 2011) and the King III code and report on governance (IoDSA, 
2009a; IoDSA, 2009b).  
 
An effective control environment or internal control system, using separation 
of duties to enable monitoring, is important in supporting the control indicators used 
to reduce goal divergence. Fama and Jensen (1983b:304) note that an “effective 
system for decision control implies … that the control (ratification and monitoring) 
of decisions is to some extent separate from the management (initiation and 
implementation) of decisions”. Beasley (1996:446) explains that although the board 
delegates most decision management and control functions to top management, 
they maintain control by ratifying important decisions and monitoring top 
management’s compliance. Separation of duties includes the use of hierarchies to 
control all management levels in the company as well as the use of independent 
directors as monitors of the executive directors and the chairperson of the board as 
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monitor of the CEO. This separation of duties between board members is critical as 
oversight via monitoring requires a level of distance to operate effectively.  
 
It is possible that the use of additional monitoring through the separation of 
duties may increase monitoring costs and that this could result in a reduction in firm 
value. Grantham (2004:225) warns that corporate governance must retain its focus 
on the creation of wealth and not focus only on controls to root out corruption and 
fraud. Daily et al. (2003:375) find little support for the correlation of the monitoring 
model with improved firm performance. It is possible, however, that the 
maximisation of self-interest, especially for independent directors, results in an 
increased focus on their monitoring/oversight role to indicate their value as 
supervisors/monitors to the labour market.  
 
It is to the advantage of the board as specialist managers to reduce goal 
divergence by using internal control indicators to reduce agency cost while 
maximising the benefit of using specialist managers. To accomplish this, the board 
can use guidance from regulations such as the JSE listing requirements and King III 
to select the most appropriate governance methods for the company. Bathala and 
Rao (1995:67) find that the choice of mechanisms used to reduce agency cost 
depends on the extent of alternative agency conflict-minimising options that are 
used. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996:378) agree, noting that there are several 
alternative mechanisms that are interdependent, and the board should select the 
mechanisms that maximise firm value. Kuliks (2005:348-349) acknowledges the 
continued challenge of maximising firm value as none of the different methods used 
to control agency cost fully solve the agency problem. The continued challenge of 
finding the ideal solution to minimise agency cost is emphasised by Abdo and 
Fisher (2007:53). 
 
4.3 Using monitoring to control the agency problem 
 
Monitoring by the board can be used to help reduce information asymmetry 
and agency cost. Board-implemented monitoring centres on the use of separation 
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of duties and oversight to reduce information asymmetry and moral hazard by 
ensuring that the enterprise is focused on achieving its business objectives and that 
managers are not slacking or engaging in the excessive use of perquisites in the 
process, and that managers are engaged in actions that will maximise firm value 
and not career progression.  
 
Managing moral hazard is important as Millson and Ward (2005:74) explain 
that moral hazard can take the form of misappropriation of resources, task 
avoidance or a focus on selfish interests like career building to the detriment of the 
pursuit of organisational objectives. The moral hazard risk thus needs to be 
managed considering the separation of duties on the board. 
 
The board structure and composition influence the controls the board is able 
to utilise to help control the goal divergence problem and form part of the index of 
board-level CI identified and defined in sections 4.3.1-4.3.4. Table 4-7 summarises 
South African studies that centred on the board as a control mechanism, 
highlighting each study’s sample size, period and main findings. 
 
Table 4-7 Summary of South African studies on the board as a governance 
mechanism 
Authors Sample sizes and 
study periods 
Main findings 
Swartz and 
Firer (2005) 
117 companies 
during 2003. 
There is a positive relationship between 
ethnic diversity and intellectual capital 
performance, but there is not a 
statistically significant relationship 
between having women on the board 
and intellectual capital performance. 
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Table 4-7 Summary of South African studies on the board as a governance 
mechanism - continued 
Authors Sample sizes and 
study periods 
Main findings 
Ntim and 
Soobaroyen 
(2013) 
75 listed companies 
for the period 2003-
2009. 
Found that the extent of BEE disclosure 
varied substantially and that the level of 
disclosure improved over the period. 
Companies with higher government 
ownership, higher block ownership, 
higher board diversity, larger boards and 
proportionally more non-executive 
directors had better BEE disclosures. 
Ntim et al. 
(2015) 
169 listed firms for 
the period 2002-
2011. 
Board size is positively associated with 
firm value. 
Smit (2015) 48 companies listed 
on the AltX for the 
period 2008-2011. 
The boards did not adopt conservative 
accounting practices that could lead to 
information asymmetry and the reported 
earnings did not improve due to an 
increase in the percentage monitoring 
non-executive directors. 
Muchemwa et 
al. (2016) 
338 companies for 
the period 2006-
2012. 
Board size is not significantly related to 
Tobin’s Q or RoE but is positively 
associated with RoA while the non-
executive directors as proxy for 
independent directors were not 
associated with firm performance. 
 
4.3.1 Monitoring as a control 
Monitoring as a control as used by the board needs to be adapted to maximise 
the overall monitoring or oversight of the enterprise of the company in a manner 
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that reduces goal divergence and agency cost. Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010:943) 
note that the monitoring of the board should be aligned to the monitoring by 
shareholders to address goal divergence. Adams and Ferreira (2007:217) caution 
that too much monitoring can “create a rift between non-executive and executive 
directors”. Various control variables influence the selection of internal monitoring 
controls by the board at board-level as well as board committee level. Thus, the 
control measures used should be selected to reduce agency cost while maximising 
firm value. Internal monitoring methods make use of board and internal control 
structures that enforce separation of duties through the use of independent directors 
as monitors who oversee the labour of the executives or managers (Fama, 
1980:293), and the chairperson of the board (chair) as the monitor who oversees the 
CEO (Donaldson & Davis, 1991:49; Bakar, 2012:107).  
 
The separation of duties between the CEO and chair, and between executive 
and independent board members, allows for monitoring or oversight at board-level, 
while the use of independent board members supported by an independent chair at 
committee level allows for oversight at board committee level. The use of 
separation of duties to enable oversight through monitoring at board and board 
committee level is visually presented in Figure 4-5. 
 
Figure 4-5 Monitoring as a control 
 
 
Monitoring at board committee level
Independent chairperson of the committee Majority members are independent directors
Monitoring of executive directors
Independent directors Executive directors
Separation of control over the board
Independent chairperson of the board CEO
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The structure used by the board for monitoring is influenced by the needs of 
the company and the level of “outside of the board” monitoring by for example 
shareholders, blockholders or loan covenants discussed in section 4.2 under the 
various control variables. Beiner et al. (2006:277) find that controlling shareholders 
had larger boards with fewer independent directors, supporting the argument that a 
controlling shareholder can act as a monitor and would need to rely less on the 
monitoring ability of independent directors to reduce goal divergence. In 
considering the structure of the board the diversity, busyness and expertise of board 
members are important contributors to their monitoring ability (Bakar, 2012:107). 
 
Separation of duties and the use of monitoring are part of the control system 
used in a company and are evident from the organisational structure deployed 
within the company. Prior studies encourage the use of control systems to manage 
the agency problem (Jensen, 1991:14; Jensen, 1994a:6; Jones, 2008:1052). The use 
of internal control structures to enable monitoring by the separation of roles is 
extended, as independent board members are also used to provide oversight to board 
committees, including the risk, nomination, remuneration, audit and S&E 
committees.  
 
The challenge is that the board itself must be capacitated by having enough 
members, including independent members, to enable the required separation of 
duties and oversight. Care should also be taken to ensure that the independent board 
members have the capacity or availability to execute their monitoring function with 
due care and diligence, as serving on too many other boards could influence their 
monitoring capacity (Wright, 2012).  
 
Separation of duties is a form of preventative control that separate the people 
who monitor and ratify decisions from the people who initiate and implement the 
decisions, while monitoring is both a preventative and a detective control. The 
existence of monitoring as a preventative control can influence behaviour in line 
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with the Hawthorn effect71 (McCambridge, Witton & Elbourne, 2014), while as a 
detective control it focuses on identifying existing problems for further corrective 
action.  
 
Monitoring at board-level as a detective control will have a lagged effect as 
it takes time for a problem in an organisation to become prominent enough to be 
identified by monitoring at board or board committee level, which influences the 
efficiency of high-level monitoring as a control. Implementing corrective controls 
also lags as the impact of a new control will take time to become evident in firm 
performance or firm value measures. Jensen (1994a:17) highlights the slow 
response time of monitoring as he found that CEOs were only removed after huge 
losses had been reported, indicating a reliance on accounting performance measures 
in the monitoring. In South Africa, African Bank’s share price tumbled from R40 a 
share to below R3 in 18 months, leading to the resignation of the CEO, followed by 
warnings of a R7.3 billion loss mere months after a R5.5 billion capital injection 
(Whitfield, 2014). Thus, using monitoring as a control mechanism at board-level 
differs from the application of internal controls at a lower level, given the time it 
needs to be effective. This indicates that monitoring at board-level is a less efficient 
control which is not unexpected as board only meet a couple of times a year. The 
next section focuses on the use of board-level controls.  
 
4.3.2 Board-level controls 
As directors are appointed by shareholders at the annual general meeting 
(AGM), the directors should be motivated to control and direct the company in a 
manner that will satisfy the shareholders in order to encourage them to re-appoint 
them as directors. The structure and composition of the board as well as the other 
variables included in the CCI influence the selection of controls by the board to 
further reduce agency cost towards improved goal alignment. Board-level controls 
                                                 
71 The Hawthorn effect was first identified in a study that used an experimental design in an attempt 
to identify factors that influenced people’s productivity. The main finding of the study was the fact 
that people were studied, rather than the manipulated factors, influenced their productivity. This 
underlines the need to consider unexpected or new concepts when studying human behaviour. 
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include the separation of duties (section 4.3.2.1) to enable independent monitoring 
(section 4.3.2.2), the composition of the board in-terms of skills and diversity 
(section 4.3.2.3), board experience (section 4.3.2.4), and diligent monitoring 
(section 4.3.2.5).  
 
4.3.2.1 Separation of duties 
One of the specific monitoring roles of the board is the monitoring of the CEO 
by the chairperson of the board (chair). It is important to have a chair to “run board 
meetings and oversee the hiring, firing, evaluating and compensation of the CEO” 
(Jensen, 1994a:20; IoDSA, 2009b: Principle 2.16). However, this is bonded by the 
Companies Act requirements given the additional responsibilities allocated to 
shareholders (RSA, 2008a: sections 66-70). The differences between the roles and 
skills sets of the chairperson and the CEO are acknowledged by Carver 
(2007:1036), who explains that the duties of the CEO and chairperson are “two 
separate jobs requiring two sets of skills”. O'Sullivan and Diacon (1999:366-367) 
also note that it would be “difficult for an individual who serves both as chairman 
and CEO to perform these duties effectively”. The need for the roles to be fulfilled 
by separate people comes from the difference in skills set as well as the separation 
of duties for improved control. 
 
The above clearly highlights the need for a monitoring role by the chair and 
a chair that can direct or curtail the activities of the CEO when there is a need to 
respond to the existence of moral hazard. A dominant CEO will only become a 
problem when the company underperforms, and it becomes necessary to question 
the decisions of the CEO. This questioning is easier when there is a separation of 
the role of the CEO and the chair. However, there may be a time lag between poor 
results and the replacement of the CEO; for example, the CEO of General Motors 
(GM) was only replaced after two years of significant reported losses in the early 
1990s (Jensen, 1994a:17). In South Africa, it is more likely that the board would 
pressure the CEO to resign, or that the CEO would elect to resign. For example, the 
CEO of African Bank resigned after a lengthy term as CEO on a pending R7.3 
billion loss following on a substantial loss in the preceding period (Whitfield, 
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2014). The possible lagged impact between poor performance and action suggest 
that the effect of board-level controls could take time to take effect. After a number 
of years of publicly raised concerns Markus Jooste resigned as Steinhoff’s CEO 
only after the announcement of accounting irregularities (Crotty, 2017).  
 
The separation between the chairperson and the CEO puts the chairperson in 
a strong hierarchical position to act as a monitor and controller, using separation of 
duties to make it more difficult for the CEO to dominate the board. This separation 
of duties enables the chairperson to exercise control by ratifying and monitoring the 
decisions of the CEO, who is responsible for initiating and implementing the 
decisions and actions necessary to manage the assets of the company efficiently and 
effectively. This is in line with the recommendation to separate decisions from 
control as suggested by Fama and Jensen (1983b:304). McColgan (2001:18) states 
that the separation of the functions of the CEO and chairperson of the board adds a 
level of final board control and monitoring as the chairperson should be able to 
ensure that the CEO cannot dominate the board to force decisions.  
 
Governance guidelines recommend separation between the CEO and chair as 
a control and monitoring mechanism. The Cadbury (1992:21) report 
recommendations include the separation of the role of the chairperson and CEO, as 
does the guidance of the King code (IoDSA, 2009a: Principle 2.16). Separation 
between the CEO and chair (or a non-CEO duality) is the first variable of the CI 
index. As a “1” or “0” score is used for the CI index calculation, the definitions of 
the indicators only define scenarios applicable to the “1” score. A lack of qualifying 
for a “1” score is coded as “0”. 
 
CI1 = Separation between the roles of the CEO and chair.   
 
Tarus and Ayabei (2016:1073) found that CEO duality (where the chair is 
also the CEO) could encourage entrenchment and reduce leverage, which highlights 
the downside of CEO duality (where the role of the CEO and chair is performed by 
the same person). The relationship between the separation of the duties of the chair 
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and the CEO and firm value has not yet been clearly established in the literature 
(Tsipouri & Xanthakis, 2004:18). The diversity in prior findings is summarised in 
Table 4-8. 
 
Table 4-8 Separation between the CEO and chairperson of the board 
Findings References 
No relationship to firm value or performance. (Dalton et al., 1998:280) 
Combining the role of the CEO and chair has 
a positive relationship with firm value. 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991:56; 
Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 
2010:622) 
Combining the role of the CEO and chair has 
a negative relationship with firm value. 
(Ehikioya, 2009:239; 
Yammeesri & Herath, 
2010:290) 
Separating the roles of the CEO and the chair 
has a negative relationship with firm 
performance and no significant impact on firm 
value. 
(Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008) 
CEO duality is positively related to 
performance. 
(Wijethilake et al., 2015:263) 
 
4.3.2.2 Independent monitoring 
Given the fact that the chairperson’s role is also that of a monitor, it may be 
expected that the chairperson will also be an independent director. This general 
expectation is included in King III, which requires the board to elect an independent 
chair (IoDSA, 2009a: Principle 2.16). The focus on using independent directors 
stems from the fact that independent directors are considered to be a “hallmark of 
effective corporate governance” (Geletkanycz & Boyd, 2011:335).  
 
The monitoring role of the chair over the CEO is the highest monitoring role 
in a company and needs to be performed by an independent director to ensure there 
is no conflict of interest. The independence of the role of the chair is emphasised 
by the recommendations in King III that the “board should elect a chairman of the 
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board who is an independent non-executive director”, and in situations where the 
independence of the chair is questionable the board should appoint a lead 
independent director (IoDSA, 2009a: Principle 2.16). The use of an independent 
chair or a lead independent director emphasises the use of independence in 
monitoring. However, this level of independence can be costly as it requires the 
appointment of enough independent directors to comply with the independent 
monitoring needs and meet the associated costs.  
 
It is possible for a chair not to be independent when the chair represents a 
shareholder, in which case a lead independent director should be appointed. When 
a past CEO is appointed as the chair, the past CEO will only be considered to be 
independent after three years have elapsed since his or her resignation or retirement 
as CEO (IoDSA, 2009b: Principle 2.16). Thus, the independence of the chairperson 
of the board is the next indicator. 
 
CI2 = The existence of an independent chair or lead independent director.  
 
4.3.2.3 Board composition 
The percentage independent directors are included in the CCI. In addition, the 
demographics of directors are also important. B-BBEE encourages the appointment 
of people from previously disadvantaged communities to help redress past 
inequalities (Tangri & Southall, 2008:706).  
 
Prior studies have revealed various advantages and some mixed findings on 
using a more diverse board, especially when the board does not represent token 
diversification (Rhode & Packel, 2014:377). A South African study Swartz and 
Firer (2005:159-160) found a positive relationship between racial diversity and 
intellectual capital but not between female representation and intellectual capital. 
Bear, Rahman and Post (2010:207) found a positive relationship between women 
on boards and corporate social responsibility in a USA study, but did not test the 
relationship with performance or firm value. In a more recent South African study, 
Mans-Kemp and Viviers (2015a:392) found that the “percentage of female and 
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black directors of companies” on the JSE improved during “the research period”, 
with a “statistically significant positive relationship” between female and black 
directors and earnings per share, but found a “statistically significant negative 
relationship” with “total shareholder return”. Further advantages of using female 
directors were identified by Chen, Ni and Tong (2016:599), who found that female 
directors reduce performance volatility with R&D investments and lower the effect 
of R&D investment on the cost of debt.  
 
However, given the B-BBEE requirement for transformation, there is a risk 
that South African companies may appoint more diverse board members not to 
improve the overall effectiveness of the board but to comply with B-BBEE 
expectations. Table 4-9 summarises the recommendations of King III that influence 
board composition. 
 
Table 4-9 King III recommendations on board composition 
Recommendations Principles 
The board should comprise a balance of 
power, with a majority of non-executive 
directors. The majority of the non-executive 
directors should be independent. 
Principle 2.18 
A minimum of two executive directors, 
namely the CEO and CFO. 
Principle 2.18 para 73 
The board should have the collective 
knowledge, skills and experience to conduct 
the business of the company. 
Principle 2.18 para 70 
The board’s diversity and demographics 
should make it effective. Diversity includes 
academic qualifications, expertise, relevant 
industry knowledge, skills and experience. 
Principle 2.18 para 71 
(IoDSA, 2009b) 
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Using the above definitions of board diversity in King III, companies can 
indicate their compliance with the diversity requirement relatively easily by 
communicating the diversity of board members using their curricula vitae (cv’s). 
Other factors such as age, race and gender are also used in diversity studies as they 
are easily observable (Milliken & Martins, 1996:403-404). However, although age 
is generally disclosed, the gender and race of the board members must be coded 
using the information disclosed in the individual director’s cv.  
 
Board composition is reflected by the following CI indicators: 
CI3 = A balance of power requires a balance of power among the 
executive and other directors, where the majority of the board are 
independent directors. This is stricter than the recommendation of King 
III that there should be a majority of non-executive directors of whom a 
majority must be independent (IoDSA, 2009b: Principle 2.18). 
CI4 = Division of duties between the roles of the CEO and CFO through 
the requirement that a company should have separate people for the roles 
of the CEO and CFO. 
CI5 = Diverse knowledge and skills, where the board is required to have 
a variety of qualifications and skills, with at least one director for three 
different areas of expertise, such as financial expertise, legal expertise 
and industry expertise. 
CI6 = Varied experience on the board where age is a proxy for experience 
and there is an age gap of 25 years or more between the youngest and 
oldest director on the board. 
CI7 = A diverse board is a board that represents a mix between gender 
and race/ethnicity. A mix between gender and race requires at least two 
people from a different gender as well as at least two people from a 
different race to be members of the board. This is more stringent than the 
definition used by Ntim (2009:392), who defined ethnic diversity as at 
least one white and one non-white board member at the end of the year, 
and gender diversity as at least one male and one female director at the 
end of the year. 
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4.3.2.4 Experience 
The experience of executive directors is important to help direct the business 
of the company while the experience of independent directors is centred in their 
monitoring ability. The experience of executive directors could be proxied by their 
tenure as poorly performing executive directors are more likely to be pushed into 
resigning; it is, however also possible for long tenure to indicate entrenchment. The 
link between tenure of executive directors and firm performance is supported by 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2008), who found a positive relationship to RoA. Thus, the 
tenure of the CEO and the average tenure of executive directors are indicators that 
proxy for executive director experience. 
CI8 = CEO tenure equal to or above the median CEO tenure for the 
industry grouping. 
CI9 = the average executive director tenure equal to or above the median 
executive director tenure for the industry grouping. 
 
The experience of independent directors cannot be measured by their tenure 
as a longer term could threaten their level of independence or their perceived 
independence. To address the risk to their independence, independent directors 
retire after three-, six- or nine-year72 terms. As the effectiveness of the monitoring 
ability of independent directors can be dependent on their standing as directors, it 
is likely that a person who has already established a good reputation in the market 
as an effective and efficient director is a good candidate as an independent director. 
But it is also important for them to maintain an independent mindset which could 
be influenced by longer personal relationships forged by people working together 
over time. 
 
  
                                                 
72 As non-executive directors including independent directors rotate at a rate of a third of the 
members each year, the terms of non-executive directors including independent directors are 
generally measured in three-year cycles. 
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4.3.2.5 Board diligence 
The level of other directorships outside the company could impact on the 
board member’s diligence. Overall, there are two contrasting theories, the expertise 
theory (Li & Ang, 2000:17) which suggests that multiple board appointments 
indicate a capable skill set, and the overboardness or the busyness theory, which 
focuses on the lack of sufficient time, which influences the diligence of board 
members negatively (Falato, Kadyrzhanova & Lel, 2014:423). In support of the 
busyness theory, Zhang (2008:869) found that serving on too many boards can have 
a detrimental impact in accordance with the overboarded principle. Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker (1999:388) found that directors with three or more board 
positions are positively related to increased CEO’s remuneration, suggesting that 
busy directors might slack in their monitoring role. 
 
Falato et al. (2014:423) found that “independent director busyness is 
detrimental to” the quality of board monitoring. In contrast, the expertise theory 
indicates that multiple directorships are an indication of a director’s expertise. 
Kaiser (2013) notes that three or more board positions can be seen as evidence of 
the director’s effectiveness and abilities. Prior research produced mixed findings. 
Li and Ang (2000:17) found that the number of outside directorships is not related 
to lower merger premiums. Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003:1110) note that 
directors who attract multiple directorships are normally older and serve on larger 
boards in larger firms and found a positive relationship between the number of 
directorships and firm performance, indicating that expertise and not the limited 
available time is the major consideration. Kiel and Nicholson (2006:544) found no 
relationship between multiple directorships and firm performance, indicating that 
the debate on multiple directorships requires more in-depth research to evaluate 
how much value is added or eroded. Fich and Shivdasani (2007:317-318) found a 
substantial reduction in other board appointments for independent directors of 
companies where fraud prompted a lawsuit, indicating the adverse consequences of 
a damaged reputation. Too many other directorships can, however, be an indication 
of a free rider problem or entrenchment. Kim, Mauldin and Patro (2014:127) found 
217 
 
 
that it is possible to balance the demands of the monitoring and advisory role of 
independent directors as these roles can be complementary. 
 
It is possible that independent directors with too many other directorships 
might not have the time available to be effective monitors for all the companies 
where they are appointed. There is a risk that busy directors could become free 
riders, especially in the case of one person among a sizable group of independent 
directors. Given the smaller market and the need for independent directors a 
tendency developed in South Africa for independent directors to classify 
themselves as a “Director of Companies” to market their availability as 
independent directors. It is important for independent directors to only accept 
appointments for positions that they have the required the expertise and time for to 
ensure they can apply proper oversight. Wright (2012:1) summarised availability 
considerations, stating that one independent directorship normally requires between 
227 and 250 available hours a year, with some S&P companies placing limits of 
between 3 and 5 on multiple directorships. However, Li and Ang (2000:7) tested 
the influence of multiple directorships on monitoring and did not find any 
relationship between improved monitoring for people with fewer additional 
directorships. Directors are, however, bonded by the due care requirement in the 
Companies Act, under which delinquent directors can be held personally liable 
(RSA, 2008a: section 77). The strength of this bonding is evident from the recent 
legal action initiated by the liquidators of Pamodzi against the directors of Aurora 
to hold them personally liable for debts of about R1.5 billion owed to Pamodzi by 
Aurora (Stone, 2015), and a lawsuit against the directors of African Bank in their 
personal capacity by the BEE shareholders (Maake, 2016). 
 
In contrast, the holding of other directorships by executive directors can 
indicate slacking as this suggests that they are spending time away from the primary 
position as executive directors, especially since an executive director should not 
need to serve on other boards to bolster his or her experience. The acceptance of an 
independent director’s position by an executive director may be an indication of 
shirking or not paying enough attention to the management of the company where 
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an executive position is held. This highlights the negative impact of possible 
capacity constraints or limited available time (availability theory) as a result of 
other commitments.  
 
To ensure that shareholders appoint directors with enough capacity, King III 
recommends that the “other significant directorships of each board member” should 
be disclosed (IoDSA, 2009b:42). This disclosure requirement will help to reduce 
information asymmetry and help the shareholders and the nomination committee to 
evaluate possible capacity constraints of the proposed directors.  
 
The number of meetings held by board committees can be an indication of 
how actively or diligently they monitor the activities of the company. Wijethilake 
et al. (2015:262) found a positive relationship between the number of board 
meetings as an indicator of board activity and performance. Additional meetings 
should be scheduled in problem situations to ensure that they are appropriately 
resolved in a timely manner. It is possible that companies who are in difficulties 
would increase the number of meetings at board-level as well as at board committee 
level to help monitor and direct the company through its problem phase.  
 
Thus, the other directorships for executive and independent board members, 
the tenure of independent board members that could threaten their independence as 
well as the use of independent directors who classify themselves as a “Director of 
Companies” without listing the companies that could indicate a possible over 
commitment, are variables that form part of the CI. In addition, the number of 
meetings of the board and the number of meetings of the board committees serve 
as proxies for board diligence, and form part of the CI. 
 
CI10 = Companies without an executive director who holds an outside 
directorship that could erode the director’s diligence. 
CI11 = Companies without a majority of busy independent directors. 
Where a busy independent director holds three or more other 
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directorships (outside the group), and a busy board has a majority of busy 
independent directors. 
CI12 = Companies without an independent director who has served on 
the board for more than nine years. Although the experience of board 
members is important for independent directors, a long association with 
the company could have a negative influence on their objectivity and 
independence. King III recommends that any independent director who 
has served nine years or more should undergo a rigorous independence 
review (IoDSA, 2009a: recommended practice 2.18.18) to address the 
risk that the continued relationship with the company has negatively 
influenced the person’s independence. 
CI13 = Companies without an independent director who describes his or 
her position as a “Director of Companies” but does not disclose the 
number of outside companies he/she serves on as a director. Not 
disclosing the other directorships increases information asymmetry and 
is not in line with the disclosure recommendation of King III (IoDSA, 
2009b:42) 
CI14 = Companies where the number of board meetings is equal to or 
above the median of the industry grouping, which shows diligent board 
monitoring. 
CI15 = Companies where the sum of all the board committee meetings is 
equal to or above the median of the industry grouping, which shows 
diligent board committee monitoring. 
 
The increased demand for independent directors in South Africa has resulted 
in people developing their abilities as independent directors and accepting multiple 
directorships, requiring a balance between the additional knowledge and experience 
generated by the additional directorships and the time required to best serve the 
company. The next section deals with the types and composition of board 
committees as control indicators. 
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4.3.3 Board committee controls 
Companies generally make use of audit, risk, nomination and remuneration 
board committees to enhance their corporate control. In South Africa, the audit 
committee, which was discussed in section 4.2.3.4, has enhanced status as a 
statutory committee (RSA, 2008a: section 94), and form part of the QAS, a control 
variable. 
 
Another unique aspect in South Africa is the statutory requirement regarding 
a S&E committee (RSA, 2008a: section 72). In addition to the statutory committees, 
other board committees are recommended by King III. Principle 2.23, which states 
that the risk, remuneration and nomination committees should be appointed as 
standing committees (IoDSA, 2009b: paragraph 130). The composition of the board 
and board committees has been highlighted by the agency theory literature as one 
of several mechanisms that can be used to manage agency problems (Bathala & 
Rao, 1995:60). The level of independence of specific board committees is important 
to ensure that the committees can act as monitors of the activities of executive 
directors. King III recommends in Principle 2.23 that board committees “(excluding 
the risk committee) should have a majority of non-executive members of which the 
majority should be independent” under the leadership of an independent director as 
chairperson (IoDSA, 2009b: paragraph 131).  
 
The application of separation of duties to control and monitor executive 
directors as a control over the board committees, including the nomination, 
remuneration and S&E committee, rests with independent directors. A threat to the 
monitoring challenges faced by the independent board members exists when the 
CEO is able to influence the nomination process. This kind of influence over the 
nomination process may reduce the ability of the board members to be effective 
monitors for the shareholders, as their allegiance could be to the CEO who is able 
to influence their re-appointment. Walkling (2008:32) describes this problem as 
“even the outside directors basically see themselves as employees of the CEO”. To 
counter the controlling influence, it is important that the CEO is not a member of 
the nomination and remuneration committees and that these committees are staffed 
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by a majority of independent directors. However, executive directors are often 
invited to attend board committee meetings as attendees for improved transparency 
and to contribute where needed. Because of their superior knowledge of the 
operations of the company, executive directors could serve on the risk committee 
to assist with the identification of risks but should not dominate the committee 
(IoDSA, 2009b: Principle 2.23 par. 133). 
 
It is critical to the company and its shareholders that the nomination 
committee should be able to identify capable directors, whether for a position as an 
executive or independent director. It is important here that committee members 
should not be too busy with other commitments. The importance of independent 
directors is emphasised by Brick and Chidambaran (2010:544), who found that 
“firm value is adversely affected when the CEO is on the Nominating Committee”, 
warning against CEO-dominated appointments. However, Brown and Caylor 
(2006:429) found no association between firm value and independently staffed 
nomination or remuneration committees. Furthermore, in contrast to the call for 
more independence, Anderson and Bizjak (2003:1346) found that the “[p]ay mix, 
pay levels, and pay sensitivities are largely unrelated to committee independence”. 
In the corporate control construct, the fact that the nominations and remunerations 
committees exist and consist of a majority of independent directors should enable 
them to act as a moderating influence to encourage goal alignment. It is not clear 
from prior research what contribution, if any, this would make to firm value. The 
role of the remuneration committee is more complex, as it deals with control and 
labour aspects relating to all directors. The influence of the remuneration committee 
in directing board labour is dealt with in more detail in chapter 5. 
 
The S&E committee is a new requirement of the Companies Act (RSA, 
2008a: section 72) and mandates a focus on the monitoring of social and ethical 
matters by the board committee. The legislative requirement for the S&E committee 
bonds the choices of the board by requiring specific monitoring of social and ethical 
considerations. This additional monitoring could possibly distract the board from a 
focus on the efficiency of the operations of the company and could also make it 
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necessary to increase the size of the board to accommodate different skills. Given 
that the focus of this committee is not directly linked to financial performance 
because of its broader stakeholder focus, the existence of a S&E committee could 
have a detrimental impact on firm value. The bonding of the board to establish a 
S&E committee encourages the use of contracts to manage social and ethical issues 
in the firm, which could have a longer term positive influence on the value of the 
firm. However, it is also likely to result in increased expenses in the short term, 
which could detract from firm value. On a positive note, it could also result in 
increased monitoring, as Brick and Chidambaran (2010:539) have found that 
“starting a new committee is associated with an increase [in] the level of board 
monitoring”. A review of prior research identified one published academic article 
that focused on the S&E committee (Kloppers, 2013), but it used a corporate social 
responsibility perspective and did not consider the impact on firm value. 
 
The board can use different board committees to help oversee and control the 
business. As the audit committee is a statutory committee it is included under the 
control variables as part of the QAS variable. Control by the nomination and 
remuneration committee is included by examining the level of independence in the 
composition of the committees as a control to help ensure that capable directors are 
nominated for appointment and fair performance-based remuneration rewards the 
labour of executive directors. The risk and S&E committees focus on the continued 
sustainability of the business. All board committees should be able to operate 
independently and should therefore be chaired by independent directors, staffed 
with a majority of independent directors in line with King III (Principle 2.23 par. 
131) (IoDSA, 2009b).  
 
The key variables linked to the control functions of various board committees 
are listed below: 
 
CI16 = Nomination committee is staffed by a majority of independent 
directors. 
CI17 = Nomination committee is chaired by an independent director. 
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CI18 = Remuneration committee is staffed by a majority of independent 
directors. 
CI19 = Remuneration committee is chaired by an independent director 
who is not the chairman of the board, in line with Principle 2.16 par. 45 
(IoDSA, 2009b). 
CI20 = One of the members of the remuneration committee is also a 
member of the audit committee (to allow the remuneration committee 
insight into the actual reported performance of the company in their 
assessment of the fairness of executive director remuneration). 
CI21 = S&E committee is staffed by a majority of independent directors. 
CI22 = S&E committee is chaired by an independent director. 
CI23 = Risk committee is staffed by a mix of executive and non-executive 
directors with a majority of independent directors. 
CI24 = Risk committee is chaired by an independent director who is not 
the chairman of the board, in line with Principle 2.16 par. 45 (IoDSA, 
2009b) 
CI25 = Risk committee is separate from the audit committee, as the 
recommended composition of the two committees differ. 
 
4.3.4 Summary of control indicators for the CI index 
All monitoring methods are geared to limit the use of perquisites and shirking 
while encouraging the optimal investment of the company’s assets to maximise firm 
value. The maximisation of firm value benefits both the board, through continued 
employment as directors, and the shareholders, through profit attributable to the 
shareholders and increased value of their shares.  
 
In summary, monitoring methods that must be taken into consideration will 
depend on the board composition, board committee composition as well as 
company characteristics. Control systems rely on the use of independent directors 
as monitors on the board as well as any board committees linked to separation of 
duties, which is coupled in turn with oversight by independent chairpersons. The 
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duties of the chairperson must be separated from those of the CEO to allow the 
chairperson to counter the effect of a dominant CEO and monitor the CEO.  
 
The number and type of other directorships held by board members should be 
taken into consideration to ensure that they will have the time available to execute 
their duties with due care. In addition, the number of meetings at board as well as 
board committee level are included as a proxy for board diligence. The experience 
and diversity of the board members are considered together with the independence 
of monitoring directors in identifying the variables used to build the CI.  
 
The control indicators defined above form the CI index and are visually 
summarised in Figure 4-6, with a more detailed summary in Appendix 5. 
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Figure 4-6 CI index 
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4.4 Summarising corporate control  
 
The variables identified in this chapter focus on two broad areas, namely 
control variables (CV) and board-level control indicators incorporated in the CI 
index. The control variables are not directly linked to the research objectives or 
hypothesis but are used as control variables to enable the study to control for other 
factors that influences firm value to focus on identifying the relationship between 
CI and firm value. The board-level control indicators have been used to identify and 
define the indicators of the CI index. The development of the CI index enables this 
study to achieve SO 1. The development of the CI index is the main contribution 
and focus of this chapter as it is directly linked to SO 1 and SH 1. The analysis of 
the data from the CI index is dealt with in detail in chapter 7. 
 
SO 1 – to develop a CI index to measure the level of corporate 
control of the board.  
 
The development of the CI index assists the study to answer SO 1 and to test 
SH 1 (detail of the hypothesis testing is discussed in chapter 7). 
 
SH 1 – there is a positive relationship between the CI index that 
measure the level of the board’s corporate control and 
firm value. 
 
The next chapter, chapter 5, is a continuation of the literature review and 
focuses on managerial labour and the influence of the agency theory on controlling 
and directing the labour of the board. 
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CHAPTER 5: MANAGERIAL LABOUR CONSTRUCT 
 
“A leader's job is to look into the future and see the organization, not as it is, but as it should be.” 
Jack Welch 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 described the current relevance of the agency theory, the separation 
of ownership and control, causes of goal divergence and the development of agency 
theory in the context of cooperative production challenges. In the preceding chapter 
on corporate control the study focused on control variables and board-level controls 
in the CI index used to reduce goal divergence and agency cost. This chapter 
focuses on managerial labour that control and direct the boards’ labour towards goal 
alignment.  
 
The need for managerial labour control stems from the need to manage the 
maximisation of self-interest through slacking and excessive rent taking (Chalmers, 
Koh & Stapledon, 2006:260; Bussin & Blair, 2015:534) by controlling and 
directing the labour of the board in the different board roles towards goal alignment. 
Using control mechanisms to direct the activities or labour of the board towards 
improved enterprise for the company can help the board to manage their 
reputational risk as their labour reputation is linked to the success of the enterprise 
of the company and influences their future marketability and remuneration as board 
members (Adams et al., 2010:78).  
 
Managerial labour deals with controls that direct the labour of the board, 
using different controls to manage executive and non-executive (including 
independent73) directors as their labour roles differ. Executive directors’ role is to 
direct the enterprise of the company for improved performance, and the oversight 
role of non-executive directors focus on monitor the execution of the executive 
                                                 
73 References in this chapter to non-executive directors include independent directors. 
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directors to reduce slack and rent extraction and maximise firm value. These roles 
are graphically illustrated in Figure 5-1. 
 
Figure 5-1 Different board roles 
 
 
This chapter expands on the board’s managerial labour role to identify and 
define control indicators that can be used by the board to direct and control their 
labour in a manner that control agency cost and reduce goal divergence. The focus 
of this chapter is to identify and define the managerial labour indicators (MLI) that 
examines how the boards control and direct their labour by considering their ethical 
leadership, experience, performance and remuneration. The identification of control 
indicators enables the study to construct the MLI index to achieve SO 2.  
 
SO 2 – to develop a MLI index to measure the level of managerial 
labour of the board.  
 
Managerial labour
Executive directors
CEO
Direct the enterprise for 
improved firm value
Remuneration performanc-
based
Non-executive 
directors
Chairman
Oversight control slacking 
and rent extraction towards 
improved firm value
Remuneration role-based
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Developing an MLI index enables the study to identify the level of control 
and direction used by the board using the MLI index and enable the study to test 
SH 2. 
 
SH 2 – there is a positive relationship between the MLI index that 
measures the level of the board’s managerial labour and 
firm value. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: section 5.2 highlights 
the focus on ethical leadership in South Africa while section 5.3 introduces 
managerial labour. This is followed by section 5.4, which describes the methods 
used to direct managerial labour or board performance towards goal congruence 
and firm value maximisation. Section 5.4 identifies and defines the indicators used 
to construct the MLI index to encapsulate the role of managerial labour, ending with 
section 5.5 that summarises the MLI index within the context of managerial labour. 
 
5.2 Ethical leadership 
 
This study extends existing governance and board related studies by including 
ethical leadership. Ethical leadership is a cornerstone of South African governance 
and is especially important as honesty and integrity cannot be legislated (Rossouw 
et al., 2002:297; IoDSA, 2009b: Chapter 1; IoDSA, 2016:4). The link between 
enterprise and integrity has been part of the corporate governance foundations 
established in King I (IoDSA, 1994:24). Thus, a unique differentiation has been 
added by using an African ethical focus linked to ubuntu to differentiate the South 
African corporate governance model from the ‘Anglo-American model’ 
(Andreasson, 2011b:647). Although South Africa follows the ‘Anglo-American 
model’ in using a single board with a mixture of executive and non-executive 
directors, dominated by non-executive directors elected by the shareholders (Broni 
& Velentzas, 2012:65), the board is bonded to ethical leadership. Using an “African 
worldview” together with a focus on ethical leadership distinguishes the South 
African agency view by limiting the maximisation principle to operate within 
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ethical boundaries. Marx and Els (2009:7) note that the ethical role, or ‘tone at the 
top’, of directors is seen as critical in the overall environment of companies.  
 
From a legislative viewpoint, the board has a fiduciary duty to the company 
to protect its assets, including its reputation, emphasising the value of an ethical 
viewpoint to the shareholders. Non-ethical leadership could indicate that non-
compliance with social norms, regulations or even laws is acceptable. Non-
compliance could result in heavy fines as experienced by the construction industry 
after collusive tendering (Anonymous, 2013; Greve, 2013). Cho et al. (2013:82) 
found that shareholders value ethical leadership, which underlines the value of 
ethical leadership in goal alignment. The inclusion of ethical leadership in a study 
on the SRI companies is in line with the nature of the index as it integrates “ethical 
as well as environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) considerations” 
(Herringer et al., 2009:11). However, as the SRI index consist of large companies 
with division of duties between the shareholders and directors within the South 
African ubuntu world view, the maintenance of an ethical focus can be a valuable 
goal alignment tool, as information asymmetry is reduced. 
 
Initially there were four ethical pillars, namely “fairness, accountability, 
responsibility and transparency”, that helped to highlight the moral obligations of 
companies (Rossouw, 2002:407 & 410). Ethical leadership continued to evolve 
with the various governance updates and changed to “effective, responsible 
leadership” that is “characterised by the ethical values (or pillars) of responsibility, 
accountability, fairness and transparency” in King III (IoDSA, 2009b: Principle 
1.1). King IV further added integrity (highlighting honesty and moral principles) 
and competence (to act with due care, skill and diligence) (IoDSA, 2016: Principle 
1). Internationally the cost of unethical practices was recently highlighted in the 
demise of Bell Pottinger for following unethical public relations practices 
(Czarnecki, 2017) and by Cambridge Analytical for exposing private information 
collected via Facebook (Farivar, 2018). 
 
231 
 
 
This study used Leximancer, a content analysis program, to analyse the 
annual integrated reports of the companies over the period of the study in order to 
develop an ethical leadership disclosure score (ELDS). More detail on the 
construction of the ELDS is included in chapter 6 as part of the research 
methodology discussion. Thus, the first MLI indicator is ethical leadership. As a 
“1” or “0” score is used for the MLI index calculation, the definitions of the 
indicators discussed below only include scenarios applicable to the “1” score. 
 
MLI1 = Ethical leadership as represented by ELDS that is scored as “1” 
when the ELDS result are equal to or above the median ELDS score for 
the industry grouping.  
 
The median is used as a midpoint to differentiate between high-performance 
and low-performance groups as the median is a better representative of the midpoint 
than the mean. The ELDS is not contrasted with variables used in prior studies as 
prior studies linked to ethics followed a more conceptual narrative format 
(Rossouw, 2002; Rossouw, 2005; Rossouw, 2009; West, 2009). The next section 
focuses on how the labour of the board is directed and controlled to maximise the 
enterprise or business of the companies. 
 
5.3 Directing board labour 
 
Managerial labour focuses on directing the enterprise of a company by 
evaluating and rewarding the labour of the board in a manner that aligns their 
interests with the interests of the shareholders to minimise agency cost within the 
South African context. Ntim et al. (2017:1) note that it is important to consider 
monitoring and incentives for goal alignment in directing labour. Various controls 
can be used to direct the labour of the board in a manner that reduces agency cost. 
This should, however, be done in a way that uses ethical leadership to encourage 
sustainable growth in a company by focusing on monitoring long-term value 
creation, to comply with South African governance recommendations (Zahra, 
1996:1715; IoDSA, 2016:4).  
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The remainder of this chapter focuses on directing and controlling the labour 
of the board by aligning the interests of the board with those of the shareholders 
through an examination of the required expertise and performance of the board 
along with the use of remuneration and performance linked incentive contracts. 
Although optimal contracts are not possible, contracting can make a contribution to 
goal alignment (Haron & Akhtaruddin, 2013:23). Anderson and Bizjak (2003:1324) 
explain that remuneration contracts are fundamental to “attracting and maintaining” 
high quality board members while encouraging goal alignment. Goal alignment 
considerations are important as the board’s “objectives and risk preferences may” 
differ from the views of shareholders (Lai et al., 2017:191). The causes of goal 
divergence (discussed in section 3.3.4) should be taken into consideration in the 
development of incentives to ensure that labour alignment is achieved for the whole 
board. Prior South African studies, however, did not comprehensively consider the 
control and direction indicators that can influence the labour of the board. These 
studies are summarised below in Table 5-1. 
 
Table 5-1 Summary of South African studies  
Authors Sample size and study 
period 
Main finding 
Scholtz and 
Smit (2012) 
64 companies on the 
AltX from 2003-2010. 
There is a strong relationship 
between executive remuneration 
and total assets, turnover and share 
price. 
Scholtz and 
Engelbrecht 
(2015) 
70 of the Top-100 
companies between 
2009 and 2012. 
Institutional shareholders monitor 
share options but not bonuses, with 
increased directors’ remuneration 
with higher director’s shareholding, 
while non-executive directors 
reduce the total directors’ 
remuneration. 
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Table 5-1 Summary of South African studies on the board controlling labour 
– continued 
Authors Sample size and study 
period 
Main finding 
Bussin (2015) Review of South African 
research context before, 
during and after the global 
financial crisis of 2008 
against various theoretical 
backgrounds. 
The agent and optimal contract 
theory were found to be 
dominant in strong economic 
periods and managerial power 
and behavioural aspects more 
dominant in weak economic 
periods. 
Bussin and 
Blair (2015) 
Considered 11 financial 
performance indicators 
linked to CEO 
remuneration in different 
industries in South Africa. 
254 listed companies, in 5 
industries from 2008 to 
2012. 
CEO remuneration is driven by 
profit and different industries 
have various other metrics such 
as fixed assets and capital 
employed in capital and fixed 
asset-intensive industries. 
Viviers (2015) Focused on executive 
remuneration concerns 
raised by activists or 
institutional investors in 
JSE listed companies for 
2013. 
Voting to support executive 
director remuneration attracted 
the most opposition. 
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Table 5-1 Summary of South African studies on the board controlling labour 
– continued 
Authors Sample size and study 
period 
Main finding 
Ntim et al. 
(2017) 
169 non-financial firms 
over a ten-year period, with 
executive director and CEO 
pay between 2003 and 2012 
with financial and 
corporate governance data 
from 2002 to 2011. 
Pay for performance sensitivity 
(PPS) is higher with more 
reputable, founding and 
shareholding CEOs, increased 
director ownership and 
independent nomination and 
remuneration committees, but 
lower in firms with larger boards, 
powerful and long-tenured 
CEOs. 
 
5.3.1 Introduction to board labour 
Managerial labour focuses on board labour within the different board roles, 
board expertise, and remuneration aligned to the different roles to reduce self-
interested behaviour towards goal congruence. Boivie, Lange, McDonald and 
Westphal (2011:551) state that “governance theorists have given considerable 
attention to the role of governance mechanisms in externally controlling executive 
self-serving behavior”, thereby emphasising the need to control for goal divergence. 
In a Malaysian study Ya’acob (2016:309) found a positive relationship between 
CEO duality, acquisitions or mergers and compensation, highlighting the risk of 
self-serving behaviour. Walsh and Seward (1990:422) describe the challenges 
caused by self-interest as follows: the “compelling issue, [is] how to mitigate this 
temptation in order to preserve the beneficial aspects of the separation of ownership 
and control” to improve firm value. This study focuses on the internal direction and 
control of the board’s labour towards goal alignment. 
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Some of the causes of goal divergence stem from moral hazards such as 
information asymmetry, where the board members have access to better 
information than the shareholders and use their advance knowledge for personal 
benefit. Legislation protects shareholders as the board are bonded by the outlawing 
of insider trading (RSA, 2004). The board could focus on achieving short-term 
objectives to maximise their performance bonus, but this is also controlled by the 
Companies Act which requires directors not to engage in reckless trading but to act 
with due care (RSA, 2008a: sections 22 & 76). Recently, the courts held directors 
of a company personally liable for claims that could amount to R1.7 billion based 
on reckless trading (Crowley, 2015). To an extent the Companies Act also reduces 
the goal divergence risks by bonding the self-interested behaviour of the directors 
by requiring them to act in the best interests of the company (RSA, 2008a: sections 
77 & 78).  
 
Executive directors can make investments that entrench them, resulting in 
higher remuneration and increased consumption of perquisites for the directors, 
highlighting the need to address goal divergence (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989:137; Lai 
et al., 2017:191). The monitoring ability of non-executive directors could help to 
reduce information asymmetry by monitoring returns on investments to ensure 
quality reported earnings. This might not always be the case as in a South African 
study on the AltX companies Smit (2015:69) found no relationship between an 
increase in non-executive directors and quality reported earnings. Excessive use of 
perquisites can be a risk in situations where a company has a powerful CEO 
(Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, 2002:845; Chalmers et al., 2006:261). Walsh and 
Seward (1990:421) describe goal divergence, stating that the goals of shareholders 
are “to earn the maximum profit compatible with a reasonable degree of risk”, “to 
distribute those profits generously and equitably among the owners” and “to 
maintain market conditions that are favourable to the investor” while the goals of 
the board could be influenced by “prestige, power, or the gratification of 
professional zeal”, enhancing the risk of “featherbedding”, a moral hazard.  
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The diligence or effort with which board members engage in their duties to 
prevent free loading or slacking (moral hazards) is another matter that is important 
to assess, although it is difficult for outsiders to observe this with accuracy. The risk 
of featherbedding (excessive use of perquisites) can also be reduced by the labour 
market as poor, prior performance caused by featherbedding or rent extraction (the 
extraction of additional compensation) could distract from the future marketability 
of the labour of the directors. The reputations of directors as specialist managers 
are linked to the performance of the companies they manage, which in itself 
encourages directors to align their goals to reduce the agency problem. However, 
as the board links their personal labour reputation to that of the company their 
personal risk increases and as a consequence they could expect increased rewards 
in the form of higher remuneration or increased utility to compensate for the 
increased risk (Jensen & Smith, 1985:8). The increased liability stemming from 
changes in the Companies Act could possibly result in upward pressure of the 
remuneration of directors. 
 
Growing the company by investing resources that optimise a director’s 
personal strengths can lead to entrenchment, higher wages and excessive extraction 
of perks (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989:137). In such a case there is a risk that “there is 
a disconnect between company performance and the nature of performance 
incentives” (Viviers, 2015:2). As a local example one could cite Markus Jooste, 
whose remuneration over the last three years was R286m amid claims of “shady 
overseas deals” and accounting irregularities that led to his resignation when the 
auditors refused to sign off on the 2017 financial statements and the share price 
went into free fall, losing around 90% (Rose, 2017).  
 
It is difficult at the time of investment to discern the expert decision driving 
the investment and classify that investment as risk averse or innovation driven as it 
is possible for talented executive directors to grow the company in a manner that 
optimises their talents as well as the long-term sustainability of the company. Salas 
(2010:656) recommends identifying entrenched executive directors as people who 
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extract “higher wages and larger perquisites” but cautions that entrenchment is 
difficult to identify.  
 
Just as it is difficult to detect the expert decision behind an investment, it is 
equally difficult to determine expertise. Using age and/or tenure as proxies for 
expertise can identify successful executive directors who are retained in their 
positions by the shareholders for their expertise or suggest entrenchment. Salas 
(2010:657) found that a “combination of tenure and poor performance” can be a 
useful “proxy for entrenchment”. Thus, an entrenchment symptom could be an 
underperforming company that pays a premium to the executive directors which 
can be observed by the shareholders over time. The shareholders can reduce this 
risk through remuneration contracts. Haron and Akhtaruddin (2013:18) explain that 
appropriate remuneration contracts can encourage goal congruence without 
allowing excessive remuneration.  
 
The board might also prefer to invest internally generated resources and 
possibly not pay dividends as a growth strategy. Funding growth from retained 
earnings (internally generated funds) is a less risky strategy than using loans. 
However, growth in firm size without an associated link to increased performance 
could signal maximisation of executive director self-interest. Chalmers et al. 
(2006:268) highlighted the difficulty of assessing the fairness of CEO 
compensation as they found that “the only significant economic determinant of 
CEO compensation” was firm size, which underlines the fact that bigger firms pay 
more. Maintaining remuneration practices that are fair and reasonable as required 
by King III in Principle 2.25 in given the skill shortage remains a challenge (IoDSA, 
2009a). The wage gap between the remuneration of the CEO and entrance level 
employees continues to attract wide criticism in South Africa (Bronkhorst, 2014). 
 
The preceding discussion highlights some of the complexity of the board’s 
labour as any assessment of the actions of executive directors could result in 
contrasting interpretations. Long tenures could signal either expertise or 
entrenchment, while withholding dividends could indicate internally funded growth 
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through an inspirational new investment or risk aversion and possible 
entrenchment.  
 
Goal divergence risks can be addressed through using managerial labour by 
evaluating performance and using remuneration incentives that align the self-
interest of the board with that of the shareholders. The influence of separation of 
ownership and control, where the shareholders use specialist managers (the board) 
to manage the company on their behalf, and the challenges of managing labour in 
team production are described in more detail in sections 5.3.1.1 to 5.3.1.2 below. 
 
5.3.1.1 Specialist managers  
The advantage of separation of ownership and control is that the owners can 
use specialist managers to man the board. While the whole board directs the 
company through strategic objectives, the executive directors are the main 
directional drivers while the non-executive directors are more involved as monitors 
who control the direction so that it is in line with company strategy. Shareholders 
appoint executive directors to manage the business of the company as they tend 
either to lack the necessary management skills or, possibly, do not have the time to 
properly evaluate or perform the actions of the board. Crutchley and Hansen 
(1989:37) state that diverse shareholders manage their risk though a balanced 
portfolio and use the expertise of the board as specialist managers to manage the 
company. Shareholders therefore prefer to use the advantages of managerial labour 
as a specialisation by appointing specialists to contribute to and oversee the 
company’s enterprise or business. The main challenge is that a board of directors 
consists of individuals who have to monitor and direct a company as a team. The 
challenges of team production are discussed in the next section. 
 
5.3.1.2 Team production 
The use of specialist managers, such as the board of directors, to direct and 
manage a company results in the need to manage and assess team production. 
However, in cooperative or team production, it is difficult to measure the 
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contribution of individual members, as the outcomes achieved are the product of 
the performance of the whole team. To address the need to manage team production, 
monitoring can be used as a control to help achieve goal alignment (Nilakant & 
Rao, 1994:650). Kaufman and Englander (2005:13) emphasise the challenge of 
monitoring and evaluating as “the contributions of individual board members to the 
performance and value of the company” due to “a lack of detailed information on 
the productivity of individual members” makes it problematic “to differentiate 
between the labours of individual team members”. The use of agreements or 
contracts to manage information asymmetry linked to team production is also a 
challenge. Blair and Stout (1999:250) state that the use of contracts to “prevent 
shirking and rent-seeking by defining individual team members' duties and rewards 
through explicit contracts can be impossibly difficult”. 
 
The board uses continuous internal monitoring by the non-executive directors 
to discourage slacking and the excessive use of perquisites to encourage effective 
performance. Fama (1980:289) views the firm “as a team whose members act from 
self-interest but realise their destinies depend to some extent on the survival of the 
team in its competition with other teams”. Increased internal monitoring reduces 
the human capital risk of the board, leading to positive signals to the labour market 
about the performance of the board. Positive signals could maximize the future 
earning potential of the board members. The protection of future earnings 
encourages board members to use monitoring to ensure quality team performance 
as the whole board’s future earning opportunities are influenced by the current 
performance of the company. Ferris et al. (2003:1109) found that previous board 
positions influence future offers of directorships. 
 
Monitoring is, however, only a valuable method when there is a clear 
understanding of the responsibilities of the board members and of the way 
responsibilities are aligned by means of contracts to achieve goal congruence. 
Contracts are a popular method of managing goal divergence, as they help to 
manage team production towards agreed-upon goals. The use of contracts can guide 
behaviour through pay-for-performance contracts that guide individual 
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performance towards improved firm performance and value. Although all directors 
contribute towards monitoring the direction and strategy of the company, it is 
generally the remuneration of executive directors that is strongly linked to the 
performance of the company through variable and performance-aligned pay such 
as performance bonuses and share-based incentives, including delayed and 
conditional requirements to link performance to long-term shareholder objectives.  
 
Unfortunately, it is difficult for outsiders to measure individual contributions 
to team performance, and this could result in free-riding within the team. The 
management of free-riding is not the only challenge; it is equally difficult to manage 
the opposite, namely the enhancement of the enterprise through the identification 
of further investments or innovation, in order to identify the actual contribution of 
individual directors. There is a risk that executive directors could use diversified 
investments by the company to reduce their risk; however, the monitoring of non-
executive directors counteracts this risk by serving as an encouragement to invest 
only in projects that further the company’s enterprise (Lai et al., 2017:192). 
 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972:783) suggested that the central party who 
arranges remuneration contracts should also be a residual claimant, which would 
offer a solution to help achieve goal congruence. To enable the board to control its 
labour as a whole, there is a split between the initiation and implementation of 
decisions and the ratification and monitoring of those decisions (Fama & Jensen, 
1983b:302). To accomplish this, the board members need to split their labour into 
different roles, which are described in the next section.  
  
5.3.2 Roles of executive versus non-executive directors 
Directors fall into two groups, namely executive directors and non-executive 
directors. Executive directors initiate and implement decisions, and non-executive 
directors ratify and monitor those decisions. Non-executive directors are usually 
further divided into non-executive or grey directors who have a closer relationship 
with the company, either as representatives of shareholders, former employees or 
persons who have business relations with the company, and independent directors, 
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who are independent of the company, its shareholders, enterprise and the executive 
directors. In this chapter, the study only refers to non-executive directors although 
the reference include independent directors, given their oversight or monitoring role 
for the sake of consistency.74 The roles, expertise and performance of non-executive 
and executive directors are influenced by the different roles they play on the board 
and should be considered in the evaluation of their labour and in the determination 
of their remuneration. It is therefore important to consider the different roles of the 
board in terms of monitoring and directing performance and in the determination of 
board remuneration, in order to reduce the agency problem by guiding the labour 
of the board.  
 
Although the board uses its specialist knowledge to establish strategy and 
enhance firm performance, the different roles of board members influence their 
labour contribution and the management of their labour. While the whole board 
contributes to the direction and strategy of the company, the executive directors are 
responsible for the execution of the direction and strategy, and the non-executive 
directors are responsible for monitoring the actions of the executive directors to 
ensure that improved firm performance and value are achieved. These different 
roles are reflected in Figure 5-2 below. 
 
Figure 5-2 Directors’ roles 
 
 
                                                 
74 References to non-executive directors made in the managerial labour chapter and context include 
independent directors who are also non-executive directors as the roles of all non-executive directors 
(including independent directors) are to provide oversight as a control over the labour of executive 
directors. 
Board of directors
Contribute to the 
firm's direction 
and strategy
Executive 
directors
Execute the 
direction and 
strategy
Non-executive 
(including 
independent) 
directors
Monitor the 
execution of the 
direction and 
strategy
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Irrespective of the individual roles of board members, it is important that they 
actively participate as board members. Bradley (2004:9) explains that the inability 
or unwillingness of non-executive directors to “devote the appropriate time to their 
positions” is a risk. Slackness by non-executive directors could indicate a free rider 
problem where a non-executive director assume other directors or shareholders will 
perform the monitoring role, thereby reducing the level of monitoring over 
executive directors. The value of active and assiduous boards is supported by the 
finding that “monitoring by the entire board leads to increased firm value” (Brick 
& Chidambaran, 2010:551). The above discussion illustrates that it is important to 
direct the labour of the board in a manner that optimises the enterprise of the firm 
and encourages an active and diligent board. A more detailed discussion on the 
different roles of executive and non-executive directors is found in sections 5.3.2.1 
and 5.3.2.2. 
 
5.3.2.1 The role of non-executive directors 
The different board-level roles (executive versus non-executive) have led to 
an additional layer of separation of duties by separating the decision management 
(the initiation and implementation of decisions) performed by executive managers 
from the control of decisions through ratification and monitoring performed by non-
executive directors as specialist monitors (Fama & Jensen, 1983b:304; Bathala & 
Rao, 1995:59-60). The split between oversight and implementation extends to the 
role of the chairperson over the CEO, to control against entrenched or controlling 
CEOs. 
 
As the role of non-executive directors focuses on monitoring the execution 
and direction of the company’s strategy, including the monitoring of the reward 
system of executive directors, non-executive directors should be motivated by 
means of a different mechanism from the one used for executive directors. It is 
critical that non-executive directors retain their ability to act as objective monitors, 
indicating that their remuneration should not be influenced by the performance of 
the company, which could negatively influence their ability to act objectively as 
independent monitors. King III extended the independence requirements to help 
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ensure that the monitoring role remains undiluted through the use of independent 
directors (IoDSA, 2009a: Principles 2.16 & 12.18). This is in line with the finding 
by Brick and Chidambaran (2010:551) that non-executive directors will be more 
objective if they are independent. Independence is defined in King III as “the 
absence of undue influence and bias which can be affected by the intensity of the 
relationship between the director and the company” (IoDSA, 2009b:236). Fama 
(1980:293-294) explains that the market is a motivator for the maintenance of 
objectivity and independence as the opportunity wage of the non-executive director 
is dependent on the market view of the effectiveness of his or her ability to act as a 
monitor or referee. 
 
To enhance the independence of the non-executive directors, King III 
recommends that their remuneration consist only of a fixed fee and a meeting 
attendance fee (IoDSA, 2009a: recommended practice 2.25.24). This excludes any 
performance-based link that could negatively influence the objectivity or 
independence of non-executive directors.  
 
As non-executive directors will be remunerated in a different manner, they 
also need to undergo some form of performance evaluation. This could include peer 
monitoring by other board members as part of the individual’s and the board’s 
performance evaluation as well as tracking meeting attendance. King III 
recommends annual “evaluations of the board, its committees and the individual 
directors” (IoDSA, 2009b: Principle 2.22). However, the ultimate control is the 
labour market and its use of past performance as a basis for decisions on future 
board positions. Ferris et al. (2003:1109) found that good “firm performance has a 
positive effect on the number of board seats subsequently held by a director”. 
Performance management of the board is discussed in more detail in section 5.4.2, 
and board remuneration to achieve goal alignment is discussed in section 5.4.3. 
 
5.3.2.2 The role of executive directors 
The role of executive directors focuses on establishing a strategy and 
direction to guide the business activities of the firm and ensure the strategy is 
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implemented in a way that enhances firm performance and value. As with non-
executive directors, their labour or performance needs to be evaluated, including 
meeting attendance and performance evaluation. To encourage high performance, 
the remuneration contracts of executive directors should be linked to firm 
performance and value. Bebchuk and Fried (2005:4-6) caution that arms-length 
contracting might be difficult in the case of a powerful CEO. Executive 
remuneration could be contingent on a pre-set future outcome to encourage a longer 
term focus on performance. Delaying a portion of the compensation of executive 
directors is a method that can be used to encourage longer term performance and 
address time horizon risks.  
 
The OECD (2009:10) highlights the importance of linking remuneration and 
incentive practices to the long-term interest of the company and shareholders. 
King III recommends the use of remuneration practices for executive directors that 
create value for the company over the long-term (IoDSA 2009b:96). However, in 
contrast, Donaldson and Davis (1991:56) found that long-term compensation did 
not result in higher returns on equity. A popular mechanism used to achieve delayed 
compensation is to use share option grants that can only be exercised after a specific 
period if pre-set performance criteria have been maintained. Anderson and Muslu 
(2010:27) found that for CEOs to realise their delayed remuneration they must 
deliver in excess of the market expectation and/or stay with the company for a long 
period of time, indicating that delayed remuneration can have a favourable 
influence over a longer period. However, as executives control the exercise of their 
stock options, once vested, they could be motivated to report inflated results or 
suppress bad news to maximise the option value (Bebchuk & Fried, 2005:5). It is 
possible for shareholders to fire a CEO or executive director due to poor 
performance. However, in South Africa the board members are more likely to 
pressure the CEO to resign after poor performance, as evidenced by the resignation 
of CEOs of underperforming companies like African Bank, PPC and Steinhoff 
(Hedley & Derby, 2014; Ziady, 2015; Bowker, 2017). 
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The different roles of executive and non-executive directors can be used to 
help address the agency theory problem and achieve goal congruence. Although the 
focus of this chapter is on the different roles of the executive and non-executive 
directors, the direction of the company is linked to the CEO while the chair has a 
stronger duty to oversee the actions of the CEO. The control methods that are 
available to use to achieve goal congruence are discussed in the following section. 
 
5.4 Board labour factors  
 
The methods used to manage labour centre on a combination of incentives 
and monitoring and take into consideration the expertise, performance and 
remuneration of the board in a manner that maximises firm performance and value. 
These methods are discussed in more detail in sections 5.4.1 to 5.4.3. 
 
5.4.1 Board expertise 
The appointment of specialist managers is influenced by the required 
expertise and performance needed for the respective roles, whether as non-
executive (including independent) or as executive directors. The use of the different 
board roles results in a further level of labour specialisation for directors by 
differentiating between the activities and duties of executive directors and those of 
non-executive directors. A further level of specialisation can be an advantage. 
Smith (1776/2003:16-17) indicates that increased specialisation through division of 
labour should result in improvements as labour specialists continuously improve 
their work.  
 
The special expertise of specialist managers is not easily identifiable as it is 
not linked to specific qualifications; it is more dependent on talent, prior success 
and experience at board-level. As expertise is not easily observable, the age and 
tenure of the director can be used as proxies for expertise. 
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5.4.1.1 Executive directors’ tenure and age 
Tenure and age are used to proxy for expertise of executive directors, because 
specialist managers tend to gain experience over time. Fields et al. (2012:1540) 
found that companies with “more directors who have served for more than 15 years 
(those with greater experience) borrow more cheaply”, highlighting the value of 
experience to the enterprise of the company. Thus, executive directors could be 
retained because of their superior performance over time (Ayogu, 2001:8). In a 
South African study Millson and Ward (2005:81) found that private equity investors 
preferred experienced managers. Age is seen as a proxy for experience as Kang, 
Cheng and Gray (2007:201 & 204) note that the experience of older directors might 
be more desirable than the new ideas of a younger generation as more than 80% of 
the directors were older than 50 years. In addition, Salas (2010:665) found that older 
executives perform better on average than their younger counterparts.  
 
The time served as an executive director, or tenure, can be an indication of 
expertise, for executive directors are likely to be removed by the shareholders after 
persistent poor performance, indicating that executives with long tenures have 
performed at satisfactory levels. Remuneration practices that use conditional 
delayed incentives encourage a longer tenure and continued satisfactory 
performance. Anderson and Muslu (2010:18) found that longer CEO tenure led to 
greater opportunity to exercise option grants, thereby rendering some support for 
the use of years served as executive director as a suitable proxy for expertise.  
 
As a “1” or “0” score is used for the MLI index calculation, the definitions of 
the indicators discussed below only apply to scenarios applicable to the “1” score. 
The indicators identified as proxies for the expertise of executive directors are their 
age and tenure. This study also examines the age and tenure of the CEO separately 
as the main accountable and responsible board member or leader. 
 
MLI2 = Executive experience is represented by multiplying the age and 
tenure of executive directors and averaging the result per company to 
obtain an average executive expertise score. Companies with high 
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average executive expertise are companies with an average expertise 
score equal to or above the median for the industry group. 
 
MLI3 = CEO expertise is represented by multiplying the age and tenure 
of the CEO to obtain a CEO expertise score. Companies with high CEO 
expertise are companies where the CEO expertise score is equal to or 
above the median for the industry group. 
 
It is possible that an executive director may be underperforming and may then 
be encouraged by the rest of the board to resign as a mechanism to protect their 
labour reputation and encourage board labour towards the maximisation of firm 
value. Even where an executive director retires, the incoming executive might need 
some time to adapt. Thus, companies without any change in the incumbents of 
executive directors’ posts would have a more continuous and stable direction to 
control the labour of executive directors.  
 
MLI4 = Companies without a change in the incumbents of executive 
directors’ posts during the year have a more stable and controlled labour 
direction.  
 
The indicators linked to expertise include executive experience represented 
by multiplying the age and tenure of executive directors to obtain an executive 
director expertise score that is averaged per company and compared to the industry 
grouping median to identify companies with high expertise. CEO experience is 
represented by multiplying the CEO age and tenure to obtain a CEO expertise score. 
The CEO expertise is also compared to the median score for the industry group to 
identify CEOs with more expertise. Lastly, a change in an executive position during 
the year represents a disruptor to the control and direction of executive labour.  
 
Prior South African research on executive director expertise, age and tenure 
is limited (Ntim et al., 2017). Ntim et al. (2017:18) considered the age and tenure 
of the CEO but not those of the other executive directors. They found the pay 
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performance sensitivity “lower in firms with larger boards, more powerful and 
long-tenured CEOs” (Ntim et al., 2017:1), suggesting that in South Africa tenure is 
linked to entrenchment and not expertise, which is in line with the findings of 
Correa and Lel (2016:500)75. Balafas and Florackis (2014:103 & 112) did not take 
CEO age into account but found a positive association between CEO tenure and 
RoA. Serfling (2014:251 & 256) found that older CEOs tend to generate positive 
risk-adjusted returns, have longer tenure and more performance-sensitive 
compensation, supporting the link between age and tenure as proxies for 
experience, as used in this study. Fedaseyeu, Linck and Wagner (2018:824) 
examined individual director characteristics in relation to remuneration and found 
that increased age and tenure are associated with increased remuneration. 
 
5.4.1.2 Non-executives’ ages 
As non-executive directors are also responsible for monitoring the executive 
directors in an independent manner, their tenure is not considered because a long-
term relationship could be viewed as a threat to their independence. The need to 
retain shorter tenure periods for monitoring board members is highlighted by Tarus 
and Ayabei (2016:1073), who make the point that entrenched boards could serve 
the CEO, thereby adding to goal divergence. Non-executive directors who are also 
independent are required to maintain a level of independence from the business 
activities, shareholders and executive directors of the company, which could limit 
their tenure.  
 
King III requires that a third of the non-executive directors retire annually, 
and that the independence of independent directors should be evaluated by the 
chairman (IoDSA, 2009b:77-78).76 As with executive directors, the age of non-
                                                 
75 Correra and Lel (2016) had similar findings but their study focused on executive director 
remuneration and tenure in multiple other countries 
76 The requirement that a third of the non-executive directors must retire annually should not be seen 
as a takeover protection measure as its aim is to allow for renewal and diversity on the board without 
losing tacit knowledge and to help ensure objectivity and independence of the monitoring board 
members as a long-term relationship could negatively influence their independence. Negotiating 
with institutional investors is a more practical option in South Africa as they have the expertise to 
evaluate a takeover option and since 2014 they have tended to disclose their preferences in the media 
(Mantshantsha, 2014). 
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executive and independent directors can proxy for their expertise, as experience is 
gained over time. However, being too old to be a diligent monitor can be a risk, as 
illustrated by Core et al. (1999:388), who found that independent directors over 69 
years are positively related to increased CEO’s remuneration. 
 
The indicator identified as a proxy for expertise of non-executive directors is 
age including the age of the chair, given the oversight role over the CEO. 
 
MLI5 = Companies where the average non-executive directors’ age is 
equal to or above the median of the average non-executive directors’ age 
for the industry group. 
 
MLI6 = Companies where the age of the chair is equal to or above the 
median for the industry group. 
 
The qualifications, tenure and age of the board members are readily 
observable and can be used as proxies for directors’ expertise. Unfortunately, actual 
expertise or talent is not easily observable, and it is important for the board to 
establish performance requirements for the board members that take the different 
roles on the board into account and can be used to help align board performance to 
firm performance and value. 
 
5.4.2 Performance 
The market for labour also plays a role because the market has an influence 
on the cost of obtaining managerial services or the cost of appointing a replacement 
manager, depending on the level of market competition. An oversupply of specialist 
managers can make it unnecessary for shareholders to share rents with the 
managers, whereas a shortage can result in the need to pay a premium to attract 
suitable specialist managers. Therefore, it is important that the remuneration 
contracts are monitored and that all factors influencing the specialist labour in the 
company are taken into account, including the actual performance of the board, the 
individual board members and the company. Performance monitoring is important 
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as the labour market is not a compensating control for directors close to retirement. 
In support of this, Weisbach (1988:438) found that the market-adjusted returns were 
lower in the four quarters before a CEO retires.  
 
Remuneration contracts with the board do, however, need to be monitored in 
order to be an effective goal alignment mechanism, using methods such as meeting 
attendance and performance evaluations. Fama (1980:294) highlights the 
importance of the board as an internal monitor in the description of the board as a 
“market-induced institution, the ultimate interior monitor of the set of contracts 
called a firm, whose most important role is to scrutinize the highest decision makers 
of the firm”. The ultimate level of such monitoring is via a performance appraisal 
where the results will influence the bonus and share-based incentive allocation for 
executive directors and can be used to evaluate the suitability of reappointing non-
executive directors. 
 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996:377-378) say that the labour market can be a 
motivating factor for managers because the performance of their company 
influences their reputation as managers in the labour market, thereby indicating that 
the past performance of directors influences their future employability and 
remuneration as specialist managers. Anderson and Muslu (2010:18) note that 
CEOs of companies with low stock returns realise 60% of their nominal pay, 
whereas CEOs of companies with high stock returns realise 110% of their nominal 
pay, indicating that poor performance has a detrimental influence on directors’ 
remuneration. To ensure adequate performance it is important for the board to 
evaluate the performance of the board as a whole as well as the performance of the 
individual directors, given the context of the performance of the company. It is 
essential for the board to evaluate and reward or penalise performance (O'Sullivan 
& Diacon, 1999:366). To evaluate board and board committee performance, this 
study focuses on using board and board committee level performance evaluations 
or appraisals as well as the frequency of meeting attendance as a proxy for 
diligence. 
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5.4.2.1 Performance evaluations 
One of the challenges is that the board is also a team and it is more difficult 
to monitor the actual contribution of the individual team members, making it more 
likely that some individuals on the team will use perquisites, shirk or become 
freeloaders. Alchian and Demsetz (1972:780) sum up this problem as follows: 
“costs must be incurred to monitor each other, each input owner will have more 
incentive to shirk when he works as part of a team, than if his performance could 
be monitored easily or if he did not work as part of a team”. Any remuneration 
structure should therefore be supported by a performance evaluation to ensure 
compliance with the requirements in the remuneration contract. In support of this, 
in principle 2.22 King III recommends an annual performance evaluation of the 
board, the board committees and individual board members including the chairman 
(IoDSA, 2009b:44).  
 
A board-level performance evaluation is a critical mechanism as outsiders 
cannot readily observe the labour of the board. Ayogu (2001:8) states that 
companies pay extra “rent” when the remuneration of executive directors or CEOs 
is above market average as their expertise is critical but not easily observable. 
Monitoring via board evaluations would be preferable to high remuneration levels 
to help ensure that the team production of executive directors, non-executive 
directors as well as the whole board enable the reduction of agency cost. 
 
The challenge of evaluating team performance can be overcome by using 
more detailed and specific key performance areas for individual board members 
linked to annual performance evaluations. These should encourage the development 
of the enterprise of the company to improve monitoring and reduce the chances of 
shirking and featherbedding. The value of using monitoring and evaluation to 
ensure proper performance is highlighted by McColgan (2001:16), who notes that 
directors who are considered to be poor performers are more likely to lose their 
jobs, indicating that over time the performance of directors is taken into 
consideration in their re-appointment by the shareholders. 
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King III recommends an annual evaluation of the board, its committees and 
the individual directors (IoDSA, 2009a: recommended practice 2.33). The 
evaluation of the labour of directors through a performance evaluation is a method 
of addressing the problem of managing labour in a team production situation and 
can strengthen the control of the individual labour contracts applicable to each 
board member. This evaluation results in performance appraisals that form a key 
variable in managing goal divergence when used in association with remuneration 
contracts. Fama (1980:296) highlights evaluations as a key mechanism for 
managing shirking and the excessive use of perquisites. It is, however, important 
for monitors who are involved in the board evaluation to have the necessary 
expertise and incentives to be proper monitors and evaluators of managerial actions. 
They need to have sufficient standing and credibility in the business environment 
for the results of their monitoring and evaluations to be accepted and valued. The 
use of evaluations can help to ensure that high performance is acknowledged and 
rewarded, and steps are taken to correct poor performance. McColgan (2001:5) 
emphasises that “monitors must have the necessary expertise and incentives to fully 
monitor management, in addition such monitors must provide a credible threat to 
management’s control of the company”. The performance assessment of non-
executive and independent directors could influence their re-election to the board 
in situations where non-executive board members retire in three-year cycles. The 
existence of an annual performance evaluation for the board and its members is the 
identified variable that monitors board performance to ensure goal alignment and 
maximise firm performance and value.  
 
MLI7 = The existence of an annual performance evaluation for the board 
and its members.  
 
The board delegates a number of important responsibilities to board 
committees such as the risk, nomination, remuneration and S&E committee. 
Performance evaluations of the work performed by board committees should 
therefore be carried out to give the board assurance that the delegated duties have 
been performed in an acceptable manner. This illustrates the importance of the 
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evaluation of the work of board committees in line with the recommendation of an 
annual performance evaluation for board committees in principle 2.22 of King III 
(IoDSA, 2009b:44).  
 
MLI8 = The existence of an annual performance evaluation for the risk, 
nomination, remuneration and S&E committees (board committees).  
 
5.4.2.2 Meeting attendance 
A more objective mechanism for measuring active participation by the board 
members is meeting attendance. Brick and Chidambaran (2010:533) found that 
“board activity has a positive impact on firm value”. In addition, Brown and Caylor 
(2006:430) found that when all directors attend at least 75% of the meetings this 
has a positive influence on firm value.  
 
Meeting attendance can be used as an indication of actively involved directors 
but the mere fact that somebody attended a meeting is not in itself an indication of 
the level or value of the contribution made by that person in the meeting. The 
opposite is true, however, as non-attendance is an indication of inactivity or 
shirking. As it is not possible for non-board members to observe effort, tracking 
meeting attendance is used as a proxy for effort. Kiel and Nicholson (2006:544) 
consider attendance to be a “superficial indication of effort”, and it should thus be 
considered together with the board evaluation. Attendance of meetings is not 
sufficient evidence of the contribution of a director, thus payments for mere 
attendance by itself are unlikely to help reduce the agency problem. Some South 
African companies compensate for this by using a fixed annual remuneration 
(Woolworths Holdings Limited, 2012:83) or penalising non-attendance (WBHO, 
2012:83). In a South African study Ntim and Oseit (2011:97) used the natural log 
of the number of board meetings and found a statistically significant and positive 
association with performance. 
 
Attendance is a measure of level of activity or effort, although it is not 
possible to observe the quality of the engagement in the meeting. It is, however, 
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important to be part of a meeting in order to be able to contribute to the decisions 
made in the meeting. 
MLI9 = Companies where the average attendance of board meetings is 
equal to or above the median for the industry group. 
 
To get a comprehensive view of the diligence of the board it is also important 
to consider meeting attendance for board committees. Meeting attendance for the 
risk, nomination, remuneration and S&E committees helps to create a more 
comprehensive view of board diligence to complement the board-level meeting 
attendance.  
MLI10 = Companies where the average attendance of the risk committee 
meetings is equal to or above the median for the industry group. 
 
MLI11 = Companies where the average attendance of the nomination 
committee meetings is equal to or above the median for the industry 
group. 
 
MLI12 = Companies where the average attendance of the remuneration 
committee meetings is equal to or above the median for the industry 
group. 
 
MLI13 = Companies where the average attendance of the S&E committee 
meetings is equal to or above the median for the industry group. 
 
5.4.2.2 Performance summation 
Fama (1980:291-292) notes that “managers of a firm rent a substantial lump 
of wealth – their human capital – to the firm, and the rental rates for their human 
capital signalled by the managerial labour market are likely to depend on the 
success or failure of the firm”. The market unfortunately does not distinguish 
between the identity of the different team members when the human capital of the 
board is linked to the performance of the firm. This situation could result in 
encouraging some directors to become free riders in circumstances where it is 
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difficult to distinguish between the different levels of contribution of individual 
directors to team performance, and ultimately, the performance and value of the 
company. It could also encourage younger board members who are still building 
their reputation as specialist managers to be more effective monitors of their fellow 
board members. Abbott et al. (2007:808) found that serving on audit committees 
can enhance the reputational capital of independent directors but it can also result 
in reputational damage if financial misstatements occur. The link between prior 
firm performance and the future employment of directors is summed up in Figure 
5-3. 
 
Figure 5-3 Link between prior firm performance and directors’ employment 
 
 
The methods used to remunerate the different types of directors in a manner 
that helps to address the agency problem are discussed in section 5.4.3.  
 
5.4.3 Remuneration 
The link between performance and remuneration is supported by Fama 
(1980:292), who found that the labour market uses the “previous associations of a 
manager with success and failure” to judge current worth. The managerial labour 
market is a double-edged sword, as it also allows future directors to judge the 
suitability of working in companies by their ability to appropriately reward 
directors. Directors’ remuneration has increased dramatically over the last decade 
(Sengupta & Zhang, 2015:1084) and is often a controversial topic (Scholtz, 
2009:59). Curtailing excessive executive director or CEO remuneration is 
especially important in South Africa, given its developmental stage, the level of 
unemployment and the large wage gap. The “growing wage gap” and the negative 
publicity it attracts tend to result in “stakeholder discontent” (Viviers, 2015:2). 
Good firm performance results in increased future 
employment and higher remuneration 
opportunities.
Poor firm performance results in increased 
appointment of independent directors and the 
replacement of executive directors.
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Remuneration levels that are viewed by society as excessive attract negative press 
(Scholtz & Engelbrecht, 2015:22); that highlights the wage gap between the lowest 
and highest paid people in a company (Holmes, 2014), and could negatively 
influence the company’s reputational risk.  
 
Ayogu (2001:8) challenges using huge executive remuneration packages as a 
motivational tool for running the company well as this practice could encourage 
moral hazard at the executive director level that increases agency cost and might 
not be aligned to an appropriate goal congruence measure. A number of prior 
studies focused on the relationship between director pay and performance 
(Abdullah, 2006; Lee, 2009; Bussin, 2015; Bussin & Nel, 2015); however, this 
chapter focuses on how the board directs labour, using the MLI to answer SO 2. 
 
Goal alignment can be improved through remuneration contracts or executive 
directors’ shareholding (Abor & Biekpe, 2006:59). The use of equity-based 
remuneration for executive directors as a key incentive towards goal alignment is 
already well established in South Africa (Malherbe & Segal, 2001:4; Millson & 
Ward, 2005:81). However, as the roles of executive and independent directors are 
different, their respective remuneration contracts need to take their different roles 
into account to ensure appropriate goal alignment. In principle 2.25 paragraph 155 
and principle 2.27 paragraph 186, King III requires shareholders to approve both 
the remuneration of non-executive directors and the remuneration policy that guides 
the remuneration of executive directors (IoDSA, 2009b). In addition, the 
Companies Act requires in section 66 that directors’ remuneration, for their duties 
as directors, be pre-approved by the shareholders via a special resolution (RSA, 
2008a). Thus, the broader South African regulatory environment adds a further 
level of oversight to curtail unfair or excessive remuneration practices and in this 
process considers the different roles, as non-executive directors should not receive 
share-based remuneration or other incentive rewards (paragraph 154) (IoDSA, 
2009b: principle 2.25). 
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MLI14 = Companies that apply different remuneration practices in line 
with King III for executive versus non-executive directors given their 
different roles. 
 
5.4.3.1 Remuneration committees 
The remuneration committee is responsible for establishing a remuneration 
policy and developing contracts suitable for managing the direction of the labour of 
the board members. Scholtz and Engelbrecht (2015:28) state that the remuneration 
committee performs a critical role in that they control the quality of remuneration-
related information to ensure that the remuneration practices result in sustainable 
business decisions. The differentiation in remuneration policies and practices based 
on the different roles of directors is supported by governance requirements that 
encourage the use of fixed remuneration for independent directors (section 5.4.3.2) 
with performance bonuses and share-based compensation used for executive 
directors, linked to conditional pay (section 5.4.3.3), to encourage sustainable 
improvement in firm performance (IoDSA, 2009a: recommended practice 2.25). 
The control responsibility of the remuneration committee is included in the CI in 
chapter 4. 
 
Remuneration policies should differentiate between a fixed fee for non-
executive directors, to maintain their independence from the operations, and a base 
fee, plus various performance-based incentives that could include delayed 
conditional incentives. The use of share options to encourage the board to improve 
the enterprise of the business through increased firm-level risk has been found to 
be effective irrespective of the roles of the board members (Deutsch, Keil & 
Laamanen, 2011:213). The ability of executive directors to add value is the reason 
why the shareholders are prepared to use pay-for-performance mechanisms.  
 
Care should, however, be taken to ensure that the pay-for-performance 
mechanisms do in fact encourage the long-term sustainability of the firm. There is 
a risk that directors’ remuneration could encourage short-term profit-seeking, 
which can be detrimental to the long-term sustainability of the firm (time horizon 
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problem). Pay linked to performance measures is broader than share options, and 
executive compensation contracts tend to consider “both accounting-based and 
stock-price-based measures of performance” (Bushman & Indjejikian, 1993:3). The 
OECD notes that the inability of companies to align the rewards systems to the 
long-term interests of the company and its shareholders was a contributing factor 
to the 2008 global financial crisis (OECD, 2009:10). King III recommends in 
principle 2.25 that remuneration for executive directors should include a base pay 
and performance element consistent with the long-term objectives of the company 
that includes a share-based and long-term incentive component (IoDSA, 2009b). 
 
MLI15 = Companies where the remuneration of executive directors 
consists of a fixed and variable component taking multiple periods into 
account often centres on short- medium- and long-term incentive 
considerations. 
 
The mechanisms used by the remuneration committee to align the goals of 
the executive and non-executive directors are discussed in sections 5.4.3.1 - 5.4.3.3. 
 
5.4.3.1 Remuneration linked to performance 
There are various methods available for managing the labour of directors, 
including monitoring and evaluating their performance. The latter can be 
accomplished through the use of a remuneration policy that is then used to establish 
performance contracts with the board members on the basis of annual performance 
appraisals. The common use of pay-for-performance incentives focuses on 
rewarding the labour of executive directors to help align their interest in the 
management and directing of the company with the interests of the shareholders 
and relies on the monitoring role of independent directors to ensure effective 
management.  
 
The current practice of using independent directors with fixed remuneration 
to control the performance-linked pay of executive directors is in contrast to the 
recommendation of Alchian and Demsetz (1972:783), who advise that the party that 
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arranges remuneration contracts should also be a residual claimant or should benefit 
in a manner similar to the shareholders. King III tries to address this aspect by 
recommending that shareholders should approve the remuneration policy (IoDSA, 
2009a: recommended practice 2.27). A practice supported by the Companies Act, 
section 66 (8) and (9), requires directors’ remuneration “for services as a director” 
to be pre-approved by shareholders via a special resolution, reducing the risk of 
excessive directors’ remuneration (RSA, 2008a). However, where shares are widely 
held by inactive shareholders, the shareholders are likely to approve directors’ 
remuneration in the absence of poor firm performance. The various methods that 
can be used to encourage optimal board-level performance for the different board 
roles are discussed in more detail in sections 5.4.3.2 and 5.4.3.3. 
 
5.4.3.2 Remuneration for non-executive directors 
To ensure that their ability to act as unbiased monitors is not compromised, 
remuneration for non-executive directors should be fixed and should not contain 
share-based incentives or other performance-based incentives. The remuneration 
contracts with independent directors need to take into account their role as monitors 
and be in line with the recommendations of King III (IoDSA, 2009a: recommended 
practice 2.25), which recommends a fixed level of remuneration with a fee for 
meeting attendance, with no performance-based incentives.77  
 
The following indicators (MLI16 to MLI18) represent the use of remuneration 
for non-executive directors to help achieve goal alignment in order to improve firm 
performance and value.  
MLI16 = Non-executive directors do not receive a performance-based 
incentive.  
 
                                                 
77 Meeting attendance fees are not viewed as a performance-based incentive. A performance-based 
incentive must be linked in some form to the performance of the company.  
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MLI17 = Companies with an average total remuneration paid to non-
executive directors (in Rand)78 that is equal to or above the median for 
the industry group.   
 
Rajgopal et al. (2012:119) note that it is only more recently that studies started 
to consider the role of individuals in board remuneration. Given the enhanced 
oversight role of the chairman of the board, the remuneration paid to the chair, who 
has additional agenda-setting and oversight responsibilities, is considered 
separately. 
 
MLI18 = Companies where the total remuneration paid to the chairman 
of the board (in Rand) is equal to or above the median for the industry 
group. 
 
5.4.3.3 Remuneration for executive directors 
The remuneration contract for executive directors should focus on pay-for-
performance mechanisms that can be used to guide the actions of the executive 
directors to maximise firm value through improved firm performance in the long-
term (IoDSA, 2009a: principle 2.25). Wibowo and Evans (2009:96) recommend the 
use of incentive systems to align divergent interest. A considerable body of prior 
research on executive director remuneration focuses on indicators that influence 
CEO remuneration as the dependent variable (Haron & Akhtaruddin, 2013:29; 
Deschenes et al., 2015:68; Scholtz & Engelbrecht, 2015:39). However, focusing on 
remuneration as a dependent variable does not show the influence of remuneration 
as a labour mechanism on firm value. The use of incentives enables the board to 
reduce monitoring costs by bonding their actions through limitations in their 
employment and remuneration contracts that align the determination of their 
remuneration to their performance as managers and direction givers in the company 
                                                 
78 Where applicable, the value of directors’ remuneration was converted to Rand, using the average 
exchange rate on the year-end date of the specific company, or the disclosed average rate disclosed 
by the company. 
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in a manner that considers the performance of the company over the short-, 
medium- and long-term. 
 
Bonus mechanisms that can be used to encourage the board to maximise 
shareholder value need not take the form of cash; they can consist of shares, share 
options, and delayed share options where the bonus is delayed, thereby ensuring 
that the higher levels of performance are sustainable over a number of years. A 
conditional performance bonus of this kind can help to protect against time horizon 
problems by postponing the bonus to a later date, depending on a continued level 
of company performance. However, delayed performance measures are not always 
effective. Anderson and Muslu (2010:27) found that only 19% of the CEOs were 
able to “realise compensation that equalled or exceeded their nominal pay” and 
“only when they delivered long-term performance” or “when they stayed with the 
company for long periods (8 years or longer versus 4.4 years for the CEO 
population)”. Thus, a conditional remuneration component might not be a sufficient 
motivator in situations where the turnover in executive director positions is fairly 
high.  
 
The use of share-based incentives as part of the directors’ remuneration 
contracts is in line with the recommendation by Alchian and Demsetz (1972). It is 
also supported by Tsipouri and Xanthakis (2004:16), who recommend the use of 
long-term incentive contracts, using share ownership and share options to align the 
interests of the board with those of the shareholders as the providers of finance as a 
suitable solution to the agency problem. Using share options to encourage all 
directors to improve firm value through increased risk taking has been found to be 
an effective incentive mechanism (Deutsch et al., 2011).  
 
The remuneration indicators used to help align the interests of executive 
board members with those of shareholders include a multi-tier structure starting 
with base pay, supplemented with various incentives, including a performance 
bonus, and a conditional delayed share-based compensation that is geared towards 
encouraging improved firm value for the short-, medium- and long-term. Executive 
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director remuneration has been widely studied, with a number of prior studies 
considering total or gross directors’ remuneration which includes base pay, 
bonuses, allocated shares or exercised share options (Scholtz & Smit, 2012; Scholtz 
& Engelbrecht, 2015; Ntim et al., 2017). Ntim et al. (2017:36) found a small 
positive pay-to-performance link, with improved pay-to-performance in firms with 
a committed CEO and strong governance. Scholtz and Engelbrecht (2015:44) found 
that institutional shareholders, director shareholdings, the number of non-executive 
directors on the remuneration committee and company size helped to explain gross 
directors’ remuneration. Scholtz and Smit (2012:35) found a strong relationship 
between executive director remuneration, total assets, turnover and share price in a 
study on AltX companies. Although these studies contributed to the broader body 
of knowledge linked to executive director remuneration, they focused on earlier 
regulatory periods and did not comprehensively consider the various options 
influencing the labour of the board. 
 
The following indicators, which form part of the MLI, represent the use of 
remuneration for executive directors to achieve goal alignment in order to improve 
firm performance and value.   
 
MLI19 = Companies where the average total (gross) remuneration
79 paid 
to executive directors (in Rand) is equal to or above the median for the 
industry group.  
 
MLI20 = Companies where the total remuneration paid to the CEO (in 
Rand), is equal to or above the median for the industry group.  
 
MLI21 = Companies where the average percentage total pay as a 
percentage of the average base pay for executive directors is equal to or 
above the median for the industry group. 
 
                                                 
79 Total remuneration consists of base pay that includes benefit contributions, bonuses received, and 
share options exercised. 
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MLI22 = The existence of a share-based incentive for executive directors. 
 
MLI23 = The existence of remuneration for executive directors that is 
conditionally delayed for more than two years.  
 
Thus, the remuneration indicators for non-executive directors should be fixed, 
with no performance-related component that could cloud their monitoring ability 
while executive directors should receive performance-linked remuneration, starting 
with a base salary, which is extended with bonuses and share-based performance-
linked rewards that include share-based and conditional incentives.  
 
From the above descriptions, the most critical methods used to achieve goal 
alignment include the use of a remuneration committee linked to the evaluation of 
effort expended to help develop contracts suited to the different roles played by 
directors, influenced by their effort to align the goals of the board with those of the 
shareholders and improve firm performance and value. 
 
Table 5-2 Variable elements linked to director remuneration 
Variable elements References 
Natural log of CEO remuneration, 
including contributions, performance 
bonuses, granted shares and exercised 
options. 
(Ntim et al., 2017:18) 
Natural log of total executive director 
remuneration, including contributions, 
performance bonuses, granted shares 
and exercised options divided by the 
number of executive directors. 
(Scholtz & Engelbrecht, 2015:36; 
Ntim et al., 2017:18) 
Total cash remuneration, which 
includes base pay, benefits and 
bonuses. 
(Scholtz & Smit, 2012:32) 
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Several specific indicators have been identified that can be used in the 
managerial labour construct to enable goal alignment; more detail on how they 
interact in MLI is supplied in section 5.5.  
 
5.5 Summarising managerial labour 
 
Managerial labour starts by grounding the board’s labour in ethical leadership 
using the ELDS. Thereafter the study deals with the labour of the board, focusing 
on evaluating the directors’ expertise, performance and remuneration to help 
achieve goal alignment between the board and the shareholders. A review of the 
literature points to numerous indicators that can be used to guide the labour of the 
board, considering the different roles applicable to the board, as summarised in 
Table 5-3. 
 
Table 5-3 Different board roles 
Type of 
director 
Non-executive, including 
independent directors 
Executive directors 
Duty of the 
type of 
director 
 Contribute to the firm's direction 
and strategy 
 Monitor the execution of the 
direction and strategy 
 Contribute to the firm's direction and 
strategy 
 Execute the direction and strategy 
 
After the ELDS the next section focused on the expertise of the board 
considering the age of all directors and the tenure of the executive directors. This 
was followed by a focus on board performance. Even though the board members 
have different roles, they still need to direct the company as a team. High-
performing team production is only possible if all the directors are actively engaged, 
which led to the identification of meeting attendance as an indicator, supported by 
performance evaluations, to assess the contribution of the individual board 
members and the board as whole, as well as for board committees. Lastly this 
chapter focused on using remuneration contracts linked to the different roles to help 
achieve goal alignment. In this section, the remuneration of the different roles is 
strongly aligned to expectations of the directors’ roles. Non-executive (including 
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independent) directors are the main monitors of team production and, as such, their 
remuneration should be a fixed fee, plus a meeting attendance fee, with no 
component of their remuneration linked to the performance of the company. In 
contrast, the remuneration of executive directors should be linked to the 
performance of the company including performance bonuses, conditional delayed 
components and share-based options to promote a long-term performance focus.  
 
The indicators identified in this chapter (summarised in Figure 5-4 below) 
have been linked to the directional role of the board and identified and defined 23 
board-level control indicators to help construct MLI index. The development of the 
MLI index enables this study to achieve SO 2. The development of the MLI index 
is the main contribution and focus of this chapter as it is directly linked to SO 2 and 
SH 2. The analysis of the data from index is dealt with in detail in chapter 7. 
 
SO 2 – – to develop a MLI index to measure the level of managerial 
labour of the board.  
 
The development of the MLI index assists the study to answer SO 2 and to 
test SH 2 (detail of the hypothesis testing is discussed in chapter 7). 
 
SH 2 – there is a positive relationship between the MLI index that 
measures the level of the board’s managerial labour and 
firm value. 
 
The next chapter describes the research methodology used by the study to 
achieve the research objectives and test the hypotheses. 
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Figure 5-4 MLI Index 
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CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
“Research is to see what everybody else has seen, and to think what nobody else has thought” 
Albert Szent-Gyorgyi 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 defined the two indexes (CI and MLI) used by the study to 
capture the controlling and directional role of the board as a governance 
mechanism. This chapter discusses the research approach, design and methods 
(research methodology) used to achieve the purpose of the study. Ryan, Scapens 
and Theobald (2003:1) describe research as a “process of intellectual discovery, 
which has the potential to transform our knowledge and understanding of the world 
around us”. The research methodology describes the process followed in this study 
by unpacking the research methods, design and approach used to achieve the 
research objective and purpose.  
 
This study uses an agency theory perspective as a lens in assessing the 
relationship between the board as a governance mechanism and firm value within 
the context of a changed legislative environment in South Africa. Agency theory is 
a mid-range theory that is well established in helping to explain the relationship 
between agents (the board) and principals (shareholders). Bryman and Bell (2015:4) 
position mid-range theories between grand theories and empirical findings as they 
help to “understand and explain a limited aspect of social life”. This study focuses 
on the relationship between the board as a governance mechanism (CI and MLI) 
and firm value.  
 
As the study centres on an improved understanding of the relationship 
between the board as a governance mechanism and firm value, the thesis is 
presented using a descriptive format. Dudovskiy (2013:36) describes descriptive 
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research as research “conducted to describe specific elements, causes, or 
phenomena in the research area”, in contrast to causal research, which focuses on 
“cause-and-effect relationships”. Causation is not the focus of the study. In 
addition, causation in complex systems may be multi-directional; for example, poor 
past performance could encourage increased future controls to direct the company 
in a more profitable manner or vice versa, whereas strong prior performance 
increases the available assets and cash, thereby increasing the temptation to slack 
or misuse resources (as the company is doing well) with consequent poorer future 
performance.80 
 
The deconstruction of the purpose of this study into the research objective 
(RO) and sub-objectives (SO) is summarised in Figure 6-1. The research processes 
used were conducted in line with the ethical research protocols of the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal. The approval is included in Appendix 1. 
 
Figure 6-1 Research purpose and objectives 
 
 
                                                 
80 The causality or multi-directional relationship between the dependent and independent variables 
could possibly be assessed by means of simultaneous equation modelling and is an area for future 
study. Simultaneous equation modelling was not used in this study as there is a possible time lag in 
the relationship and the focus is on the relationship not causality. 
The main research objective (RO) of this study is to assess the relationship between 
the board as a governance mechanism (CI and MLI) and firm value.
The board as a governance mechanism controls and directs the activities and labour 
of the board using corporate control and managerial labour.
SO 1 – to develop a CI index to measure the 
level of corporate control of the board
SO 2 – to develop a MLI index to measure the 
level of managerial labour of the board
The purpose of this study is to address the knowledge gap with respect to the 
relationship between board as a governance mechanism (CI and MLI) and 
firm value,
in the changed legislative environment of 
the 2008 Companies Act,
using an agency theory lens.
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The study began with a literature review to describe the unique South African 
context (chapter 2), followed by a discussion of the historical development of 
agency theory supplemented by highlighting the current relevance to the South 
African context (chapter 3) to establish agency theory as the lens used in the study. 
The process used to identify the indicators for the CI and MLI indexes as well as 
their definitions and related hypotheses are discussed in detail in chapters 4 and 5.  
 
The discussion of the two indexes identifies the indicators for the indexes and 
suggests a hypothesis for each index. The identification and definition of the 
indicators for the CI and MLI indexes, discussed in chapters 4 and 5, form the basis 
for the index construction and analysis used in this study to address the research 
objective, sub-objectives and related hypotheses. This chapter focuses on the 
research approach, design and methods used to achieve the research purpose. 
 
The next section discusses the research objectives and hypotheses (section 
6.2). This is followed by a discussion of the research approach, world view and 
design which underpin the study (section 6.3), with a discussion on the methods 
used to test the hypotheses in section 6.4. Section 6.5 describes the research phases 
used in the study, followed by a discussion of the sampling considerations (section 
6.6). Lastly the steps used in the data collection and analysis are discussed in section 
6.7, while the methodology followed is summarised in section 6.8. The results of 
the analysis and interpretation are discussed in chapter 7.81 
 
6.2 Research objectives and hypotheses 
 
The purpose of this study equates to the main research objective (RO), namely 
to assess the relationship between the board as a governance mechanism (CI and 
MLI), and firm value. For this analysis the study regards board governance 
mechanisms as the controls used by the board to control and direct its activities and 
                                                 
81 Different textbooks use different terminology to describe the research process. For example, the 
research approach used in the thesis might be referred to as research methodology and the research 
design as research strategy in some textbooks.  
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labour using corporate control and managerial labour as represented by the CI and 
MLI indexes. Thus, the board as a governance mechanism = CI + MLI. The purpose 
and main research objective can be expressed as hypothesis 1 (H 1).82 
H 1: There is a positive relationship between the board as a 
governance mechanism (CI and MLI) and firm value.  
 
This study argues that there is a positive relationship between increased 
corporate controls that help to reduce agency cost, along with increased managerial 
labour that controls and directs the labour of the board to reduce agency cost, and 
firm value. The positive association with firm value is linked to the use of 
monitoring and bonding to reduce agency cost. For example, improved monitoring 
and bonding using oversight, separation of duties and performance-based incentives 
can reduce inefficiencies, wastage, slacking, and rent extraction resulting in an 
increase in firm value.  
 
As there is an expected positive relationship between the board as a 
governance mechanism and firm value, the same relationship is expected to extend 
to the corporate control and managerial labour indexes. Their accompanying sub-
objectives (SO) and sub-hypotheses (SH) are summarised in Table 6-1: 
 
Table 6-1 Sub-objectives and sub-hypotheses 
Corporate control Managerial labour 
SO 1 – To develop a CI index to 
measure the level of corporate control 
of the board 
SO 2 – To develop a MLI index to 
measure the level of managerial labour 
of the board 
SH 1 – There is a positive 
relationship between the CI 
index that measures the level of 
the board’s corporate control and 
firm value 
SH 2 – There is a positive 
relationship between the MLI 
index that measures the level of 
the board’s managerial labour and 
firm value.  
 
                                                 
82 A hypothesis is a testable speculative statement delineating the relations between all of the 
elements in a theory” (Page & Meyer, 2003:23). 
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The positive relationship between corporate control and firm value stems 
from a reduction in agency cost through improved control over wastage (excessive 
use of perquisites) and slacking. The positive relationship between managerial 
labour and firm value stems from a reduction in agency cost through improved goal 
alignment between the remuneration of the different roles of the board and 
oversight resulting in reduced rent extraction and wastage. Wherever variables in a 
putative relationship can be quantified, it is possible to use statistical methods such 
as correlation and regression analysis to test the relationships (more information on 
the research methods used is given in sections 6.4 and 6.7).  
 
By way of introduction the research phases in the empirical section of the 
study are briefly described here, followed by a more detailed discussion of the 
research approach, design and methods used in the study. The study uses four 
phases to achieve the RO. Phase 1 focuses on defining and collecting the data for 
the four firm value proxies extracting the data from IRESS a well-known South 
African database. Phase 2 defines the data required for the control variables (CV) 
and the indicators needed to construct the indexes for the independent variables 
(discussed in detail in chapters 4 and 5). Where the CV data was available in IRESS 
the relevant data was extracted from the database. The remaining data needed were 
extracted using a structured content analysis in phase 3. Phase 3 extracts and 
summarises the required data to populate the remaining control variables and the 
CI and MLI indexes (as independent variables) to achieve SO 1 and SO 2. The 
content analysis was guided by using a spreadsheet template structured to collect 
and summarise all the required indicator data. A structured content analysis was 
necessary as the required data was not readily available in a database. Phase 4 
performs the statistical and econometric estimations to test the hypotheses, enabling 
the study to achieve the research objectives. To achieve the main RO the 
relationship between the board as a governance mechanism (CI and MLI) and firm 
value is assessed with the aid of the following model, which tests H 1: 
Firm valueit = α0 + β1BLOCKit + β2CONSHAit + β3DIRSHAit + 
β4QASit + β5INDit + β6CCIit + β7CIit + β8MLIit +εit 
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(α0 = intersect; i = the boards of a companies (1-84); t = number of time 
periods (1-3); β = beta, the coefficient or slope of the variable; ε = error 
term; the six control variables (BLOCK, CONSHA, DIRSHA, QAS, 
IND, and CCI) are summarised in Appendix 4. Firm value is the 
dependent variable (summarised in Appendix 3) and the CI and MLI 
indexes are the independent variables (summarised in Appendixes 5 
and 6 respectively). The independent and control variables in the 
formula are represented by acronyms using capitals for ease of 
interpretation during the statistical analysis.) 
 
The hypotheses and research objectives influence the research approach, 
design and methods. The focus on the development of indexes and the evaluation 
of relationships prompted the choice of a quantitative statistical focus. A 
quantitative method enables “the quantitative measurement and analysis of actual 
economic and business phenomena” allowing econometric analysis, with the testing 
of hypotheses being one of the major applications of econometrics (Studenmund, 
2011:2). Prior studies based on an agency theory perspective also tended to use 
quantitative approaches (Huang et al., 2011; Mustapha & Ayoib Che, 2011; 
Stepanov & Suvorov, 2017). However, it is important to consider the various 
research approaches and designs to ensure that the most suitable alternatives have 
been chosen for use in the study. 
 
6.3 Research approach, world view and design 
 
Creswell (2014:3) explains that research approaches “are plans and the 
procedures for research that span the steps from broad assumptions to detailed 
methods of data collection, analysis and interpretation”. There are three main 
research approaches; the quantitative approach, the qualitative approach and the 
mixed methods approach (Creswell, 2009:4). The approaches are informed by the 
data required to answer the research question where the qualitative approach 
focuses on words, the quantitative approach on numbers, and the mixed methods 
approach uses a combination of words and numbers to describe the phenomenon of 
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interest (Williams, 2007:65). Page and Meyer (2003:17-19) define quantitative 
research as an approach “that places greater value upon information that can be 
numerically manipulated in a meaningful way” and qualitative research as an 
approach that “can be conceptualised as a focus on words and feelings – the quality 
of an event or experience”. A more detailed description is provided by Leedy and 
Ormrod (2005:94), who state that: 
 quantitative research “is used to answer questions about 
relationships among measured variables with the purpose of 
explaining, predicting, and controlling phenomena”, whereas  
 qualitative research is “used to answer questions about the complex 
nature of a phenomenon” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005:94). 
 
The study focuses on the relationship between the board as a governance 
mechanism and firm value. Relationships between people can be assessed 
qualitatively through direct observation; however, the relationships between board-
level controls (using the CI and MLI indexes) and firm value are quantifiable. 
Whereas a qualitative study with direct observation can lead to enhanced insight 
into the operation of a phenomenon, direct observations of controls enacted by 
people might not show the true value of the control and may limit the number of 
people who can be physically observed. By quantifying board-level controls, it is 
possible to assess the operation of the controls over a much wider area, including a 
negative lagged effect, and use statistical methods for objective further analysis. 
Quantified controls can more readily be used to assess relationships with other 
quantitative measures like firm value by using statistical analysis.  
 
Although aspects of controls are quantifiable, the talent or rigour of the 
control action is qualitative in nature and is not always readily observable. 
Separation of duties can be observed, for example, but the rigour or talent with 
which an independent board member performs his or her oversight duty at board 
meetings is not readily observable, although poor oversight would become visible 
over time as goal divergence increases. 
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Poorly applied board-level controls would increase the risk of moral hazard 
and information asymmetry as the ineffective controls becomes visible to the people 
directly exposed to them but not to outside people. In such a case the ineffective 
controls would increase agency cost and reduce firm performance and value over 
time. To address this information asymmetry challenge, boards use disclosure to 
reduce goal divergence and show compliance with good governance practices by 
the board. This disclosure enables the study to identify control indicators to 
populate quantitative indexes representing board-level controls (CI and MLI 
indexes) that represent the actions of the board as a governance mechanism. Care 
must, however, be taken to ensure that appropriate measures and definitions are 
used to maximise data validity for the various indicators.  
 
This study uses indicators of board-level controls as the data source in the 
index-building process (described in chapters 4 and 5). The index-building process 
applies 0 or 1 options with the scoring based on the disclosed control indicators in 
line with their definitions. Using dummy variables to build the index does allocate 
an equal weighting to each of the indicators.83 Despite this possible weakness, prior 
South African governance studies constructed their indexes using dummy variables 
in a manner that allocated equal weightings to the different indicators used by their 
indexes (Ntim, 2009; Mans-Kemp, 2014; Ashwin, 2015). The construction of the 
indexes is discussed in greater detail in section 6.7.1. 
 
Another factor to consider is whether the variables required to answer the 
research question can be measured (a quantitative characteristic) or whether they 
merely indicate a preference (qualitative) (Huck, 2012:53). Although the indexes 
use 0 or 1 to quantify the index, the allocation is based on a quantifiable aspect such 
as CEO duality, or the percentage meeting attendance, and not on a preference. A 
preference would, for example, be the use of a Likert scale where the participant 
indicates a personal perception on a scale to answer a question. The quantifiable 
                                                 
83 An assessment of the indicators to determine whether some are more important than others and 
need to receive different weightings is an area for future study. 
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aspect of indexes and the ability of statistical methods to assess or test for 
relationships support the use of a quantitative approach.  
 
The choice between the quantitative and qualitative approaches is also 
influenced by the world view adopted in the study. A “quantitative view is described 
as being ‘realist’ or sometimes ‘positivist’, while the world view underlying 
qualitative research is viewed as being ‘subjectivist’” (Muijs, 2011). A specific 
‘world view’ reflects the belief system that guides research and is also referred to 
as a paradigm. Positivism “largely served as a label” to describe “the conventional 
approach to Quantitative Research” (Morgan, 2007:56), however, paradigms or 
world views are more complex. The four world views emphasised by Creswell 
(2014:6) are summarised in Table 6-2. 
 
Table 6-2 World views 
Post-positivism Constructivism 
 Determination 
 Reductionism 
 Empirical observation and 
measurement 
 Theory verification 
 Understanding 
 Multiple participant meanings 
 Social and historical construction 
 Theory generation 
Transformative Pragmatism 
 Political 
 Power and justice orientated 
 Collaborative 
 Change-oriented 
 Consequences of actions 
 Problem-centred 
 Pluralistic 
 Real-world practice oriented 
Creswell (2014:6) 
 
Post-positivism stems from positivism thinking that only recognised absolute 
truth of knowledge by acknowledging positive claims about knowledge related to 
studies of human actions (Creswell, 2014:7). Bryman and Bell (2015:10) describe 
positivism as “an epistemological position that advocates the application of 
methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality” by focusing on 
observable indicators that can be factually measured in a value-free or objective 
manner to test a hypothesis. Creswell (2014:7) note that the post-positivist world 
view is deterministic in that it looks at causes and effects, reductionistic in that it 
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reduces ideas to small test sets using variables and research questions and uses 
“numerical measures of observation” to test theories.  
 
In contrast, constructivism “challenges the assumption that categories such as 
organization and culture are pre-given and therefore confront the social actors as 
external realities” (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Creswell (2014:8) states that 
constructivism is often combined with interpretivism and is typically a qualitative 
approach that considers the understanding individuals seek in their world and their 
subjective meanings and experiences that direct meaning. Thus, the interpretive 
researcher attempts to interpret the meaning others attribute to the world. 
Interpretivism accepts that “social reality has a meaning for human beings and 
therefore human action is meaningful” and needs to be understood (Bryman & Bell, 
2015:13). 
 
The transformative world view moved away from the structural laws and 
theories of positivism that do not accommodate marginalisation in society and are 
practised by critical theorists and participatory action researchers to advocate a 
changed agenda for reform (Creswell, 2014:9). A pragmatic world view focuses on 
the research question by using pluralistic approaches to search for solutions, 
resulting in the application of mixed methods (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004:16). 
 
Given the research objectives, hypotheses and indexes of this study, it can be 
said to fit into the post-positivist world view, as it uses reductionism to reduce 
indicators into indexes for statistical analysis by means of which to test the 
hypotheses in order to achieve the research objective and purpose. The agency 
theory view enables the study to consider the theory in the index construction and 
data analysis, which also fits in with post-positivism. However, as the study focuses 
on the relationship between the board as a governance mechanism and firm value, 
it does not follow the deterministic dictates of post-positivism. Data are collected 
in a value-free, objective manner by using indicator definitions and extracting data 
from publicly available documents in line with the expectation that objective 
empirical observations will be carried out.  
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Although the study considers the different roles played by executive and non-
executive directors, it does not consider multiple participant meanings or aim to 
understand why the controls were used or were not used (which excludes 
constructivism). The study is not change-orientated or politically-focused despite 
the transformative political agenda noted in the South African context (which 
excludes the transformative world view), nor is the study problem-centred or 
practice-orientated (i.e. it is not pragmatic). The study uses descriptive research to 
assess the controls used by the board as a governance mechanism, using indexes to 
determine the relationship to firm value, thus excluding the constructivist, 
transformative and pragmatism paradigms. 
 
The advantages of using a quantitative approach from a post-positivist 
viewpoint are that it enables the study to use externally observable records of 
published controls or proxies for the controls (extracted from secondary sources) to 
construct the indexes and perform statistical assessments. Physical observation of 
people’s actions can be invasive and result in the Hawthorne effect (McCambridge 
et al., 2014), in contrast extracting data from secondary sources after the fact results 
in the collection of reliable data, in a non-invasive and objective manner using 
methods that can be replicated. As quantitative research “emerged around 1250 
A.D.” and has been the dominant research method used to create meaning and new 
knowledge, it is a well-established approach by now (Williams, 2007:66). 
 
The research objectives and hypotheses influence the research approach and 
the nature of the data influences the research design. The key differences between 
the alternative research designs, given the different research approaches, are 
summarised in Table 6-3 below. 
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Table 6-3 Alternative research designs for the approaches 
Quantitative Qualitative Mixed methods 
 Experimental designs 
 Non-experimental 
designs 
 Narrative research 
 Phenomenology 
 Ethnographies 
 Grounded theory 
studies 
 Case studies 
 Sequential 
 Concurrent 
 Transformative 
Creswell (2009:12) 
 
Ryan et al. (2003:117) explain that the value of a good research design is that 
it enables “more valid conclusions and inferences” to be “drawn from the work”. 
As this study uses a quantitative research approach, the available research designs 
are experimental or non-experimental. Page and Meyer (2003:15) describe non-
experimental research as research that “does not measure effects directly by 
manipulating controlled variables, but seeks relationships that can be found to exist 
between uncontrolled variables”. Leedy and Ormrod (2005:179; 217) explain that 
a descriptive design (non-experimental) “examines a situation as it is”, and 
experimental designs control variables to “identify cause-and-effect relationships”. 
As this study focuses on the relationship between the board’s use of controls (using 
the CI and MLI indexes) and firm value, a non-experimental research design is 
required. Non-experimental research indicates the non-manipulation of data or ex 
post facto data collection where the variables are not under the direct control of the 
researcher (Ryan et al., 2003:129). The use of secondary publicly available data is 
not invasive nor is it possible to influence the controls as the collection of the data 
occurs after the control was applied (ex post facto).  
 
The use of agency theory as a lens results in the use of theory-based reasoning 
to identify the variables needed to populate the CI and MLI indexes (De Vos, 
Strydom, Fouché & Delport, 2005:47). Identifying the indicators enables the study 
to extract the required data to construct the indexes. Bryman and Bell (2015:3) 
explain that “research data become significant and contribute to knowledge when 
they are viewed in relation to theoretical concerns”, thereby encouraging the use of 
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a theoretical lens. Using agency theory as the theoretical lens helps the study to 
move from a theoretical description of board-level controls to the identification of 
indicators and the construction of indexes to enable hypothesis testing, while using 
inductive reasoning enables the study to use the results to identify patterns related 
to the theory in the result discussion section.  
 
The lack of manipulation of variables indicates that a non-experimental 
design has been used rather than an experimental design. An experimental design 
requires the manipulation of variables to measure the effect of the manipulation 
(Ryan et al., 2003:122). Non-experimental research “seeks relationships that can be 
found to exist between uncontrolled variables” (Page & Meyer, 2003:15). Thus, the 
value of a non-experimental design is that it enables the assessment of relationships 
in line with the main objective of this study. The use of a non-experimental design 
also indicates the need to use econometric methods in the detailed analysis rather 
than standard statistical methods as econometrics specifically focus on the 
assessment of data collected using a non-experimental research design 
(Wooldridge, 2014:2). Using uncontrolled variables is important as the study does 
not attempt to influence or control the variables, given its focus on evaluating the 
board’s use of controls and the relationship thereof to firm value, and not on 
establishing a cause-and-effect relationship. 
 
Non-experimental studies and cross-sectional analysis are prone to omitted 
variable bias where an unmeasured factor can affect the dependent or independent 
variables, thereby biasing the results (Mans-Kemp, 2014:180). Studenmund 
(2011:168) explains that leaving an important explanatory variable out of the 
regression equation causes “bias in the estimated coefficients of the variables in the 
equation” and is referred to as the “omitted variable bias” or “specification bias”. It 
is, however, possible to control for an unobservable effect of an omitted variable 
by using panel data with Fixed Effects (Wooldridge, 2014:387), allowing the 
research method to compensate for any specification bias. The next section focuses 
on discussing the research methods that are compatible with the research approach 
and design used in the study. 
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6.4 Research methods 
 
Bryman and Bell (2015:28) describe a research method as “a technique for 
collecting data”. Data are the “facts and figures collected, analysed and 
summarised” in the study (Anderson, Sweeney & Williams, 2015:5). Given the 
nature of this study, it is important to understand some of the terms commonly used 
in quantitative studies. The subjects for which data have been collected are the 
boards of companies on the SRI index, while variables and indicators are 
characteristics of interest linked to the board, and the set of measures obtained from 
a subject (a board) are referred to as observations (Anderson et al., 2015:5).  
 
The collection of data differs between qualitative and quantitative studies and 
depends on the world view used by the study. However, the nature of the collected 
data influences the measurement and methods used to analyse the data, as discussed 
in section 6.4.2. 
 
6.4.1 Data collection methods 
Data for a quantitative study can be collected by using survey instruments like 
questionnaires or by using a content analysis to extract data from archives 
(including databases, websites and reports) (Bryman & Bell, 2015:99-261). Given 
the quantitative nature of this study and the post-positivist world view adopted, it is 
important that data should be collected in an objective and neutral manner.  
 
Quantitative surveys are structured, self-completion questionnaires that 
gather data from participants at a point in time (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005:183-186). 
This is a popular method of ascertaining people’s perceptions, for example for 
marketing research. The other method, namely content analysis, is a method that 
analyses texts and documents to quantify their content against indicators or 
categories “in a systematic replicable manner” (Bryman & Bell, 2015:219). As this 
study considers board-level control indicators used by boards from various 
281 
 
 
 
companies over a three-year period, questionnaires were not used because they are 
not an efficient data collection method. Questionnaires tend to have poor response 
rates and will need to collect responses from the board members at different points 
in time for a time series analysis, possibly influencing the future actions of the board 
as they are aware of being measured. As the required data are available in 
documents in the public domain such as integrated reports, websites or commercial 
databases (IRESS host a variety of financial and non-financial data on listed 
companies), a structured content analysis was used to extract the required data. 
 
A more detailed discussion on the data collections methods used in this study 
is included in section 6.7. The measurement of data discussed in the next section is 
important to ensure that the data comply with the identified variable definitions to 
avoid bias.  
 
6.4.1.1 Measurement 
Quantitative data collection methods employ various measuring options (De 
Vos et al., 2005:159). For example, a survey could ask participants to answer on a 
5-point Likert scale to measure their responses, whereas a content analysis could 
extract data linked to specific indicators from documents, website and databases by 
using the underlying inherent measure of the indicator or by coding the data in line 
with the identified definition. A structured content analysis focuses on identifying 
the data needed using pre-defined indicators aided by a consistent structure to guide 
the data extraction. This study used an Excel template to structure the content 
analysis in order to ensure consistency and completeness in the data collection 
process. The template is discussed in more detail in section 6.7. It is also important 
that the measurement method applied in the identification and collection of the data 
enables the study to collect reliable and valid data (De Vos et al., 2005:160).  
 
Measurement is important as a quantitative method requires numerical data 
that quantify the theoretical putative relationship in the observed variable in an 
objective or valid manner (Page & Meyer, 2003:63; Bryman & Bell, 2015:99). The 
measurement of the variables must be supported by rules or definitions against 
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which the measurements are made, in line with the theoretical arguments (Ryan et 
al., 2003:118) to ensure validity and enable reliability. Validity refers to whether or 
not a measure of a concept really measures the concept (Bryman & Bell, 2015:109). 
Reliability requires definitions to be clear enough to ensure that if the data 
extraction process is repeated or checked the identical measure would be identified 
(Page & Meyer, 2003:84).  
 
This study specifically addressed validity and reliability concerns by defining 
the variables and indicators in chapters 4 and 5. Appropriate definitions are 
important to avoid incorrect data extraction which could lead to measurement 
errors. A measurement error is present when the extracted data do not measure the 
underlying variable (Page & Meyer, 2003:78). The challenge in social science 
studies is that in a complex phenomenon, proxies are generally used as 
approximations to represent the underlying criterion, such as firm value. In such 
cases validity challenges need to be considered by using theoretical deductions and 
prior research in the definitions of the variable to increase validity. Reliability is 
ensured by using clear definitions in the measurement of the proxies that can be 
replicated. The nature of data also influences the measurement as certain types of 
data are easily measured with accuracy. 
 
The company names are used to identify their boards and are nominal data 
(also referred to as categorical data) (Devore & Berk, 2012:3). Nominal data are 
easy to identify accurately; for example, the industry classification of a company 
can easily be identified using information from a database, since it is the mere 
allocation of a name (Ryan et al., 2003:118; De Vos et al., 2005:164). Dichotomous 
variables are nominal data that represent mutually exclusive options and are also 
referred to as dummy or binary variables. For example, the question whether the 
external audit firm of a company is one of the Big 4 firms would produce a yes or 
no answer, or a 0 or 1 dummy variable. It is easy to assess the validity of a nominal 
variable by considering the data against its definitions to determine whether the data 
measure the aspect they claim to measure (face validity) (De Vos et al., 2005:161). 
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The nature of the data also influences the analysis options, which are discussed in 
more detail in section 6.4.2. 
 
Data that indicate differences in perception, for example the classification of 
companies as small, medium or large, increasing in ranking where size of the 
difference between ranks is not known or measurable, are referred to as ordinal or 
ranked data (Levin & Fox, 2006:11). None of data extracted by this study were 
ordinal or ranked data although it would be possible to re-code continuous data into 
ranked data.  
 
The more commonly used level of measurement in econometric analysis is 
continuous data or ratio data with a limitless range (Page & Meyer, 2003:64). This 
study mainly uses ratio data. Ratio data employ a measurement scale with equal 
intervals between data points, with a true zero point (Field, 2009:9) using 
percentages for example. Extracting market or financial data from commercial 
databases can result in easily obtainable and accurate ratio data with strong face 
validity and high reliability.  
 
Similarly, using a context analysis of the integrated reports to identify 
variables such as the age, tenure and remuneration of directors is also 
straightforward and has a high level of validity and reliability. The biggest 
challenge with extracting data is to ensure that the data extraction process follows 
a structured procedure to ensure consistency and record the data accurately. This 
requires additional controls to ensure the reliability of the data capturing process. 
Once the appropriate data have been extracted, it is important to summarise the data 
using appropriate formulas in a consistent manner to enable the study to construct 
the CI and MLI indexes. 
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6.4.1.2 Structure of the data 
There are two broad data structures, namely cross-sectional data and time 
series data. Cross-sectional data consist of observations linked to the subject84 at 
the same point in time, whereas time series data consist of variables linked to the 
subject over time (Wooldridge, 2014:5-8).  
 
Not considering all variables could lead to biased results in econometric 
analysis. Thus, combining cross-sectional data with time series data addresses the 
bias risk and improve the predictability of the analysis by adding more data points 
and changes over time. Where a study includes time series and cross-sectional data 
for the same subjects and the same time periods, it is referred to as panel data 
(discussed in section 6.4.2.3). Although panel data have specific advantages and 
applications basic statistical analysis methods are valuable in assessing 
relationships and for descriptive statistics purposes. 
 
6.4.2 Data analysis methods 
The quantifiable nature of the data used in this study is ideal for assessing 
relationships or correlations between various variables to test the theoretically 
argued relationships (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005:181). This can be accomplished using 
descriptive statistics to better understand the data with correlation and regression 
analysis linked to the hypothesised theoretically argued relationships (Ryan et al., 
2003). As a relationship between two variables could be influenced by an outside 
or omitted variable, further analysis using econometric models and tests is 
warranted. To ensure the model design considers the functional relationship of the 
variables, descriptive statistical methods and correlation analysis have been used to 
obtain a better understanding of the underlying data.  
 
  
                                                 
84 In panel analysis the “term subject is used in a generic sense to include the microunits” and 
represent the boards of the SRI index companies in this study (Gujarati & Porter, 2009:592). 
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6.4.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics describe data by summarising the frequency, middle 
point and distribution to show the average latency across the variability of the data 
(Howell, 1999:5). The results can be presented using graphs or tables, depending 
on the nature of the data and the number of variables that need to be summarised. 
The hypotheses, nature of the data and underlying relationships influence the 
selection of the methods used for the analysis to test the hypotheses.  
 
Different methods are used to describe data, depending on their nature. 
Nominal data are only described using the frequency of occurrence (Howell, 
1999:9). For the other types the percentage of the frequency can be used to show 
the number of observations of the different variables (Anderson et al., 2015:38-39). 
Using a frequency distribution with visualisation, such as a histogram, helps to 
clearly show the underlying characteristics of the variables and can allude to the 
midpoint of the data as well as the distribution and range (Howell, 1999:32-33).  
 
Additional common descriptions centre on the midpoint. Measures to show 
the position of the midpoint include the mean, median and mode while the 
distribution can be derived by considering the quartiles, percentiles, range (highest-
lowest score) or standard deviations. The mean is the mathematical average while 
the median is the middle value in an ascending variable, and mode is the value that 
occurs with the greatest frequency (Anderson et al., 2015:108-112). This study used 
the median as the midpoint as it is regarded as a better midpoint than the mean and 
will be the same as the mean for a normally distributed variable. Considering the 
midpoints enabled the study to identify the measures of central tendency (Howell, 
1999:55-59). 
 
Measuring variability is also important and here the first step is to consider 
the range (highest value less lowest value) and the average deviation (the difference 
from the mean), to show the variance (Howell, 1999:66-68). Quartiles and 
percentiles can be useful for showing the spread in smaller sections. Quartiles and 
percentiles are used to show the quarter or percentage points in an ascending 
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variable (Anderson et al., 2015:117-119). The variance is a better indication of the 
distribution. Variance is a “measure of the variability that utilizes all the data”, 
showing how each observation differs from the mean, where standard deviation is 
the square root of the variance and the coefficient of variance shows the standard 
deviation on the mean (Anderson et al., 2015:127-130).  
 
Distributions can be negatively skewed (with the higher values in the 
distribution clustered towards the right) or positively distributed (with the high 
values clustered to the left), indicating non-normal distributions (Howell, 1999:44). 
The variability may be considered for a smaller section of the dataset, for example 
the upper quartile. It is important to consider variability as the sample variance helps 
to estimate the population variance (Howell, 1999:72). The value of statistics lies 
in its ability to estimate or infer the population’s characteristics by using the sample. 
This is also referred to as inferential statistics. The sample used in this study is large 
in comparison to the population (as close to the population as possible given the 
constraints of a balanced panel) which reduces sampling error risks in the use of 
inferential statistics. Interpretation of the results in this study should consider the 
near population size sample used in this study.85  
 
6.4.2.2 Inferential statistics 
This study focuses on the relationship between the board as a governance 
mechanism (considering CI and MLI indexes as the independent variables) and firm 
value (the dependent variables). There are various statistical methods available, 
such as correlation analysis, regression or multiple regression analysis, related 
sample t-tests, analysis of variance or factor analysis. However, the type of data as 
well as the hypotheses must be considered in selecting the method of analysis.  
 
Given the focus of this study on the relationship, a correlation or regression 
analysis is better suited than related sample t-tests or analysis of variance tests for 
                                                 
85 In the broader assurance field it is not unusual to apply statistical or econometric methods to 
populations as the use of computer assisted techniques enable auditors to assess populations with 
ease. 
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differences. T-tests or analysis of variance tests can be valuable to identify 
differences between groups whereas factor analysis can be valuable for assessing 
the interaction between variables in complex concepts.86 This study already uses 
indexes to consolidate board-level controls and can therefore directly assess the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Thus, factor analysis 
is not considered in the assessment of relationships used in this study while t-tests 
could be valuable to shed light on differences between groups linked to the nominal 
variables for descriptive purposes. To identify which statistical method of analysis 
is the most suitable, a decision tree that considers the methods that test relationships 
is shown in Figure 6-2. 
 
Figure 6-2 Decision tree for statistical analysis 
 
Adapted from Howell (1999). 
 
The decision tree shows that the degree of relationship between a dependent 
and an independent variable can be assessed using a Pearson correlation analysis. 
However, as there are two independent variables a multiple regression is the better 
method. A correlation analysis is a “descriptive measure of the strength of linear 
association between two variables” whereas a regression model describes how the 
dependent variable is related to the independent variables using a linear equation 
with an error term to include the omitted variables (Anderson et al., 2015:607). A 
regression analysis aims to link movement in the dependent variable as a function 
of movement in the set of predictor87 variables using a single equation with an error 
                                                 
86 The use of factor analysis to consider the interaction between the individual indicators or variables 
is an area for future study. 
87 The term predictor variables are used to represent the independent and control variables used in 
the regression model. 
Relationship 
assessment
Multiple independent 
variables
Multiple regression
One independent 
variable
Continuous or ratio
Degree of relationship Pearson correlation
Form of relationship
Regression
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added to accommodate variations that cannot be explained (Studenmund, 2011:5 & 
9). A regression model operates under specific assumptions, namely: 
1. “The error term is a random variable with a mean or expected 
value of zero. 
2. The variance of the error term is the same for all the values of 
the independent variables. 
3. The values of the error term are independent. 
4. The error term is a normally distributed variable for all values 
of the independent variable” (Anderson et al., 2015:631). 
 
When multiple independent variables are used to predict the dependent 
variable, there could be a correlation between the independent variables known as 
multicollinearity. Severe multicollinearity (a sample correlation coefficient 
exceeding 0.7) between two or more independent variables could make interpreting 
the results difficult and should therefore be controlled for (Anderson et al., 
2015:714-715). It is also important to consider a possible correlation between the 
independent variables and the error term referred to as an “endogenous explanatory 
variable” as it can breach the zero conditional mean assumption, as well as the 
inclusion of possible irrelevant variables in the model (Wooldridge, 2014:75-76). 
As the study uses a non-experimental design, it is important to consider an 
econometric model that addresses the challenges associated with multiple 
regression analysis. 
 
6.4.2.3 Econometric models 
Due to the non-experimental nature of the research design, the study uses 
econometric models that specifically cater for regression analysis options by 
enabling the analysis to hold the other variables constant (ceteris paribus) in order 
to identify the effect of one variable (Studenmund, 2011:4; Wooldridge, 2014:12). 
Econometrics enables the use of regression analysis to make “quantitative estimates 
of economic relationships” that have been theoretically described to “predict the 
direction of change”, using a sample to “predict the amount of change” 
(Studenmund, 2011:5).  
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As the corporate control and managerial labour indexes are complementary, 
the combined impact of both (CI+MLI) is assessed against firm value to determine 
the relationship between the board as a governance mechanism and firm value using 
the following model:  
Firm valueit = α0 + β1BLOCKit + β2CONSHAit + β3DIRSHAit + 
β4QASit + β5INDit + β6CCIit + β7CIit + β8MLIit +εit 
 
The above model considers the combined effect of the independent variables 
CI and MLI on the dependent variable – firm value. The additional control variables 
enable the model to identify the relationship between CI and MLI and firm value 
while keeping the control variables that could also influence firm value constant. 
Although the study uses the term dependent variables they are synonyms for 
explained or predicted variables. Independent variables refer to the CI and MLI 
indexes whereas predictor or explanatory variables refer to the independent and 
control variables. 
 
Six control variables (CVs) that are known variables that can influence firm 
value have been added to the model using the literature as a guide. By adding the 
CVs to the model, the study controls for the omitted variable risk to some extent. 
Although time series data can lead to autocorrelation, they are less likely to have 
heteroskedasticity when compared to cross-sectional models (Studenmund, 
2011:337-339). It is possible to test for heteroskedasticity (whether the error 
variance is constant) by using the Breusch-Pagan test (Wooldridge, 2014:219-224). 
Heteroskedasticity can be caused by outliers, skewed independent variables or 
omitted variables (Gujarati & Porter, 2009:367-368). The Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroscedasticity and random coefficient variation can be used to assess the 
balanced panel to ensure an appropriate analysis method is used (Breusch & Pagan, 
1979; Gujarati & Porter, 2009:385).  
 
The omitted variable risk can also be addressed by using both a cross-
sectional component, the different subjects (the boards of companies on the SRI 
290 
 
 
 
reflected as ‘i’) and different time periods ‘t’ to consider more variability. Changes 
over time can complicate the analysis as time series variables are more complex 
than a cross-sectional analysis because business and economic related observations 
are seldom “independent across time” (Wooldridge, 2014). Correlation across time 
in the error term, referred to as serial correlation or autocorrelation, requires the 
calculation of an autocorrelation coefficient to test the correlation (Studenmund, 
2011:305 & 315)88. Some variables (such as the existence of a dominant 
shareholder) may be constant over time while other variables (such as the QAS) 
may show incremental increases over time. The short time dimension used in this 
study is very short for time series effects to emerge which is why most time series 
focused studies use longer time spans that are closer to ten years. Time invariant 
variables could influence estimations over time and have been taken into 
consideration in the Fixed Effects estimations model. As it is not possible to include 
all the independent or explanatory variables in a regression, there will always be 
omitted variables, making the error term an important part of the equation 
(Wooldridge, 2014:59). 
 
In addition to considering the error term, the regression model must take the 
functional relationship between variables into account to ensure that their 
relationship is appropriately reflected in the model (Wooldridge, 2014:18). This 
highlights the importance of descriptive statistics and correlation analysis in 
building a stronger understanding of the actual relationship versus the theoretical 
or expected relationship of the underlying data to ensure that the model’s 
descriptions are appropriate.  
 
The nature of the data and functional relationships of the variables can 
influence the type of regression method. The most common regression model 
option is ordinary least squares (OLS), which calculates the variable coefficient by 
minimising the sum of squared residuals (Studenmund, 2011:35). However, it is 
important that an OLS regression should address the Gauss-Markov assumptions, 
of which one of the more common challenges is the omitted variable risk. To help 
                                                 
88 Given the short time dimension this study does not report on serial correlation tests for the panel. 
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address this risk the study included data from different subjects (the boards of 
companies on the SRI) and time periods. It is also possible to use a general least 
square (GLS) estimation where OLS is expected to be inefficient to consider the 
variability between subjects helping to control for heteroskedasticity (Gujarati, 
2003:395).  
 
The use of both cross-sectional and time series data results in panel data that 
are defined as a data set that “consists of a time series for each cross-sectional 
member in the data set” (Wooldridge, 2014:10). Panel data have advantages as 
“having multiple observations on the same” companies enables the study to “control 
for certain unobserved characteristics”, thereby reducing the omitted variable risk 
and increasing the sample size (Studenmund, 2011:526; Wooldridge, 2014:11). The 
benefits of panel data as explained by Baltagi (2005:4-7) include controlling for 
individual heterogeneity, providing more informative and greater variability in data, 
with less collinearity, greater degrees of freedom and more efficiency, identifying 
effects not detectable in cross-sectional or time series studies to study the dynamics 
of change, and to detect unobserved effects, useful in more complicated behavioural 
models and minimize bias when aggregating data. The sampling process discussed 
in section 6.6 incorporates explanations on how the study controlled for possible 
sample selection bias. 
 
Panel data use methods of analysis that accommodate the cross-sectional and 
time series nature of the panel, namely Fixed Effects estimation. Fixed Effects 
estimation allows each cross-sectional subject to have a different intercept that is 
time invariant allowing for both individual and time effects and avoid the time-
invariant omitted variable bias (unobserved heterogeneity) by using time-demeaned 
data (Gujarati & Porter, 2009:596-600; Studenmund, 2011:528-536; Wooldridge, 
2014:373-395). Thus time-invariant data (such as the industry data that is consistent 
over time) cannot be analysed with Fixed Effects and should be excluded.  
 
Random effects or the error component model uses a composite error term 
that include the cross-sectional error term and the combined cross-sectional and 
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time series error (Gujarati & Porter, 2009:603). Random Effects estimation assumes 
that the intercept of each cross-sectional subject is drawn from a distribution that is 
centred around the mean (Studenmund, 2011:528-536; Wooldridge, 2014:373-
395). It is important to note that the individual error terms are not correlated with 
each other and are not autocorrelated across both cross-sectional and time series 
units and that the composite error term is not correlated with the explanatory 
variables in the model (Gujarati & Porter, 2009:602-603). Random effects might 
not apply to this study as the study uses a near population sample or boards, 
however boards are represented by individual directors that are part of a larger 
sample. The Hausman test can be used to assess the relationship between the 
intercepts and the independent variables to determine whether Fixed or Random 
Effects would be the recommended method (Studenmund, 2011:536).  
 
Even if the best methods are used, statistical analysis is only valuable if the 
data collection methods and the whole methodology used by the study are 
structured and managed in a manner that ensures the validity and reliability of the 
data to test the study’s hypothesis. The study used different research phases to 
control the validity and reliability of the data collection as well as the variable 
definitions to ensure that the methods used enabled the study to test the hypotheses 
and achieve the research objective and purpose. 
 
6.5 Research phases 
 
This study used four phases to achieve the research purpose. Phase 1 focused 
on identifying and defining the proxies for firm value (summarised in Appendix 3). 
It was possible to extract the data for the firm value proxies from the IRESS 
database (archival research). Data extracted from the database were exported into 
Excel and copied into the panel to ensure that the extracted data were accurately 
transferred to the panel.  
 
Phase 2 defined the data required for the control variables (CVs) and the 
index indicators, using the literature to support the definitions. The identification 
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and definitions for the CVs have been discussed in chapter 4 in detail and 
summarised in Appendix 4. It was possible to extract the data for most of the CVs 
from IRESS. Data extracted from the databases were extracted into Excel and 
copied into the panel to ensure that the extracted data were accurately transferred 
to the panel. However, some of the data for the CVs (specifically for CCI and QAS) 
were not available in databases but were available in integrated reports, including 
the audited annual financial statements. Data for CVs that could not be directly 
exported from IRESS were extracted together with the indicators used for the CI 
and MLI indexes using a structured content analysis (phase 3). The indicator 
definitions for the CI and MLI indexes were identified and defined in chapters 4 
and 5 respectively and summarised using mindmaps to give a visual overview 
linking the indicator definitions to the indexes. The CI index indicators are 
summarised in Appendix 5 and the MLI index indicators are summarised in 
Appendix 6. 
 
Phase 3 followed a stepped approach to extract the required indicator-related 
data. Step 1 started with the development of a spreadsheet template to structure the 
content analysis in a manner that facilitated the consistent extraction and 
summarisation (using formulas) of the required data for all the periods for each 
board (resulting in the use of 84 spreadsheets with separate sheets for each year). 
Step 2 extracted the data and step 3 reviewed the extracted data for completeness 
and accuracy and reviewed the formulas for appropriateness. Step 2 and 3 was 
extremely costly as a large volume of data relating to the individual director 
(approximately 1000 individual directors per year) indicators had to be manually 
collected, checked and summarised to represent information on the board for each 
board and each period. Step 4 consolidated the data from the individual 
spreadsheets into a panel by copying the summarised data into a spreadsheet and 
using formulas to calculate the indexes and remaining control variables. The 
purpose of step 5 was to ensure that there were no missing or incorrect data by 
reviewing the panel, and the last step led to the construction of the remaining control 
variables, the CI and MLI indexes.  
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Phase 4 used statistical software to calculate descriptive statistics for all the 
variables, considering the cross-sectional aspect of the variables per year as well as 
for the pool where the descriptive statistics of the variables for all the years were 
calculated. To assess the independent variables used in this study, a multiple 
regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses by means of a variety of 
regression methods. As this study collected panel data (data for the same subject 
over the same time periods), panel analysis methods were applied to control for 
possible “bias in cross-sectional studies” (Studenmund, 2011:526-527). The 
selection of the sample is also a crucial step as poor sampling can lead to sampling 
bias, however, the aim of the sampling process described below was to come as 
close as possible to a census given the restrictions of a balanced panel. 
 
6.6 Sampling process 
 
Although the subject of analysis of this study is the board, each board leads a 
company on the SRI index and it is practical to identify the company first and then 
identify the board members for each company in each period. As the directors on a 
board can change over time, this study uses the directors on the board at year-end 
to represent the board for the relevant period. The board is thus a consolidation of 
the directors who serve on the board. Companies on the SRI index tend to follow 
transparent disclosure practices to retain their position on the index and reduce 
information asymmetry by disclosing more information on non-financial matters to 
control for compliance with the requirements of the SRI index. 
 
Using a panel data set entails a survivor bias risk if the sample was selected 
retrospectively. A survivor bias risk is generally applicable to most panels built 
retrospectively from listed companies and has been acknowledge in prior local 
studies as a potential weakness (Ntim, 2009:136; Taljaard et al., 2015:430). This 
study did not select the sample retrospectively and included all the companies from 
the SRI index over the period for which data were available to comply with the 
restrictions of panel data. The study aimed to get as close to a census as possible, 
given the constraints of a panel data model. Although panel data have statistical 
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advantages, they do limit the sample as data are needed from all subjects for all the 
periods.  
 
There is, however, still a small risk of survivor bias in the sample. This risk 
is limited and affects only one company. African Bank was excluded because the 
company was placed in curatorship in 2014; however, the findings of the curator’s 
report have been considered. The study also includes a new joiners bias as 
companies such as Capevin and Sibanya, which joined the SRI index after 2012, 
only started operating towards the end of 2012 and were excluded as they did not 
have data for 2012. However, as only two out of 84 companies were affected the 
new joiners risk is not expected to be significant. More information on the sample 
selected is included in Appendix 2. 
 
6.6.1 Study period 
The study focuses on the years 2012 to 2014. The study began in 2012 as it 
was the first year of the implementation of the 2008 Companies Act. The 
implementation of the Companies Act was delayed as extensive amendments 
legislated in 2011 first had to be enacted before the 2008 Companies Act could 
come into force in 2012 (RSA, 2011). The study period ended in 2014 as the JSE 
partnered with the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) Russell89 in 2015, 
which changed the index in 2015 (JSE, 2015).  
 
To identify the companies on the SRI index for the period, the list of 
companies allowed onto the index from 2011 to 2014 was extracted to form a 
combined list of companies on the SRI index for the years 2011 to 2014 as 
summarised in Table 6-4 (JSE, 2014b). 
  
                                                 
89 FTSE Russel represents the FTSE and Russell indexes which combined to become a global index 
leader. More information can be accessed via the website at: www.ftserussell.com. 
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Table 6-4 Companies on the SRI index 
Year Number of companies 
2011 74 
2012 76 
2013 72 
2014 84 
Total number of companies on the SRI index 
over the period 
9090 
(JSE, 2014b) 
 
 
6.6.2 SRI index 
The JSE identified qualifying companies for the SRI index on an annual basis 
(JSE, 2010b; JSE, 2014a). The company identification for this study began in 2011, 
as the companies identified in 2011 as suitable for inclusion on the SRI index were 
known at the beginning of 2012. The study ended in 2014 it was the last evaluation 
before the JSE partnered with FTSE Russell in 2015 (JSE, 2015). Given the control 
focus of this study a short time series is acceptable as auditors mostly uses analytical 
procedures over two-year periods (Gray & Manson, 2005:410). As the SRI index 
companies were analysed annually for inclusion in the index the number of 
companies on the index fluctuated annually (as summarised in Table 6-4).  
 
The sample of companies used in this study was constructed by starting with 
all the companies that were part of the SRI index during the periods 2011 to 2014, 
resulting in 90 companies in total being included in the index from 2011 to 2014. 
Companies that lost their listing or underwent a material change in their 
shareholding during the period were excluded from the evaluation. In addition, 
companies that did not operate during any of the periods from 2012 to 2014 were 
excluded.  
                                                 
90 There were 90 companies on the SRI index identified between 2011 to 2014, some companies 
might only have been members of the index for one year while other companies were members for 
the whole period. 
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Details of the list of companies as well as the name changes and exclusions 
are shown in Appendix 2. In summary the companies that form part of the study 
had to operate for the period of the study, be selected to be part of the SRI index in 
any year between 2011 and 2014, have a level of consistency in ownership and 
retain their status as listed companies for the period of the study. The criteria 
enabled the study to build a balanced panel data set (same companies over the same 
periods) in line with prior studies (Yermack, 1996:189; Ntim, 2009:136; Taljaard 
et al., 2015:430). 
 
6.6.2.1 Background to the SRI index 
The SRI index in South Africa is unique in that its establishment was driven 
by companies and not by institutional investors (GCX Africa, 2015). The index was 
the “first of its kind in an emerging market” (Herringer et al., 2009:14) when 
established in 2004 (JSE, 2015). In 2015, just over ten years later, the JSE partnered 
with FTSE Russell, a respected global index provider, and adopted the FTSE ESG91 
ratings linked to two indexes that focus on socially responsible investment in the 
FTSE/JSE Responsible Investment Index and the FTSE/JSE Responsible 
Investment Top 30 Index (JSE, 2015). The use of indexes like the Top 40, 
Responsible Investment Top 30, Resource 10, Industrial 25 and Financial 15 
highlights the limited size of the South African market for listed and large listed 
companies.  
 
The SRI index might represent a relatively small number of companies, 
especially when contrasted with international indexes. However, the SRI index 
represents a large portion of the market capitalisation in South Africa. In 2012 the 
total market capitalisation of the SRI index, as extracted from the McGregor’s 
BFA92 database, was 81.97% (and in 2013 it was 81.73%) of the total market 
capitalisation of the JSE All Share index. The top 100 companies in 2012 were 88% 
                                                 
91 ESG – Environment social and governance 
92 McGregor’s BFA changed to INET BFA, and then to IRESS during the period of the study. 
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of the JSE, highlighting the extensive market capitalisation coverage of the SRI 
index.   
 
The SRI index consists of larger profit-orientated companies with more 
diverse shareholders trading on the JSE, in line with agency theory as described by 
Dalton et al. (2007:34). Given the agency theory lens used in the study, larger 
companies where the board have oversight responsibility and a need to control goal 
alignment with the shareholders, who appointed them, merit special attention. Large 
listed companies are more likely to have widely held shares and need to comply 
with specific requirements, including the auditing of the financial statements as 
required by the Companies Act as well as additional disclosure requirements 
included in the JSE listing requirements (RSA, 2008a; JSE, 2011). 
 
In general, South African accounting and disclosure practices are strong, as 
pointed out in section 2.3. The First World nature of South African accounting 
practices extends to quality non-financial disclosure. Maubane et al. (2014:153) 
found that “South Africa is regarded as one of the leaders in sustainability reporting 
in the world”. Cho et al. (2013:71) found that improved corporate social 
responsibility disclosure or more transparent reporting practices help to reduce 
information asymmetry. Thus, the South Africa practice of applying transparent 
disclosure principles is invaluable as it enabled the study to extract the required data 
with the aid of a content analysis. 
 
6.6.2.2 Sample selection 
The SRI index has been purposely selected not for its sustainability focus but 
for its superior disclosure practices as publicly available documents are used in the 
evaluation of companies against the criteria of the index (JSE, 2010b; JSE, 2014a). 
SRI index companies are expected to apply transparent disclosure practices, and 
this expectation is not unfounded as an evaluation of disclosed integrated reporting 
trends found that companies on the SRI index outperformed companies on the JSE 
Top 100 in respect of disclosure (Nkonki Inc., 2012:17).  
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As this study focuses on non-financial controls applied by the board, focusing 
on companies that use transparent disclosure practices especially for non-financial 
information increases the likelihood that appropriate and reliable data will be 
available. This could bias the study with regard to larger companies. However, 
smaller owner-managed companies do not suffer from the level of goal divergence 
(or agency problems) that applies to their non-owner manager counterparts as they 
are generally managed by the owner. The index requirements regarding the 
disclosure of financial, non-financial and governance information made it more 
likely that relevant information will be available. The constituents on the SRI index 
are annually assessed for inclusion in or exclusion from the index by the JSE. Thus, 
using the SRI index criteria, companies on the SRI index are more likely to disclose 
appropriate, relevant and useful information to safeguard their position on the index 
(JSE, 2010b; JSE, 2011; JSE, 2014a). For example, Sun International has 
“[m]aintain inclusion in the JSE’s SRI Index” as a governance and sustainability 
strategic priority (Sun International, 2013:46).  
 
The South African SRI index is also unusual in that the index includes many 
mining companies (15 companies on the basic materials index are in mining) as 
well as companies involved in “sin” trades such as tobacco (1 company) and alcohol 
(2 companies). Heese (2005:730) notes that with the move towards social 
investment “large US municipal pension funds and private investors” publicly 
withheld investment based on ethical considerations around companies involved in 
“gambling, tobacco, alcohol and weapons” and mining activity, which is seen as 
involvement in “environmental degradation”. As mining, tobacco and alcohol-
based groups of companies are involved in unethical activities, the inclusion of 
companies involved in mining, tobacco and alcohol may be an indication of the 
success of the South African transformational agenda towards improved social 
responsibility. However, this study focuses on board-level controls and the 
relationship between transformational and ESG business practices, with firm value 
as an area for future research.  
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There are nine major industries represented on the JSE and they are all 
represented on the SRI. In South Africa utility companies are state-owned 
companies (SOC) and are not listed.93 The industry groupings are based on the 
industry groupings used by the JSE and extracted from INET for all the companies. 
More information on the number of companies in the major industry groupings as 
well as the re-coding of the industry groupings for CV5 is given in Table 6-5. 
 
Table 6-5 SRI Industry groupings 
Industry name Number of companies 
per industry 
Primary industries (0) 
versus consumer 
industries (1) re-coded94 
Consumer services 11 1 
Basic material 22 0 
Industrials 17 0 
Financials 17 1 
Telecommunication 3 1 
Health care 4 1 
Consumer goods 8 1 
Technology 1 0 
Oil and gas 1 0 
(INET BFA, [S.a.]) 
 
 
The re-coded industry groupings split the results in a 41 to 43 split, with 41 
companies in the primary industry group (coded as 0) and 43 in the consumer 
industry group (coded as 1). There was no change in the industry groupings over 
the period of the study.  
 
This study includes companies in the financial industry, which is often 
excluded from governance-related studies (Ntim, 2009:136; Mans-Kemp, 
2014:212-217). The more regulated nature of the financial industry is usually cited 
                                                 
93 Telkom is the only SOC that is listed and falls under the telecommunication industry. 
94 Industry is one of the control variables, CV5 = IND, a dichotomous variable where the primary 
industries, such as, mining (basic materials), oil and gas, technology and industrial (industrials) 
sectors with few customers are coded as 0 representing primary industries. The customer-centred 
industries, such as, consumer goods and services, health care, finance (financials) and 
telecommunication sectors with large customer bases are coded as 1 representing consumer 
industries. 
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as the main reason for the exclusion of the industry (Yermack, 1996:189; Ntim, 
2009:133; Carter, Li, Marcus & Tehranian, 2016:3). However, this might not be a 
valid argument as each industry has its own regulatory challenges. Eccles et al. 
(2009:31) included financial services in their accountability study on large South 
African listed companies. Kolobe (2010:22) also used all industries in a corporate 
governance study in line with Abdo and Fisher (2007:46). One of the disadvantages 
of including the financial industry is that the use of sales as a control variable to 
represent firm size is excluded as the revenue flows of financial companies are 
recorded differently from sales by other industries.  
 
6.6.3 Sampling practices in prior studies 
Accounting, auditing and control related studies on corporate governance 
areas in South Africa focus their research on large companies where separation 
between ownership and control is more likely. Samples used in recent prior studies 
include Semosa (2012) who used the five largest Platinum companies making up 
about 80% of the sector; Opperman (2009) used the 20 largest companies; Ashwin 
(2015) used 30 companies and Taljaard et al. (2015) used a sample of 40 companies. 
The Top 40 listed companies on the JSE have been used by multiple studies (Eccles 
et al., 2009; Marx, 2009; Barac & Moloi, 2010; Seakamela, 2011; Williams, 
Deodutt & Stainbank, 2016). Alessandri et al. (2011:244) based their Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) cross-sectional regression study on 64 transactions 
in BEE deals between 1993 and 1995, a census.  
 
Some recent corporate governance studies used larger samples, across longer 
timespans; Ntim (2009) used 100 companies in five industries over a five-year 
period and Mans-Kemp (2014) used 227 companies in six industries over an eight-
year period. Tshipa (2017) used 90 companies in five industries over a 13-year 
period. This study extracts panel data based on 84 SRI index constituents during 
the period 2012 to 2014 (252 firm year observations), in an environment in which 
the 2008 Companies Act applies.  
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6.6.4 Statistical versus control view 
Although data for multiple years yield more data points, and more data points 
are valued from a statistical point of view, this study centres on evaluating controls. 
In the evaluation of controls the reliable and consistent operation of controls over 
the assessed period is key to the evaluation of the acceptability of the operation of 
internal controls during an audit (Gray & Manson, 2005:329). Controls are 
generally judged to be ineffective if there is any indication that they are not reliable 
or consistent.  
 
Board-level controls differ from the normal operational internal control 
system by possibly having a delayed effect; therefore, the impact of a negative 
lagged dependent variable will also be considered. A delayed effect might be 
reasonable as it takes time for any change in controls in a company to filter through 
the processes in a manner that results in perceptible changes to firm performance 
and value. As noted in section 4.3.2.1, some board-level controls (on controlling 
for CEO ineffectiveness) could lag for up to two years. Using a micro panel enables 
this study to consider a possible lag effect.  
 
6.7 Data collection and analysis 
 
As very little of all the required information is available in archival databases, 
a structured content analysis of the available annual reports and websites was 
performed to extract the required data. As little information on board-level controls 
is available, the content analysis was the dominant data collection method. It is a 
manually intensive method that requires additional controls to ensure that the 
correct data have been extracted and captured reliably. Such a content analysis is 
not a frequently used research method due to the high time and cost demands of 
performing the content analysis in a manner that result in valid and reliable data. 
The content analysis was structured to identify, and capture information linked to 
the indicators defined in chapters 4 and 5. The indicators were used to represent the 
data collection units, however, some indicators needed multiple collected data 
points to provide the information needed in the indicator definition. For example, 
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identifying the ELDS required the automated analysis of 252 annual reports 
assessing 24 terms (Appendix 8) and took approximately a full week to identify the 
data related to one indicator using an automated tool. Although the individual score 
per integrated report was included in the MLI index, the average ELDS run on all 
84 companies’ integrated reports together per year initially showed an improving 
trend moving to from 2407 in 2012 to 3486 in 2013 falling back to 2541 in 2014. 
 
A content analysis is not as neutral when compared to database extraction 
because the researcher must identify the appropriate information and extract it 
manually. Some data such as the remuneration or meeting attendance of the 
different board members are easily identifiable and extractible per director. 
However, as the study focuses on the board and the board consist of a number of 
individuals it means that the relevant information had to be extracted from just over 
1000 directors per year. Only thereafter was it possible to calculate for example the 
average remuneration for executive and non-executive directors per board for each 
of the 84 companies, or the average percentage meeting attendance. Other factors 
were more difficult to identify and required an analysis of the narrative of the 
integrated report to identify, for example, to determine whether the board performed 
an annual performance evaluation for the board as well as all the board committees 
it was necessary to read large sections of the governance part of the integrated 
report. However, with additional controls it was possible to extract the data reliably. 
 
Face validity was considered in the definitions of the variables and indicators 
as well as during the data extraction process. The coding used to identify the 
indicators were determined a priori in the index identification and indicator 
definition phase of the study. During the identification of the variables and 
indicators in chapters 4 and 5, this study considered the definitions used by prior 
studies as well as local governance guidelines and regulations in the development 
of the definitions. Clear definitions for the indicators assisted to establish validity 
and enable reliability of the content analysis. Mostly the data collection was sourced 
from the integrated reports and company websites, however not all the information 
needed for the various indicators were readily disclosed. For example, the 
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information relating to race and gender are seldom disclosed and were coded using 
the guidance of the director’s cv or online profile and data from the Who Owns 
Whom database. This resulted in the diversity indicator being the most time-
consuming indicator to identify. 
 
As the study focuses on boards of listed companies the data needed to achieve 
the research objective are publicly available in various formats. Financial and 
market-related data are available on archival databases like IRESS. In addition, 
boards disclose information in the integrated reports of their companies on the 
methods they employ to control and direct their companies. Extracting data from 
publicly available integrated reports or existing archives is more objective as it 
takes place after the fact and cannot influence the phenomenon being studied, in 
line with this study’s worldview and the non-experimental design. Extracting 
quantifiable data for the various indicators enabled this study to construct the 
various indexes. 
 
6.7.1 Building indexes 
Given the complexity in the business environment, corporate governance 
studies have started to use index building as a mechanism to consolidate variables 
(Gompers et al., 2003; Ntim, 2009; Daines et al., 2010; Bhagat, Bolton & Lu, 2015). 
This study builds on the existing practice of constructing indexes by building four 
indexes. The CI and MLI indexes are independent variables and measure the board 
as a governance mechanism, and the QAS and CCI indexes are part of the control 
variables.  
 
The CI and MLI indexes extend the traditional practice of building corporate 
governance indexes by developing indexes that focus on board-level controls. The 
focus on board-level controls uses an annual focus in line with the annual reporting 
cycle of the board to the shareholders at the AGM. The indexes were constructed 
using 0;1 scoring for the various indicators as per their definitions. In several cases 
the 0;1 split was determined by the indicator’s median for the industry group. An 
advantage of using the median is that it is the midpoint of the data and “is not 
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disproportionally affected by extreme scores” (Howell, 1999:57). To improve 
comparability, the index score is translated to a percentage. More information on 
the CI and MLI indexes has been included in Appendixes 5 and 6. 
 
Gompers et al. (2003:108-110) developed the first seminal governance index 
as a proxy for shareholders’ rights by considering provisions that reduce 
shareholders’ rights, such as takeover defences. Their motivation for the 
development of the index was to avoid the limitations of event studies by “taking a 
long-horizon approach”. They based their index on the Investor Responsibility 
Research Centre’s 24 provisions and coded the provisions as “1” when they reduced 
“shareholder rights” (Gompers et al., 2003:109). Subsequently their index was used 
by other studies that were making use of data from the USA (Core, Guay & 
Rusticus, 2006:656; Chae, Kim & Lee, 2009:2095; Bushee, Carter & Gerakos, 
2014:129), or cited by other studies that were building indexes (Ntim, 2009:142; 
Bhagat et al., 2015).  
 
A number of commercial corporate governance indexes have been developed 
by The Corporate Library, Institutional Shareholder Services and Governance 
Metrics International (Ertugrul & Hegde, 2009:158; Daines et al., 2010:440). 
However, they focused mostly on USA data and applied standardised methods 
which do not fully consider the differences between countries and their legal 
systems. Country-specific differences do, however, play a role as noted by 
Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013:8).  
 
South African governance studies have also followed the index-building trend 
to consolidate a number of corporate governance factors into an index by 
developing indexes that centred on the unique governance environment that 
prevails in South Africa. Ntim (2009:27-28) developed a South African Corporate 
Governance Index as a compliance index with 50 governance provisions that were 
scored using 0;1 as dummy variables. Mans-Kemp (2014:9) used the PIC’s 
Corporate Governance Rating Matrix to develop a comprehensive corporate 
governance score using 39 disclosure provisions with 35 acceptability dimensions 
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(Mans-Kemp, 2014:160-161 & 199). However, an index that was used by other 
South African studies was developed by Abdo and Fisher (2007:45), who used 29 
governance disclosure factors for a G-score with an added quality aspect, using a 
score of 0;1;2. The index developed by Abdo and Fisher (2007) was subsequently 
applied by Opperman (2009) and Kolobe (2010). All the above studies focused on 
corporate governance and used a limited number of board-related indicators in their 
indexes. 
 
This study used index-building strategies to consolidate two control variables, 
namely QAS and CCI95. As with the CI and MLI indexes the QAS and CCI was 
also constructed in line with the variable definitions using 0;1 scores to construct 
the index and for improved comparability the score is converted to a percentage. 
The CI index consisted of 25 indicators and the MLI index consisted of 23 
indicators to focus the study on the board as a governance mechanism. The 
following section discusses the process used to extract, check and summarise the 
data to construct the indexes. 
 
6.7.2 Extracting, checking and summarising data 
Despite the expected availability of the data for the dependent and control 
variables in databases, there were instances where the database contained 
incomplete information, especially for audit fees. In such cases the missing data 
were extracted from the company’s audited annual financial statements. Extracted 
financial information that was not expressed in Rand was converted to Rand using 
the disclosed exchange rate reported in the integrated reports to allow for 
consistency in the analysis.  
 
Where extraction of data for control variables and dependent variables from 
a database (archival research) was possible, this was the preferred method. One of 
the advantages of archival research in addition to the ease of downloading large 
                                                 
95 This study extends the current body of knowledge on the development of the QAS and CCI 
indexes and positioning quality audit considerations and company control considerations outside of 
the direct control of the board as part of the control variables.  
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numbers of variables for large numbers of entities over many periods is that it is 
considered a reliable source of valid data.  
 
The data extraction focused on the data of companies and boards at financial 
year-end as reported in the annual financial statements and integrated reports, with 
the exclusion of shareholder data. Shareholder data were extracted at the end of 
January for all the companies and all the years. To ensure consistency in the way 
shareholders’ information was summarised, a macro was used to classify 
shareholders in the various years to identify the larger shareholders based on their 
percentage shareholding. Where shareholder data were not available in IRESS, they 
were extracted from other databases like Thomson Reuters or from the integrated 
reports (that also frequently disclose large shareholders and directors’ interest in 
shares).  
 
The data extraction process was extremely time-consuming and costly as the 
study used narrower definitions of board control indicators for both the CI and the 
MLI indexes. Data on each individual director for each firm and each period were 
extracted manually and used to populate a spreadsheet for the further consolidation 
and analysis of the individual director’s characteristics and activities to identify the 
data needed for the various indicators for the board.  
 
To facilitate the consistent analysis and summation of the extracted data, a 
template spreadsheet was developed to structure the process to ensure that the same 
layout encourages consistent data collection, while the underlying formulas ensured 
consistent analysis and summation of individual director’s data to board-level data 
(refer to Figure 6-3). Data for each board was collected on its own spreadsheet 
resulting in 84 spreadsheets that summarised the collected data per year in the 
summary sheet that collected around 100 points to gather information for all the 
identified indicators. 
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Figure 6-3 Spreadsheet template 
Spreadsheet template design 
 
Spreadsheet template summary 
 
 
Formulas were used in the spreadsheet to ensure correctness and consistency 
in the consolidation and summarisation of the extracted data. Summation was 
needed to transform the data collected from more than 3000 directors over the 
period of the study into indicators representing the boards over the different periods. 
The template with its formulas enabled accuracy and consistency in the 
summarisation process. Different sheets were used for the data applicable to 
different years, and a summary was provided on the last sheet. The summary sheet 
summarised approximately 100 datapoints for each year and each company to 
enable the study to construct the defined indexes. Thus, the summarised data that 
enabled index building in this study represent 25 200 data points (100×3×84 = 
25 200). The use of standardisation and templates to reduce input errors is in line 
with normal document design principles applicable to source documents as an input 
control (Gray & Manson, 2005:279). The extracted data translated into over 3000 
individual director observations for more than 100 indicators (per year) that had to 
be consolidated per board to populate the indicators and construct the indexes.  
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Unfortunately, manual extraction is prone to human error. To control for 
human error, separation of duties was applied between the person extracting the 
data and the person checking the data. Thus, although the initial data extraction was 
extremely time consuming and costly, the controls over the process was equally 
time consuming and costly. To ensure reliability, data were extracted by trainee 
accountants and research assistants and checked by another person96 for accuracy. 
The data extraction, data capturing, and checking were all time consuming and each 
stage took months to complete. The time required ranged from an average of 
between an hour to two hours to extract the data per company per year. Checking 
the correctness of the extracted data required a replication of the original process 
that also took an average of between an hour to two hours per company per year. 
The biggest challenge was finding data not readily disclosed in the integrated report. 
The checking of the data ensured the reliability and correctness of the data as the 
checking process mimicked the extraction process. 
 
6.7.3 Data analysis 
Once the data had been extracted the template summaries were copied to a 
consolidated spreadsheet that combined all the data for all the company boards, and 
the data were reviewed again. This was followed by the coding of the various 
indicators and the construction of the indexes using formulas. The coding and 
formulas were reviewed for compliance with the indicator definitions described in 
chapters 4 and 5. Lastly, all the identified variables were transferred to the panel 
used by the study for analysis and testing (Figure 6-4). 
  
                                                 
96 The extracted data were checked for completeness and accuracy mainly by the author. In some 
cases, easily verifiable data were checked by other research assistants to ensure timely completion. 
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Figure 6-4 Panel data 
 
 
The construction of a panel enabled the study to use descriptive and 
inferential statistics with econometric methods to analyse the data in line with the 
hypothesised model. Despite the development of a theoretical model to test the 
hypotheses, the main factor that influenced the analysis of the data was the nature 
of the data itself.  
 
Descriptive statistics show the frequencies for normative data while for ratio 
data the means (averages), median, minimum, maximum, standard deviation and 
skewness are shown to help paint a picture of the central tendency (Howell, 
1999:55-59) and variance (Howell, 1999:66-74) of the data.97 Descriptive statistics 
render more information on individual variables. However, this study focused on 
the relationship between the dependent and independent variables and 
understanding individual variables does not produce more information on 
relationships between variables. A correlation analysis98 was used to “measure the 
association between two numerical variables” (Sweet & Grace-Martin, 2003:87). A 
correlation test produces a correlation coefficient, which shows “the degree or 
strength” of the relationship and the covariance, which shows “the degree by which 
two variables vary together” (Howell, 1999:142 and 151). These measures do not 
show the cause of the relationship.  
                                                 
97 The visual representation of central tendency and variability in the form of a histogram with a 
normal distribution curve has been included for the different variables in Appendixes 3 to 6. 
98 A more detailed discussion on the correlation method used is provided in chapter 7 with the 
analysis. 
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Using statistical methods such as correlation or regression analysis enabled 
the study to identify the relationships between variables as well as identify the 
significance of these relationships. The term ‘significance’ considers “estimates of 
probability that indicate the degree to which chance is a likely explanation for the 
observed patterns” (Sweet & Grace-Martin, 2003:88). A strong positive statistically 
significant relationship therefore not only identifies an existing relationship but is 
an indication that it can be used to predict the effect of the relationship on the related 
variables. A strong correlation between control and independent variables can be 
an indication of multicollinearity and an unstable regression model. 
Multicollinearity is tested in the next chapter. 
 
As the study focused on the relationship between multiple variables, a 
multiple linear regression model is better suited to assess the relationship. Multiple 
regression shows “how two or more variables act together to affect a dependent 
variable” (Sweet & Grace-Martin, 2003:131 & 139) using the following model: 
Y = α0 + β1X1it + β2X2it + β3X3it + β4X4it + … + βk Xkit + εit 
Y, the dependent variable, is a linear function of Xkit independent variables. 
β0 the intercept is a constant, and β is the regression coefficient for each X variable 
and indicates the slope of the relationship on a line. ε the error or residual is assumed 
to be zero. i and t represent the number of cases and the time periods in 
consideration of the cross-sectional and time series nature of panel data. This can 
be translated to the variables used in this study as follow: 
Firm valueit = α0 + β1BLOCKit + β2CONSHAit + β3DIRSHAit + 
β4QASit + β5INDit + β6CCIit + β7CIit + β8MLIit +εit 
To obtain a better understanding of the relationship between the variables, the 
study first used a cross-sectional multiple regression on a year-by-year analysis of 
the model. This analysis also considered the effect of a negative lagged dependent 
variable as there are indications of a lag in the literature. Thereafter the model was 
tested using pooled OLS with the Breusch-Pagan variation of the Lagrange 
Multiplier test to test for heteroscedasticity and random coefficient variation. 
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Given the short time dimension99 thus study does not report on serial 
correlation tests for the panel, but heterogeneity is considered. The cross-sectional 
and time series nature prompted the study to use panel analysis as panel data can 
control “for unobserved time invariant heterogeneity in cross-sectional models” and 
help to “study the dynamics of cross-sectional populations” (Arellano, 2003:7). 
There are alternative econometric methods available for panel data namely Random 
Effects and Fixed Effects using OLS or GLS. However, the data will determine the 
best estimation method after considering the results of the Breusch-Pagan and 
Hausman tests. More information on these tests is included in chapter 7. 
 
6.8 Summary 
 
The research purpose dictates the research methods, design and approach 
followed in addressing the research objectives and testing the hypotheses. This 
chapter summarised the research methodology followed to achieve the objectives 
and purpose of the study. The study uses descriptive research to describe the 
controls used by the board as a governance mechanism supported by index 
development to measure the boards’ controlling (CI) and directional (MLI) use of 
board-level controls. The development of quantifiable indexes is in line with the 
quantitative research design as well as a post-positivist world view used by this 
study and enable the study to measure the controls used by the board to achieve the 
study’s sub-objectives. The quantification of the indexes enabled this study to use 
econometric analysis to assess the relationship between the board as a governance 
mechanism and firm value to test the study’s hypotheses.  
 
This study extended the index building practice of Gompers et al. (2003) by 
constructing the CI and MLI indexes to measure the controls used by the board as 
a governance mechanism. In addition to the CI and MLI indexes the study also 
constructed two control indexes the QAS and CCI indexes. The underlying data 
                                                 
99 This study did not discuss the alternative statistical methods commonly used for macro panels or 
longer time-series of around ten years. 
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used to populate the indexes were extracted from integrated reports and websites 
(publicly available information) using a structured content analysis. The structured 
nature of the content analysis guided the data collection to ensure valid and reliable 
data is extracted in a value neutral manner in line with the post-positivist world 
view.  
 
The use of externally observable data from published records resulted in a 
non-experimental design as none of the variables or indicators were manipulated in 
the collection process. The use of value neutral quantitative data enables 
econometric methods to analyse the panel variables in a manner that helps to 
identify the association between specific individual variables while holding the 
other variables constant. Econometric methods analyse data in a manner that 
simulate an experimental design to identify the associations of individual predictor 
variables in the dependent variable while holding the other variables constant. 
 
The study is based on the boards of 84 SRI index companies between 2012 
and 2014 resulting in a near population coverage given the limitations of a balanced 
panel. The timing of the study started in 2012 when the 2008 Companies Act came 
into effect and ends in 2014 as the SRI index changed in 2015 to focus this study 
on the changed legislative environment that bond the control options of the board 
and allocated specific decision or approval control to shareholders. Data from 84 
companies over three time periods enabled the study to develop a balanced micro 
panel for further panel analysis using Random and Fixed Effects. Panel analysis can 
help to control for cross-sectional heterogeneity, improves the sample size and are 
better able to identify effects when compared to a purely cross-sectional or time 
series model. 
 
The phase 1 data were extractible from IRESS. Phase 2 defined the data 
required for the control variables and the index indicators and extracted the control 
variables where data was readily available in IRESS. Phase 3 used a structured 
content analysis to extract and summarise the required data to populate the 
remaining control variables and the CI and MLI indexes to achieve SO 1 and SO 2. 
314 
 
 
 
Phase 4 performs the statistical analysis to test the hypotheses, enabling the study 
to achieve the main research objective (RO), as described in chapter 7. Chapter 7 
discusses the results of the analysis and tests performed on the collected data and 
enable the study to test the hypotheses and achieve the study’s outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
“Progress, of the best kind, is comparatively slow. Great results cannot be achieved at once; and 
we must be satisfied to advance in life as we walk, step by step.” 
Samuel Smiles  
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter 6 the research methodology followed in this study was described 
from the perspective of the research approach, design and methods applied to 
collect and analyse the required data into a panel data set.100 In the discussion on 
research methods, the variables and index indicators identified in the preceding 
chapters were highlighted, and the research methods used to collect and analyse the 
required data explained. In this chapter the emphasis is on discussing the analysis 
of the collected data and the procedures used to test the hypotheses. When assessing 
controls in auditing it is important to clearly describe the full process followed to 
allow other auditors to follow the logic and steps of the process in a reliable manner.  
 
This chapter’s discussion uses a descriptive format to explain the various 
steps taken in the assessment of the data from descriptive statistics ending in 
Random and Fixed Effects panel estimations to test the hypotheses. The data 
analysis methods used are summarised in Figure 7-1. 
 
  
                                                 
100 This study used a short or micro panel to test the hypothesis as it included a relatively large cross-
section with a time period of only three years (Arellano, 2003:1). 
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Figure 7-1 Data analysis methods 
 
 
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the descriptive statistics for all 
the variables identified to consider the nature of the underlying data in section 7.2. 
The descriptive statistics discussion is followed by a bivariate Pearson product-
moment correlation and cross-sectional multiple regression analysis using the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method in section 7.3. The correlation and regression 
analyses were used to perform a more detailed analysis to obtain a better 
understanding of the nature of the relationship between the variables on a year-by-
year basis that focuses on the cross-sectional nature of the data.  
 
The main assessment used in this study is the hypotheses testing discussed in 
section 7.4 that begins with pooled OLS estimators with a Breusch-Pagan 
adaptation of the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests to assess the underlying data to 
determine the most suitable analysis method. This is followed by Random Effects 
panel estimation with Hausman’s test and Fixed Effects panel estimation to assess 
the hypotheses. More detail on the various options used in the Random and Fixed 
Effects estimations are discussed in section 7.4.3. Lastly, section 7.5 summarises 
Hypothesis testing for pooled and panel data
Pooled OLS with Breusch-Pagan test
Random and Fixed Effects estimations using 
panel data with Hausman test
Describing the underlying relationships between variables for pooled data 
and per year
Bivariate correlation analysis considering 
multicollinearity
Multiple regression analysis per year 
between the current (t) and t+1 dependent 
variables with multicollinearity tests 
Descriptive statistics on pool data and per year
Frequencies for normative data
Descriptives on central tendency and 
variation of ratio data
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the results of the hypotheses testing and presents the conclusions on the study’s 
research objectives. 
 
7.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
The development of descriptive statistics is dependent on the nature and 
levels of measurement of the data in the underlying variables. Data that are nominal, 
like a company’s name, or a dichotomous variable (where there is a choice between 
mutually exclusive categories) are of a qualitative nature and the frequency and 
percentage of their occurrence are used for descriptive statistical purposes (Levin 
& Fox, 2006). The nominal variables are summarised in Table 7-1, which describes 
the frequency and percentage occurrence for each period of the study as well as for 
the whole period, as pooled data, to better understand the distribution of the 
underlying data. 
 
Table 7-1 Descriptive statistics for variables represented by nominal data 
Per year Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
2012 No controlling shareholder 55 65.5 65.5 65.5 
Controlling shareholder 29 34.5 34.5 100.0 
Primary sector 41 48.8 48.8 48.8 
Consumer-centred sector 43 51.2 51.2 100.0 
2013 No controlling shareholder 56 66.7 66.7 66.7 
Controlling shareholder 28 33.3 33.3 100.0 
Primary sector 41 48.8 48.8 48.8 
Consumer-centred sector 43 51.2 51.2 100.0 
2014 No controlling shareholder 56 66.7 66.7 66.7 
Controlling shareholder 28 33.3 33.3 100.0 
Primary sector 41 48.8 48.8 48.8 
Consumer-centred sector 43 51.2 51.2 100.0 
 
  
318 
 
 
 
Table 7-1 Descriptive statistics for variables represented by nominal data 
- continued 
For 2012 to 2014 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
No controlling shareholder 167 66.3 66.3 66.3 
Controlling shareholder 85 33.7 33.7 100.0 
Primary sector 123 48.8 48.8 48.8 
Consumer-centred sector 129 51.2 51.2 100.0 
 
 
The assumptions of the agency theory, discussed in more detail in chapter 3, 
include the assumption that there is a separation of duties between the shareholders 
and the board. This is less likely in situations where there are controlling 
shareholders. As around two-thirds (66.3%) of the companies to which the pooled 
data relate do not have a controlling shareholder, the likelihood of agency cost due 
to goal divergence is applicable to the boards the study focuses on. There was a 
small decrease in the number of controlling firms between 2012 and 2013. In 2012, 
65.5% of the boards of companies had no controlling shareholder but this increased 
to 66.7% in 2013.  
 
An assessment of the difference between shareholder groups (shown in Table 
7-2) using t-tests on the pool (2012-2014), shows that except for CI there are 
significant differences between the means of the group controlled by a controlling 
shareholder and the group with no controlling shareholder, supporting the use of an 
agency theory perspective. The existence of a controlling shareholder shows lower 
levels of directors’ shareholding or blockholding. Monitoring by a controlling 
shareholder resulted in higher levels of assurance as evidenced by the higher QAS 
mean, with lower use of company controls as shown by a lower CCI score. The 
higher mean for MLI for companies without a controlling shareholder suggests that 
diverse shareholders rely more on the directional role of the board as a monitoring 
mechanism as measured by the MLI index to compensate for their lack of 
monitoring. However, there is not a significant difference between the groups for 
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CI suggesting that the controlling role of the board are possibly more influenced by 
governance recommendations than goal alignment.  
 
Table 7-2 Influence of controlling shareholders 
For 2012 to 2014 N Mean 
BLOCK No controlling shareholder 167 23.347*** 
Controlling shareholder 85 14.545*** 
DIRSHA No controlling shareholder 167 4.36* 
Controlling shareholder 85 2.052* 
QAS No controlling shareholder 167 46.706*** 
Controlling shareholder 85 57.648*** 
CCI No controlling shareholder 167 51.897*** 
Controlling shareholder 85 43.53*** 
CI No controlling shareholder 167 60.24 
Controlling shareholder 85 59.01 
MLI No controlling shareholder 167 67.48*** 
Controlling shareholder 85 59.871*** 
*** significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; * significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
The split between primary and consumer-centred industries (shown in Table 
7-1) is around 50:50, with the primary sector at 48.8% and the consumer-focused 
sector at 51.2%. An assessment of the difference between industry groups (shown 
in Table 7-3) using t-tests focusing on the different industries for the pool shows 
significant differences for QAS and CI. 
 
Table 7-3 Influence of the different industries 
 Description N Mean 
BLOCK Primary industries 123 19.3020 
Consumer industries 129 21.4038 
DIRSHA Primary industries 123 3.3002 
Consumer industries 129 3.8487 
QAS Primary industries 123 53.39** 
Consumer industries 129 47.545** 
CCI Primary industries 123 48.6456 
Consumer industries 129 49.4835 
CI Primary industries 123 63.77*** 
Consumer industries 129 56.062*** 
MLI Primary industries 123 65.32 
Consumer industries  129 64.53 
*** significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; * significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
320 
 
 
 
There was no industry-related change over the different periods resulting in 
industry being a constant over time. The constant nature of the industry 
classification was taken into consideration in the Fixed Effects estimations in 
section 7.4. For both CI and QAS the controls used by the primary sector had higher 
means, suggesting the regulatory environment of the primary industries result in 
higher legislative or regulatory control demands. 
 
This study relied mainly on ratio data that use measurement scales with equal 
intervals between data points and a true zero point (Field, 2009:9). Examples of the 
ratios used in this study are the four proxies for firm value, namely RoA, RoE, EV 
and Q. The descriptive statistics for the different proxies for firm value as the 
dependent variables are summarised in Table 7-4 for the combined three-year 
period as well as each year. 
 
Table 7-4 Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable proxies 
2012 to 2014 ROA RoE EV Q 
N Valid 252 252 252 252 
Mean 9.8249 12.167 190.9175 1.5584 
Median 8.5331 14.4683 103.399 1.12 
Std deviation 13.12715 46.99257 260.21304 1.30104 
Variance 172.322 2208.301 67710.824 1.693 
Minimum -40.31 -483.65 1.05 0.13 
Maximum 63.73 81.61 1726.47 6.2 
Percentiles 25 1.8484 7.7645 44.6906 0.7825 
50 8.5331 14.4683 103.399 1.12 
75 14.665 21.9934 224.0905 1.805 
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Table 7-4 Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable proxies - 
continued 
Year ROA RoE EV Q 
2012 N Valid 84 84 84 84 
Mean 10.5578 10.7025 176.7535 1.5965 
Median 8.533 14.714 92.168 1.13 
Std deviation 13.26028 52.68265 242.68792 1.34352 
Variance 175.835 2775.461 58897.426 1.805 
Minimum -25.76 -422.655 1.05 0.13 
Maximum 63.37 81.61 1457.79 6.09 
Percentiles 25 2.4628 7.2585 44.0838 0.7875 
50 8.533 14.714 92.168 1.13 
75 15.908 23.1288 191.1513 1.8425 
 
2013 N Valid 84 84 84 84 
Mean 9.227 8.7221 188.1115 1.5869 
Median 7.6805 14.237 93.8405 1.135 
Std deviation 15.36947 60.25877 255.97093 1.36009 
Variance 236.223 3631.119 65521.117 1.85 
Minimum -40.314 -483.65 1.26 0.13 
Maximum 63.732 74.15 1610.64 6.1 
Percentiles 25 1.5228 6.8915 42.8783 0.7775 
50 7.6805 14.237 93.8405 1.135 
75 15.4768 21.629 223.7285 1.965 
 
2014 N Valid 84 84 
 
Mean 9.6898 17.0766 207.8875 84 84 
Median 8.7235 14.5505 114.0145 1.4917 
Std deviation 10.39903 15.26335 282.56512 1.1 
Variance 108.14 232.97 79843.046 1.20715 
Minimum -6.95 -8.97 1.48 1.457 
Maximum 43.62 57.89 1726.47 0.13 
Percentiles 25 1.117 9.416 6.2 
Percentiles 25 1.117 9.416 45.1255 0.7675 
50 8.7235 14.5505 45.1255 0.7675 
75 13.997 21.5383 114.0145 1.1 
 
 
The value of descriptive statistics lies in its ability to describe the data to 
improve insight into the central tendency and distribution of the data. Both RoA 
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and RoE could be negative in situations where the company made a loss, but the 
market-related data linked to EV and Q cannot move below zero.101 The high 
variance of RoE and EV could be an early warning of heteroskedasticity as 
Studenmund (2011:346) warns that “cross-sectional studies with large variations in 
the size of the dependent variable are particularly susceptible to heteroskedasticity”. 
More details on the different proxies for firm value as the dependent variables have 
been summarised in Appendix 3. The study specifically considered 
heteroskedasticity in the hypotheses testing section. 
 
The only descriptive variable with an increasing mean trend is EV with Q 
following a reducing trend. The differences in the performance of the two market-
related variables may be attributed to the exclusion of cash in the EV formula as 
well as to differences between them in respect of the divisions used. EV is divided 
by the number of shares whereas Q is divided by assets valued at replacement cost. 
The means of both RoA and RoE decreased between 2012 and 2013, with RoE 
increasing above its 2012 value in 2014 while RoA increased as well, but not above 
its 2012 level. The latter highlights the advantage of using outside funding 
(leverage) for increased return despite the increased risk to shareholders. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the control variables are also mostly ratio data except 
for the two variables described above for the industry (IND) and controlling 
shareholders (CONSHA). The study controls for the percentage shareholding held 
by blockholders (BLOCK) who are not controlling shareholders and directors’ 
shareholding (DIRSHA) to control for the monitoring by shareholders. Together 
with the 34.5%-33.3% (Table 7-1) of the companies being controlled by a 
controlling shareholder, blockholders control around 20% and the board another 
+3.5% although the median board control is less than 0.5% (Table 7-5). The level 
of shareholder control is a clear indication that there is remains a clear level of 
separation of ownership from control which is a cornerstone of the agency theory. 
 
                                                 
101 Negative values influence data transformation options as log or inverse transformations are not 
possible and squared values could adversely influence the functional relationship. 
323 
 
 
 
As shareholders appoint both the audit firm and the audit committee, the 
quality audit score (QAS) represents assurance used by shareholders to bond the 
board to transparent and reliable reporting practices using quality assurance as 
monitor. The last control variable is a company control index (CCI) that combines 
several company control considerations that represent past board or shareholder 
decisions that are beyond the control of the board in the current period but could 
influence their control options. This study extended the practice of index 
construction to also include QAS and CCI as control variables. 
 
A detailed summary of the control variables is included in Appendix 4. The 
descriptive statistics for the ratio control variables are summarised in Table 7-5, 
showing the statistics by year as well as for the whole period.  
 
Table 7-5 Descriptive statistics for the control variables 
Year BLOCK DIRSHA QAS CCI 
2012 N Valid 84 84 84 84 
Mean 20.688 3.7414 48.8093 49.6037 
Median 19.59 0.215 33.33 50.0 
Std deviation 12.8715 8.99793 22.2269 22.2519 
Variance 165.677 80.963 493.981 495.149 
Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maximum 57.14 57.93 100.0 100.0 
Percentiles 25 11.5 0.0325 33.33 33.3333 
50 19.59 0.215 33.33 50.0 
75 28.0525 2.7275 66.67 66.67 
 
2013 N Valid 84 84 84 84 
Mean 20.2575 3.4844 50.7938 48.2149 
Median 18.735 0.235 66.67 50.0 
Std deviation 12.16119 8.91556 22.24362 21.4934 
Variance 147.895 79.487 494.779 461.67 
Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maximum 57.84 57.93 100.0 83.33 
Percentiles 25 11.0025 0.02 33.33 33.33 
50 18.735 0.235 66.67 50.0 
75 28.195 2.315 66.67 66.67 
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Table 7-5 Descriptive statistics for the control variables - continued 
Year BLOCK DIRSHA QAS CCI 
2014 N Valid 84 84 84 84 
Mean 20.1882 3.517 51.5874 49.4045 
Median 18.775 0.265 66.67 50.0 
Std deviation 12.41152 10.00674 22.20059 21.86818 
Variance 154.046 100.135 492.866 478.217 
Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maximum 56.40 57.95 100.0 100.0 
Percentiles 25 11.2425 0.0225 33.33 33.33 
50 18.775 0.265 66.67 50.0 
75 28.555 1.6225 66.67 66.67 
 
2012 to 2014 BLOCK DIRSHA QAS CCI 
N Valid 252 252 252 252 
Mean 20.3779 3.581 50.3968 49.0745 
Median 19.09 0.24 66.67 50.0 
Std deviation 12.43702 9.28346 22.16553 21.79471 
Variance 154.679 86.183 491.311 475.009 
Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maximum 57.84 57.95 100.0 100.0 
Percentiles 25 11.3275 0.0225 33.33 33.33 
50 19.09 0.24 66.67 50.00 
75 28.3675 2.41 66.67 66.67 
 
 
Although the means and medians for BLOCK and DIRSHA show small 
variations over time, the median of CCI is constant at 50 over the period. The small 
median of DIRSHA in comparison to the mean indicates that directors’ 
shareholdings are generally small, which could increase goal divergence. The mean 
of the QAS shows an increasing trend over time, which could be attributable to a 
rising need to use quality assurance as a monitor to ensure transparent disclosure 
practices and compliance with the new stricter legislative and regulatory 
requirements. The indexes developed by this study (QAS, CCI, CI and MLI) are all 
measured using percentages, and BLOCK and DIRSHA represent the respective 
percentage shareholding. 
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The last variables that need to be considered are the independent variables, 
namely the CI and MLI indexes. Together the CI and MLI indexes represent the 
board as a governance mechanism. In addition to the QAS and CCI indexes this 
study extended the body of knowledge on the board as a governance mechanism by 
constructing indexes that represent an in-depth analysis of board-level controls in 
the corporate control and managerial labour constructs. The definitions of and 
indicators for the CI and MLI indexes were given in chapters 4 and 5 and 
summarised in Appendixes 5 and 6 respectively. Descriptive statistics relating to 
the CI and MLI indexes as independent variables are summarised in Table 7-6 for 
the whole period as pooled data and on a year-by-year basis. 
 
Table 7-6 Descriptive statistics for the independent variables 
Variable and 
period 
Mean Median Std 
deviation 
Variance Minimum Maximum 
CI 2012-2014 59.83 60.0 14.288 204.145 24 88 
MLI 2012-2014 64.91 65.0 13.113 171.953 22 100 
 
 CI 
2012 
CI 
2013 
CI 
2014 
MLI 
2012 
MLI 
2013 
MLI 
2014 
N Valid 84 84 84 84 84 84 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 58.86 59.29 61.33 63.4 64.88 66.45 
Median 60.0 60.0 60.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 
Std deviation 14.543 14.351 14.013 14.496 12.455 12.25 
Variance 211.497 205.941 196.369 210.123 155.118 150.058 
Minimum 32 28 24 22 30 43 
Maximum 88 88 88 96 91 100 
Percentiles 25 48.0 48.0 52.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 
50 60.0 60.0 60.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 
75 72.0 71.0 72.0 74.0 74.0 74.0 
 
 
The CI and MLI indexes both have constant medians and show a slight 
upwards trend in their means. Both the means and medians are close suggesting a 
normal distribution with a limited range through the period showing a lack of 
outliers in the independent variables. In the CI index there is a more dramatic 
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improvement in the lower percentiles, with an increase from 48 in 2012 and 2013 
to 52 in 2014.  
 
In contrast, the MLI percentiles are constant. The consistent nature of the 
percentiles and median for the MLI index could indicate a higher level of maturity 
linked to the directional role of the board. To obtain a better understanding of the 
relationships between the variables, a correlation analysis and cross-sectional 
regression analysis are done in the next section. 
 
7.3 Correlation and cross-sectional regression analyses 
 
Testing a relationship or correlation between two variables can help to 
identify the significance and size of the correlation or relationship, but it does not 
indicate the cause of the relationship (Field, 2009:173). With the use of multiple 
explanatory variables (the control as well as independent variables), a cross-
sectional analysis can identify the relationship between the variables at a point in 
time. Section 7.3.1 introduces correlation analysis; this is followed by section 7.3.2, 
which focuses on the correlation analysis between the variables considering each 
period separately as well as the combined period as pooled data and to assess 
possible multicollinearity problems. Section 7.3.3 focuses on the cross-sectional 
regression analysis of the variables for the individual years to better understand the 
underlying relationships between the variables, to consider a negative lag102 to firm 
value, the dependent variable and to assess possible multicollinearity problems.  
 
7.3.1 Correlation analysis 
This study calculated the Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient 
for each of the different years (Pearson’s correlation). A value of +1 indicates a 
perfectly positive correlation between two variables and a value of -1 indicates a 
perfectly negative correlation relationship (Field, 2009:170). To describe the 
                                                 
102 A negative lag is the opposite of a lag and is used to indicate that there is a delayed relationship 
with future events, whereas the term lag relates to a delayed relationship to the past. 
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different strengths of a correlation, irrespective of whether it is positive or negative, 
this study describes correlations of r = 0.1 to 0.29 as weak, r = 0.3 to 0.49 as 
moderate and correlations of r = 0.5 and above as strong (Pallant, 2007:132).  
 
A Pearson’s correlation was used on the cross-sectional data using SPSS as 
the variables are mostly based on ratio data, and it is also possible to use Pearson 
between interval or ratio data and dichotomous variables (Pallant, 2007:126). 
However, it is recommended that a point-biserial correlation coefficient be used to 
measure the strength of the linear relationship between an interval or ratio variable 
and a dichotomous variable (Field, 2009:183). In SPSS the Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient analysis is used to calculate a point-biserial correlation; however, the 
dichotomous variables must be coded as 0 and 1, as was the case in this study.  
 
To calculate a Pearson’s correlation coefficient two assumptions need to be 
satisfied, the first is that the variables are normally distributed (or that a large 
sample is used), and the second is that interval or ratio data are used with categorical 
variables that only have two categories (Field, 2009:177). Field (2009:42) explains 
that “as samples get large (usually defined as greater than 30), the sampling 
distribution has a normal distribution”. As this study is based on 84 boards of 
companies (more than 30) and three years (252 observations)103 and uses interval 
or ratio data with 0;1 coded dichotomous variables, the assumptions are satisfied.  
 
7.3.2 Correlations between the variables 
It is important to consider the correlations between all the variables used in 
the study to better understand the underlying relationships between the variables. 
The results of the correlation analysis for the variables for all the periods combined 
are shown in Table 7-7 (ignoring the difference in years). This is followed by 
correlation analysis on a year-by-year basis with the significant relationships 
highlighted in Table 7-8. 
                                                 
103 Wooldridge (2013:142) explains that even when a dependent variable is not normally distributed 
“the central limit theorem concludes that OLS estimators satisfy asymptotic normality” in “large 
enough sample sizes”. 
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As the dependent variables are proxies for firm value, their relationship with 
each other is not considered a risk for multicollinearity and thus the strong positive 
correlation (r = 0.754; p < 0.01) between Tobin’s Q and RoA (Table 7-7) in the 
pooled data is not a concern and they will not be assessed together. The second 
highest score is between RoA and RoE (r = 0.466; p < 0.01), less than 0.7 but was 
also not a concern as the dependent variable proxies are not run together in the 
regression. Thus, multicollinearity is not a concern. Where there is a significant 
relationship between an independent and dependent variable the correlation is noted 
in the relevant tables. Pink colouring is used in the tables to highlight results that 
are considered to be important either because of statistical significance or to 
highlight possible problem areas. 
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Table 7-7 Correlation analysis – all periods 
2012-2014  RoA RoE EV Q BLOCK CONSHA DIRSHA QAS Industry CCI CI 
RoA 1                      
RoE .466***                     
EV -0.043 0.074                   
Q .754*** .248*** 0.028                 
BLOCK 0.046 0.016 -.154** 0.118               
CONSHA -0.101 0.038 0.091 -0.083 -.335***             
DIRSHA -0.054 -0.008 -0.098 -0.012 0.039 -0.118*           
QAS -.221*** -0.030 .267*** -.238*** -0.074 .234*** -0.057         
Industry .181*** 0.051 .201*** .368*** 0.085 -0.009 0.030 -.132**       
CCI .312*** 0.025 .230*** .264*** -0.096 -.182*** 0.098 -0.013 0.019     
CI 0.079 -0.028 0.013 -0.079 -0.109* -0.041 0.005 0.073 -.270*** .373***   
MLI 0.006 0.051 .223*** 0.014 -0.006 -.275*** 0.086 0.064 -0.030 0.121 -0.061 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-
tailed) 
 
The focus of this study is on the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The only significant relationship in the pool 
analysis between independent and dependent variables is between MLI and EV, the relationship is weakly positive and highly significant 
(r = 0.223; p < 0.01). The correlation between the control and independent variables are only important for possible multicollinearity 
considerations, which is not a problem given the results.  
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Table 7-8 Correlation analysis – per year 
Year 2012 RoA RoE EV Q BLOCK CONSHA DIRSHA QAS Industry CCI CI 
 
RoA 1                      
RoE .540***                     
EV -0.029 0.091                   
Q .796*** .233** 0.028                 
BLOCK 0.019 0.028 -0.181 0.126               
CONSHA -0.063 0.108 0.135 -0.087 -.325***             
DIRSHA -0.021 0.018 -0.121 -0.024 0.046 -0.146           
QAS -0.105 0.176 .328*** -0.205* -0.078 .285*** -0.046         
Industry 0.125 -0.030 0.175 .348*** 0.114 0.008 0.012 -0.071       
CCI .319*** -0.048 0.211* .277** -.247** -0.157 0.107 -0.055 0.072     
CI 0.122 -0.157 0.025 -0.033 -0.070 -0.060 0.046 0.070 -.295*** .383***   
MLI -0.056 0.032 .294*** -0.019 -0.038 -.264** 0.060 0.134 0.003 0.121 0.026 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-
tailed) 
 
MLI is highly significantly positively related to EV but the effect size is weak (r = 0.223; p < 0.01).  
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Table 7-8 Correlation analysis – per year continued 
Year 2013 RoA RoE EV Q BLOCK CONSHA DIRSHA QAS Industry CCI CI 
 
RoA 1                      
RoE .396***                     
EV -0.004 0.083                   
Q .722*** 0.208* 0.015                 
BLOCK 0.114 0.002 -0.179 0.153               
CONSHA -0.124 0.025 0.095 -0.076 -.362***             
DIRSHA -0.082 -0.030 -0.099 -0.012 0.015 -0.142           
QAS -.292*** -0.186* 0.184* -.278** -0.144 .317*** -0.082         
Industry 0.207* 0.040 0.202* .373*** 0.103 -0.017 0.026 -0.162       
CCI .329*** 0.012 .239** .265** -0.137 -0.197* 0.090 0.018 0.011     
CI 0.093 0.082 -0.020 -0.099 -0.160 -0.064 -0.012 0.045 -.223** .334***   
MLI 0.048 0.078 0.175 0.004 0.096 -.303*** 0.121 0.047 -0.073 0.154 -0.165 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-
tailed) 
 
None of the independent variables showed a significant relationship with any of the dependent variables. 
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Table 7-8 Correlation analysis – per year continued 
Year 2014 RoA RoE EV Q BLOCK CONSHA DIRSHA QAS Industry CCI CI 
 
RoA 1                      
RoE .784***                     
EV -0.112 0.043                   
Q .771*** .690*** 0.046                 
BLOCK -0.0175 0.047 -0.108 0.071               
CONSHA -0.121 -0.120 0.051 -0.087 -.322***             
DIRSHA -0.060 -0.014 -0.077 0.000 0.054 -0.072           
QAS -.271** -0.169 .286*** -.226** 0.000 0.102 -0.044         
Industry .223** .416*** .225** .388*** 0.036 -0.017 0.049 -0.164 
 
      
CCI .291*** .344*** .242** .252** 0.100 -0.194* 0.095 0.036 -0.027     
CI 0.011 -0.088 0.024 -0.101 -0.098 0.005 -0.016 0.096 -.296*** .404***   
MLI 0.048 0.0145 0.190* 0.080 -0.062 -.263** 0.087 -0.014 -0.026 0.089 -0.084 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-
tailed) 
 
MLI is moderately significantly positively related to EV but the effect size is weak (r = 0.190; p < 0.1).  
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As all the periods were used in the first correlation analysis (forming a 
balanced pool), any correlation between variables over time could also have been 
influenced by a time-related correlation. None of the control and independent 
variables was strong enough (r = 0.7 or above) to be an indication of a 
multicollinearity problem (Pallant, 2007:155). The only significant relationship 
between an independent variable and a proxy for firm value was between MLI and 
EV with a highly significant but weak positive relationship, in line with the 
hypothesised relationship (r = 0.223; p < 0.05) for the pooled data and for 2012 (r 
= 0.294; p < 0.01), tapering to a moderately significant and week relationship in 
2014 (r = 0.190; p < 0.1). A review of the other relationships between the dependent 
and independent variables showed very week relationships that were not significant 
but with different signs.  
 
Board-level control and direction can be amended during a year as board 
members change or as control needs change during board meetings, but a negative 
sign would suggest a control where the costs exceed the benefits. The poor 
correlation to firm value could be ascribed to the control-related nature of the 
indexes where a balance between costs and benefits of the controls are considered. 
The balance between the cost and benefit of controls can be linked to the utility 
maximisation principle were the expected utility gained from the use of a control is 
expected to exceed the cost of the control. As board-level controls have been in 
existence for several years the utility obtained from the controls might have 
diminished over time as the control cease to further reduce slacking or control for 
other moral hazards including excessive perquisites or rent taking. The increased 
legislative environment could also influence the cost benefit balance of controls as 
legislative compliance are compulsory irrespective of the cost of compliance or the 
benefit thereof. 
 
One of the limitations of a correlation analysis is that it focuses on assessing 
the relationship between two variables at a point in time which has limitations in 
the assessment of multiple variables. To aid in better understanding the relationship 
between the variables, a year-by-year cross-sectional multiple regression analysis 
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is used in the next section to consider the relationship between the multiple 
variables at different points in time.  
 
7.3.3 Cross-sectional multiple regression analysis 
By considering the variables at a point in time it is also possible to test for a 
possible negative lag effect on the dependent variable. Section 4.3.1 notes that 
monitoring controls would wait for confirmation of poor performance from 
accounting results before action is taken which in turn will take time for the 
corrective action to filter though to improved firm performance and value. The 
negative lagged effect is tested by comparing the results of the multiple regression 
analysis with the dependent variable in the current year and contrasting them with 
the results for the following year’s dependent variable (t+1). The influence of past 
performance of firm value forms part of the CCI score, a control variable, as 
discussed in section 4.2.6.2. 
 
As the following year’s dependent variables are easily extractible from INET 
BFA, additional dependent variables were added to the panel for t+1 dependent 
variables (referred to as NY for next year). Adding additional variables enabled the 
study to maintain a three-year balanced panel104. To better understand the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables while controlling for 
the cross-sectional effect of the control variables a cross-sectional year-by-year 
regressions were performed using an OLS linear regression model in SPSS. All the 
variables were entered together, and the detailed analysis results have been 
summarised in Appendix 7. One of the advantages of assessing the relationship 
between the variables in a regression analysis is the additional testing of 
multicollinearity (where “the predictors105 are highly correlated with each other”), 
which could lead to an unstable regression (Howell, 1999:200).  
 
                                                 
104 Due to the takeover of BCX after 2014 its next year’s dependent variables (for 2015) were 
estimated using the results of the dependent variables for 2010 to 2014 to maintain a balanced panel, 
all the next year variables for all the other subjects were extracted from INET BFA. 
105 Predictors refer to the combined relationship between the control variables and independent 
variables and the dependent variable. 
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The results of the regression analysis can be interpreted using the following: 
 
• R is the value of the multiple correlation coefficient and measures the 
quality of the prediction of the dependent variable (Field, 2009:235). 
• R squared (R2), the coefficient of determination, “is a measure of how 
much of the variability in the outcome is accounted for by the 
predictors” (Field, 2009:235). 
• Adjusted R2 gives an “idea of how well [the] model generalizes” and 
should be the same or close to R2; when the values are close it is an 
indication that the cross validity of the model is very good (Field, 
2009:235). 
• F-ratio “is calculated by dividing the average improvement in the 
prediction of the model by the average difference between the model 
and the observed data”. F is greater than 1 if the “improvements due to 
fitting the model are much greater than the inaccuracy within the model” 
(Field, 2009:237). 
• p represents the probability of the results occurring by chance (Field, 
2009:237). 
• β or beta indicates “to what degree each predictor affects the outcome if 
the effects of all other predictors are held constant” (Field, 2009:238). 
• t-statistic measures whether the predictor is making a statistically 
significant contribution to the model (Field, 2009:239). 
• VIF is the variance inflation factor, a “measure of whether there is 
collinearity in the data”. If the “VIF is greater than 10” it can be an 
indication of a multicollinearity problem, values close to 1 confirm “that 
collinearity is not a problem”. (Field, 2009:242). 
 
The cross-sectional multiple regression models are run for descriptive 
purposes to consider the relationship between the independent variables and firm 
value at a point in time. The results summary focuses on the independent variables 
per dependent variable for the current period and the next year’s (NY) dependent 
variable (t+1), per year, to consider a possible negatively lagged relationship and to 
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test for multicollinearity. Multicollinearity can be a problem but a review of the 
correlation analysis (section 7.3.2) did not indicate a multicollinearity problem. The 
Tolerance and VIF results showed no very low Tolerance values, as they were all 
above 0.10, and the VIF values were close to 1 in general, with no individual value 
higher than 2, indicating that there is no collinearity problem. The results of the 
multiple regression analysis per dependent variable and the next year’s variable are 
summarised in the following tables, highlighting the significance of variables and 
the signs of the independent variables, with the negative sign shown in red. 
 
Table 7-9 Return on Assets and Next Year’s Return on Assets 
RoA 
2012. Predictors: (Constant), +CI, -MLI, IND, DIRSHA, BLOCK, QAS, CCI**, CONSHA 
2013. Predictors: (Constant), +CI, +MLI, QAS**, DIRSHA, CCI**, IND, BLOCK, CONSHA 
2014. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, +MLI, QAS*, BLOCK, DIRSHA, IND, CONSHA, CCI** 
 
NYRoA 
2012. Predictors: (Constant), +CI, -MLI, IND, DIRSHA, BLOCK, QAS, CCI**, CONSHA 
2013. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, -MLI, QAS*, DIRSHA, CCI**, IND, BLOCK, CONSHA 
2014. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, +MLI, QAS**, BLOCK, DIRSHA, IND, CONSHA, CCI** 
 
** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
Table 7-9 shows a variability in the signs for both CI and MLI between the 
years as well as between the current and the following year’s return on assets, but 
none of the relationships to the independent variables were significant. The overall 
lack of significance suggests a possible random nature, or an omitted variable as 
alternative explanations.  
 
Table 7-10 Return on Equity and Next Year’s Return on Equity 
RoE 
2012. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, +MLI, QAS, BLOCK, DIRSHA, IND, CONSHA, CCI 
2013. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, -MLI, QAS*, DIRSHA, CCI, IND, BLOCK, CONSHA 
2014. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, -MLI, QAS, CLOCK, DIRSHA, IND**, CONSHA, CCI** 
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Table 7-10 Return on Equity and Next Year’s Return on Equity - 
continued 
NYRoE 
2012. Predictors: (Constant), +CI, +MLI, QAS, BLOCK, DIRSHA, IND, CONSHA, CCI 
2013. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, -MLI, QAS, BLOCK, DIRSHA, IND**, CONSHA, CCI** 
2014. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, +MLI, QAS*, BLOCK, DIRSHA, IND**, CONSHA, CCI** 
** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
Table 7-10 shows a variability in the signs for MLI between the different 
periods as well as between the current and the following year’s return on equity. 
Against the hypothesised positive relationship between CI and firm value, the signs 
for CI linked to RoE was negative for all the periods and negative in 2013 and 2014 
linked to NYRoE. However, the overall lack of significance suggests a possible 
random nature, or missing variables as alternative explanations.  
 
Table 7-11 Enterprise value per share and the following year’s enterprise 
value per share 
EV 
 
2012. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, +MLI**, QAS**, BLOCK, DIRSHA, IND, CONSHA, CCI 
2013. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, +MLI, QAS, BLOCK, DIRSHA, IND*, CONSHA, CCI 
2014. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, +MLI, QAS**, BLOCK, DIRSHA, IND**, CONSHA, CCI* 
 
NYEV 
2012. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, +MLI, QAS, BLOCK, DIRSHA, IND, CONSHA, CCI 
2013. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, +MLI**, QAS*, BLOCK, DIRSHA, IND**, CONSHA, CCI 
2014. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, +MLI*, QAS*, BLOCK, DIRSHA, IND**, CONSHA, CCI** 
 
** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 7-11 shows consistent signs for both independent variables for EV and 
NYEV. CI is, however, negative against the hypothesised sign, suggesting that the 
cost of controls could exceed their benefit, however none of the CI coefficients were 
significant. MLI was positive for all periods and highly significant in 2012 for EV 
and in 2013 for NYEV and significant for NYEV in 2014. As EV is a more strongly 
market related dependent variable the consistent signs could be an indication that 
the smaller market size reacts with less volatility to changes in controls in the 
absence of other poor performance signals. However, the negative signs for CI 
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could indicate that controls have peaked in terms of reducing slack or wastage and 
cannot further reduce agency cost, while the more positive view on MLI, or the 
directional controls, could indicate that they are valued by the market.  
 
The risk of a missing variable still exists although multicollinearity is not a 
problem despite the large standard error estimates (Wooldridge, 2014:113). A 
review of the Tolerance and VIF results showed no very low Tolerance values, 
which were all above 0.10, and the VIF values were close to 1 in general with no 
individual value higher than 2 (as summarised in Appendix 7). 
 
Table 7-12 Tobin’s Q and Next year’s Tobin’s Q 
Q 
2012. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, -MLI, QAS, BLOCK, DIRSHA, IND**, CONSHA, CCI** 
2013. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, -MLI, QAS*, BLOCK, DIRSHA, IND**, CONSHA, CCI** 
2014. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, +MLI, QAS**, BLOCK, DIRSHA, IND**, CONSHA, CCI** 
 
NYQ 
2012. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, +MLI, QAS, BLOCK, DIRSHA, IND**, CONSHA, CCI* 
2013. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, -MLI, QAS, BLOCK, DIRSHA, IND**, CONSHA, CCI** 
2014. Predictors: (Constant), -CI, +MLI, QAS, BLOCK, DIRSHA, IND**, CONSHA, CCI* 
 
** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 7-12 shows consistent negative signs for CI for Q and NYQ, against 
the positive hypothesised relationship suggesting that the cost of controls could 
exceed the benefit or that the utility gained from the board as a control mechanism 
is less than the cost of the control. However, none of the CI coefficients were 
significant. The relationship between MLI showed a greater variability over the 
different periods and with a negative sign for 2013 for Q and NYQ and a positive 
sign for 2014 for Q and NYQ.  
 
The overall variability of the independent variable signs and their significance 
are summarised for the different dependent considering the normal and negatively 
lagged dependent variables in Table 7-13.  
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Table 7-13 Independent variable signs and significance 
Dependent variable CI MLI 
RoA + + - - + + 
NYRoA + - - - - + 
RoE - - - + - - 
NYRoE + - - + - + 
EV - - -  + + + 
NYEV - - -  + + + 
Q - - -  - - + 
NYQ - - -  + - + 
significant at the 0.01 or 0.05 level. 
 
The overall results are comparable to the results of the correlation analysis 
where the only independent variable with a significant relationship to a firm value 
proxy was between MLI and EV. The changed in significance between the normal 
dependent variable and the negatively lagged dependent variable suggest that the 
inefficient nature of board-level controls results in relationships to firm value that 
are longer than a financial year. Although none of the CI results showed 
significance suggesting that the relationship could be random or close to zero, the 
majority of the signs are negative suggesting that the costs of CI controls exceed 
any possible utility gained from the controls. This might not be unreasonable as the 
emphasis on board level controls already started with King I in 1994 and the goal 
aligning value of the control could have levelled out by now. The low level of 
significance could also be because board-level controls are dwarfed by the other 
governance mechanisms that influence firm value. Given that the average number 
of board meetings per year is six meetings it is possible that the board will only 
adjust board-level controls after their review of the performance of the company at 
board meetings and possibly only as a response to persistent problems. It could also 
be that there are possible missing variables, or a more random effect given the 
variability of the independent variables between the different periods.  
 
As the correlation analysis and the cross-sectional multiple regression 
analysis focused on the cross-sectional part of the panel data, enhanced insight over 
the relationship between the dependent variables and the independent variables can 
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be obtained by also considering the time series nature by using panel analysis. Using 
a different method of analysis, namely starting with pooled data, could help to 
improve the analysis and the information generated by the analysis and thereby 
improve understanding of the relationship between CI and MLI and firm value. As 
the negative lag (the following year’s dependent variable) was an overall 
improvement for the model as a whole for the proxies for firm value, the further 
analysis will also use the negatively lagged dependent variables (t+1). This resulted 
in an amendment to the planned multiple regression model to include a negative lag 
in the dependent variable. The addition of a negatively lagged (NY= next year’s 
dependent variable) did not reduce the time periods of the study as the additional 
variables were extracted from INET BFA. 
 
Firm valuei(t+1) or Firm valueit = β0 + β1BLOCKit + β2CONSHAit + 
β3DIRSHAit + β4QASit + β5INDit + β6CCIit + β7CIit + β8MLIit +εit 
 
One of the disadvantages of examining relationships at a point in time is the 
fact that changes over time are not considered. A key risk is that there may be an 
unobserved variable whose changes over time influence the results of a cross-
sectional analysis, resulting in an unobserved heterogeneity. These shortcomings 
are considered in the next section.  
 
7.4 Hypotheses testing 
 
In the previous section correlation and regression tests were used as statistical 
tools for descriptive purposes. Arellano (2003:7) says that a “regression model is 
an essential statistical tool”, valuable for descriptive purposes as well as hypotheses 
testing. However, before the analysis can focus on the hypotheses it is important to 
first consider the reasoning behind the model development. 
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7.4.1 Model development 
Irrespective of the legal and regulatory environments, the choices influencing 
the firm are under the control of the principals (shareholders) and their agents 
(board) associated with the firm. The SRI index represents large companies with 
dispersed ownership which is supported by the size of the market capitalisation of 
companies on the SRI index that was 81.97% of the JSE all share index in 2012, 
and 81.73% in 2013 (section 6.6). The limited number of controlling shareholders 
(Table 7-1), and small directors’ shareholding as noted in Table 7.5 support the use 
of an agency theory perspective as there are separation of duties between the 
shareholders and the board. As panel data was collected the assessment should 
consider the cross-sectional as well as the time series nature of the data in the model. 
Four proxies are used for firm value (discussed in section 1.8.3), RoA and RoE are 
accounting related measures while EV and Q are more market related measures. 
 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge on the board as a governance 
mechanism by positioning the controlling role of the board (CI) in the corporate 
control construct and the directing role (MLI) in the managerial labour construct. 
The corporate control and managerial labour constructs are complementary and 
collectively encapsulate the board as a governance mechanism. To measure the 
controlling and directing role of the board in the two constructs, this study extended 
the practice of indexes building in the broader corporate governance field to board-
level control indexes by developing the CI and MLI indexes, as independent 
variables.  
 
In the development of a multiple regression model it is important to include 
variables (referred to as control variables) that could also influence the dependent 
variable (firm value) to enable the study to identify the relationship between the 
independent variables (CI and MLI) and firm value, while controlling for the six 
control variables (BLOCK, CONSHA, DIRSHA, QAS, IND and CCI), resulting in 
the development of model 1: 
Model 1: Firm valueit = β0 + β1BLOCKit + β2CONSHAit + β3DIRSHAit 
+ β4QASit + β5INDit + β6CCIit + β7CIit + β8MLIit +εit 
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Prior research (discussed in section 4.3.1) suggests that a possible time 
difference of up to two years can exist before board-level control action would be 
triggered, suggesting that board-level controls operate differently from normal 
internal controls (such as the authorisation of a payment) where the result of the 
control can be observed or audited immediately. The time lag in board-level 
controls due to the limited meetings (6 meetings on average a year) of the board 
could make the control less efficient. As the board is the highest level of control the 
directors could give other interventions more time to take effect and only respond 
once evidence of maintained poor performance exist. The expected time difference 
resulted in the use of a negatively lagged dependent variable. Model 1 was adapted 
to accommodate a negative lag (t+1) option, resulting in the following redefined 
model. 
Model 2: Firm valueit or Firm valuei(t+1) = β0 + β1BLOCKit + 
β2CONSHAit + β3DIRSHAit + β4QASit + β5INDit + β6CCIit + β7CIit + 
β8MLIit +εit 
Prior research cautions that an omitted variable may result in spurious or 
misleading results when normal ordinary least squares (OLS) cross-sectional 
regression analysis is used (Beiner et al., 2006:252; Ntim, 2009:144). Although the 
focus of the cross-sectional analysis (summarised in section 7.3.3 and Appendix 7) 
was to better understand the relationship between the variables at different points 
in time and to assess the multicollinearity between the variables, the overall lack of 
significance suggests a possible random nature, or the existence of missing 
variables. In order for this study to analyse the data for hypotheses testing the cross-
sectional and time series nature of the panel data needs to be taken into 
consideration. The next step is to use pooled OLS data in an OLS estimation.  
 
7.4.2 Pooled OLS estimation 
The study pooled the data from the different periods together to enable an 
analysis over time as well as across subjects (cross-sectional). The assumptions of 
pooled data are that the observations are independently distributed across time, that 
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the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables 
remains constant over time and that there is no unobserved time invariant variable 
(Wooldridge, 2014:360-361). In essence Pooled OLS estimation assume that the 
“regression coefficients are the same” for all subjects over time and the error term 
is “independently and identically distributed with a zero mean and constant 
variance” (Gujarati & Porter, 2009:594). Given the variability of the cross-sectional 
data across the different time periods (discussed in section 7.2 and 7.3), the 
observations are unlikely to be in line with the above assumption, but the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables over time has not yet 
been tested. Histograms of the residuals for the Pooled OLS analysis are 
summarised in Appendix 11. 
 
Testing of Model 2 using a pooled OLS estimation was performed using 
EViews. The pooled data consist of 84 cross-sections over three years, resulting in 
252 observations. The pooled data was stacked linking each cross-section to its 
different time periods. The hypothesised directional relationship between CI and 
MLI is positive in relation to firm value. The further analysis is performed using 
Model 2. The coefficients for the various variables are summarised in Table 7-14. 
The significant variables (p ranging between < 0.1 to < 0.01) are highlighted in pink 
and the level of significance is indicated only for the independent variables. 
 
The F statistic values in Table 7-14 are significant excluding for RoE, which 
highlight that the model for RoE is not significant as a whole. Pooled data can, 
however, increase the risk of heterogeneity as the “individuality of each subject is 
subsumed in the disturbance term” (error term), increasing the risk of a correlation 
between the error term and some regressors resulting in “biased and inconsistent 
results” (Gujarati & Porter, 2009:594). A low predictability for RoE was 
highlighted by Tshipa (2017:153-154) who excluded RoE as a dependent variable 
due to its low level of explanation in the model. In line with Tshipa this study 
excludes RoE and NYRoE from further analysis.  
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Table 7-14 Pooled OLS estimation 
 RoA NYRoA RoE NYRoE EV NYEV Q NYQ 
Constant 2.141 10.399 -9.3918 -2.6019 -381.58 -391.6 0.88941 0.75341 
CI 0.0236 0.020 -0.0574 0.0011 -0.3177 -0.604 -0.0074 -0.004 
MLI 0.00089 -0.099 0.26957 0.17837 4.3378* 4.877* 0.001441 0.00314 
BLOCK 0.06316 -0.023 0.15978 -0.0093 -2.117 -2.431 0.012583 0.007094 
CONSHA 0.42066 -1.624 8.83356 4.0148 47.3225 35.51 0.153927 0.063964 
DIRSHA -0.1438 -0.131 -0.067 -0.1772 -3.2817 -3.547 -0.0086 -0.0055 
QAS -0.1207 -0.152 -0.0975 -0.2777 2.99568 2.8522 -0.0115 -0.012 
IND 4.0147 5.8794 3.66458 11.565 127.38 159.86 0.7970 0.94650 
CCI 0.19 0.190 0.09239 0.2198 2.70357 2.8523 0.01861 0.01565 
R2 0.18007 0.2468 0.0129 0.07118 0.25296 0.2535 0.2587 0.27008 
Adjusted 
R2 0.1531 0.2221 -0.0196 0.0406 0.22836 0.2289 0.2343 0.24605 
F-statistic 6.6708 9.9553 0.39756 2.3277 10.2854 10.316 10.600 11.2389 
Prop 
(F)106 0.0000 0.0000 0.92128 0.02005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Durbin-
Watson 0.7928 0.8548 1.8927 1.3268 0.1617 0.19927 0.1774 0.2367 
* = significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
The only independent variable with any significance is MLI that shows a 
positive and highly significant relationship to EV and NYEV, however the size of 
the coefficient seems large for a board-related variable although the signs for MLI 
and EV and NYEV are consistent with the results in Table 7-13. The variability of 
the signs of the independent variables across the different dependent variables could 
indicate a more random nature or an omitted variable suggesting Random Effects 
estimation is an option. 
 
It is also important to use additional asymptotic analysis to test multiple 
exclusion restrictions (Wooldridge, 2014:145) in order to ensure that the most 
appropriate estimation methods are used. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test form 
the basis for asymptotic analysis. The LM test “analyses how well the lagged 
residuals explain the residuals” in the current period using all the predictor variables 
                                                 
106 Probability of 0.0000 indicates that the probability is smaller than 0.0000. 
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for testing serial correlation (Studenmund, 2011:413-414). In essence LM tests 
whether the error term is uncorrelated to the predictor variables (Wooldridge, 
2014:146). This is an important consideration as heteroskedasticity can stem from 
a “neglected parameter heterogeneity” (Zietz, 2001:263).  
 
The Breusch-Pagan variation of the LM test for heteroscedasticity and 
random coefficient variation have been used to assess the pool to ensure an 
appropriate analysis method is used by assessing whether there are random effects 
to consider the suitability of a Random Effects estimation and by considering the 
appropriateness of cross-section and time series analysis (Breusch & Pagan, 1979; 
Gujarati & Porter, 2009:385). The results of various LM tests are given in Appendix 
9, however, this study used the Breusch-Pagan results as summarised in Table 7-
15.  
 
Table 7-15 Breusch-Pagan test 
Dependent variable Cross-section Time series Both 
RoA 104.0848*** 1.304384 105.3892*** 
EV 204.4130*** 1.429245 205.8423*** 
Q 199.6994*** 1.231315 200.9307*** 
NYRoA 48.03004*** 0.169543 48.19958*** 
NYEV 195.0660*** 1.450921 196.5169*** 
NYQ 184.8329*** 1.043714 185.8766*** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; * Significant at the 0.1 level 
 
 
The cross-sectional tests are highly significant for all the dependent variables 
while none of the time series was significant, suggesting a one-way analysis 
focusing on the cross-section. In situations where time series is not significant, but 
the cross-section is, a one-way method is recommended. 
 
7.4.3 Panel data estimation  
Panel data have advantages as a having both cross-sections and time series 
data increases the sample size and can help to control for unobserved characteristics 
to reduce the omitted variable risk Panel estimations focuses on testing Model 2 
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using panel data starting with Random Effects.107 The analysis is performed with 
the aid of EViews. Before estimation the panel was sorted “starting with the first 
cross-section for all time periods, followed by the second cross-section for all time 
periods, and so on” (Studenmund, 2011:527), to use a stacked panel in the analysis. 
The panel data consist of 84 cross-sections over three years, resulting in 252 
observations. The hypothesised directional relationship between CI and MLI is 
positive in relation to firm value, as the relationship between the board as a 
governance mechanism and firm value is expected to be positive. Table 7-16 
summarises the Random Effects tests for all the proxies for firm value for Model 
2108. 
 
The Random Effects estimation was performed using feasible general least 
squares (FGLS) with cross-section set to random. Generalized least squares enable 
the estimation to control for heteroscedasticity. The Random Effects estimation 
used the Wansbeek-Kapteyn option as an estimator of component variances, given 
the limited time span of three years, for unbiased estimators. The Hausman test was 
run after the Random Effects estimation to indicate whether Fixed or Random 
Effects would be the best option.  
 
The Hausman test measures “whether the regression coefficients under the 
fixed effects and random effects models are statistically different from each other”. 
If there are no differences the Random Effects model is preferred to “conserve 
degrees of freedom”, with the Fixed Effects model preferred if the result show 
differences despite the loss of degrees of freedom (Studenmund, 2011:536). For 
RoA, NYRoA, EV and NYEV the Hausman test indicates that Fixed Effects 
estimation would be a better assessment, for Q and NYQ Random Effects is the 
suggested preferred method.  
  
                                                 
107 Random Effects are “based on the assumption that the intercept of each cross-sectional unit is 
drawn from a distribution that is centred around a mean intercept” (Studenmund, 2011:535). 
108 The results of the Random Effects estimation are summarised for independent variables in Table 
7-22 under Test 1 for ease of comparison. 
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Table 7-16 Random Effects cross-sectional (Test 1)109 
 RoA NYRoA EV NYEV Q NYQ 
Constant -5.6939 12.3379* -38.553 9.131 0.9414** 0.9657* 
CI 0.13304** 0.036973 1.1884** 1.2679* 9.61E-05 0.00025 
MLI 0.13916** -0.1421** 0.1894 0.196 -0.001 -0.0005 
BLOCK 0.03433 -0.0182 -0.1218 -0.07696 0.0085* -0.0033 
CONSHA -0.13115 -2.95458 26.837 33.133 -0.025 -0.2168 
DIRSHA -0.12466 -0.10338 -1.051 -1.0788 -0.0076 -0.0014 
QAS -0.1059*** -0.0932** 0.3938 -0.37098 -0.004* -0.0022 
IND 5.24197** 6.3363*** 116.103** 147.08** 0.9137*** 1.0609*** 
CCI 0.01979 0.1269*** 1.304*** 0.8995** 0.0057** 0.0054* 
Cross-section 
random Rho 0.7381 0.5135 0.9648 0.9602 0.9275 0.9044 
Idiosyncratic 
random Rho 0.2619 0.4865 0.0352 0.0398 0.0725 0.0956 
Hausman test p110 0.009FE 0.0471FE 0.0198FE 0.0073FE 0.3891RE 0.3638RE 
Weighted R2 0.07763 0.121729 0.1029 0.06261 0.0949 0.0863 
Weighted adjusted 
R2 0.04726 0.092815 0.0734 0.03175 0.06506 0.0562 
Weighted F-
statistic 2.556360 4.209996 3.4837 2.0288 3.1833 2.8693 
Weighted prop (F) 0.01*** 0.0001*** 0.0008*** 0.0438** 0.0019*** 0.0046*** 
* = significant at 0.10 level; ** = significant at 0.05 level; *** = significant at 0.01 level 
FE = Fixed Effects; RE = Random Effects 
 
 
The cross-sectional Rho results show a large improvement with Random 
Effects panel analysis explaining more of the model for all the dependent variables. 
As hypothesised the CI shows a positive sign for all the dependent variables 
suggesting that the improved controls represented by CI is seen as valuable when 
the cross-sectional and time series nature of the data is considered. The positive 
relationship with CI suggest that the board’s controlling role still contributes to the 
improvement of firm value by reducing agency cost through controlling wastage 
and slacking. In addition, CI is statistically significant for RoA, EV and NYEV. It 
                                                 
109 The random effects are calculated using panel analysis and FGLS estimation with cross-sections 
weights and idiosyncratic random effects. 
110 A significant probability in the Hausman’s test indicates that Fixed Effects (FE) estimation is the 
preferred method, otherwise it is Random Effects (RE). 
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is also possible that CI is a more efficient control with less of a negative lagged 
effect given the change in significance between RoA to NYRoA and EV to NYEV. 
An efficient control would mean that the impact of the control is close to immediate 
like normal internal controls. The changed sign and improved significance highlight 
the value of panel analysis over cross-sectional analysis.  
 
MLI is as hypothesised positive for RoA, at a statistically significant level, 
however, the influence of time seems to suggest that the positive influence is short 
lived as the sign change to negative for NYRoA also at a significant level. The 
changed sign is an indication of a time horizon problem. RoA is an accounting-
based measure that can be more readily influenced by executive management and 
is a regularly reported ratio. The positive relation to RoA could indicate short-term 
manipulation to maximise utility to the detriment of a longer term view as indicated 
by the negative relationship to NYRoA. Although MLI is not significantly related 
to any of the other dependent variables the sign is positive for EV and NYEV but 
negative for Q and NYQ. However, the negative coefficient values for Q and NYQ 
are very small. The changed sign of MLI could suggest a time horizon problem in 
the directional controls over the board’s labour. It is possible that board members 
maximise their short-term utility in line with the time horizon problem that help to 
cause goal divergence in an agency relationship (refer to section 3.3.4 for a more 
comprehensive discussion on the causes of goal divergence). It is also possible that 
the low coefficients for MLI for the market related proxies for firm value (Q and 
EV) could be an indication that the increased bonding of the 2008 Companies Act 
placed more responsibility for the directional role of the board’s labour on 
shareholders, reducing their need to rely on board-level direction. 
 
As the Hausman’s test indicated that Random effects is the preferred method 
for Q and NYQ the one-way Random Effects was run again (summarised in table 
7-16) retaining the Wansbeek-Kapteyn option as estimator of component variances 
and adding the White period111 for robust standard errors and corrected degrees of 
                                                 
111 Using the White period as the coefficient covariance method enable EViews to compute standard 
errors that are robust for serial correlation. The White period method assumes that the errors for a 
cross-section are heteroskedastic and serially correlated (cross-section clustered).  
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freedom, the results are summarised in section 7.4.3.1. In line with the Hausman 
test the further Fixed Effects estimations (Test 2) are discussed in section 7.4.3.2. 
 
7.4.3.1 Random Effects estimation for Tobin’s Q 
The random effects are calculated using panel analysis and FGLS estimation 
with cross-sectional weights and idiosyncratic random effects as done in Test 1 and 
the coefficient covariances were calculated using a White period estimator. Overall 
using White period did not improve the results (summarised in Table 7-17) over the 
Test 1 results (summarised in Table 7-16).  
 
Table 7-17 Q and NYQ additional Random effects 
Dependent variable Q NYQ 
Constant 0.941385*** 0.965638** 
CI 9.61E-05 0.000246 
MLI -0.000988 -0.000463 
BLOCK 0.008473 -0.003312 
CONSHA -0.025226 -0.216751 
DIRSHA -0.007635 -0.001380 
QAS -0.004132** -0.002225 
IND 0.913645*** 1.060851*** 
CCI 0.005686** 0.005402*** 
Cross-section random Rho 0.9275 0.9044 
Idiosyncratic random Rho 0.0725 0.0956 
Weighted R2 0.094860 0.086310 
Weighted adjusted R2 0.065061 0.056230 
Weighted F-statistic 3.183342 2.869313 
Weighted prop (F) 0.001878*** 0.004555*** 
* = significant at 0.10 level; ** = significant at 0.05 level; *** = significant at 0.01 level 
 
 
The assumption for Random Effects is that a sample was drawn from a 
population large enough to enable the intercept to have a common mean value in 
contrast to the assumed individual intercepts assumed for Fixed Effect estimation. 
As this study uses a near population size sample the assumption behind Random 
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Effects are unlikely and thus Q and NYQ will be included in the Fixed Effects 
estimations.  
 
The Hausman’s test indicated that Fixed Effects estimations would be the 
preferred method for RoA, NYRoA, EV and NYEV performed in the next section. 
One of the motivations for using Fixed Effects is to “control for unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity in a cross-sectional model” (Arellano, 2003:7). Such an 
expected time-invariant effect is talent. The talent of a director is expected to remain 
constant over time and is not readily observable. Section 7.4.3.2 summarised a one-
way Fixed Effects estimation. 
 
7.4.3.2 One-way Fixed Effects estimation 
As time-invariant variables have to be excluded from a Fixed Effects 
estimation IND has been excluded in the one-way Fixed Effects estimation. The 
same stacked balanced panel used for the Random Effects estimation was used for 
the Fixed Effects estimation using the panel analysis option in Eviews. Table 7-18 
shows the Fixed Effects estimation results for the various dependent variables. 
Test 2 used a one-way Fixed Effects least square (LS) estimation and only held the 
cross-sectional effects fixed. 
 
Table 7-18 One-way Fixed Effects Estimation (Test 2) 
 RoA NYRoA EV NYEV Q NYQ 
Constant -3.01776 21.59* 45.889 111.45 1.4501*** 1.603*** 
CI 0.16605** 0.011 1.2615** 1.3626* 0.0005 0.0005 
MLI 0.17572*** -0.232*** -0.005 -0.0749 -0.0018 -0.0014 
BLOCK 0.022663 0.0485 0.0664 0.2478 0.0085 -0.0063 
CONSHA 1.185390 0.24398 -0.0209 23.761 0.1064 -0.2097 
DIRSHA -0.136795 -0.0705 -0.219 -0.213 -0.0107 0.002 
QAS -0.08715* 0.0209 0.2 -0.631 -0.0029 -7.56E-05 
CCI -0.09123* -0.015 1.207*** 0.725 0.0035 0.0032 
R2 0.8447 0.7452 0.9785 0.9747 0.9575 0.9428 
Adjusted R2 0.75788 0.6028 0.9666 0.9605 0.9338 0.9108 
F-statistic 9.72975 5.2316 81.575 68.822 40.326 29.489 
Prop (F) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
* = significant at 0.10 level; ** = significant at 0.05 level; *** = significant at 0.01 level 
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The Fixed Effects estimation method resulted in a dramatically improved 
estimation for Model 2 (Test 2) that is overall highly significant for all dependent 
variables. However, the focus of this study is on the independent variables and their 
relationship to the dependent variables. Where the independent variable coefficients 
were significant the results were highlighted using bold in the above table.  
 
Controlling for Fixed Effects also improved the level of significance for CI. 
CI is, as hypothesised, positively associated with all dependent variables retaining 
the signs obtained in the Random Effects estimation. Positive coefficients for CI 
indicates that board-level controls continue be beneficial as the benefit or utility of 
the controls seems to reduce goal divergence problems as indicated by the positive 
relation with the dependent variables. The relationship between CI is positive and 
moderately significant with NYEV and significant with RoA, and EV. The 
coefficients of CI to the other dependent variables are very small suggesting a 
possible lack of a relationship. The reduced coefficient size between RoA and 
NYRoA suggest that CI could be an efficient control similar to normal internal 
controls with a more immediate effect. The significant coefficient for EV that is 
larger and moderately significant for NYEV, suggest that the market places a higher 
value on CI over a longer period. This could be because diverse shareholders need 
to rely on the controlling role of boards as an alternative to shareholder monitoring. 
 
The relationship between MLI and the different proxies for firm value is 
mostly negative, against the hypothesised sign, suggesting that the directional 
control of the board is seen as costly. The changed sign and significance between 
Test 1 and Test 2 for MLI, EV and NYEV suggest that a time invariant omitted 
variable for example talent could have influenced the previous estimations. MLI is 
highly significant and positive to RoA but the sign change to a slightly larger 
coefficient that is also highly significant but negatively correlated to NYRoA. The 
increased value of the negative coefficients for MLI between RoA and NYRoA as 
well as EV and NYEV suggests that the directional role of the board is seen as 
costly over time. The costly aspect could be attributed to the maximisation of short-
352 
 
 
 
term utility by the board linked to a possible time horizon problem, especially given 
the change in sign between RoA and NYRoA. An area of future study is to assess 
the relationship between the MLI index and accrual quality or agency costs to 
consider possible time horizon problems. Given the criticism especially against 
executive directors’ remuneration in the news media (discussed in section 3.3.1) it 
is possible that the board’s control and direction of the labour of the directors are 
not as effective and efficient as it can be. Although the MLI is an index considering 
the increased average remuneration of the non-executive and executive directors 
that are part of the index (Table 7-19) could help explain the negative sign.  
 
Table 7-19 shows an above inflation increase for non-executive directors 
(2013 = 10.54%; 2014 = 7.69%) and a very high increase (19.38%) for executive 
directors in 2013, that was more than three times the rate of inflation for the same 
year. The executive directors increase did taper down to a below inflation increase 
(3.88%) 2014. 
 
Table 7-19 Board remuneration 
  Average 
board size 
Mean non-
exec salary 
% increase 
on 
previous 
year 
Mean exec 
total 
salary 
% increase 
on previous 
year 
Inflation 
rate 
(Table 2-
5) 
2012 13 826238.53  - 11829263  - 5.7% 
2013 12 913348.38 10.54 14121357 19.38 5.8% 
2014 12 983597.91 7.69 14669190 3.88 6.1% 
 
 
The negative signs for MLI could be attributed to the enhanced Companies 
Act responsibilities placed on shareholders to approve directors’ remuneration, 
resulting in the marker viewing the directional control of the board as less 
important, as directors’ remuneration fall under the monitoring responsibility of the 
shareholders. An area of future study is to reposition the CI and MLI indexes of the 
board separating the indexes using the non-executive and executive director roles 
to identify the relationship between the different roles and firm value. 
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Using a standard one-way Fixed Effects model allocate equal weighting to 
the different subjects but the boards of the SRI companies do vary, and such an 
equal allocation does not reflect the reality. Thus, it is necessary to control for the 
differences between subjects as discussed in section 7.4.3.3. 
 
7.4.3.3 Fixed Effects estimation with weights 
 
To control for the differences in subjects the same Fixed Effects estimation 
that held the cross-section fixed used in Test 2 is extended to a feasible general least 
squares (FGLS) analysis. In order to adjust for differences in subjects, the study 
uses FGLS (with the cross-section fixed) with weights added to the cross-section; 
in addition. the White period test was used to add robust standard errors and 
corrected degrees of freedom for Test 3.  
 
The results of the more robust Test 3 analysis are summarised in Table 7-20. 
 
Table 7-20 One-way Fixed Effects Estimation with weights (Test 3) 
 RoA NYRoA EV NYEV Q NYQ 
Constant -1.420831 20.522*** 95.318*** 141.6*** 1.3884*** 1.5647*** 
CI 0.16184*** -0.027 0.6416*** 1.0576*** 0.0004 0.0002 
MLI 0.13826*** -0.156*** 0.1017 0.0023 -0.0018** -0.0012** 
BLOCK -0.007134 -0.0005 0.0806 -0.0126 0.0065*** -0.0035* 
CONSHA 
0.510763 -0.618** 2.0413 19.944*** 0.0632** 
-
0.1479*** 
DIRSHA -0.005373 -0.0708 0.1299 0.12 -0.01*** 0.0034 
QAS -0.0592*** 0.012 0.0928 -0.672*** -0.0009 0.0003 
CCI -0.0904*** -0.011 0.879*** 0.5329*** 0.0038*** 0.0021** 
R2 0.9883 0.986 0.9915 0.9948 0.9981 0.9909 
Adjusted R2 0.98179 0.9784 0.9867 0.9919 0.997 0.9858 
F-statistic 151.386 127.2037 207.747 343.81 939.45 194.97 
Prop (F) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
* = significant at 0.10 level; ** = significant at 0.05 level; *** = significant at 0.01 level 
 
 
The FGLS Fixed Effects estimation with cross-sectional weighting and the 
White period test method resulted in a further improved highly statistically 
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significant estimations for all dependent variables. The F-statistic values are also 
much higher for all dependent variables. 
 
CI is mostly positively associated to the firm value proxies except for 
NYRoA, where the relationship changed to a negative sign, suggesting that the 
controlling role of the board can also be short-term focused. However, the 
coefficient is small, and the relationship is not statistically significant. The positive 
association between CI and RoA is highly significant and the high levels of 
significance is retained for EV and NYEV. The coefficient increase between EV to 
NYEV suggests that the market value the controls by the board as an alternative to 
shareholder monitoring. Although controls could be costly given the slight negative 
sign with NYRoA, shareholders seem to value strong board-level controls as 
suggested by the relationship to EV and NYEV. Given the increased coefficient of 
CI between EV and NYEV it could indicate that the market value board-level 
controls given the expectation that strong controls will continue to reduce moral 
hazard and reduce information asymmetry due to board-level monitoring as an 
alternative to shareholder monitoring.  
 
The relationship between RoA and NYRoA and MLI did not change between 
the Test 2 and 3 as MLI maintained a positive and highly significant association to 
RoA and a negative and highly significant relation to NYRoA. The changed signs 
of CI linked to NYRoA, and MLI linked to EV and NYEV could indicate a more 
random relationship as the coefficients are small and not significant. It can also 
indicate that directors manage to maximise RoA in a given year ignoring the 
possible future negative consequences for both CI and MLI. Although regulations 
recommend the use of a variety of strategies including delayed compensation, an 
area of future research could consider whether applying the governance 
recommendations were successful in reducing time horizon problems or curtail rent 
extraction and improve sustainability. 
 
The more robust model resulted in a change back to a positive sign for MLI, 
EV and NYEV, however, the relationship is not statistically significant. It is 
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possible that EV and NYEV as market-related measures do not consider MLI as a 
valuable control as directors’ remuneration are disclosed in detail in the integrated 
report and can be discussed at the AGM. In addition, given the requirements of the 
Companies Act shareholders have an additional oversight responsibility over 
directors’ remuneration and might not need to rely as strongly on the directional 
control of the board. MLI has a significant but very small negative relationship to 
Q and NYQ given the more robust Test 3. MLI’s relationship with Q and NYQ 
retained its size and signs but changed to a significant relationship. Again, the small 
negative coefficient could indicate that the market does not rely on the directional 
controls of the board and could view them as slightly expensive. The lack of 
reliance on the board’s directional controls could be attributed to the increased 
bonding of the 2008 Companies Act who placed additional responsibilities on 
shareholders to direct the board’s labour. Any focus on maximising short-term 
benefits by people in an agency relationship would become visible over the longer 
term as goal divergence increase the associated agency cost and reduce firm value. 
The next section summarised the results of the different tests and align the results 
to the study’s objectives and hypothesis. 
 
7.4.4 Summary of the hypotheses testing  
The development of the indexes and the assessment of the results enable this 
study to achieve the research objectives and conclude on the hypotheses. The 
development of CI and MLI indexes led to the achievement of the two sub-
objectives (SO 1 and SO 2).  
SO 1 – to develop a CI index to measure the level of corporate 
control of the board 
SO 2 – to develop a MLI index to measure the level of managerial 
labour of the board. 
 
The construction of the unique CI and MLI indexes extended corporate 
governance index building practices to board-level control to enable the 
measurement of the controlling (CI) and directional (MLI) role of the board in the 
corporate control and managerial labour constructs. Quantifying the controlling and 
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directional role of the board was difficult given the scarcity and quality of relevant 
data, however, it enabled this study to contribute to the body of knowledge on 
board-level controls. The results of the index construction are summarised for each 
year using the mean and median scores as summarised in Table 7-21. 
 
Table 7-21 CI and MLI descriptive statistics 
 CI 
2012 
CI 
2013 
CI 
2014 
MLI 
2012 
MLI 
2013 
MLI 
2014 
Mean 58.86% 59.29% 61.33% 63.4% 64.88% 66.45% 
Median 60.0% 60.0% 60.0% 65.0% 65.0% 65.0% 
 
 
The means of both indexes show small improvements over time which is 
consistent with prior findings on South African corporate governance research 
showing increased levels of compliance to governance recommendation over time 
(Ackers, 2009:14; Ntim, 2009:343; Mans-Kemp, 2014:197). However, the medians 
remained constant, highlighting the need to balance the utility against the cost of 
controls (also referred to as a cost benefit analysis), and the possibility that the 
controls could have reached a plateau in their ability to improve goal alignment. 
Measuring board-level controls enable the study to assess the relationship of CI and 
MLI with firm value in line with the sub- and main hypotheses. 
 
SH 1 – there is a positive relationship between the CI index used to 
measure the board’s level of corporate control and firm value.  
SH 2 – there is a positive relationship between the MLI index used 
to measure the board’s level of managerial labour and firm value. 
H 1 – there is a positive relationship between the board as a 
governance mechanism (CI and MLI) and firm value.  
 
The results of the Model 2 estimations using Tests 1, 2 and 3 are summarised 
in Table 7-22 for each dependent variable. Only the results of the independent 
variables are summarised as the focus of this study is on the relationship between 
CI and MLI (the independent variables) and firm value.  
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Table 7-22 Hypotheses tests summary 
 Test RoA NYRoA EV NYEV Q NYQ 
CI Test 1 FGLS 
random cross-
section  0.133** 0.037 1.188** 1.268* 
9.61E-05 0.0003 
MLI Test 1 FGLS 
random cross-
section 0.139** -0.142** 0.189 0.196 
-0.001 -0.0005 
CI Test 2 Panel LS 
fixed cross-
section  0.1661** 0.011 1.262** 1.363* 0.0005 0.0005 
MLI Test 2 Panel LS 
fixed cross-
section  0.176*** -0.232*** -0.005 -0.075 -0.002 -0.001 
CI Test 3 FGLS 
cross-section 
fixed, weighted 
&White period 0.1618*** -0.027 0.6410*** 1.0576*** 0.0004 0.0002 
MLI Test 3 FGLS 
cross-section 
fixed, weighted 
&White period 0.138*** -0.16*** 0.1017 0.0023 -0.002** -0.001** 
* = significant at 0.10 level; ** = significant at 0.05 level; *** = significant at 0.01 level 
Negative signs are shown in red 
 
 
7.4.4.1 Corporate control results from the CI index 
In considering SH 1, CI shows a positive relationship that is statistically 
significant for RoA, EV and NYEV across all the estimation methods (Tests 1-3) 
(SH 1). CI’s relationship with Q and NYQ was also positive but it was not 
significant, and the coefficient values were very small. The relationship between CI 
and NYRoA was not significant and very small, however there was a change to a 
negative sign in the more robust Test 3. The very small coefficient size and lack of 
significance for CI could indicate a lack of a relationship with NYRoA, Q and NYQ. 
 
7.4.4.2 Managerial labour results from the MLI index 
In considering SH 2 MLI shows a positive relationship that is statistically 
significant for RoA across all the estimation methods. However, MLI shows a 
negative relationship that is statistically significant for NYRoA across all the 
estimation methods. The change in sign suggest a short-term focus on the 
directional controls used by the board in relation to RoA, that becomes detrimental 
in the medium term as indicated by the negative relation to NYRoA. Thus, MLI has 
a positive relationship with RoA but a negative relationship with NYRoA (SH 2). 
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The change in sign suggests a time horizon problem in the direction of the board’s 
labour. 
 
MLI’s relationship with Q and NYQ are negative and very small, and only 
significant for the Test 3 estimation, suggesting that MLI has a negative relationship 
with Q and NYQ (SH 2). The stricter bonding of the 2008 Companies Act could 
make the directional control of the board less valuable to shareholders. MLI’s 
relationship with EV and NYEV is positive for Test 1 and 3 but negative for Test 
2. However, none of relationships were significant. The small coefficients for MLI 
coupled with a lack of significance could also be interpreted as a lack of a 
relationship with EV and NYEV. 
 
7.4.4.3 The board as a governance mechanism  
In considering H 1 the combined results of the relationship of the independent 
variables (CI and MLI) and firm value are considered. As both CI and MLI are 
positively related to RoA in a manner that is statistically significant across all 
estimation methods it is also possible to conclude that there is a positive relationship 
between the board as a governance mechanism (CI = positive and MLI = positive) 
and RoA as a proxy for firm value (H 1). As the relationship between CI and 
NYRoA is not significant the relationship between CI and NYRoA is not 
significantly different from zero. However, there is a negative relationship between 
MLI and NYRoA. Thus, there is a negative relationship between the board as a 
governance mechanism (with CI = 0 and MLI = negative) and NYRoA (H 1). 
 
The association between CI and MLI with Q and NYQ show very small 
coefficients throughout all the estimations with MLI only significant in Test 3. As 
CI’s relationship with Q and NYQ are not significant it is not significantly different 
from zero. MLI, however, has negative relationship with Q and NYQ that is 
significant in the final estimation. Thus, there is a negative relationship between the 
board as a governance mechanism (with CI = 0 and MLI = negative) and Q and 
NYQ (H 1). 
 
359 
 
 
 
CI has a significant positive relationship with EV and NYEV. As MLI has no 
statistically significant relationships with either EV or NYEV the relationship is not 
statistically different from zero. Thus, the relationship between the board as a 
governance mechanism (CI = positive and MLI = 0) and EV and NYEV, are 
positive (H 1). 
 
The above results show mixed findings in the relationship between the board 
as a governance mechanism and the different proxies for firm value. The 
relationship between the board and RoA seems the strongest and significant for CI 
and MLI supporting the internal complementary nature of the controlling and 
directional role of the board. However, when compared to market related proxies 
for firm value the positive coefficients are retained between CI and MLI for EV and 
NYEV but only significant for CI also supporting the complementary nature of the 
independent variables. In contrast the direction between CI and MLI’s coefficients 
is different for Q and NYQ, CI is positive and MLI is negative, with all the 
coefficients very small, and MLI only significant for the more robust Test 3. 
 
A summary of the results of the H 1 discussion is included in Table 7-23. 
Concluding on H 1 enable this study to achieve its main research objective (RO) 
namely: 
RO - to assess the relationship between the board as a governance 
mechanism (CI and MLI) and firm value.  
The development of the CI and MLI indexes enabled this study to assess the 
relationship between the board as a governance mechanism and firm value, with 
mixed results depending on the firm value proxy used. There is a positive 
relationship between the board as a governance mechanism and RoA, EV and 
NYEV, but a negative relationship with NYRoA suggesting that different time 
horizons remains a goal alignment challenge. The board as a governance 
mechanism also has a negative relationship with Q and NYQ. However, the 
coefficients are very small and only MLI is significant suggesting the controlling 
role of the board does not influence Tobin’s Q and that the directing role of the 
board’s labour might have lost its initial utility giving the additional bonding of the 
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2008 Companies Act and achieved a plateau. The negative relationship between 
MLI and firm value proxies could also suggest the persistence of moral hazard as 
the board’s direction of their labour seems costly.  
 
The increased cost of directors’ remuneration is supported by above inflation 
increases in their remuneration (summarised in Table 7-19). It is possible that the 
increased directors’ remuneration is a response to the increased liability risk and 
the increased responsibility stemming from the 2008 Companies Act which could 
be attributed to normal supply and demand economic principles and not to agency 
problems. Deconstructing the root cause of the negative relationship between MLI 
and firm value is an area of future research. The H 1 results are summarised in Table 
7-23 showing positive relationships to RoA, EV and NYEV and negative 
relationships to NYRoA, Q and NYQ. 
 
Table 7-23 Relationships to firm value - H 1 
There is a positive relationship between the board as a governance mechanism 
(CI = positive and MLI = positive) and RoA as a proxy for firm value. 
There is a negative relationship between the board as a governance mechanism 
(with CI = 0 and MLI = negative) and NYRoA. 
There is a positive relationship between the board as a governance mechanism 
(CI = positive and MLI = 0) and EV and NYEV. 
There is a negative relationship between the board as a governance mechanism 
(with CI = 0 and MLI = negative) and Q and NYQ. 
 
 
The lack of significance in some instances could also be because the 
magnitude of board-level controls is so small given the size and complexity of large 
listed companies that their relationship is dwarfed by other variables. In addition, 
the very small coefficients for Q and NYQ may be an indication that the initial 
move to improved governance controls started in 1994 by King I has matured to 
more established practices that maintain the existing controls to prevent the re-
introduction of goal divergence practices such as rent extraction, slacking or the 
excessive use of perquisites. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
This study differentiated from prior studies on the board as a governance 
mechanism by performing an in-depth study on the board as a governance 
mechanism by differentiating between the controlling role of the board in the 
corporate control construct and the directional role of the board in the managerial 
labour construct. The controlling and directional role of the board was measured 
using the CI index for the controlling role and the MLI index for the directional 
role. 
 
To construct the indexes this study performed an in-depth analysis and 
consolidated board-level controls using 25 indicators for the CI index and 23 
indicators for the MLI index. The CI and MLI indexes enabled the study to measure 
board-level controls in the two constructs showing slight improvements in the 
average control scores over time but a constant median for both the CI and MLI 
indexes.  
 
This chapter started by describing the descriptive analysis of the data 
collected by the study to obtain a better understanding of the variability and central 
tendency of the underlying data. In addition to the normal descriptive statistics 
correlation analysis was used for the individual periods as well as the pool and a 
cross-sectional OLS multiple regression was used for descriptive purposes to 
consider the relationship between the independent and dependent variables on a 
year-to-year basis.  
 
As a cross-sectional analysis do not consider the time series nature of the data 
a pooled OLS analysis was performed. However, given the variability of the data 
observed in the year-by-year analysis and the fact that the data represent 84 boards 
that are different the study used panel analysis with Random Effects and Fixed 
Effects estimations as the main analysis methods to test the hypotheses. The 
robustness of the estimations used improved as the analysis moved from a pool OLS 
analysis, using Breusch-Pagan test, to using panel analysis with FGLS Random 
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Effects estimation with Hausman test to consider the suitability of Random and 
Fixed Effects estimations. The last two estimations used Fixed Effects panel 
estimations initially with only the cross-section fixed and finally using a fixed 
cross-section with weights added to the cross-section and the White period test for 
robust standard errors. These estimations were summarised to enable the study to 
conclude on the hypotheses testing and research objectives and sub-objectives as 
discussed in section 7.4.4 and summarised in Table 7-23. The next chapter 
summarises and concludes on this study.  
363 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter summarises the results of the econometric analysis performed in 
chapter 7. The results of the hypotheses tests are utilised to achieve the research 
objective of arriving at a conclusion on the study. In order to put the study into 
context, the summary positions the board as a governance mechanism in the South 
African context - highlighting both the controlling and the directional role of the 
board. This is followed by a discussion of the research findings on the level of 
control and direction exercised by the board. Board-level controls in the corporate 
control and managerial labour constructs are measured using the CI and MLI 
indexes to achieve SO 1 and SO 2. The discussion of the results includes a 
discussion of the results of the unique indexes constructed in this study, and of the 
model development and testing performed.  
 
In addition to the CI and MLI indexes, the control variables included two 
indexes: one was consolidated quality assurance (QAS), which is under the control 
of the shareholders, and the other focused on longer term company-level controls 
(CCI). The panel analysis of the CI and MLI indexes, as independent variables was 
discussed in relation to firm value, taking the various panel methods used into 
account. The contribution of this study was summarised, and the practical 
implications of the research findings were clearly indicated. Lastly, the 
delimitations and limitations of this study were discussed and areas for future 
research highlighted. 
 
Section 8.2 briefly recapitulates the controlling and directional role of the 
board as a governance mechanism. This is followed by section 8.3, which 
summarises the study’s findings relative to the research objective and hypothesis, 
taking into account the results of Tests 1 to 3 of the panel estimations used. Section 
8.4 summarises the contribution of this study, and section 8.5 describes the 
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delimitations and limitations of the study, followed by section 8.6, which highlights 
areas for future research. The study ends with a brief conclusion in section 8.7. 
 
To recapitulate, the main research objective or RO of this study is: 
RO - to assess the relationship between the board as a governance 
mechanism (CI and MLI) and firm value.  
As the board as a governance mechanism is represented by corporate control 
(CI) and managerial labour controls (MLI), the main objective can be expressed as 
a hypothesis: 
H 1 – There is a positive relationship between the board as a 
governance mechanism (CI and MLI) and firm value.  
 
8.2 The board as a governance mechanism 
 
This study focused on the relationship between the board as a governance 
mechanism and firm value. The study extended the body of literature by positioning 
the controlling and directional role of the board in the corporate control and 
managerial labour constructs. Focusing on board-level controls enabled this study 
to consider the knowledge gap on the board as a governance mechanism that 
stemmed from the introduction of more stringent regulatory requirements with the 
implementation of the 2008 Companies Act in 2012. Focusing on board-level 
controls also enabled this study to answer the following research question: 
What is the relation between the controlling (CI) and directing 
(MLI) role of the board as a governance mechanism and firm value 
in a more regulated developmental environment? 
The provisions of the Companies Act limit the control options of the board 
while increasing the liability risks of directors. The study differs from prior board-
related studies in that it used an in-depth assessment of board-level controls in 
relation to firm value within the unique, more regulated developmental South 
African context.  
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Chapter 2 included a detailed discussion of the South African context which 
examined the First World elements such as a strong market, legal and governance 
elements in contrast to the Third World elements of an endemic corruption score, 
high unemployment, and transformational challenges given the high societal 
inequality on educational and economic levels. South Africa’s governance 
regulatory practices have been developed to encourage competitive business 
practices using a more stakeholder-centric African world view.  
 
Despite a stakeholder-centric view promoted by corporate governance 
guidelines, this study uses an agency theory perspective as a lens to assess the board 
as a governance mechanism in relation to firm value. The continued relevance of 
agency theory is centred in the continued goal divergence brought about by the 
separation of duties between the board and the shareholders. Stemming from the 
separation of duties between the board and shareholders, coupled with the 
regulatory and legal responsibility and accountability of the board to the 
shareholders, goal divergence challenges remain aspects that form part of the 
board/shareholder relationship. Because of the board’s legal accountability to the 
shareholders, this study argues that the board will view shareholders as the primary 
stakeholders and manage the company to maximise firm value in view of the goal 
alignment principles of agency theory. The fiduciary duty of the board is to act in 
the best interests of the company, which also indicates a focus on maximising firm 
value. The continued maximisation of self-interest in South Africa as well as the 
endemic corruption index score indicate that moral hazard remains prevalent, which 
supports the use of goal alignment principles within an agency theory perspective.  
 
The number of controlling shareholders over the period of the study varied 
little, reducing from 34.5% in 2012 to 33.3% in 2013 and 2014. The percentage 
shares held by the directors averaged at around 3.5% but the median was less than 
0.5% over the period of the study. The low level of controlling shareholders and the 
low level of directors’ shareholding indicate that separation of ownership from 
control remains a reality – a finding which supports the agency theory perspective 
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used in the study. As the agents of the shareholders, the board is the primary 
governance mechanism in the management of the agency problem.  
 
Board-level controls are important as the board is an alternative to 
shareholder monitoring. Thus, board monitoring becomes complicated by the 
existence of dispersed shareholders, which is more common in large companies. 
The split between companies with no controlling shareholders and companies with 
a controlling shareholder (Table 7-2) reveals some differences between the use of 
controls in the different shareholding groups. This indicates that controlling 
shareholders can exercise additional monitoring and might not need to rely as much 
on board-level controls as measured in the CI and MLI indexes. Companies with 
no controlling shareholder have a lower average QAS score (No controlling 
shareholder = 46.71; Controlling shareholder = 57.65), but higher scores for CCI 
and MLI, with CCI (No controlling shareholder = 51.9; Controlling shareholder = 
43.53) and MLI (No controlling shareholder = 67.48; Controlling shareholder = 
59.87). It seems that dispersed shareholders might not need extensive assurance as 
represented by the lower QAS score but value the extra control provided by CCI 
and MLI.  
 
As the agents of the shareholders, the board is the primary governance 
mechanism used in the management of the agency problem. Board-level controls 
are important as the board is an alternative to shareholder monitoring, which is 
complicated by the fact that shareholders are dispersed, particularly in large 
companies. The controlling roles of other governance mechanisms and the board 
are discussed in detail in chapter 4, the corporate control construct chapter, using 
the literature to identify and define the different variables and indicators. The 
discussion of the controlling role of other governance mechanisms considers the 
market and regulatory mechanisms as external governance mechanisms.  
 
The market-driven external governance mechanism is represented by the 
shareholders who use the JSE as a market. The shareholder governance variables 
include controlling shareholders (CONSHA), blockholders (BLOCK) and 
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directors’ shareholding (DIRSHA), all of which use the market to buy and sell 
shares. Regulatory mechanisms stem from the legal requirements that bond board 
options, including the legal bonding of industries (IND) and the power of 
shareholders to use quality assurance (QAS) to bond the board to transparent 
disclosure practices. The last control variable focuses on company-level control 
considerations (CCI) that represent past strategic decisions which bond the current 
board. Such decisions affect the firm’s risk and growth, firm size, prior firm 
performance, board size and board independence. Board size and board 
independence are included in the CCI as the shareholders appoint the board and 
control its size and composition. The control variables, along with their definitions, 
are summarised in Appendix 4. The control variables represent variables that are 
beyond the direct control of the board in a given year but are variables with expected 
relationships to firm value. The use of control variables enables the study to control 
for the variety of factors that influence firm value in order to isolate the relationship 
between CI and firm value, and MLI and firm value.  
 
Chapter 4 identifies, discusses and defines the 25 indicators for the CI index 
to enable this study to develop the CI index and measure the level of the board’s 
corporate control, while chapter 5 identifies, discusses and defines the 23 indicators 
for the MLI index to enable this study to develop the MLI index and measure the 
level of the board’s managerial labour. In addition to contributing to the body of 
knowledge on board-level controls by positioning the controlling role of the board 
in the corporate control construct with directional control in the managerial labour 
construct, this study extended the index building practice used in corporate 
governance studies to measure the board as a governance mechanism by 
constructing the CI and MLI indexes.  
 
The control variables are influenced by the market, which enables 
shareholders to buy and sell shares (CONSHA, BLOCK and DIRSHA), and the 
regulations that influence industries (IND) and enable shareholders to use quality 
assurance (QAS) to bond the board. Given the control focus of chapter 4, the control 
variables were also identified and defined in chapter 4. As the board consists of 
368 
 
 
 
various directors and its composition may differ slightly from year to year, prior 
company decisions such as those that affect the company’s risk, growth and 
leverage bond the options of the board in the current period. In addition, the board 
is limited to the people appointed to the board by the shareholders and is bonded by 
the size of the board and the level of independence of the board as represented by 
CCI.  
 
Figure 8-1 visually represents the various governance variables and indexes 
used in this study to highlight the board-level control focus and its 
interconnectedness with corporate governance. 
 
Figure 8-1 Control focus of governance 
 
 
The use of control variables in a multiple regression model enables the use of 
econometric methods to simulate an experimental design using non-experimental 
observations to identify the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables while holding the other variables constant. The independent variables are 
the CI and MLI indexes and are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
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8.2.1 CI Index 
The monitoring and controlling role of the board are consolidated in the CI 
index. The board’s monitoring and controlling role are designed to limit the 
excessive use of perquisites and to curb slacking. Monitoring controls focus on the 
separation of duties with independent oversight for the board, as well as board 
committees, to encourage diligence. Board diligence encompasses the number of 
board meetings, the distractions created by other directorships, and sustained 
independence. The last group of indicators focuses on the board committee controls 
and considers the nomination, remuneration, risk, and S&E committees, their 
composition and the independence of their chairmen.  
 
This study differs from other board-related studies by positioning quality 
assurance that includes the statutory audit committee as a control variable. The audit 
committee is a statutory committee and are part of QAS, a control variable, as the 
committee is appointed by the shareholders and reports annually to the shareholders 
in line with the requirements of the Companies Act.  
 
A mindmap of the CI index describing the 25 indicators with their definitions, 
is shown in Figure 8-2. 
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Figure 8-2 CI index 
 
 
Details of the composition and definitions of the indicators on the CI index 
are summarised in Appendix 5. Constructing the CI index enabled this study to 
develop a unique instrument to measure the controlling role of the board. Measuring 
the controlling role led to the achievement of SO 1 with a constant median at 60% 
over the period, and an improving mean of 58.85% for 2012, 59.92% for 2013 and 
61.33 for 2014. 
SO 1 – to develop a CI index to measure the level of corporate 
control of the board. 
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8.2.2 MLI Index 
The role of the board in respect of directional control is consolidated in the 
MLI index. The directional role is geared to guiding the board’s activities and 
labour towards maximising firm value by reducing slacking and rent extraction. 
However, the developing environment in South Africa, coupled with societal 
differences, negatively influences the pool of skilled directors. In addition, the 
Companies Act regulates the responsibility and liability of the board, complicating 
the managerial labour environment in which boards operate. The labour of the board 
is rewarded in line with the different board roles of the members, where executive 
directors are the “specialist managers” with their remuneration linked to firm 
performance and share-based remuneration with a conditionally delayed 
component. Non-executive directors are seen as the “specialist monitors” with their 
remuneration anchored in their oversight role and unrelated to the firm’s 
performance or shares. In directing board activities and labour, the expertise of the 
board is considered, along with their ages, the performance evaluations of the board 
as well as board committees, meeting attendance, and the split between executive 
and non-executive remuneration.  
 
A unique part of the MLI index is the ethical leadership disclosure score or 
ELDS. Ethical leadership has been a core element in South African governance in 
line with the African world view. Chapter 1 of King III provides specific guidance 
on ethical leadership. However, this indicator is difficult to observe and measure. 
This study used an automated content analysis tool (Leximancer) to assess the 
individual integrated reports of all the subjects for all the years to develop the ELDS 
for inclusion in the MLI index, as ethical leadership guides the activities and labour 
of the board towards goal alignment by discouraging illegal and unethical activities.  
 
A mindmap of the MLI index describing the 23 indicators is shown in Figure 
8-3. 
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Figure 8-3 MLI index 
 
 
Constructing the MLI index enabled this study to develop a unique instrument 
to measure the directional role of the board. Measuring the directional role led to 
the achievement of SO 2 with a constant median at 65% over the period and an 
improving mean of 63.4% for 2012, 64.88% for 2013 and 55.45% for 2014. 
SO 2 – to develop a MLI index to measure the level of managerial 
labour of the board. 
 
This study developed four unique indexes. Firstly, the CI and MLI indexes 
were constructed as independent variables representing the controlling and 
directional role of the board as a governance mechanism. The CI and MLI indexes 
represent in-depth board-level controls that are assessed on an annual basis in line 
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with the annual reporting cycle of the board at the AGM. In addition, the study 
developed two indexes that form part of the control variables. One represents the 
quality assurance regulatory environment that is unique to South Africa (QAS). The 
introduction of the 2008 Companies Act changed the audit committee to a statutory 
committee appointed by the shareholders with a duty to report back to the 
shareholders annually. The remaining index is the CCI, which represents company 
controls stemming from past decisions that include firm growth, leverage, size, and 
risk. The CCI also includes board size and independence, which are under the 
control of the shareholders who appoint the board. This study deviates from prior 
board-related studies by positioning board size and independence as beyond the 
direct control of a board and incorporating them into a control variable (the CCI). 
The results of the methods of index development used in this study and the panel 
estimation tests are discussed in section 8.3. 
 
8.3 Discussion of results  
 
The analysis of the data, and thus the results, centres on an assessment of the 
board as a governance mechanism in relation to firm value. Other analysis 
alternatives are possible and are discussed in section 8.6 as areas for future research. 
The relationship between the board and firm value has not been assessed in depth 
within the context of the more regulatory environment which followed the 
introduction of the 2008 Companies Act. The result is a gap in the body of 
knowledge on the revised agency role of the board in relation to the shareholders 
given the bonding of the board in terms of the Companies Act and the additional 
decision responsibilities placed on shareholders. The discussion in section 8.3.1 
highlights the focus of this study by recapitulating the research question, objective 
and hypotheses as the starting point of the discussion of the results to link the results 
to the purpose of the study. 
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8.3.1 Research question, objectives and hypotheses 
The board controls and directs its activities and labour using the corporate 
control and managerial labour constructs. Thus, considering how boards direct and 
control their activities and labour in relation to firm value encapsulates the main 
problem of this study, which can be worded as the following question: 
 
What is the relation between the controlling (CI) and directing 
(MLI) role of the board as a governance mechanism and firm value 
in a more regulated developmental environment? 
 
To answer the above question, the study constructed the CI and MLI indexes 
in order to consolidate the complexity of board-level controls into measurable 
indexes, to enable an assessment of the relationship between the board (CI and MLI) 
and firm value with the aid of econometric estimation methods using a micro panel. 
The changed legislative environment coupled with limited in-depth prior research 
on the board as a governance mechanism helped to prompt the researcher to 
undertake the study,112 which brings us to the purpose of the study.  
The purpose of this study is to address the knowledge gap with 
respect to the relationship between the board as a governance 
mechanism and firm value, that has arisen due to the introduction 
of the 2008 Companies Act (with its more stringent regulatory 
environment), from an agency theory perspective.  
 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge on the board as a governance 
mechanism by differentiating between the controlling and directing role of the 
board using the corporate control and managerial labour constructs. The results of 
the indexes are discussed in section 8.3.2. To focus the study, the purpose was 
translated into the following main research objective or RO of this study: 
RO - To assess the relationship between the board as a governance 
mechanism (CI and MLI) and firm value.  
 
                                                 
112 A detailed discussion on the motivation for undertaking this study can be found in section 1.3. 
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Theories can be used to help explain a phenomenon, and this study used the 
agency theory as a basis for discussing the complexity of the relationship between 
the board’s use of board-level controls and shareholders, given the separation of 
duties between the board and shareholders and the accompanying goal divergence 
challenges. Measuring board-level controls in the corporate control and managerial 
labour constructs in combination encapsulates the controls used by the board as a 
governance mechanism and enables this study to test its main hypothesis. 
H 1 – There is a positive relationship between the board as a 
governance mechanism (CI and MLI) and firm value.  
 
Given the descriptive nature of this study, various analytical methods were 
used to assess the relationship between the independent variables and the proxies 
for firm value. The hypotheses testing focused on panel estimation methods, 
starting with Random Effects and ending with Fixed Effects. The next section 
summarises the index results. 
 
8.3.2 Index results 
This study extended the index building practices in corporate governance to 
an in-depth study on the controlling (CI) and directional (MLI) role of the board, as 
a governance mechanism, as well as for two consolidated control variables (QAS 
and CCI). The board as a governance mechanism is one of a variety of governance 
mechanisms used in corporate governance, as shown in Figure 8-1. The 
identification of the indicators used in developing the indexes is discussed, defined 
and anchored using the literature in chapters 4 and 5, and summarised in 
Appendixes 4, 5 and 6.  
 
The construction of the unique CI and MLI indexes extended corporate 
governance index building practices to board-level controls to enable the 
measurement of the controlling (CI) and directional (MLI) role of the board in the 
corporate control and managerial labour constructs. Given the scarcity and quality 
of relevant data, quantifying the controlling and directional role of the board was 
difficult. However, it enabled this study to contribute to the body of knowledge on 
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board-level controls. Constructing the CI and MLI indexes enabled the testing of 
the two sub-hypotheses. 
SH 1 – there is a positive relationship between the CI index used to 
measure the board’s level of corporate control and firm value.  
SH 2 – there is a positive relationship between the MLI index used 
to measure the board’s level of managerial labour and firm value. 
 
In considering SH 1, CI shows a positive relationship that is statistically 
highly significant for RoA, EV and NYEV. CI’s relationships with Q, NYQ and 
NYRoA were not significant, and the coefficient values were very small. There was, 
however, a change to a negative sign for NYRoA. The changed sign could indicate 
a short-term control focus linked to return on assets which as an accounting ratio is 
more susceptible to accounting adjustments. The hypothesis is supported as CI 
bears a positive relationship to RoA, EV and NYEV. However, it is not possible to 
conclude that there is a relationship between CI and the remaining firm value 
proxies as the test results were not significant and the relationship is thus not 
statistically different from zero. 
 
In considering SH 2, MLI shows a positive relationship with RoA but a 
negative relationship with NYRoA, both of which are statistically highly 
significant. The change in sign suggests a short-term focus on the directional 
controls used by the board in relation to RoA. This becomes detrimental in the 
medium term or suggests a time horizon problem. When compared to the above 
inflation increase in directors’ remuneration (summarised in Table 7-19), it seems 
that either the specialist skills of directors successfully demanded greater market 
premiums to compensate them for the increased liability risk since the introduction 
of the 2008 Companies Act, or there is increased rent extraction by the board, 
increasing goal divergence. Identifying the root cause behind the changed sign is 
an area for future study. The relationship between MLI and Q and NYQ is negative 
and very small but significant, continuing the negative trend. MLI does not bear a 
significant relationship to EV or NYEV. Thus, the hypothesis is supported as MLI 
bears a positive relationship to RoA, but negative relationships to NYRoA, Q and 
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NYQ, in contrast to the predicted relationship. It is not possible to conclude that 
there is a relationship between MLI and the remaining firm value proxies (EV and 
NYEV) as the test results were not significant. 
 
The study also extended the practice of index building to construct the QAS 
and CCI indexes that are part of the control variables. The QAS enabled this study 
to measure quality assurance by considering the contribution of the audit 
committee, the appointment of a quality external audit firm and the proportional 
audit fees paid. The results for QAS show an increasing mean of 48.81% – 2012; 
50.8% – 2013 and 51.59% – 2014, with the median increasing in 2013 (33.3% – 
2012; 66.7% – 2013 and 66.7% – 2014). CCI enabled this study to control for 
company level considerations that bond the board’s control options in the current 
year. The mean and median for CCI were more constant and closer together with a 
mean of 49.6% – 2012; 48.2% – 2013 and 49.4% – 2014 and a constant median of 
50% for all periods. Although the CCI score in 2013 was a little lower, the change 
was around 1% and the median remained constant, indicating that the CCI score 
has a stable influence over time. 
 
The index construction process followed the guidance of Gompers et al. 
(2003), where each indicator has the same weight in the index. Allocating equal 
weighting to the different indicators operates on the assumption that they are of 
equal importance. Prior South African studies that also used index building 
strategies also placed equal weighting on the different indicators in the index. Thus, 
testing the equal weight assumption of the individual indicators in the indexes is an 
area for future study. The construction of the indexes enabled the study to test the 
sub-hypotheses linked to the individual independent variables.  
 
Given the panel data collected by the study, hypotheses testing was performed 
using econometric panel estimation methods. The advantage of panel estimation 
methods is that by using one estimation that considers all the variables, all the 
underlying relationships can be assessed while considering the cross-sectional as 
well as time series nature of the data.  
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8.3.3 Panel estimation methods 
The study started its analysis with a pooled OLS estimation to assess the 
pooled results for all the subjects over the three-year period. The results showed 
that RoE is not significant for the model as a whole, which excluded RoE and 
NYRoE from further analysis. Pooled data can increase the risk of heterogeneity, 
resulting in the need to perform more robust tests. Given the possibility of more 
random influences stemming from the variability of the results in the descriptive 
cross-sectional analysis (section 7.3.3), the Breusch-Pagan test was performed with 
positive results that were highly significant on the cross-sectional analysis and the 
combined cross-sectional time series analysis but not on the time series, suggesting 
one-way panel analysis methods on the cross-section.  
 
As a second analysis the study performed a Random Effects estimation using 
FGLS with cross-section set to random (Test 1). GLS enables the estimation to 
control for heteroscedasticity. The Random Effects estimation used the Wansbeek-
Kapteyn option as an estimator of component variances, given the limited time span 
of three years, for unbiased estimators. The Hausman test was run after the Random 
Effects estimation to indicate whether Fixed or Random Effects would be the best 
option. The results are summarised in Table 8-1. 
 
Table 8-1 Random Effects cross-sectional 
 RoA NYRoA EV NYEV Q NYQ 
CI 0.13304** 0.036973 1.1884** 1.2679* 9.61E-05 0.00025 
MLI 0.13916** -0.1421** 0.1894 0.196 -0.001 -0.0005 
Hausman test p 0.009FE 0.0471FE 0.0198FE 0.0073FE 0.3891RE 0.3638RE 
Weighted R2 0.07763 0.121729 0.1029 0.06261 0.0949 0.0863 
Weighted adjusted R2 0.04726 0.092815 0.0734 0.03175 0.06506 0.0562 
Weighted F-statistic 2.556360 4.209996 3.4837 2.0288 3.1833 2.8693 
Weighted prop (F) 0.01*** 0.0001*** 0.0008*** 0.0438** 0.0019*** 0.0046*** 
* = significant at 0.10 level; ** = significant at 0.05 level; *** = significant at 0.01 level 
FE = Fixed Effects; RE = Random Effects 
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The results for Test 1 as a whole were statistically significant to highly 
significant for all dependent variables. The Hausman’s test indicates that Random 
Effects should be the preferred method for Q and NYQ, and Fixed Effects for the 
other dependent variables. However, as the study used a near population sample, 
Fixed Effects estimations were performed for all the Dependent variables. 
 
One of the advantages of Fixed Effects estimation is that it controls for time 
invariant variables that could influence estimations over time. Thus, IND was 
excluded for Fixed Effects estimations. The Fixed Effects estimation used a one-
way Fixed Effects least square (LS) estimation and only held the cross-sectional 
effects fixed (Test 2).  
 
The results of the Fixed Effects estimation are summarised in Table 8-2. 
There is a markedly improved level of predictability with the same significance and 
coefficient signs as for Test 1 for the independent variables, showing consistency 
in the results between the different estimations for the independent variable 
relationships. 
 
Table 8-2 Fixed Effects estimation (one-way) 
 RoA NYRoA EV NYEV Q NYQ 
CI 0.16605** 0.011 1.2615** 1.3626* 0.0005 0.0005 
MLI 0.17572*** -0.232*** -0.005 -0.0749 -0.0018 -0.0014 
R2 0.8447 0.7452 0.9785 0.9747 0.9575 0.9428 
Adjusted R2 0.75788 0.6028 0.9666 0.9605 0.9338 0.9108 
F-statistic 9.72975 5.2316 81.575 68.822 40.326 29.489 
Prop (F) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
* = significant at 0.10 level; ** = significant at 0.05 level; *** = significant at 0.01 level 
 
 
To control for the differences in subjects, the Fixed Effects estimation was 
extended to a FGLS analysis (Test 3) to adjust for differences in subjects, with the 
cross-section fixed, weights added to the cross-section, using the White period test 
to add robust standard errors and corrected degrees of freedom. The results are 
summarised in Table 8-3. 
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Table 8-3 FGLS Fixed Effects Estimation  
 RoA NYRoA EV NYEV Q NYQ 
CI 0.16184*** -0.027 0.6416*** 1.0576*** 0.0004 0.0002 
MLI 0.13826*** -0.156*** 0.1017 0.0023 -0.0018** -0.0012** 
R2 0.9883 0.986 0.9915 0.9948 0.9981 0.9909 
Adjusted R2 0.98179 0.9784 0.9867 0.9919 0.997 0.9858 
F-statistic 151.386 127.2037 207.747 343.81 939.45 194.97 
Prop (F) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
* = significant at 0.10 level; ** = significant at 0.05 level; *** = significant at 0.01 level 
 
 
The results of Test 3 showed high levels of significance with high F statistical 
values for all dependent variables. In addition, the significance of the relationships 
between the independent variables and RoA, NYRoA, EV and NYEV was 
consistent for all tests. However, the more robust Test 3 showed a statistically 
significant negative relationship between MLI and Q and NYA. 
 
Overall the studies yielded mixed results, with some relationships found to be 
positive, some negative, and some not statistically significant, suggesting a possible 
absence of a relationship (shown below as = 0). The overall results for H 1 can be 
summarised as follows: 
 There is a positive relationship between the board as a governance 
mechanism (CI = positive and MLI = positive) and RoA as a proxy for 
firm value. 
 There is a negative relationship between the board as a governance 
mechanism (with CI = 0 and MLI = negative) and NYRoA. 
 There is a positive relationship between the board as a governance 
mechanism (CI = positive and MLI = 0) and EV and NYEV. 
 There is a negative relationship between the board as a governance 
mechanism (with CI = 0 and MLI = negative) and Q and NYQ. 
 
It is possible that some of the small coefficients can be explained by the fact 
that board-level controls are dwarfed by the other governance mechanisms or that 
board-level controls have stabilised or plateaued and merely continue to control on 
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a basic, more protective level to minimise misuse of resources. The negative 
relationship could be attributed to possible time horizon problems where the board 
maximise their short-term utility to benefit RoA (a commonly reported ratio) to the 
determent of NYRoA. The root cause of the negative relationship is an area for 
future study. 
 
8.4 Summary of research contribution 
 
Firstly, given the complex role of the board, this study contributes to the body 
of knowledge by building indexes to assess the board’s use of controls in the 
corporate control and managerial labour constructs. Together the MLI and CI 
indexes represent a set of comprehensive board-level indexes which differentiate 
this study from prior studies that focused on limited board-level variables. This 
study used narrower indicator definitions to develop indexes that represent the in-
depth use of board-level controls. The indexes comprehensively represent the 
controlling and directional role of the board by consolidating 25 indicators in the 
CI index and 23 in the MLI index to permit the study of board-level controls in 
greater depth. Both indicators showed increasing trends in their means over the 
period of the study, in line with prior corporate governance indexes that also showed 
increasing trends. However, for both indexes the medians remained constant over 
the period.  
 
Secondly, this study contributes to the body of knowledge by adopting a 
control focus that uses the two constructs to differentiate between the controlling 
and directional role of the board as a governance mechanism. The focus on control 
in this study differs from normal operational internal controls as the control 
mechanisms available to the board focus on directing and controlling the activities 
and labour of the board at a more strategic level. In contrast to normal internal 
controls, which generally need to operate in an effective and efficient manner, 
board-level controls can be slow to respond and filter through to firm value. To 
assess the inefficiency of the controls, dependent variables with a negative lag (t+1) 
were added to the model. The most dramatic result was the significantly positive 
382 
 
 
 
relation between the board and RoA, which changed to a negative relation to 
NYRoA that was statistically significant for MLI. The change in the sign suggests 
a short-term focus linked to RoA which changed to a negative sign for NYRoA, 
indicating the persistence of time horizon problems. However, identifying the root 
cause of the problem is an area for future study. EV, a market-based proxy for firm 
value, indicated that the controlling role (CI) is especially valued. CI showed a 
highly significant and positive association with EV that increased in coefficient size 
and retained the positive sign and level of significance between CI and NYEV. Even 
though the principles for board-level controls have been well established since the 
introduction of King I, the controlling role of the board still did not plateau as its 
monitoring and oversight role is still positively associated with EV and NYEV. 
 
Thirdly, South African governance follows the African world view of ubuntu, 
which emphases ethical leadership. This study extends the existing literature by 
including an indicator to incorporate ethical leadership in the MLI index. To 
measure ethical leadership, a qualitative content analysis of the integrated reports 
of the relevant companies was carried out with the aid of Leximancer.113 This 
enabled the study to incorporate ethical leadership into the MLI index to 
acknowledge the hybrid governance model used in South Africa. The average 
ELDS run on all 84 companies’ integrated reports together per year initially showed 
an improving trend, moving from 2407 in 2012 to 3486 in 2013 and falling back to 
2541 in 2014. In addition, this study included the social and ethics (S&E) 
committee, which is a statutory board committee, in the indicators for the CI and 
MLI indexes. The inclusion of ethical elements set the South African governance 
view apart from the views of developed countries, bonding the control options of 
the board to the ubuntu view. However, given the pervasive corruption score and 
continued societal inequality, encouraging an ethical view does not always 
counteract the practice of maximising self-interest. 
 
Fourthly, this study extends the index-building practice used to consolidate 
independent variables into control variables. The first consolidated control variable 
                                                 
113 Leximancer is an automated content analysis tool. 
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is the quality audit score (QAS). The QAS consolidates the bonding impact of the 
Companies Act requirements relating to external audit and the audit committee into 
a single score. The development of a QAS sets this study apart as it consolidates 
the complex relationship linked to assurance into an index and positions the audit 
or assurance relationship outside the control of the board. The results for QAS show 
an increasing mean of 48.81% – 2012; 50.8% – 2013 and 51.59% – 2014, and 
median 33.3% – 2012; 66.7% – 2013 and 66.7% – 2014. The second consolidated 
control variable focuses on company-level controls or company control indicators 
(CCI). CCI consider the risk, growth, prior performance, company size, board size 
and board independence in the index construction process. This study breaks new 
ground by positioning board size and independence outside the direct control of the 
board as part of the CCI index. Board size and independence are dependent on the 
shareholders who appoint the board. The development of the CCI differentiates this 
study as it consolidates the complexity of past control or direction decisions 
(relating to risk and growth for example) which bond the current options of the 
board with the board size and composition into an index that is beyond the direct 
control of the board in the current year. The mean and median for CCI were more 
constant and closer together with a mean of 49.6% – 2012; 48.2% – 2013 and 49.4% 
– 2014 and a constant median of 50% for all periods. 
 
In the fifth place, this study is based on boards of companies on the SRI index 
and uses an agency theory perspective on SRI companies that has a social 
responsibility focus coupled with transparent reporting. An agency theory 
perspective in a study on the SRI index is relatively unexplored in South Africa as 
prior studies using the SRI index focused on social or sustainable objectives. 
However, as the SRI companies are larger companies with separation between the 
board and shareholders, an agency relationship exists with its related goal 
divergence problems, as evidenced by African Bank and Steinhoff International, 
both part of the SRI index. Although the selection of companies in prior corporate 
governance studies which used samples of 90 or more companies would have 
overlapped with companies on the SRI index, these studies did not analyse the 
results linked to companies on the SRI index in their findings.  
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In the sixth place the period of this study focuses on the business environment 
after the enactment of the 2008 Companies Act. The study began in 2012 and ended 
in 2014 as the composition of the SRI index changed in 2015. Thus, the timing of 
the study was influenced by structural changes. The 2008 Companies Act increased 
the legislative requirements applicable to directors in a manner that increased their 
bonding and granted shareholders more power to approve directors’ remuneration 
and appoint an audit committee that reports to the shareholders. This changed 
requirement of the Companies Act requires a re-balancing of the agency 
relationship between the board and the shareholders. This study contributes to the 
body of knowledge by assessing the relationship between the board as a governance 
mechanism and firm value, in an altered and more regulated environment and a 
developing economy. 
 
In the seventh place the focus of this study on the SRI index includes 
companies from all industries. The study used a unique industry classification based 
broadly on the spectrum of customers to identify two industry groupings. The first 
group was the basic or primary industry, with a limited number of customers, and 
the second group the consumer-centred industry with a wide spectrum of customers. 
In the industry classification the primary industries have a higher average CI score 
(63.8%) when compared to the consumer-centred industries (56.1%), illustrating 
that industries influence board-level control options. 
 
The next section summarises the delimitations and limitations of the study 
and the assumptions made by this study. 
 
8.5 Delimitations and limitations 
 
The delimitations include the focus of this study on the relationship between 
the board as a governance mechanism and firm value within the context of the more 
regulated environment of the 2008 Companies Act, using an agency theory lens. 
The assessment performed in this study focused on the relationship between the 
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board as a governance mechanism and firm value. It is not a causal study geared to 
the prediction of firm value. The starting point chosen for the study was the 
introduction of the 2008 Companies Act as the Act legislates the responsibility and 
liability of the board and the accountability of the board to the shareholders. The 
annual accountability to the shareholders, coupled with division of duties between 
shareholders and the board, establishes an agency relationship. Annual timelines 
were used as the board has to report annually to the shareholders at the AGM and 
uses the annual integrated report as the main feedback report. Furthermore, the 
study used an agency theory lens as the assumptions applicable to the agency theory 
apply to large companies with separation of duties between the board and 
shareholders, and this delineates the study. 
 
The study is limited by the agency theory lens and its reliance on efficient 
markets in South Africa. The market is smaller and less liquid, which implies a 
limitation, as it might not be possible to buy and sell shares as freely as in a more 
developed market. The reliance on the economic principle of effective markets 
might not be a valid assumption as South Africa is a developing country with 
foreign exchange controls and a smaller, less liquid market. However, the 
maximisation of self-interest assumption is evident in South African society, 
especially when the high corruption index score is considered. The limited market 
in South Africa also influences the labour market as the pool of available directors 
is limited, which could result in upward pressure on directors’ remuneration due to 
supply and demand limitations. 
 
The index construction process followed the guidance of Gompers et al. 
(2003) where each indicator is assumed to contribute in an equal manner to the 
index. This assumption is in line with prior studies, but a future study could consider 
whether the indicators should receive different weightings.  
 
Boards of companies on the SRI index were used as the SRI index uses better 
transparent disclosure practices, especially on non-financial information. However, 
the use of a balanced panel was a limitation as the same companies had to be 
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included for all periods. This led to the exclusion of some companies as noted in 
Appendix 2. The aim of the selection of the sample was to get as close to a census 
as possible given the limitations of a balanced panel. The next section highlights 
areas for future research. 
 
8.6 Areas for future research 
A number of areas for future research have been highlighted by this study as 
listed below. 
 Assess the relative contribution of the individual indicators to test the 
assumption that board-level controls should be equally weighted in an 
index.  
 Consider a different theoretical view like institutional theory or 
signalling theory to the board as a governance mechanism to help 
establish a deeper understanding of the control options used by 
boards. 
 Assess the MLI index’s relationship to accrual quality or agency costs 
given the negative signs linked to MLI. 
 Assess the relationship between the implementation of improved 
governance practices and economic growth under more constrained 
economic conditions to determine whether improved governance 
practices do in fact enhance competitiveness and improve economic 
growth. 
 Assess the magnitude of the differences between groups, for 
controlling shareholders versus dispersed shareholders, and the 
changes in company- and board-level controls linked to the different 
ownership categories. 
 Investigate the maturing contribution of institutional shareholders in 
South Africa as a governance mechanism. 
 Assess the relationship between ethical leadership using the ELDS 
score and other board-level controls and firm value. 
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 Investigate the contribution of the two specialist roles of the board by 
separately analysing the relationship between expert monitoring by 
non-executive directors, including independent directors, and 
specialist management by executive directors and firm value. 
 Assess whether the governance recommendations have been 
successful in reducing time horizon problems by using a variety of 
mechanisms to structure the remuneration of executive directors. 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study is to address the knowledge gap with respect to the 
relationship between the board as a governance mechanism and firm value, that has 
arisen due to the introduction of the 2008 Companies Act (with its more stringent 
regulatory environment), from an agency theory perspective. The changed 
legislative environment requires the repositioning of the agency relationship 
between the board and shareholders as legislative changes increase the 
shareholders’ approval responsibilities and the bonding of the board. To enable the 
study to achieve its purpose, an index representing the controlling role of the board 
was developed in the corporate control construct and an index representing the 
managerial labour of the board was developed in the managerial labour construct. 
The development of the indexes enabled the study to measure the controlling and 
directional role of the board as a governance mechanism against firm value.  
 
The study investigated boards in South African companies on the Socially 
Responsible Investment (SRI) index for the period 2012 to 2014 given the structural 
break of the introduction of the 2008 Companies Act in 2012 and the structural 
change to the SRI index in 2015. The sample consisted of 84 boards over three 
years, resulting in 252 firm year observations, comprehensively covering the index 
given the limitation of obtaining a balanced panel.  
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The study followed a quantitative approach using panel analysis and 
considering both the cross-sectional and time series nature of the data. The main 
estimation method used was Fixed Effects with the cross-section kept fixed and 
with weights added to the cross-section as well as using the White period in a 
feasible general least squares analysis, to ensure a robust estimation. The study used 
different proxies for firm value by considering return on assets (RoA), enterprise 
value per share (EV) and Tobins’s Q (Q) as the dependent variables. In addition, a 
negative lagged relationship to the next year’s (NY) firm values for all dependent 
variables was also considered (NYRoA, NYEV & NYQ).  
 
Both the CI and MLI were positively related to RoA but their relationship to 
NYRoA became negative. The changed sign suggests that board-level controls use 
a short-term focus to maximise RoA in a manner that is negative in the longer term, 
revealing a time horizon problem. The relationship between CI and EV is highly 
significantly positive, suggesting that the more market-focused measure value 
board-level controls as an alternative to shareholder monitoring and the positive 
relationship continue into the next period. The coefficient for NYEV is slightly 
larger and significant. In contrast the relationship between MLI and Q as well as 
NYQ shows small coefficients that are significant and negative. The negative sign 
could be influenced by the fact that the additional approval responsibilities of the 
shareholders bond the shareholders to direct the labour of the board, thereby 
reducing the value of MLI, or that shareholders used the introduction of the 
Companies Act to maximise directors’ remuneration as their remuneration 
increased above inflation in total over the period.  
 
This study showed that board-level control is still a factor that bears a 
relationship to firm value. However, there were mixed findings among the different 
proxies for firm value. The board as a governance mechanism is positively related 
to RoA, EV and NYEV, and negatively related to NYRoA, Q and NYQ. 
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“There’s a trick to the 'graceful exit.' It begins with the vision to recognize when a job, a 
life stage, or a relationship is over — and let it go. It means leaving what’s over without 
denying its validity or its past importance to our lives. It involves a sense of future, a belief 
that every exit line is an entry, that we are moving up, rather than out.”  
Ellen Goodman 
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Appendix 2 List of SRI companies 
AdvTech Ltd (ADH) 
Howden Africa Holdings Ltd 
(HWN) Optimum Coal Holdings114 
AECI Ltd (AFE) Hulamin Ltd (HLM) 
Palabora Mining Company 
Ltd115  
African Bank Investments 
Ltd116 Hyprop Investments Ltd (HYP) Pick n Pay Stores Ltd (PIK) 
African Oxygen Ltd (AFX) Illovo Sugar Ltd (ILV) PPC Ltd117 (PPC) 
African Rainbow Minerals Ltd 
(ARI) 
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd 
(IMP) RCL Foods Ltd118 (RCL) 
Allied Electronics Corporation 
Ltd (AEL) Imperial Holdings Ltd (IPL) Redefine Properties Ltd (RDF) 
Allied Technologies Ltd119 Intu Properties Plc120 (ITU) Remgro Ltd (REM) 
Anglo American Plc (AGL) Investec Ltd (INL) Reunert Ltd (RLO) 
Anglo American Platinum Ltd 
(AMS) JSE Limited (JSE) RMB Holdings Ltd (RMH) 
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd (ANG) 
Kap Industrial Holdings Ltd 
(KAP) 
Royal Bafokeng Platinum Ltd 
(RBP) 
Aquarius Platinum Ltd (AQP) Kumba Iron Ore Ltd (KIO) SAB Miller Plc (SAB) 
Arcelor Mittal South Africa 
Ltd (ACL) Lewis Group Ltd (LEW) Sanlam Ltd (SLM) 
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings 
Ltd (APN) Liberty Holdings Ltd (LBH) Santam Ltd (SNT) 
Aveng Ltd (AEG) 
Life Healthcare Group Holdings 
Ltd (LHC) Sappi Ltd (SAP) 
Barclays Africa Group Ltd121 
(BGA) Lonmin Plc (LON) Sasol Ltd (SOL) 
Barloworld Ltd (BAW) Massmart Holdings Ltd (MSM) Sibanye Gold Ltd122 
BHP Billiton Plc (BIL) Merafe Resources (MRF) 
Standard Bank Group Ltd 
(SBK) 
British American Tobacco Plc 
(BIT)  
Mediclinic International Ltd 
(MDC) 
Steinhoff International 
Holdings Ltd (SNH) 
Business Connexion Group Ltd 
(BCX) MMI Holdings Ltd (MMI) Sun International Ltd (SUI) 
Capevin Ltd123 Mondi Ltd (MND) Super Group Ltd (SPG) 
Clicks Group Ltd (CLS) Mpact Ltd (MPT) Telkom SA SOC Ltd124 (TKG) 
Discovery Holdings Ltd (DSY) Mr Price Group Ltd (MRP) The Bidvest Group Ltd (BVT) 
DRDGOLD Ltd (DRD) MTN Group (MTN) 
The Foschini Group Ltd 
(TFG) 
Exxaro Resources Ltd (EXX) 
Murray & Roberts Holdings Ltd 
(MUR) The Spar Group Ltd (SPP) 
FirstRand Ltd (FSR) Nampak Ltd (NPK) Tiger Brands Ltd (TBS) 
Gold Fields Ltd (GFI) Nedbank Group Ltd (NED) Tongaat Hulett Ltd (TON) 
Grindrod Ltd (GND) Netcare Ltd (NTC) 
Truworths International Ltd 
(TRU) 
Group Five Ltd (GRF) Northam Platinum Ltd (NHM) Vodacom Group Ltd (VOD) 
Growthpoint Properties Ltd 
(GRT) Oceana Group Ltd (OCE) 
Wilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon 
Ltd (WBO) 
Harmony Gold Mining 
Company Ltd (HAR) Old Mutual Plc (OML) 
Woolworths Holdings Ltd 
(WHL) 
                                                 
114 Excluded as the company was delisted in July 2012. 
115 Excluded as the company was sold in 2013 to a private consortium and changed to a private company. 
116 Excluded as the company was placed under curatorship 10 August 2014. 
117 Changed the companies name from Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd to PPC Ltd in 2012. 
118 Name changed from Rainbow Chicken Limited to RCL foods in 2013. 
119 Excluded as the company became a wholly owned subsidiary of Allied Electronics Corporation Limited in 2013. 
120 Name changed from Capital Shopping Centres Group Plc to Intu Properties Plc in 2013. 
121 Name changed from ABSA Group Limited to Barclays Africa Group Limited in 2013. 
122 Excluded as Sibanye Gold Ltd originated from a split from Gold Fields Ltd in 2013. 
123 Capevin is a passive holding company that listed in August 2012 and was previously known as KWV Ltd. 
124 Telkom SA SOC is a State-Owned Company as the government is the controlling shareholder. 
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Appendix 3 Dependent variables 
 
The study uses four dependent variables as proxies for firm value. Two 
accounting related variables return on assets (RoA) and return on equity (RoE) 
and two market related variables Tobin’s Q (Q) and enterprise value per share 
(EV). Their formulas and ratios have been extracted from INET BFA, the 
formulas are as follow (INET BFA, 2016): 
 
𝑅𝑜𝐴 =
((𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑎𝑥 (𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇) − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 )
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
×  100  
 
RoE =  
Profit Attributible To Ordinary Shareholders
Ordinary Shareholders Interest
 × 100 
 
EV  =
(Market capitalisation at year‐end in Rand + debt + preference shares) − cash
Number of ordinary shares in issue at year‐end
 
 
Q =
MV of equity + book debt
assets (valued at replacement cost)
 
 
The following histograms with normal distribution curves show the midpoint and 
distribution of the different dependent variables for each year. 
 
Dependent variable histograms with normal distribution curves for 2012 to 
2014 
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Dependent variable histograms with normal distribution curves for 2012 to 
2014 - continued 
   
   
 
Descriptive statistics on the current year’s dependent variables and next year’s 
dependent variables 
 
Descriptive statistics on the dependent variables 
Year RoA RoA EV Q NYQ NYRoA NYRoE NYEV 
2012 N Valid 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 10.5578
8 
10.7025
2 
176.7535
1 
1.59655 1.5869 9.2270 8.722 188.111
9 
Median 8.53300 14.7140
0 
92.16800 1.13000 1.1350 7.6800 14.240 93.8400 
Std. Deviation 13.2602
8 
52.6826
5 
242.6879
2 
1.34352 1.3601 15.3694 60.2586 255.970
8 
Variance 175.835 2775.46
1 
58897.42
6 
1.805 1.850 236.219 3631.09 65521.0
6 
Minimum -25.760 -422.655 1.047 .130 .13 -40.31 -483.7 1.26 
Maximum 63.370 81.609 1457.792 6.090 6.10 63.73 74.2 1610.64 
Perc
entile
s 
25 2.46275 7.25850 44.08375 .78750 .7775 1.5200 6.893 42.8775 
50 8.53300 14.7140
0 
92.16800 1.13000 1.1350 7.6800 14.240 93.8400 
75 15.9080
0 
23.1287
5 
191.1512
5 
1.84250 1.9650 15.4775 21.633 223.727
5 
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Descriptive statistics on the dependent variables - continued 
Year RoA RoA EV Q NYQ NYRoA NYRoE NYEV 
2013 N Valid 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 9.22707 8.72208 188.1115 1.5869
0 
1.4917 9.6904 17.077 207.887
3 
Median 7.68050 14.23700 93.84050 1.1350
0 
1.1000 8.7250 14.550 114.010
0 
Std. Deviation 15.3695
5 
60.25877 255.9709 1.3600
9 
1.2072 10.399
2 
15.263
9 
282.564
8 
Variance 236.223 3631.119 65521.12 1.850 1.457 108.14 232.98
7 
79842.8
6 
Minimum -40.314 -483.654 1.263 .130 .13 -6.95 -9.0 1.48 
Maximum 63.732 74.149 1610.636 6.100 6.20 43.62 57.9 1726.47 
Perc
entile
s 
25 1.52275 6.89150 42.87825 .77750 .7675 1.1200 9.418 45.1250 
50 7.68050 14.23700 93.84050 1.1350
0 
1.1000 8.7250 14.550 114.010
0 
75 15.4767
5 
21.62900 223.7285 1.9650
0 
1.7300 14.000
0 
21.540 236.700
0 
2014 N Valid 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 9.68985 17.07662 207.8875 1.4916
7 
1.4238 6.1681 11.058 216.575
8 
Median 8.72350 14.55050 114.0145 1.1000
0 
1.0050 8.0500 12.630 111.985
0 
Std. Deviation 10.39903 15.26335 282.5651 1.2071
5 
1.3682 13.909
8 
21.691 308.274
2 
Variance 108.140 232.970 79843.05 1.457 1.872 193.48
3 
470.51 95032.9
9 
Minimum -6.946 -8.971 1.476 .130 .10 -75.08 -88.6 .83 
Maximum 43.623 57.888 1726.472 6.200 8.71 40.80 75.1 1834.31 
Perc
entile
s 
25 1.11700 9.41600 45.12550 .76750 .5825 -.2325 6.863 38.2525 
50 8.72350 14.55050 114.0145 1.1000
0 
1.0050 8.0500 12.630 111.985
0 
75 13.99700 21.53825 236.7040 1.7300
0 
1.5325 13.352
5 
18.215 254.020
0 
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Appendix 4: Control variables 
 
The control variables (CVs) are visually summarised in the mindmap below, 
followed by their definitions and histograms with normal distribution curves to 
show their midpoint and distribution. 
 
 
 
CV1 = BLOCK 
is the percentage combined shareholding of blockholders with 5% or 
more shares in a company who are not a controlling or dominant 
shareholder. The relationship between monitoring by blockholders and 
firm value is expected to be positive as blockholders’ shareholding is 
too small to directly extract rent, which motivates them to maximise firm 
value through monitoring. 
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CV2 = CONSHA 
is a dichotomous variable where a controlling shareholder is a 
shareholder with 25% or more shares in a company (coded as 1), and 
companies without a dominant shareholder are seen as companies with 
dispersed shareholders (coded as 0). The relationship between 
monitoring by a controlling shareholder and firm value is expected to be 
negative as the controlling shareholders could use their position to 
maximise their utility, to the disadvantage of minority shareholders and 
the company. In situations where the controlling shareholder is a 
director or directors, the company would be classified as being without 
a dominant shareholder (coded as 0) as the company is controlled by the 
board.  
CV3 = DIRSHA 
is the percentage combined disclosed directors’ shareholding of the total 
shareholding (all the shareholding data were extracted from INET or 
Thompson Reuters databases). The relationship between monitoring by 
directors’ shareholding and firm value is expected to be negative as 
directors can still use moral hazard and information asymmetry to 
maximise their own benefit. 
CV4 = QAS 
is the sum of the three quality audit elements. The relationship between 
quality audit and firm value is expected to be negative as quality audit 
is a well-established monitoring control used to control information 
asymmetry. 
1) The appointment of a quality or Big-4 audit firm as the external 
auditors. A Big-4 firm is coded as 1.  
2) The current year’s reported audit fees as a proportion of the total 
assets below the median of the proportion of the current year’s 
audit fees to total assets for the industry grouping are coded as 1 
and the rest as zero.  
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3) Audit committees that comply with all six listed characteristics are 
considered effective audit committees (coded as 1). The audit committee 
characteristics are: 
CV4 = QAS – continued 
The audit committee characteristics are: 
 the audit committee consists of at least 3 members, 
 all the members are listed as independent directors, 
 at least one member has financial expertise, 
 not chaired by the chairperson of the board, 
 the audit committee meets at least 4 times a year, and  
 all the members attended all the meetings. 
CV5 = IND 
is a dichotomous variable where the primary sectors, such as mining 
(basic materials), oil and gas, technology and industrial sectors 
(industrials) with few customers are coded as 0. The customer-centred 
sectors, such as consumer goods and services, health care, finance 
(financials) and telecommunication sectors with large customer bases 
are coded as 1. As all industries need to comply with legislative 
requirements, their control mechanisms are selected to maximise the 
performance of the company in the industries, and no relationship 
between industries and firm value is expected. 
CV6 = CCI  
represents the sum of the six company control variables plus two board 
variables as the shareholders appoint the board, expressed as a 
percentage. The CCI is calculated by coding companies as 1 for results 
equal to or above the median and zero for those below the median, 
calculated as a percentage. The median is calculated using the following 
industry classification applicable to this study: 
 risk as proxied by leverage (the assets-to-liabilities ratio = (([Long Term 
Liabilities]+([Current Liabilities])/([Total Assets])),  
 growth as proxied by the market-to-book value ratio,  
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 performance as proxied by the average return on assets for the preceding 
two years, 
 company size as proxied by total assets in millions, 
CV6 = CCI - continued 
 board size (the number of people on the board) and 
 board independence (the number of independent directors divided by the 
total number of people on the board) as a percentage. 
 
Control variable histograms with normal distribution curves for 2012 to 
2014 
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Appendix 5: CI index 
 
The CI index are visually summarised in the mindmap below, followed by the 
indicator definitions and histograms with normal distribution curves to show the 
midpoint and distribution of the CI index per year. 
 
 
 
The following definitions describe the existence of a control indicator scored as 
“1”, the absence of a control indicator was scored as “0”. The CI index score is 
calculated by adding the total of all the indicators and calculating the total as a 
percentage to measure corporate control. 
CI1 = Separation between the roles of the CEO and chair. 
CI2 = The existence of an independent chair or lead independent director.  
CI3 = A balance of power requiring a balance between the power of the 
executive directors and a majority of the board as independent directors. 
CI4 = Separation of duties between the roles of the CEO and the CFO. 
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CI5 = Diverse knowledge and skills, requiring the board to have a variety 
of qualifications and skills, with at least one director for three different 
areas of expertise.  
CI6 = A variety of experience on the board where age is a proxy for 
experience, indicating an age gap of 25 years or more between the 
youngest and oldest director on the board. 
CI7 = A diverse board is a board that represent a mix between gender and 
race/ethnicity. A mix between gender and race requires at least two 
people from a different gender as well as at least two people from a 
different race to be members of the board.  
CI8 = CEO tenure equal to or above the median CEO tenure for the 
industry grouping. 
CI9 = Average executive director tenure equal to or above the median 
executive director tenure for the industry grouping. 
CI10 = Companies without an executive director who holds an outside 
directorship that could erode the director’s diligence. 
CI11 = Companies without a majority of busy independent directors. 
Where a busy independent director holds three or more other 
directorships (outside the group), and a busy board has a majority of busy 
independent directors. 
CI12 = Companies without an independent director who has served on 
the board for more than nine years.  
CI13 = Companies without an independent director who describes his or 
her position as a “Director of Companies” but does not disclose the 
number of outside companies he/she serves on as a director. 
CI14 = Companies where the number of board meetings are equal to or 
exceed the median of the industry grouping, thereby showing diligent 
board monitoring. 
CI15 = Companies where the sum of all the board committee meetings 
are equal to or above the median of the industry grouping, thereby 
showing diligent board committee monitoring. 
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CI16 = Nomination committee staffed by a majority of independent 
directors. 
CI17 = Nomination committee chaired by an independent director. 
CI18 = Remuneration committee staffed by a majority of independent 
directors. 
CI19 = Remuneration committee chaired by an independent director who 
is not the chairman of the board. 
CI20 = One of the members of the remuneration committee is also a 
member of the audit committee (to allow the remuneration committee 
insight into the actual reported performance of the company in their 
assessment of the fairness of executive director remuneration). 
CI21 = S&E committee staffed by a majority of independent directors. 
CI22 = S&E committee chaired by an independent director. 
CI23 = Risk committee staffed by a mix of executive and non-executive 
directors with a majority of independent directors. 
CI24 = Risk committee chaired by an independent director who is not the 
chairman of the board. 
CI25 = Risk committee separate from the audit committee. 
 
CI index histograms with normal distribution curves for 2012 to 2014 
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Appendix 6: MLI index 
 
The MLI index are visually summarised in the mindmap below, followed by the 
indicator definitions and histograms with normal distribution curves to show the 
midpoint and distribution of the MLI index per year. 
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The following definitions describe the existance of a control indicator scored as 
“1”, the absence of a control indicator was scored as “0”. The MLI index score is 
calculated by adding the total of all the indicators and calculating thwe total as a 
percentage to measure corporate control. 
 
MLI1 = Ethical leadership as represented by an ELDS score that is equal 
to or above the median ELDs score for the industry grouping.  
MLI2 = Executive experience is represented by multiplying the age and 
tenure of executive directors and averaging the result per company to 
obtain an average executive expertise score. Companies with high 
average executive expertise are companies with an average expertise 
score equal to or above the median for the industry group. 
MLI3 = CEO expertise is represented by multiplying the age and tenure 
of the CEO to obtain a CEO expertise score. Companies with high CEO 
expertise are companies where the CEO expertise score is equal to or 
above the median for the industry group. 
MLI4 = Companies without a change in the incumbents of executive 
director’s posts during the year have a more stable and controlled labour 
direction.  
MLI5 = Companies where the average non-executive directors’ age is 
equal to or above the median of the average non-executive directors’ age 
for the industry group. 
MLI6 = Companies where the age of the chair is equal to or above the 
median for the industry group. 
MLI7 = The existence of an annual performance evaluation for the board 
and its members.  
MLI8 = The existence of an annual performance evaluation for the risk, 
nomination, remuneration and social and ethics committee (board 
committees).  
MLI9 = Companies where the average attendance of board meetings is 
equal to or above the median for the industry group.  
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MLI10 = Companies where the average attendance of the risk committee 
meetings is equal to or above the median for the industry group. 
MLI11 = Companies where the average attendance of the nomination 
committee meetings is equal to or above the median for the industry 
group. 
MLI12 = Companies where the average attendance of the remuneration 
committee meetings is equal to or above the median for the industry 
group. 
MLI13 = Companies where the average attendance of the social and 
ethics committee meetings is equal to or above the median for the 
industry group. 
MLI14 = Companies that apply different remuneration practices in line 
with King III for executive versus non-executive directors in line with 
their different roles.  
MLI15 = Companies where the remuneration of executive directors 
consists of a fixed and variable component that includes short-, medium- 
and long-term incentive considerations. 
MLI16 = Non-executive directors do not receive a performance-based 
incentive.  
MLI17 = Companies with an average total remuneration paid to non-
executive directors (in Rand) that is equal to or above the median for the 
industry group. 
MLI18 = Companies where the total remuneration paid to the chairman 
of the board (in Rand) is equal to or above the median for the industry 
group. 
MLI19 = Companies where the average total (gross) remuneration
125 paid 
to executive directors (in Rand) is equal to or above the median for the 
industry group.  
MLI20 = Companies where the total remuneration paid to the CEO (in 
Rand). is equal to or above the median for the industry group.  
                                                 
125 Total remuneration consists of base pay that includes benefit contributions, bonuses received, 
and share options exercised. 
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MLI21 = Companies where the average percentage total pay as a 
percentage of the average base pay for executive directors is equal to or 
above the median for the industry group. 
MLI22 = The existence of a share-based incentive for executive directors. 
MLI23 = The existence of remuneration for executive directors that is 
conditionally delayed for more than two years.  
 
MLI index histograms with normal distribution curves for 2012 to 2014 
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Appendix 7 Cross-sectional multiple regression analysis  
 
Return on assets 
Year R R 
Squared 
Adjusted R 
Squared 
Std Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Squared 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
2012 .371 0.138 0.046 12.953671 0.138 1.497 8 75 0.173 
2013 .505 0.255 0.175 13.958902 0.255 3.203 8 75 0.004 
2014 .469 0.220 0.137 9.662372 0.220 2.642 8 75 0.013 
 
Return on assets Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
2012 (Constant) 2.114 10.514   0.201 0.841     
Percentage shares 
held by 
blockholders 
0.093 0.126 0.091 0.738 0.463 0.765 1.307 
Controlling 
shareholder 
0.306 3.603 0.011 0.085 0.932 0.681 1.469 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-0.090 0.160 -0.061 -0.564 0.575 0.970 1.031 
Quality audit score -0.042 0.069 -0.071 -0.610 0.544 0.857 1.167 
Industry 2.589 3.079 0.098 0.841 0.403 0.843 1.186 
Company level 
controls 
0.199 0.076 0.333 2.601 0.011 0.700 1.428 
Control index 0.037 0.114 0.040 0.323 0.748 0.737 1.357 
Managerial labour 
index 
-0.071 0.106 -0.078 -0.676 0.501 0.861 1.162 
2013 (Constant) -8.152 13.934   -0.585 0.560     
Percentage shares 
held by 
blockholders 
0.179 0.141 0.142 1.275 0.206 0.804 1.244 
Controlling 
shareholder 
2.958 3.977 0.091 0.744 0.459 0.660 1.515 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-0.234 0.175 -0.136 -1.340 0.184 0.965 1.036 
Quality audit score -0.196 0.075 -0.284 -2.627 0.010 0.850 1.177 
Industry 5.102 3.215 0.167 1.587 0.117 0.898 1.113 
Company level 
controls 
0.243 0.080 0.340 3.035 0.003 0.791 1.264 
Control index 0.071 0.122 0.066 0.580 0.563 0.764 1.310 
Managerial labour 
index 
0.077 0.137 0.063 0.562 0.576 0.803 1.246 
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2014 (Constant) 10.215 9.716   1.051 0.296     
Percentage shares 
held by 
blockholders 
-0.063 0.093 -0.076 -0.683 0.497 0.848 1.179 
Controlling 
shareholder 
-1.304 2.521 -0.059 -0.517 0.606 0.787 1.270 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-0.118 0.107 -0.113 -1.098 0.276 0.977 1.023 
Quality audit score -0.115 0.049 -0.246 -2.364 0.021 0.956 1.045 
Industry 3.784 2.251 0.183 1.681 0.097 0.878 1.139 
Company level 
controls 
0.159 0.055 0.334 2.869 0.005 0.768 1.302 
Control index -0.041 0.089 -0.055 -0.454 0.651 0.719 1.391 
Managerial labour 
index 
0.004 0.092 0.005 0.043 0.966 0.879 1.138 
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Next year’s Return on assets 
Year R R 
Squared 
Adjusted R 
Squared 
Std Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Squared 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
2012 .531 0.282 0.205 13.70323 0.282 3.676 8 75 0.001 
2013 .501 0.251 0.171 9.46683 0.251 3.144 8 75 0.004 
2014 .577 0.333 0.262 11.94622 0.333 4.691 8 75 0.000 
 
Next year’s Return on 
assets 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
2012 (Constant) 2.345 11.122   0.211 0.834     
Percentage shares 
held by 
blockholders 
0.168 0.134 0.141 1.257 0.213 0.765 1.307 
Controlling 
shareholder 
-1.615 3.811 -0.050 -0.424 0.673 0.681 1.469 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-0.236 0.170 -0.138 -1.393 0.168 0.970 1.031 
Quality audit 
score 
-0.121 0.073 -0.176 -1.662 0.101 0.857 1.167 
Industry 5.816 3.258 0.190 1.785 0.078 0.843 1.186 
Company level 
controls 
0.241 0.081 0.349 2.983 0.004 0.700 1.428 
Control index 0.123 0.120 0.116 1.019 0.311 0.737 1.357 
Managerial labour 
index 
-0.179 0.112 -0.169 -1.604 0.113 0.861 1.162 
2013 (Constant) 16.561 9.450   1.753 0.084     
Percentage shares 
held by 
blockholders 
-0.027 0.095 -0.031 -0.281 0.780 0.804 1.244 
Controlling 
shareholder 
-0.912 2.697 -0.042 -0.338 0.736 0.660 1.515 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-0.115 0.119 -0.098 -0.966 0.337 0.965 1.036 
Quality audit 
score 
-0.117 0.051 -0.250 -2.308 0.024 0.850 1.177 
Industry 3.388 2.180 0.164 1.554 0.124 0.898 1.113 
Company level 
controls 
0.172 0.054 0.355 3.161 0.002 0.791 1.264 
Control index -0.030 0.083 -0.041 -0.358 0.721 0.764 1.310 
Managerial labour 
index 
-0.122 0.093 -0.147 -1.315 0.192 0.803 1.246 
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2014 (Constant) 8.618 12.012   0.717 0.475     
Percentage shares 
held by 
blockholders 
-0.193 0.115 -0.172 -1.682 0.097 0.848 1.179 
Controlling 
shareholder 
-2.658 3.117 -0.091 -0.853 0.396 0.787 1.270 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-0.076 0.133 -0.055 -0.574 0.568 0.977 1.023 
Quality audit 
score 
-0.198 0.060 -0.316 -3.281 0.002 0.956 1.045 
Industry 8.007 2.783 0.289 2.877 0.005 0.878 1.139 
Company level 
controls 
0.205 0.068 0.322 2.995 0.004 0.768 1.302 
Control index -0.035 0.110 -0.036 -0.322 0.749 0.719 1.391 
Managerial labour 
index 
0.012 0.114 0.010 0.102 0.919 0.879 1.138 
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Return on Equity 
Year R R 
Squared 
Adjusted R 
Squared 
Std Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Squared 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
2012 .279 0.078 -0.020 53.216069 0.078 0.793 8 75 0.610 
2013 .282 0.080 -0.019 60.818640 0.080 0.810 8 75 0.596 
2014 .578 0.335 0.264 13.097709 0.335 4.715 8 75 0.000 
 
Return on Equity Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
2012 (Constant) 13.474 43.193   0.312 0.756     
Percentage shares 
held by 
blockholders 
0.375 0.519 0.092 0.724 0.472 0.765 1.307 
Controlling 
shareholder 
11.724 14.800 0.106 0.792 0.431 0.681 1.469 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
0.216 0.659 0.037 0.328 0.744 0.970 1.031 
Quality audit score 0.386 0.284 0.163 1.360 0.178 0.857 1.167 
Industry -10.570 12.650 -0.101 -0.836 0.406 0.843 1.186 
Company level 
controls 
0.198 0.314 0.084 0.631 0.530 0.700 1.428 
Control index -0.796 0.468 -0.220 -1.702 0.093 0.737 1.357 
Managerial labour 
index 
0.130 0.434 0.036 0.299 0.766 0.861 1.162 
2013 (Constant) -59.237 60.709   -0.976 0.332     
Percentage shares 
held by 
blockholders 
0.122 0.612 0.025 0.200 0.842 0.804 1.244 
Controlling 
shareholder 
20.722 17.326 0.163 1.196 0.235 0.660 1.515 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-0.306 0.762 -0.045 -0.401 0.690 0.965 1.036 
Quality audit score -0.666 0.326 -0.246 -2.045 0.044 0.850 1.177 
Industry 5.984 14.006 0.050 0.427 0.670 0.898 1.113 
Company level 
controls 
-0.094 0.349 -0.034 -0.269 0.788 0.791 1.264 
Control index 0.664 0.532 0.158 1.248 0.216 0.764 1.310 
Managerial labour 
index 
0.856 0.598 0.177 1.432 0.156 0.803 1.246 
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2014 (Constant) 15.081 13.170   1.145 0.256     
Percentage shares 
held by 
blockholders 
-0.044 0.126 -0.036 -0.350 0.727 0.848 1.179 
Controlling 
shareholder 
-1.496 3.417 -0.046 -0.438 0.663 0.787 1.270 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-0.119 0.145 -0.078 -0.822 0.414 0.977 1.023 
Quality audit score -0.075 0.066 -0.109 -1.133 0.261 0.956 1.045 
Industry 11.220 3.051 0.370 3.677 0.000 0.878 1.139 
Company level 
controls 
0.294 0.075 0.422 3.924 0.000 0.768 1.302 
Control index -0.159 0.121 -0.146 -1.310 0.194 0.719 1.391 
Managerial labour 
index 
-0.044 0.125 -0.035 -0.348 0.729 0.879 1.138 
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Next year’s Return on Equity 
Year R R 
Squared 
Adjusted R 
Squared 
Std Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Squared 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
2012 .241 0.058 -0.043 61.52838 0.058 0.576 8 75 0.794 
2013 .588 0.345 0.276 12.99073 0.345 4.949 8 75 0.000 
2014 .658 0.432 0.372 17.19225 0.432 7.141 8 75 0.000 
 
Next year’s Return on 
Equity 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
2012 (Constant) -24.771 49.940   -0.496 0.621     
Percentage shares 
held by 
blockholders 
0.152 0.600 0.032 0.254 0.801 0.765 1.307 
Controlling 
shareholder 
17.574 17.112 0.139 1.027 0.308 0.681 1.469 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-0.237 0.762 -0.035 -0.311 0.757 0.970 1.031 
Quality audit 
score 
-0.622 0.328 -0.229 -1.895 0.062 0.857 1.167 
Industry 4.083 14.626 0.034 0.279 0.781 0.843 1.186 
Company level 
controls 
0.053 0.363 0.020 0.147 0.883 0.700 1.428 
Control index 0.231 0.541 0.056 0.426 0.671 0.737 1.357 
Managerial 
labour index 
0.587 0.502 0.141 1.169 0.246 0.861 1.162 
2013 (Constant) 21.247 12.967   1.638 0.106     
Percentage shares 
held by 
blockholders 
0.033 0.131 0.026 0.249 0.804 0.804 1.244 
Controlling 
shareholder 
-1.469 3.701 -0.046 -0.397 0.693 0.660 1.515 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-0.135 0.163 -0.079 -0.828 0.410 0.965 1.036 
Quality audit 
score 
-0.087 0.070 -0.127 -1.254 0.214 0.850 1.177 
Industry 10.688 2.992 0.352 3.573 0.001 0.898 1.113 
Company level 
controls 
0.292 0.075 0.411 3.912 0.000 0.791 1.264 
Control index -0.128 0.114 -0.120 -1.123 0.265 0.764 1.310 
Managerial 
labour index 
-0.176 0.128 -0.143 -1.376 0.173 0.803 1.246 
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2014 (Constant) 8.984 17.287   0.520 0.605     
Percentage shares 
held by 
blockholders 
-0.238 0.165 -0.136 -1.440 0.154 0.848 1.179 
Controlling 
shareholder 
-2.102 4.485 -0.046 -0.469 0.641 0.787 1.270 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-0.122 0.191 -0.056 -0.640 0.524 0.977 1.023 
Quality audit 
score 
-0.180 0.087 -0.185 -2.075 0.041 0.956 1.045 
Industry 19.556 4.005 0.453 4.883 0.000 0.878 1.139 
Company level 
controls 
0.400 0.098 0.403 4.062 0.000 0.768 1.302 
Control index -0.206 0.159 -0.133 -1.297 0.199 0.719 1.391 
Managerial 
labour index 
0.002 0.164 0.001 0.015 0.988 0.879 1.138 
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EV 
Year R R 
Squared 
Adjusted R 
Squared 
Std Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Squared 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
2012 .536 0.287 0.211 215.583044 0.287 3.773 8 75 0.001 
2013 .466 0.217 0.133 238.286654 0.217 2.597 8 75 0.015 
2014 .532 0.283 0.206 251.755779 0.283 3.695 8 75 0.001 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
2012 (Constant) -364.777 174.979   -2.085 0.041     
Percentage 
shares held by 
blockholders 
-1.518 2.101 -0.081 -0.722 0.472 0.765 1.307 
Controlling 
shareholder 
56.719 59.957 0.112 0.946 0.347 0.681 1.469 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-3.441 2.670 -0.128 -1.289 0.201 0.970 1.031 
Quality audit 
score 
2.983 1.150 0.273 2.594 0.011 0.857 1.167 
Industry 89.156 51.248 0.185 1.740 0.086 0.843 1.186 
Company level 
controls 
2.155 1.271 0.198 1.696 0.094 0.700 1.428 
Control index -0.266 1.896 -0.016 -0.141 0.889 0.737 1.357 
Managerial 
labour index 
4.475 1.760 0.267 2.543 0.013 0.861 1.162 
2013 (Constant) -273.946 237.858   -1.152 0.253     
Percentage 
shares held by 
blockholders 
-3.030 2.399 -0.144 -1.263 0.210 0.804 1.244 
Controlling 
shareholder 
43.130 67.885 0.080 0.635 0.527 0.660 1.515 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-3.553 2.986 -0.124 -1.190 0.238 0.965 1.036 
Quality audit 
score 
1.907 1.276 0.166 1.495 0.139 0.850 1.177 
Industry 128.552 54.875 0.253 2.343 0.022 0.898 1.113 
Company level 
controls 
2.702 1.368 0.227 1.975 0.052 0.791 1.264 
Control index -0.609 2.086 -0.034 -0.292 0.771 0.764 1.310 
Managerial 
labour index 
4.078 2.344 0.198 1.740 0.086 0.803 1.246 
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2014 (Constant) -497.242 253.148   -1.964 0.053     
Percentage 
shares held by 
blockholders 
-2.290 2.418 -0.101 -0.947 0.347 0.848 1.179 
Controlling 
shareholder 
52.765 65.678 0.089 0.803 0.424 0.787 1.270 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-3.095 2.794 -0.110 -1.108 0.271 0.977 1.023 
Quality audit 
score 
4.017 1.273 0.316 3.156 0.002 0.956 1.045 
Industry 164.287 58.651 0.292 2.801 0.006 0.878 1.139 
Company level 
controls 
3.457 1.442 0.268 2.397 0.019 0.768 1.302 
Control index -0.466 2.326 -0.023 -0.200 0.842 0.719 1.391 
Managerial 
labour index 
4.682 2.407 0.203 1.945 0.055 0.879 1.138 
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Next Year’s Enterprise value per share 
Year R R 
Squared 
Adjusted R 
Squared 
Std Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Squared 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
2012 .527 0.278 0.201 228.80500 0.278 3.610 8 75 0.001 
2013 .472 0.223 0.140 262.05147 0.223 2.688 8 75 0.012 
2014 .542 0.293 0.218 272.62907 0.293 3.890 8 75 0.001 
 
Next Year’s Enterprise value 
per share 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
2012 (Constant) -359.523 185.710   -1.936 0.057     
Percentage shares 
held by blockholders 
-1.732 2.230 -0.087 -0.777 0.440 0.765 1.307 
Controlling 
shareholder 
37.354 63.634 0.070 0.587 0.559 0.681 1.469 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-3.458 2.834 -0.122 -1.220 0.226 0.970 1.031 
Quality audit score 2.899 1.221 0.252 2.375 0.020 0.857 1.167 
Industry 104.965 54.391 0.206 1.930 0.057 0.843 1.186 
Company level 
controls 
2.173 1.349 0.189 1.611 0.111 0.700 1.428 
Control index -0.595 2.012 -0.034 -0.296 0.768 0.737 1.357 
Managerial labour 
index 
4.977 1.868 0.282 2.665 0.009 0.861 1.162 
2013 (Constant) -316.108 261.580   -1.208 0.231     
Percentage shares 
held by blockholders 
-3.738 2.639 -0.161 -1.417 0.161 0.804 1.244 
Controlling 
shareholder 
19.465 74.655 0.033 0.261 0.795 0.660 1.515 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-3.605 3.283 -0.114 -1.098 0.276 0.965 1.036 
Quality audit score 2.108 1.403 0.166 1.503 0.137 0.850 1.177 
Industry 157.122 60.348 0.280 2.604 0.011 0.898 1.113 
Company level 
controls 
2.789 1.505 0.212 1.853 0.068 0.791 1.264 
Control index -0.443 2.294 -0.022 -0.193 0.848 0.764 1.310 
Managerial labour 
index 
4.779 2.578 0.211 1.854 0.068 0.803 1.246 
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2014 (Constant) -499.910 274.137   -1.824 0.072     
Percentage shares 
held by blockholders 
-2.308 2.618 -0.093 -0.882 0.381 0.848 1.179 
Controlling 
shareholder 
59.191 71.123 0.091 0.832 0.408 0.787 1.270 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-3.841 3.025 -0.125 -1.269 0.208 0.977 1.023 
Quality audit score 3.570 1.378 0.257 2.591 0.012 0.956 1.045 
Industry 218.450 63.514 0.356 3.439 0.001 0.878 1.139 
Company level 
controls 
3.877 1.562 0.275 2.483 0.015 0.768 1.302 
Control index -1.214 2.519 -0.055 -0.482 0.631 0.719 1.391 
Managerial labour 
index 
5.173 2.606 0.206 1.985 0.051 0.879 1.138 
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Tobin’s Q 
Year R R 
Squared 
Adjusted R 
Squared 
Std Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Squared 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
2012 .493 0.243 0.162 1.229780 0.243 3.008 8 75 0.006 
2013 .541 0.293 0.217 1.203171 0.293 3.883 8 75 0.001 
2014 .515 0.265 0.187 1.088443 0.265 3.386 8 75 0.002 
 
Tobin’s Q Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
2012 (Constant) 0.644 0.998   0.645 0.521     
Percentage shares 
held by 
blockholders 
0.019 0.012 0.178 1.546 0.126 0.765 1.307 
Controlling 
shareholder 
0.144 0.342 0.051 0.421 0.675 0.681 1.469 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-0.010 0.015 -0.068 -0.665 0.508 0.970 1.031 
Quality audit 
score 
-0.010 0.007 -0.167 -1.538 0.128 0.857 1.167 
Industry 0.748 0.292 0.280 2.560 0.012 0.843 1.186 
Company level 
controls 
0.020 0.007 0.325 2.706 0.008 0.700 1.428 
Control index -0.004 0.011 -0.045 -0.381 0.705 0.737 1.357 
Managerial labour 
index 
-0.001 0.010 -0.011 -0.100 0.921 0.861 1.162 
2013 (Constant) 1.098 1.201   0.914 0.363     
Percentage shares 
held by 
blockholders 
0.018 0.012 0.161 1.484 0.142 0.804 1.244 
Controlling 
shareholder 
0.323 0.343 0.113 0.941 0.350 0.660 1.515 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-0.009 0.015 -0.056 -0.571 0.569 0.965 1.036 
Quality audit 
score 
-0.014 0.006 -0.236 -2.244 0.028 0.850 1.177 
Industry 0.791 0.277 0.292 2.853 0.006 0.898 1.113 
Company level 
controls 
0.022 0.007 0.344 3.148 0.002 0.791 1.264 
Control index -0.010 0.011 -0.108 -0.970 0.335 0.764 1.310 
Managerial labour 
index 
-0.001 0.012 -0.009 -0.087 0.931 0.803 1.246 
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2014 (Constant) 0.793 1.094   0.725 0.471     
Percentage shares 
held by 
blockholders 
0.003 0.010 0.031 0.289 0.774 0.848 1.179 
Controlling 
shareholder 
0.046 0.284 0.018 0.163 0.871 0.787 1.270 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-0.007 0.012 -0.061 -0.612 0.542 0.977 1.023 
Quality audit 
score 
-0.010 0.006 -0.175 -1.729 0.088 0.956 1.045 
Industry 0.820 0.254 0.342 3.235 0.002 0.878 1.139 
Company level 
controls 
0.017 0.006 0.308 2.729 0.008 0.768 1.302 
Control index -0.009 0.010 -0.100 -0.859 0.393 0.719 1.391 
Managerial labour 
index 
0.006 0.010 0.062 0.591 0.557 0.879 1.138 
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Next year’s Tobin’s Q 
Year R R 
Squared 
Adjusted R 
Squared 
Std Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Squared 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
2012 .520 0.270 0.192 1.22226 0.270 3.472 8 75 0.002 
2013 .519 0.270 0.192 1.08522 0.270 3.462 8 75 0.002 
2014 .552 0.305 0.231 1.19996 0.305 4.114 8 75 0.000 
 
Next year’s Tobin’s Q Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
2012 (Constant) 0.554 0.992   0.558 0.579     
Percentage shares 
held by 
blockholders 
0.017 0.012 0.164 1.454 0.150 0.765 1.307 
Controlling 
shareholder 
0.180 0.340 0.063 0.530 0.598 0.681 1.469 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-0.008 0.015 -0.053 -0.529 0.599 0.970 1.031 
Quality audit 
score 
-0.015 0.007 -0.246 -2.313 0.023 0.857 1.167 
Industry 0.840 0.291 0.310 2.889 0.005 0.843 1.186 
Company level 
controls 
0.017 0.007 0.279 2.371 0.020 0.700 1.428 
Control index -0.002 0.011 -0.020 -0.172 0.864 0.737 1.357 
Managerial labour 
index 
0.003 0.010 0.035 0.333 0.740 0.861 1.162 
2013 (Constant) 1.126 1.083   1.039 0.302     
Percentage shares 
held by 
blockholders 
0.007 0.011 0.068 0.622 0.536 0.804 1.244 
Controlling 
shareholder 
0.124 0.309 0.049 0.400 0.690 0.660 1.515 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-0.006 0.014 -0.045 -0.449 0.655 0.965 1.036 
Quality audit 
score 
-0.010 0.006 -0.191 -1.787 0.078 0.850 1.177 
Industry 0.789 0.250 0.329 3.158 0.002 0.898 1.113 
Company level 
controls 
0.018 0.006 0.322 2.901 0.005 0.791 1.264 
Control index -0.007 0.009 -0.080 -0.710 0.480 0.764 1.310 
Managerial labour 
index 
-0.002 0.011 -0.022 -0.203 0.840 0.803 1.246 
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2014 (Constant) 0.281 1.207   0.233 0.817     
Percentage shares 
held by 
blockholders 
0.000 0.012 -0.001 -0.010 0.992 0.848 1.179 
Controlling 
shareholder 
-0.064 0.313 -0.022 -0.204 0.839 0.787 1.270 
Percentage 
directors' 
shareholding 
-0.003 0.013 -0.024 -0.250 0.804 0.977 1.023 
Quality audit 
score 
-0.010 0.006 -0.168 -1.707 0.092 0.956 1.045 
Industry 1.192 0.280 0.438 4.263 0.000 0.878 1.139 
Company level 
controls 
0.014 0.007 0.225 2.048 0.044 0.768 1.302 
Control index -0.004 0.011 -0.040 -0.354 0.724 0.719 1.391 
Managerial labour 
index 
0.010 0.011 0.087 0.850 0.398 0.879 1.138 
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Appendix 8 Leximancer content analysis terms 
This study uses Leximancer, an automated content analysis program, to analyse the 
annual integrated reports of the companies over the period of the study in order to 
develop an ethical leadership disclosure score (ELDS). To initiate the analysis the 
integrated reports of the sample companies for 2012 was entered into Leximancer 
and the resulting analysis were reviewed and updated to exclude terms normally 
associated with annual financial statements. The resulting reduced list or 24 terms 
include terms linked to the various stakeholders as well as ethical considerations 
that are part of the non-financial disclosure and were used to determine ELDS. 
Analysis term 2012 2013 2014 
 accountable 479 408 326 
 assurance 2151 3828 2511 
 audit 5312 7066 5680 
 code 914 1196 636 
 compliance 2987 4216 2990 
 customer 1904 2935 2215 
 dividends 3135 3783 2013 
 employees 6529 10461 7682 
 environmental 2791 4266 2775 
 ethics 2177 2102 1498 
 honest 80 149 388 
 integrity 955 1150 909 
 leadership 1278 1805 1496 
 moral 83 15 88 
 non-compliance 615 563 469 
 operations 8841 11712 8804 
 penalty 37 184 34 
 quality 1235 3124 1851 
 shareholders 8178 9711 8159 
 stakeholders 2584 3943 3177 
 succession 930 1550 1098 
 suppliers 1007 1750 1023 
 sustainable 1462 3549 2523 
 values 2097 4194 2642 
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Appendix 9 Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test 
 
The results of the various variations of the LM tests are summarised in the 
following tables linked to the various dependent variables. Although various tests 
were used, the study focused on the results of the Breusch-Pagan test as the more 
popular test. High chi scores recorded for the different tests with significant levels 
ranging from 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 as listed below indicate heteroskedasticity. As the 
random effects is significant for all the cross-sectional tests and not for the time 
series the study will focus on a one-way panel analysis 
 
LM tests for RoA 
Test name Cross-section Time series Both 
Breusch-Pagan 104.0848 1.304384 105.3892 
significance (0.0000) (0.2534) (0.0000) 
Honda 10.20220 -1.142096 6.406459 
significance (0.0000) (0.8733) (0.0000) 
King-Wu 10.20220 -1.142096 0.436366 
significance (0.0000) (0.8733) (0.3313) 
Standardised Honda 10.80896 -0.900503 0.620641 
significance (0.0000) (0.8161) (0.2674) 
Standardised King-Wu 10.80896 -0.900503 -1.850694 
significance (0.0000) (0.8161) (0.9679) 
Gourieroux, et al   104.0848 
significance   (0.0000) 
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LM tests for NYRoA 
Test name Cross-section Time series Both 
Breusch-Pagan 48.03004 0.169543 48.19958 
significance (0.0000) (0.6805) (0.0000) 
Honda 6.930371 0.411757 5.191668 
significance (0.0000) (0.3403) (0.0000) 
King-Wu 6.930371 0.411757 1.469954 
significance (0.0000) (0.3403) (0.0708) 
Standardised Honda 7.504331 0.959154 -0.746546 
significance (0.0000) (0.1687) (0.7723) 
Standardised King-Wu 7.504331 0.959154 -0.606153 
significance (0.0000) (0.1687) (0.7278) 
Gourieroux, et al -  48.19958 
significance - - (0.0000) 
 
 
LM tests for EV 
Test name Cross-section Time series Both 
Breusch-Pagan 204.4130 1.429245 205.8423 
significance (0.0000) (0.2319) (0.0000) 
Honda 14.29731 -1.195510 9.264370 
significance (0.0000) (0.8841) (0.0000) 
King-Wu 14.29731 -1.195510 1.011745 
significance (0.0000) (0.8841) (0.1558) 
Standardised Honda 14.94514 -0.964429 3.837078 
significance (0.0000) (0.8326) (0.0001) 
Standardised King-Wu 14.94514 -0.964429 -1.157881 
significance (0.0000) (0.8326) (0.8765) 
Gourieroux, et al   204.4130 
significance   (0.0000) 
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LM tests for NYEV 
Test name Cross-section Time series Both 
Breusch-Pagan 195.0660 1.450921 196.5169 
significance (0.0000) (0.2284) (0.0000) 
Honda 13.96660 -1.204542 9.024139 
significance (0.0000) (0.8858) (0.0000) 
King-Wu 13.96660 -1.204542 0.952093 
significance (0.0000) (0.8858) (0.1705) 
Standardised Honda 14.61111 -0.975238 3.566710 
significance (0.0000) (0.8353) (0.0002) 
Standardised King-Wu 14.61111 -0.975238 -1.229709 
significance (0.0000) (0.8353) (0.8906) 
Gourieroux, et al - - 195.0660 
significance - - (0.0000) 
 
 
LM tests for Q 
Test name Cross-section Time series Both 
Breusch-Pagan 199.6994 1.231315 200.9307 
significance (0.0000) (0.2672) (0.0000) 
Honda 14.13150 -1.109646 9.207844 
significance (0.0000) (0.8664) (0.0000) 
King-Wu 14.13150 -1.109646 1.071160 
significance (0.0000) (0.8664) (0.1420) 
Standardised Honda 14.77767 -0.861667 3.773461 
significance (0.0000) (0.8056) (0.0001) 
Standardised King-Wu 14.77767 -0.861667 -1.086340 
significance (0.0000) (0.8056) (0.8613) 
Gourieroux, et al   199.6994 
significance   (0.0000) 
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LM tests for NYQ 
Test name Cross-section Time series Both 
Breusch-Pagan 184.8329 1.043714 185.8766 
significance (0.0000) (0.3070) (0.0000) 
Honda 13.59533 -1.021623 8.890951 
significance (0.0000) (0.8465) (0.0000) 
King-Wu 13.59533 -1.021623 1.075895 
significance (0.0000) (0.8465) (0.1410) 
Standardised Honda 14.23612 -0.756320 3.416814 
significance (0.0000) (0.7753) (0.0003) 
Standardised King-Wu 14.23612 -0.756320 -1.080638 
significance (0.0000) (0.7753) (0.8601) 
Gourieroux, et al - - 184.8329 
significance - - (0.0000) 
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Appendix 10 Prior South African Research on Corporate 
Governance 
Author and year Focus of the study Key findings 
Reinecke (1996) Evaluated King I to establish 
whether the recommendations 
would lead to more effective 
corporate governance. 
Developed a variable combined 
assurance model to provide 
stakeholders with variable levels of 
assurance on all aspects of 
organisational performance. 
Malherbe and Segal 
(2001) 
The South African component of 
the research project on “Corporate 
Governance in Developing 
Economies and Emerging 
Economies”, initiated in 1999 by 
the OECD Development Centre. 
A description of corporate governance 
in the rapidly developing environment 
of the 1990s up to the turn of the 
century. 
Kakabadse and 
Korac-Kakabadse 
(2002) 
Evaluated South African 
governance using King II against 
international best practices. 
Recommended a balanced approach to 
prevent the civil disorder experienced 
by neighbouring countries with 
consideration of the European dual 
board system and its stakeholder 
focus. 
Rossouw et al. 
(2002) 
Overview of corporate 
governance in South Africa in 
which financial and ethical 
dimensions are considered. 
Highlighted the highly turbulent and 
fluid context in which corporate 
governance developed in South Africa 
as well as the need for continuous 
revision. 
Rossouw (2002) The relationship between 
corporate governance and ethics 
in a developing country was 
considered in King II.  
Business ethics is prominently dealt 
with in King II, which emphasises that 
corporate governance is always 
context-specific and that developing 
countries should not import models 
used by developed countries. 
Mongalo (2003) Historical discussion on company 
law and corporate governance as 
an emerging topic. 
The development of corporate 
governance in South Africa follows 
world trends and considers local 
conditions. 
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Author and year Focus of the study Key findings 
Millson and Ward 
(2005) 
Used 27 experts to investigate the 
relative importance of and 
preferences for various 
governance attributes in an 
agency relationship with private 
equity. 
Private equity has a pro-active agent-
principal relationship with active 
shareholders, focusing on the strength 
and experience of the management 
team, and transparency. The authors 
consider governance principles 
important but caution against tacit 
acceptance. 
Armstrong et al. 
(2005) 
Global best practice report. Discussion of corporate governance 
practices in South Africa as a pioneer 
in Africa. 
Vaughn and Ryan 
(2006) 
Considered the corporate 
governance initiatives in South 
Africa, given the country’s 
leadership role in Africa and its 
notable corporate governance 
reform. 
As the country rates among the best 
corporate governance performers in 
emerging markets, its ethical business 
focus should attract outside 
investment, encouraging other 
African countries to apply basic 
governance principles. 
West (2006) Used existing theory to analyse 
corporate governance in South 
Africa given the African value 
system. 
Identified incompatibilities between 
the existing corporate governance 
environment and African values given 
the communal focus on decision 
making through consensus with an 
emphasis on duties over rights. 
Abdo and Fisher 
(2007) 
Considered a link between good 
corporate governance and direct 
financial benefit to shareholders 
using a corporate governance 
index based on 29 disclosure 
factor scores on a scale of 0 to 2, 
considering King II over a three-
year period for 97 companies. 
Corporate governance was positively 
correlated with share price returns and 
it was found that investors place a 
premium on South African companies 
with good governance. 
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Author and year Focus of the study Key findings 
Esser and Dekker 
(2008) 
Illustrated the effect of B-BBEE 
on corporate governance from the 
perspective of the directors’ 
duties toward stakeholder 
protection. 
The change in regulation (with triple 
bottom line reporting) and legislation 
such as the B-BBEE aimed to 
encourage societal transformation and 
enterprise sustainability, with the 
result that boards faced a more 
complex and challenging 
environment. 
Mangena and 
Chamisa (2008) 
Examined the link between 
corporate governance and listing 
suspension from the JSE using a 
matched pair design. 
There was a positive association 
between suspension and non-
institutional investors, but no 
association with institutional 
investors, or board size, role duality, 
directors' share ownership, auditor 
quality and return on assets. 
Moloi (2008) Content analysis of corporate 
governance disclosure by the Top 
40 South African companies 
using King II and the Corporate 
Laws Amendment Act. 
Most of the companies adhere to good 
corporate governance disclosure 
practices. 
Botha (2009) Investigated corporate 
governance principles in South 
Africa and the role and duties of 
directors. 
Directors’ duties are enhanced and 
legislated, adding standards of 
conduct to regulate accountability. 
Ntim (2009) Explored the relationship between 
internal corporate governance 
structures and the financial 
performance of firms. 
The compliance-index model suggests 
a statistically significant positive 
association between quality corporate 
governance structures and firm 
performance. 
Opperman (2009) Investigated the relationship 
between corporate governance 
(using the same g-score as Abdo 
and Fisher on 20 companies) and 
cost of capital. 
Found no evidence of a relationship 
between corporate governance and the 
cost of capital but found that corporate 
governance should be advocated from 
a values perspective. 
Serretta, Bendixen 
and Sutherland 
(2009) 
Used a Delphi technique to 
identify corporate dilemmas 
facing boards. 
Identified six core dilemmas that 
require the management of contrasting 
views. 
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Barac and Moloi 
(2010) 
Assessed the 2006 reports of the 
Top 40 companies for compliance 
in respect of corporate 
governance information. 
In general, good disclosure practices 
were applied except for non-
disclosure on the selection of 
auditors and whistle-blowing. 
Carciumaru (2010) Assessed the potential impacts of 
corporate governance codes and 
legislation on directors’ and 
officers’ liability insurance using 
the Delphi technique and 
interviews. 
Director liability and claims against 
directors have been increasing 
because of doctrinal and complexity 
issues. 
Moyo (2010) Considered the South African 
governance and legal framework 
that regulates directors’ powers 
and remuneration. 
Highlighted restraints on directors’ 
powers and the move to curb 
excessive directors’ remuneration. 
Andreasson (2011b) Investigated South African 
corporate governance reform 
considering the Anglo-American 
links. 
Contrasted the shareholder and 
stakeholder models and the 
emergence of an African model. 
Ntim, Opong, 
Danbolt and Thomas 
(2012) 
Investigated voluntary 
compliance with and the 
disclosure of good governance 
practices in South African 
companies. 
Found a substantial variance in 
compliance among companies with 
an improvement over time. 
Mans-Kemp (2014) Investigated the relationship 
between corporate governance 
and the financial performance of 
selected JSE industries for the 
period 2002-2010. 
A positive association was noted 
between earnings per share and 
corporate governance scores but 
there was a negative association 
between total shareholder return and 
corporate governance scores while 
positive risk-adjusted abnormal 
returns were reported for the 
portfolio consisting of the firms with 
the highest corporate governance 
scores over the entire study period. 
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Arries (2014) Analysed and compared the 
specific governance elements in 
SOEs in two government 
departments using twenty linked 
state-owned entities for the period 
2012/2013. 
The governance elements of 
independence, ethnic diversity, 
average age and board meeting 
attendance appear to be comparable 
in the two departments. The CEO 
positions are still male-dominated, 
with a strong correlation between 
CEO remuneration and chairperson 
fee and total assets. 
Ashwin (2015) Explored the relationship between 
corporate governance and 
company performance in South 
Africa using panel data for thirty 
companies to construct a 
governance index using 10 
variables. 
Found a positive relationship 
between the developed index and 
Tobin’s Q and no relationship with 
RoA. 
Mans-Kemp and 
Viviers (2015b) 
Used the outcome dividend model 
to determine whether companies 
with good governance pay higher 
dividends. 
Over time the corporate governance 
score and dividend pay-outs 
improved with board composition 
and board committees being most 
highly correlated.  
Goodchild (2016) The principles of good 
governance as prescribed by the 
King reports were used as the 
main source in the empirical 
study, the aim of which was to 
analyse the extent to which 
corporate governance guidelines 
are implemented by a selected 
sample of congregations. 
Interviewees raised lack of 
knowledge of the King reports and 
lack of resources as key limitations 
in the implementation of good 
governance practices. 
Mans-Kemp et al. 
(2016) 
Investigated the corporate 
governance practices under King 
II of 230 companies on the JSE 
between 2002 and 2010. 
Corporate governance disclosure 
increased over time. However, the 
practice of corporate governance 
principles needs to be improved – 
indicating a need for training on 
corporate governance principles. 
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Tshipa (2017) Understanding the relationship 
between internal corporate 
governance and firm performance 
for three different economic 
periods. 
Corporate governance structures 
differed in non-crises and crises with 
different performance levels across 
industries and periods. 
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Appendix 11 Histogram of the residuals  
 
Pooled OLS analysis 
None of the residual graphs for the Pooled OLS estimation have normal 
distributions 
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Fixed Effects (Test 3) 
None of the residual graphs for Test 3 have normal distributions, however, the test 
used FGLS with weights for the cross-sections and the White period as the 
coefficient covariance method to enable EViews to compute standard errors that are 
robust for serial correlation. 
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